ROYAL
HISTORICAL
SOCIETY

63 Periodicals
Royal

23 JUL

TRANSACTIONS OF THE
ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

FIFTH SERIES
VOLUME 4

LONDON
OFFICES OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY
96 CHEYNE WALK, S.W.10
1954

SHL
WITHDRAWN
BIBL.
UNIV.

Made and Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Frankish Colonization: a New Approach. By Professor CHARLES VERLINDEN	1
War and Finance in the Anglo-Norman State. By J. O. PRESTWICH, M.A.	19
The Formation of the Coalition Cabinet of 1852. By C. H. STUART, M.A.	45
Bristol—Metropolis of the West in the Eighteenth Century. (*The Alexander Prize Essay.*) By W. E. MINCHINTON, B.Sc.(Econ.)	69
The Divisions of the Spoils of War in Fourteenth-Century England. By DENYS HAY, M.A., F.R.Hist.S.	91
Louis XIV and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession. By Professor M. A. THOMSON, D.Phil., F.R.Hist.S.	111
Presidential Address: Thomas Jefferson in American Historiography. By Professor H. HALE BELLOT, M.A., F.R.Hist.S.	135
Report of Council, Session 1952–53	157
Alexander Prize	165
David Berry Prize	167
Officers and Council, 1953	168
List of Fellows	171
List of Publications	207

TRANSACTIONS OF THE
ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

FRANKISH COLONIZATION: A NEW APPROACH

By Professor Charles Verlinden

READ 10 JANUARY 1953

THE Franks were the most successful of the Germanic invaders of the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries of our era, and the problem of the nature and date of their settlement, bound up as it is with that of the origins of the linguistic frontier in Belgium, is one of the most complex of early medieval history. It is also one of the most interesting, for whatever solution we find for it must influence our interpretation of the historical evolution which gave rise to the Frankish monarchy on the one hand and to the modern Belgian state on the other. It involves a multitude of interrelated questions: the origins of the population, language and customary law of the Germanic (Flemish) part of Belgium; the alignment of the linguistic frontier between Flemish, Walloon and German; the extent of Germanic colonization in the former Latin-speaking regions of northern Gaul; and the agrarian organization and the forms of land settlement in the same region.

It is not surprising that the literature on the subject is already considerable. This literature is not purely historical, for the question is one with which archeologists, students of dialects and place-names, historical geographers, experts in the history of law, even students of folklore, are all concerned and have their contributions to offer. The varied nature of the evidence makes a strictly methodical approach to the question doubly necessary, and from this point of view it is imperative to insist upon proper attention to chronology. The need for this will become the more apparent when we come to examine the copious literature which has seen the light in the past few years.

When Des Marez published his brilliant but misleading book, *Le problème de la colonisation franque*, in 1926, he expressed the opinion that the written texts had already yielded up all their secrets and that it was necessary to look elsewhere for further evidence. From the point of view of method, this assertion had important repercussions. Des Marez gave new life to the problem of Frankish colonization through the employment of what one may term a method of encirclement and concentration, appealing to a varied selection of specialists and approaching the subject from the point of view of their various disciplines. This, at least, was what he and his followers believed they were doing. Searchlights of varying degrees of intensity were directed from various points along the scientific horizon towards the same object. Unfortunately some of the searchlights were often more blinding than they were revealing, and it was not always clear that the objects which they were illuminating were in fact the same.

This situation was in no way altered by the publication of the very controversial book of Franz Petri, *Germanisches Volkserbe in Wallonien und Nordfrankreich. Die fränkische Landnahme in Frankreich und den Niederlanden und die Bildung der westlichen Sprachgrenze* (1937). Different groups of specialists have shown, and continue to show, how much there was that was unsound in Petri's theses, and Petri himself has recently abandoned a considerable number of the positions he had taken up.[1] But once again the dangers of a scattered advance have become apparent, and the consequent uncertainty regarding the objective has resulted in a dissipation of effort.

The view which I wish to put forward here is that without a due regard for the chronological framework, any satisfactory interpretation of the problem of Frankish settlement is impossible. It is of course true that previous scholars have not ignored chronological issues, but in my view they have failed to arrive at satisfactory conclusions. The trouble has been that each of the various disciplines invoked to provide a solution to the problem has naturally brought to it its own chronological categories, and that these categories are not the same. Linguists, archeologists and students of place-names are accustomed to thinking in terms

[1] F. Petri, 'Zum Stand der Diskussion über die fränkische Landnahme und die Entstehung der germanisch-romanischen Sprachgrenze', *Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter*, xv-xvi (1950–1).

of centuries, or at best, in the case of archeologists, of decades. The result has been the very divergent and consequently very uncertain nature of the conclusions so far reached.

Whatever Des Marez may have said, there is no clearer and more certain chronological scheme ascertainable for late antiquity and the early middle ages than that given us by the written texts, and it is impossible to agree with this scholar's view that the texts have already yielded up all their secrets. The relevant texts may be few in number, but they are the only precise sources of knowledge available, and it is in the light of the texts that one must examine the information derived from other disciplines. Information from these disciplines cannot be regarded as authentic if it does not accord with the evidence of written texts. This is the principle which I hope to illustrate in this paper.

The Frankish 'colonization' of Belgium, at least so far as Brabant and Flanders are concerned, is generally assumed to have been the work of the Salian Franks. Only the easternmost and least important part of the Flemish-speaking area, it is said, can have been 'colonized' by the Ripuarian Franks. The Salian settlement began in the fourth century A.D., and continued in northern Belgium for the period of about a hundred years previous to the campaigns of Childeric and the final conquest of Gaul by Clovis.[1] Such a space of time would have been amply sufficient to allow the main features of community life in this region to assume a definitely Salian form, and would explain why the western and

[1] Cf. for example J. Lindemans, 'Toponymische verschijnselen geografisch bewerkt', *Handelingen van de Koninklijke Commissie voor Toponymie en Dialektologie*, xxii (1948), 94 sqq., and particularly pp. 125 sqq., where he speaks of a settlement of the Salian Franks between the Senne and the Lys in the period 370–450. J. Dhondt ('Note sur l'origine de la frontière linguistique', *L'Antiquité classique*, xxi (1952), p. 108, believes that the Salians established themselves between the Scheldt and the Loire *c.* 500, but since these rivers flow in quite different directions such an opinion seems somewhat lacking in precision. By the same date, the Ripuarians would have already settled in the region east of the Scheldt. Both authors therefore ascribe to the Franks an early phase of settlement, followed by a period of relative stability, though they are in complete disagreement as to when this early phase of settlement occurred, and in neither case do they give any critically established chronology based upon the texts to justify their opinions.

central parts of the Flemish regions were to remain essentially Salian in future centuries.[1]

It is into such an historical framework that the information derived from other disciplines is generally, either tacitly or explicitly, fitted. This historical framework, essentially political, is derived from the written texts. These must therefore be re-examined.

The earliest of the texts which effectively relate to the subject inform us that the Franks crossed the Rhine near Cologne probably in 256 or 257, and invaded Gaul, and that in 259 or 260 they had reached Tarragona in Spain.[2] At about the same period the region between the Rhine and the Waal, in modern Holland, was abandoned by its inhabitants and by the Roman garrisons. These two pieces of information indicate simultaneous movements by both branches of the Frankish people, the Ripuarians on the middle and the Salians on the lower Rhine, but only the Salians settled permanently in territory that had previously formed part of the empire.

Further attacks took place before 268, between 268 and 275, and in 287. From the archeological evidence we know that the first two followed the route from Cologne to Bavai,[3] while the third was directed against Trier.[4] They were the work of the Ripuarians. Maximian subsequently was able to attack the Ripuarians in their own homeland, but he could not prevent the Salians from crossing the Rhine and occupying the Dutch region known as the Betuwe as well as the country between the mouth of the Rhine and the Scheldt.[5] A little later Genobaud, the first Frankish king known to history, was compelled to accept Roman

[1] This is at least the view accepted by the majority of philologists, and, on their authority, by many historians who have not thought of checking them by the texts. The article just cited of my friend and colleague Jean Dhondt, though it does to some extent modify the traditionally accepted zones of Frankish settlement, is almost entirely constructed without reference to strictly historical sources of evidence.

[2] Aurelius Victor, *Caesares*, c. 33; Eutropius, *Breviarium*, ix. 8; Orosius, *Hist. adv. pag.*, vii. 2.

[3] R. De Maeyer, *De Romeinse villa's in België* (Antwerp, 1937), pp. 291–2, and H. Koethe, *Zur Geschichte Galliens im dritten Viertel des 3. Jahrhunderts* (32 Bericht der Römisch-Germanischen Kommission, 1942; publ. in 1950), maps of coin hoards.

[4] Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie*, xiv (ii), col. 2497.

[5] *Pan. lat.*, vi. 5 (p. 204), vii. 4 (p. 223), viii. 8 (p. 237), x. 10 (p. 270).

suzerainty.[1] It was only in the capacity of tributary that he was permitted to retain the land his people had managed to occupy in modern Holland.

Constantius Chlorus is recorded as having settled (294–5) a certain number of Salian prisoners with the status of *laeti* in the regions of Amiens, Beauvais, Troyes and Langres, but he does not seem to have deprived them of the territory they had already occupied. No doubt these prisoners had been taken during some punitive expedition intended to keep the Salian Franks in subjection to the empire,[2] and we may assume that Constantine had the same object in mind, *vis-à-vis* the Ripuarians, when he ordered their kings Ascaric and Merogaisus to be thrown to the wild beasts in the circus at Trier. Constantius waged war against the Franks in 341–2 up to the shores of the North Sea, and compelled the Salian kinglets once again to recognize the Roman overlordship which their fathers had accepted a half-century earlier.[3] It was probably during the troubles of the later years of this ruler's reign (350) [4] that the Franks crossed the lower Rhine into Toxandria, since Ammianus Marcellinus, writing of the Emperor Julian's expedition against them in 357–8, says that they were already established for some time in this region.

By the middle of the fourth century, then, the Salian group of the Franks was in occupation of a quite extensive section of imperial territory. The Ripuarians, settled in the region of Cologne and Bonn, had not yet begun to cross the Rhine. They succeeded for a moment (*c.* 355) in taking Cologne,[5] but Julian recovered it

[1] No doubt the Salians also became *dedititii*, or at any rate a certain number of them did so, and still were in this position in 358. Cf. L. Schmidt, 'Aus den Anfängen des salfränkischen Königtums', *Klio*, xxxiv (1942), 306.

[2] *Pan. lat.*, viii. 21 (p. 247).

[3] Libanius, *Orat.*, lix. 127, says that they then received some Roman ἄρχοντες. This does not imply that they became *foederati*, as is supposed by J. Dhondt, S. J. De Laet and P. Hombert ('Quelques considérations sur la fin de la domination romaine et les débuts de la colonisation franque en Belgique', *L'Antiquité classique*, xvii (1948), 151), since they were still *dedititii* in 358. Nor is it possible, as these authors believe, that they then received permission to settle in the Betuwe, since they were already installed there in the time of Maximian. Cf. above, p. 4, n. 5, and below, p. 6, n. 3.

[4] Zosimus, iii, 6, and Libanius, *Orat.*, xviii. 75.

[5] C. Verlinden, 'De Frankische kolonisatie', in *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, i (Utrecht, 1949), 220.

shortly afterwards. In December 357 and January 358 he was fighting the Salians on the banks of the Maas, but subsequently gave them permission to settle in Toxandria with their former status of *dedititii*.[1] Since he was able to drive back the Chamavi, who had likewise crossed the Rhine, his victories meant that the whole river, from Basel to the sea, was again in Roman hands,[2] since the Salians, who likewise occupied the Betuwe as *dedititii*,[3] were at least in theory subject to imperial overlordship.

Two of my colleagues at the University of Ghent, J. Dhondt and S. J. De Laet, in two studies published in collaboration with M. P. Hombert, have recently proposed a different interpretation of the text of Ammianus on which the above reconstruction is based.[4] They believe that the Salians were established in the Betuwe only in 341–2, which is contradicted by the whole development of events previously, and they argue that at about the same time a section of the Salians had settled near Tessenderloo in the modern Belgian province of Antwerp. This last supposition is based on an emendation of the text of Ammianus which was proposed in the last century by A. Wauters (1885) but has not proved acceptable to later scholars; moreover, it would not explain how hostilities under Julian could have taken place on the banks of the Maas, since Tessenderloo lies much further south, a little to the north of the river Demer. We must in fact recognize that the Salians had by then occupied only the extreme north of Toxandria.[5]

Julian was succeeded, after the brief reign of Jovian, by Valentinian I (364–75), whose chief title to fame lies in his success in organizing the defence of the imperial frontiers.

[1] Ammianus Marcellinus, xvii. 8, 3.

[2] J. Bidez, *La vie de l'empereur Julien* (Paris, 1930), pp. 155 sq.

[3] Dhondt, De Laet and Hombert, *art. cit.*, p. 152 (following Zosimus and Ammianus Marcellinus).

[4] *Art. cit.*, and *La fin de la domination romaine et les débuts de la colonisation franque en Belgique* (Handelingen der Maatschappij voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te Gent, N.S., iii, 1948), pp. 116 sq. Cf. also S. J. De Laet, 'De Kempen in de Romeinse en de Vroeg-Merovingische tijd', *Brabants Heem*, 1950.

[5] In the text of Ammianus it is in any case only necessary to omit the comma inserted by the editors after *locum* to have a perfectly satisfactory text, reading *locum* as the direct complement of *figere* and *habitacula* as in apposition to it.

At the beginning of his reign, his general Theodosius is found fighting Frankish and Saxon pirates in the region between the Rhine and the Waal. In 369 the emperor took over the organization of defence works extending from Lake Constance to the North Sea.[1] Work of this kind was particularly necessary in what is now Holland, as became evident when this region was threatened by the Saxons (*c.* 370). This people is recorded as having attacked the Franks—evidently the Salians—and endangered the Roman *comes* Nannenus. A truce was concluded, but while the Saxons were falling back into their own territory a group of them was cut to pieces by the Romans at a place named *Deuso*, situated in the region occupied by the Franks.[2]

In view of this last fact, it is a matter of the first importance to know the exact location of *Deuso*. I discussed this question in an article published some years ago.[3] In it I gave reasons for supposing it to be Doesburg in Guelders; the texts, and the references to *Hercules Deusoniensis* in the legends of certain coins of Postumus and Carausius,[4] point to this place rather than to the various suggestions of previous authors—Duisburg near Brussels, or Diest, Deinze, or Duisburg in the Ruhr.[5] Since I wrote, none of the identifications I rejected has found any serious defender[6] but a student of place-names, M. M. Gysseling, has put forward Diessen in South Brabant (Netherlands).[7] This interpretation,

[1] 'Rhenum omnem a Raetiarum exordio ad usque fretalem oceanum magnis molibus communibat', *Amm. Marc.*, xxviii. 2, 1.

[2] 'Saxones caesi Deusone in regione Francorum', Jerome, *Chronicon* (ed. R. Helm, Leipzig, 1913), p. 246.

[3] C. Verlinden, 'Deusone in regione Francorum', *Bull. Comm. roy. de Toponymie et Dialectologie*, xx (1946), 63–86.

[4] H. Mattingly and E. A. Sydenham, *The Roman Imperial Coinage*, v (ii) (by P. H. Webb, London, 1933), pp. 338, 342, 345, 348, 349, 353, 356, 365, 530.

[5] Cf. G. Kurth, *Clovis* (3rd ed.), i. 117, n. 6; J. Gilissen, 'Note sur la colonisation germanique en Brabant', *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, xvii (1938), 96; C. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, vii. 247, n. 1; G. Des Marez, *Le problème de la colonisation franque*, p. 36, n. 1.

[6] Cf. however P. C. Boeren, 'Het probleem van de Salische kolonisatie', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen der Dialecten-Commissie van de Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam*, x (1947), 53, who returns to Duisburg in Belgian Brabant. The weakness of his reasoning has already been emphasized by Dhondt, De Laet and Hombert, *art. cit.*, p. 155.

[7] M. Gysseling, 'Deusone in regione Francorum', *Handelingen der Maatschappij voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te Gent*, N.S., iii (1948), 88–92.

like my own, would exclude a Salian occupation of Belgian Brabant *c.* 370, since this hypothesis rests on the identification of *Deuso* with Duisburg near Brussels, but would allow the possibility of a settlement in Toxandria at least as far south as the modern Belgian frontier. Since we know that in 358, fifteen years earlier, the Franks were still in the Betuwe, and since there is no reason to suppose that they had left it, such an extension of their area of settlement would imply the existence of a very large Frankish population, though the total number of Franks a century later, at the moment of their conquest of Gaul, has recently been estimated at no more than 30,000.[1] It is therefore worth while examining more closely the arguments of M. Gysseling.

These arguments, despite the fact that they have been elaborated in concert with an historian, are extremely unsatisfactory in their interpretation of the relevant texts. I showed in my article that the localization of the battle of *Deuso* in the neighbourhood of the Rhine was borne out by a passage in which Jordanes describes the combat as having taken place *Reni in limbo*.[2] This passage is followed by the record of the death of Valentinian at Trümmer in Hungary. M. Gysseling concludes from this that the preceding passage cannot refer to a battle on the lower Rhine. This is quite unjustified. The dates of the fighting with the Saxons (370 or 373) are known to us from other sources,[3] and there was plenty of time for Valentinian to have travelled from the Rhineland to Hungary between their date and that of his death (375). It would be as reasonable to deny Wellington's victory at Waterloo on the ground that Napoleon was said to have lost this battle and died at St. Helena. A passage in Orosius,[4] to which M. Gysseling attaches more importance than I do, declares in fact that Valentinian defeated the Saxons *periculosam Romanis finibus eruptionem magna mole meditantes in ipsis Francorum finibus*. The two references here to *finis* may very well refer to the same frontier, and, as we have seen already, the only place where the Roman and the Frankish frontiers coincided was the

[1] Dhondt, 'Note sur l'origine', p. 110.

[2] Jordanes, *De summa temporum vel origine actibusque gentis Romanorum*, 309 (ed. T. Mommsen in *Mon. Germ. Hist.*, *Auct. Antiq.*, v. 39).

[3] Verlinden, 'Deusone in regione Francorum', pp. 66–8.

[4] *Hist. adv. pag.*, vii. 32, 10 (ed. C. Zangemeister in *Corp. Script. eccl. lat.*, v. 513).

Rhine and the old Yssel, which flowed into the Rhine near Doesburg. This passage, then, supports the interpretation I have given for *Deuso*.

Since I am not an expert on place-names, I must forbear to follow M. Gysseling into a field in which I have no competence. One of his arguments, however, appears to me to be lacking in logic. That the etymology of *Deuso*(*n*) may be Celtic is quite possible, and I readily admit that the evolution into the modern Flemish form from those found in acts of the twelfth century, when Diessen had been Flemish for hundreds of years, is perfectly clear. But there is no justification for equating these early forms with *Deusone*, which cannot even be Frankish, since it is found already in the time of Postumus (260–7), before the Salians had begun to appear in the region at all. *Deusone* is no more than the Latin transcription of a place-name whose vernacular form is unknown to us, and the uncertainty over the original form allows a much wider possibility of conjecture than M. Gysseling is prepared to allow.[1] In my opinion, we must adhere to the identification of *Deuso* with Doesburg, and admit that about 370 the Frankish settlement in Toxandria had not reached Diessen. The Salians were only in the Betuwe and northern Toxandria, and there can be no question of any Frankish settlement in Belgium by 370.

In 388 the Ripuarians, under their kings Genobaud, Marcomer and Sunno, penetrated far into Belgium along the road from Cologne to Bavai. This road, so far from being a *limes*, as it has sometimes been regarded in the past, was a convenient route for the invaders. They were defeated near the Carbonarian Forest by the Roman generals Quintinus, Victor and Nannenus, and driven back across the Rhine.[2] The Ripuarians, then, like the Salians, had not yet begun to settle in Belgium.

Nothing further is heard of the Franks until 406, when a mixed army of Vandals, Alans, Suevi and Burgundians appeared on the banks of the Rhine. The defence of this river, in its middle course, was in the hands of the Ripuarians, no doubt in the capacity of *dedititii*, the same status that their relations, the

[1] It should be noted, however, that M. Gysseling believes that the Frankish place-names in Campine are late, certainly later than the end of the fourth century. Cf. Dhondt, De Laet and Hombert, *art. cit.*, p. 155.

[2] Sulpicius Alexander in Greg. Turon., ii. 9 (*Mon. Germ. Hist., Script. rer. Merov.*, i. 72).

Salians, had long since enjoyed further north. After their defeat in 388, Arbogast had negotiated with the Ripuarians in the name of the empire, and he had also led an expedition against them in 392–3,[1] no doubt with a view to securing their continued obedience. In 406 the Romans had been able to buy the services of the Alan king Goar, but the effective defence of the Rhine, from the military point of view, depended entirely upon the Ripuarians. The latter attacked the Vandals and killed their king Godegisel. But when a fresh Alan army under Respendial appeared, the Franks had the worst of the encounter and the way into Gaul was left open to the invaders.[2] The only figure of importance at that moment in Gaul was the usurper Constantine III, who concluded treaties with the majority of the invaders, and with the Franks as well.[3]

The emperor Honorius, powerless spectator of these disasters, died in 423, and was succeeded two years later by Valentinian III. During the thirty years of his reign (425–55), power was effectively in the hands of Galla Placidia, assisted by the great Aetius.

It is to this period that the *Notitia Dignitatum* belongs, although it contains older elements. One of the chief services which it renders to the historian is the light it throws on military organization under Valentinian III. In the Ripuarian zone in the Rhineland, there were only civil representatives of the Roman government left. In Belgica Secunda, besides the civil authorities, there were cavalry units at Marquise on the Slack, a marine unit at the mouths of the Somme and the Canche at Le Crotoy and Etaples, and perhaps a troop of Nervians at Audisque near Boulogne.[4] Probably there were also bands of militia in the towns, but their military value must have been negligible. Some of the garrison posts along the route from Cologne to Bavai must still

[1] Verlinden in *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, i. 227.

[2] A. W. Byvanck, *Nederland in den Romeinschen tijd*, ii (1943), 685; H. von Petrikovits, 'Reichs-, Macht- und Volkstumgrenze am linken Niederrhein im 3. und 4. Jahrhundert n. Chr.', *Festschrift A. Oxé* (1938), p. 239.

[3] Verlinden, 'De Franken en Aëtius', *Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, i (1946), 2.

[4] M. Gysseling, 'De Romeinsche kustverdediging in Belgica secunda volgens de Notitia Dignitatum', *Feestbundel H. J. van de Wyer* (1944), pp. 287–301, and J. Vannérus, 'Portus Aepatiaci lez Boulogne', *Revue des études anciennes*, xlvi (1944), 299–317.

have been occupied by soldiers, since otherwise there would have been no effective contact between the civil authorities in the Rhineland and the troops in the coastal area. After 406, the country in the north between the Rhine and the modern Franco-Belgian frontier must have been virtually open to all invaders, though occasional campaigns by Roman forces were still available to check systematic occupation.

The first of these campaigns, so far as our knowledge goes, was that undertaken by Aetius against the Ripuarians in 428. It was intended to drive them out of the territory they had occupied on the left bank of the Rhine, and was completely successful.[1] In 431–2 we hear of a fresh campaign on the middle Rhine, after which Hydatius tells us that the Ripuarians were *in pace recepti*.[2] Probably this means an accord of the nature of a *foedus*,[3] thus resecuring a treaty of the same kind concluded under Constantine III. About the year 440, the Ripuarians occupied Cologne, and Trier was sacked for the fourth time since 418.[4] In 446, however, Aetius seems to have expelled them from the first at least of these cities.[5] Three campaigns of Aetius against the Ripuarians are thus recorded by the texts: in 428, 431–2, and *c.* 446, the last of these being in the nature of a counter-attack to Frankish aggression in *c.* 440.

The panegyric of Majorian in one of the *Carmina* of Sidonius Apollinaris[6] contains an account of a battle between Aetius and the Salian Franks under Clodio at *Vicus Helena*. In a study of the Frankish campaigns of Aetius, I have shown that this battle took place in 446 or shortly afterwards, and not, as has often been supposed, in 428.[7] Ludwig Schmidt had independently reached the same conclusion, though without bringing out clearly the importance of the event in the history of Frankish settlement.[8] The date is here of particular importance. The site of the battle

[1] Prosper Tiro, *Epitoma chronicon*, ed. Mommsen in *Mon. Germ. Hist.*, *Auct. Antiq.*, ix. 472. Cf. Cassiodorus, *Chronicon*, ed. Mommsen in *Ibid.*, xi. 156.

[2] Cf. on this Verlinden, 'De Franken en Aëtius', pp. 5, 8, 9.

[3] E. Stein, *Geschichte des spätrömischen Reiches*, i (Vienna, 1928), 478.

[4] Verlinden, *art. cit.*, p. 9.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[6] v. 211–30 (*Auct. Antiq.*, viii. 193).

[7] 'De Franken en Aëtius', p. 12.

[8] L. Schmidt, 'Aus den Anfängen des salfränkischen Königtums', *Klio*, xxxiv. 308. Cf. also Petrikovits, *art. cit.*, p. 239.

is generally regarded as having been Hélesmes (Nord), as was suggested by Auguste Longnon in 1880,[1] but A. Loyen has recently proposed Vitry or Vis-en-Artois, both in the Pas-de-Calais.[2] This seems too far to the south if one takes account of the chronology of the Salian advance, to which we must now turn.

M. Loyen is incorrect in supposing that Tournai had been occupied by Clodio *c.* 432,[3] for the text of Hydatius on which he relies refers, as we have seen already,[4] to the Ripuarians and not to the Salians. The account which Sidonius gives of the battle of *Vicus Helena* suggests very strongly an attack on a temporary camp set up by an army on the march, not on a permanent settlement. Furthermore, no philological argument compels us to prefer Vitry or Vis-en-Artois to Hélesmes. It is possible, of course, that at the time of the battle in question the Salians had momentarily penetrated as far as Cambrai and Tournai, the later centres of their political power, just as the Ripuarians had four times succeeded in breaking into Trier. But it is scarcely probable, since if it had been the case Aetius would have had to fight against them, as he fought against the Ripuarians in the much more distant area of the middle Rhine.

We can even go further, and say that the absence of earlier campaigns against the Salians proves that they had as yet made no considerable southward advance. The latest treaty they had concluded with the empire prior to the time of Aetius had been that of 358, by which Julian authorized their settlement in northern Toxandria. We know that they received new territories from Aetius at the time when, as *foederati*, they assisted him against the Huns.[5] Perhaps it was at this time that they finally occupied the regions of Cambrai and Tournai and as far south as the Somme, though it is equally possible that such a concession would, even at that stage, have seemed too great to the imperial authorities, and that the occupation of these regions did not take place till

[1] *Bull. Soc. Antiq. de France*, 1880, p. 93.

[2] A. Loyen, 'A la recherche de Vicus Helena', *Revue des études anciennes*, xlvi (1944), 121–34. Cf. also an earlier work of the same scholar, *Recherches historiques sur les Panégyriques de Sidoine Apollinaire* (Paris, 1942), pp. 59 sq.

[3] *Recherches historiques*, p. 73, and 'A la recherche de Vicus Helena', p. 132.

[4] Cf. above, p. 11.

[5] Fragm. 16 of Priscus in C. Muller, *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, iv (1851), 98–9, and Jordanes, *Getica*, 191.

after the death of Aetius in 454, which marks the actual collapse of the empire. We must not forget that Cologne did not pass finally into Ripuarian possession till 456–7.[1]

The evidence of the texts, as it has been presented here, discloses a very different picture from that generally received for the advance of the Salian Franks across Belgium. Its chronology is precise in a way that that provided by other disciplines is not. A study of my own, published in 1949, and other more recent ones by S. J. De Laet and F. Petri[2] have shown that nothing certain regarding the Frankish advance can be derived from the study of the cemeteries of the time, nor from that of place-names or dialects, nor from legal history, nor from a topographical investigation of the form and distribution of habitations and fields, nor from the hypothesis of the existence of a *limes belgicus*. The texts, on the other hand, show us that in 358 and in 370–3 the Salian Franks were still in occupation of Toxandria and the Betuwe. We then hear nothing of them for over half a century, neither on the occasion of the Ripuarian attack of 388, nor on that of the crossing of the Rhine in 406, nor during the campaigns of Aetius and the Ripuarian attacks in 428, 431–2, *c.* 440 and *c.* 446. The explanation of this can only be that they had not changed their position during this period, for the texts are full of information regarding the Ripuarians and the other Germanic peoples who were then on the move.

If such was the case, and everything suggests that it was, we can only conclude that the Salians were living in a state of relative peace, conserving their numbers and their military strength at a time when the other Germanic peoples were exhausting themselves with incessant fighting. It was this that was to make possible their sudden shattering expansion at a later date, when in the course of a few years they attained the political mastery of the West. The unprecedented success of the new-born Merovingian state was in large measure due to a preliminary period of

[1] Verlinden, 'De Franken en Aëtius', p. 13.

[2] Verlinden,' De Frankische kolonisatie' (see above, p. 5, n. 5); S. J. De Laet, 'La Gaule septentrionale à l'époque romaine à la lumière des fouilles, des recherches et des publications les plus récentes (1935–50)', *Bull. Inst. hist. belge de Rome*, xxvi (1950–1), 188–250; F. Petri, 'Zum Stand der Diskussion' (see above, p. 2, n. 1). On the place-name aspect, cf. H. Draye, 'De chronologische rangschikking van het toponymisch materiaal', *Album Dr. J. Lindemans* (Brussels, 1951).

repose, to an accumulation of energy over the best part of a century, at a time when so many of the other Germanic peoples were undergoing a wastage of manpower that was in the long run to be fatal to them.

It was only under Clodio that the Salians emerged from this state of quiescence. It has been argued that Clodio was a Ripuarian, if the *Dispargum* where, according to Gregory of Tours,[1] he had been settled before the capture of Tournai was Duisburg in the Ruhr.[2] Even if this were true, it would not affect the chronology of the Salian advance, though it would that of the Ripuarians, or at least that of a group amongst them. Clodio was only a *Theilfürst*, to employ the German expression, and may have been only a short time at *Dispargum*. As we can see from combining the evidence of Sidonius Apollinaris's panegyric of Avitus [3] with the testimony of Gregory of Tours (ii. 9), Clodio controlled the region of Cambrai-Arras *c.* 455. From the same passage of Gregory of Tours we know that Merovech was at Tournai at about the same time. He was the father of Childeric, whom we meet with *c.* 463. There were at this time two Salian kingdoms, and it was Clovis who first united Tournai with Cambrai, taking the latter from his *parens* Ragnachar. This means either that Clodio was never master of Tournai—Gregory never says that he was—or that he must at some time have lost it.[4]

It is quite possible that two Salian kingdoms had long been in existence, with one king in Toxandria and another in Betuwe. It would then have been the Salians of Toxandria who moved first, and captured Cambrai, while the others would have later occupied Tournai. This is pure conjecture, and in any case does not affect the chronological issue. The point which I wish to emphasize is that there can have been no Salian-Frankish colonization of Belgium and northern France before the middle of the fifth century.

Nor can such a 'colonization', in the sense of permanent occupation and settlement, have effectively taken place at any

[1] ii. 9.

[2] K. Plath, 'Die Königspfalzen der Merovinger und Karolinger. I. Dispargum', *Bonner Jährbucher*, xcv (1891).

[3] *Carmina*, vii, pp. 372 sqq.

[4] Cf. L. Schmidt, 'Aus den Anfängen der salfränkischen Königtums', p. 309.

later date. We hear of Childeric fighting with Aegidius and with Paulus, Roman generals who had escaped imperial control and were operating as far as central Gaul on their own account, and we know that Tournai was Childeric's chief residence and that it was there that he was buried. But he was only a chief of a warrior band, a *Heerkönig*, and nothing more, supported by all men capable of bearing arms.

The same is true of Clovis himself at the time of his conquest of the kingdom of Syagrius. He was then no more than a warrior chief, who shared his plunder with his men. It was only after this conquest that the seizure of the estates of the Roman fisc that Syagrius had held and the taking into his service of the defeated generals *buccellarii* made him into a really powerful ruler, capable of carrying out a well-planned programme of conquest.[1] Up to that time he must have needed all his men for military purposes, and martial activities rather than 'colonization' must have occupied their time.

As a consequence of this conquest, the small group of Salian Franks—their total number has recently been reckoned as about 30,000—must have been dispersed over the whole area between the Somme and the Loire.[2] We must again envisage the theory of a *Herrensiedlung*, but with the proviso the *Herren* must be understood as including all Frankish fighting men. These dispersed Franks cannot possibly have exercised any influence whatsoever on the establishment of the linguistic frontier in Belgium and northern France.

The thesis of Godefroid Kurth, that the linguistic frontier came into existence at one stroke through the abrupt cessation of Frankish settlement, has long since been abandoned. Not a single one of the events we have been describing relates to the area in which this frontier subsequently appeared. The theory of a vast mixed linguistic zone between the Rhine and the Loire is likewise baseless: the only zone was one in which Frankish warriors were progressively absorbed by a provincial population. A third theory, put forward by Draye, Dhondt and Legros,[3] insists on a

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 316.

[2] Cf. Dhondt, 'Note sur l'origine de la frontière linguistique', p. 110.

[3] H. Draye, 'De invloed van de bevolkingsdichtheid op het onstaan van de Vlaams-Waalse taalgrens', *Miscellanea Van der Essen* (1947), pp. 107–21; J. Dhondt, 'Essai sur l'origine de la frontière linguistique', *L'Antiquité*

difference in the density of population north and south of the linguistic frontier before and at the time of the Frankish advance. The archeological evidence does in fact show a dense zone of Gallo-Roman settlement in the area south of the linguistic frontier. It does not follow, however, as has been claimed recently,[1] that there is a chronological link between the intensive settlement of the area north of this frontier and the Frankish advance. The evidence of the texts, so far as the Salians at least are concerned, is on this point decisive, and to suppose the contrary would be, in effect, to revert to the standpoint of Kurth, whose views are now quite rightly universally rejected.

Only one explanation of the linguistic frontier remains. The Germanic settlement of northern Belgium and the establishment of the linguistic frontier are in the main subsequent to the Frankish conquest. They are the result of a colonizing activity which took place within the framework of the Merovingian state and even later, under the Carolingians. The Salians as such played no part in the process at all.

This is not necessarily true, however, of other Germanic invaders, and here there is a promising field for further research. We know little of the Ripuarians after their conquest of Cologne in the middle of the fifth century. How far were they really associated in the Salian conquests carried out by the descendants of Merovech? Were they not perhaps colonizing and cultivating their fields while the latter were fighting and conquering? If this was the case, must not their role in the establishment of the distinctive characteristics of the Flemish regions of Belgium have been much greater than is at present allowed? What part was played in the settlement of Flanders by the ancient Germanic or Germanized populations—Batavians and Menapians, and later Thuringians, Suevi, Warni, Heruli, and so on—who are from time to time mentioned in our texts? These are all questions to which an answer has still to be sought.

For the moment, however, I need do no more than emphasize once again the main points of the argument I have tried to outline in this paper. There was no Salian colonization in Belgium, and we do not yet know if there was a Ripuarian one. The establish-

classique, xv (1948), 261–86; E. Legros, 'La frontière linguistique en Belgique', *Onomastica*, ii (1948), 9–16.

[1] Dhondt, 'Note sur l'origine' (above, p. 3, n. 1), p. 117.

ment of the linguistic frontier which we know today began before the Germanic invasions and continued long after them.[1]

[1] I wish to express my thanks to my friend Philip Grierson for his kindness in translating this paper into English.

WAR AND FINANCE IN THE ANGLO-NORMAN STATE

By J. O. Prestwich, M.A.

READ 14 FEBRUARY 1953

'MONEY', wrote Richard FitzNeal in the preface to the Dialogue of the Exchequer, 'appears necessary not only in time of war but also in peace. In war it is poured out in fortifying castles, in soldiers' wages and in numerous other ways, depending on the nature of the persons paid, for the preservation of the kingdom.'[1] In time of peace, the Treasurer added, money was spent on charitable purposes; but it is clear from even the limited evidence of the Pipe Rolls of Henry II that expenditure on defence greatly exceeded that on charity.

This statement on the relations between war and finance made about 1179 raises the general problem which I wish to consider in this paper. Was Richard FitzNeal merely justifying himself and his book with a well-worn commonplace, appropriate for inclusion in a preface? Or was he calling attention to a change in the character of war and its demands upon revenue, a change which both reflected and conditioned a major transformation of society and government under Henry II and his sons?

Few historians are now prepared to commit themselves to clear, confident generalizations about this period; but it still appears to be the orthodox view that such a major transformation was taking place in these reigns. Indeed, it is precisely because the transition is so obvious to historians that they find generalization so difficult. Dr. A. L. Poole, writing of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, has told us that 'already in this period a society based on tenures and services is beginning to pass into a society based on money, rents and taxes'; that 'the feudal levy had ceased to be an effective fighting force . . . It was superseded by an army chiefly composed of men paid to fight'; and that 'in the Pipe Roll

[1] *Dialogus de Scaccario*, ed. C. Johnson, p. 2.

of 1162 we have the earliest mention of *milites solidarii*'.[1] Moreover, the records of the reigns of Richard and John reveal the startling magnitude of the financial effort made in their wars, and allow us to trace in great detail the expenditure on paid troops, castles, foodstuffs, materials, weapons, ships and allies. The wages of soldiers, sailors and workmen absorbed a high proportion of this expenditure, though the payment of Richard's ransom and the subsidies to John's allies imposed a great additional strain. We can also follow in this period the ambitious attempts to organize a war economy: the direct taxation of incomes, price controls, import and export licences, the regulation and close supervision of certain industries, requisitioning, control of currency and credit and an expansion of borrowing, the organization of a national customs system, regulations against trading with the enemy and even the use of the black-list technique. It is only against this background of war finance that it is possible to understand the administrative expedients and the complicated interplay of ideas, interests and personalities which make up the political history of these years.

If we now look back to the first century following the Conquest, we find ourselves, it seems, in a very different and a much simpler world. Mr. Jolliffe, for example, when in an illuminating discussion of Magna Carta he turned back to this earlier period, observed that 'the military habit of the Normans and the comparative modesty of the wars of the first century after the Conquest enabled the monarchy to survive without putting any intolerable strain upon the generosity of its vassals'.[2] The demands of these modest wars were largely met by the system of knight-service and castle-guard, supplemented at need by the fyrd or militia. Round long ago taught us of the introduction of knight-service by the Conqueror. Vinogradoff spoke of the post-Conquest period as one in which 'society settled down on the basis of land tenure, and natural economy superseded for a time the "cash" system which had ruled the relations between the government of Canute or Edward the Confessor and its hired soldiers'.[3] Sir Frank Stenton, although warning us that the influ-

[1] *Obligations of Society in the XII and XIII centuries*, pp. 3–4, 52.

[2] J. E. A. Jolliffe, 'Magna Carta', *Schweizer Beiträge zur allgemeinen Geschichte*, x (1952), 95.

[3] *English Society in the Eleventh Century*, pp. 21–2.

ence of money on feudal relationships has often been underestimated, has emphasized that throughout this period 'the feudal army remained the ultimate defence of the land', and that for over sixty years after the Conquest the monarchy therefore 'depended in the last resort on the loyalty of individual barons and the knights of their honours'.[1] Professor Painter was even more categorical when he wrote of the Conqueror that 'even if there had been sufficient resources to maintain an adequate hired army, the fact that William and his men were deeply steeped in feudal tradition would have made the adoption of such a military system out of the question'.[2]

Vinogradoff's use of the phrase 'natural economy' in explaining the system of unpaid service and restricted warfare suggests that it may now be difficult to gain the support of economic historians for this part of the argument. But the difficulty appears to be verbal rather than substantial. Professor Postan, if I understand his chronology correctly, suspects that there was an economic slump at the time of the Conquest and holds that the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries were a period 'in which landlords happened to prefer fixed yield to fluctuating profits from rent and cultivation' and explains this in terms of 'the general economic and political insecurity of the age, which made it difficult for landlords to control production in their outlying estates, to exact labour services and to move large quantities of agricultural produce across the country'.[3] Indeed, the interpretation of the evidence for military organization and the interpretation of the evidence for economic trends support each other in an unusually reassuring way. The first century of English feudalism when military needs were largely met by unpaid service coincides with a period when the volume of production and exchange was low. The succeeding period when a bureaucratic state was able to finance a war effort vastly greater in scale and different in kind coincides with the rapid economic expansion of the thirteenth century, defined as beginning in about 1180. Thus Richard FitzNeal's remark about the pouring out of money in war, made just

[1] *The First Century of English Feudalism, 1066–1166*, pp. 50, n. 1, 214, 191.

[2] *Studies in the History of the English Feudal Barony*, p. 20.

[3] M. M. Postan, 'The Rise of a Money Economy', *Economic History Review*, xiv (1944), 133, 129.

when England was passing into this new phase of development, shows that he had a sharp and even prophetic eye.

Nevertheless, it is worth while re-examining the evidence on war and finance in the Anglo-Norman period. One reason is that Richard FitzNeal himself intended his remark as a commonplace, made familiar and respectable by long practice. Writing of the period immediately following the Conquest, he says that coined money for the wages and rewards of knights was derived from pleas of the kingdom, from voluntary payments for privileges and from the urban communities; and he adds that this payment of troops persisted under the Conqueror's sons.[1] But it would be unwise to make much of this, for the Treasurer could make mistakes, and we have been warned that he is 'a very unsafe authority for anything that had happened more than a generation before his own time'.[2] Next there are the qualifications and silences of the scholars whom I have already quoted. Round was concerned with the introduction of knight-service, not with its enforcement; and he was only able to find three instances of the summoning of the feudal host.[3] Sir Frank Stenton similarly noticed the paucity of evidence for the actual performance of knight-service.[4] Both these scholars drew attention to the early evidence for the commutation of knight-service and castle-guard. And Vinogradoff pointed out that mercenaries were employed after the Norman Conquest, though he considered that the social importance of this expedient was not great.[5]

Another reason for re-examining the evidence is that, as Mr. McFarlane has pointed out, the origin of the practice of substituting paid for unpaid service remains untraced in detail; and indeed he left open the question whether even military service was ever wholly or mainly a matter of tenure.[6] Moreover, the orthodox account of the military organization of the Anglo-Norman state presents anyone seeking to understand the political history of the period with serious difficulties. If the field armies and garrisons were largely composed of tenants-in-chief and their knights performing their due service, then indeed the monarchy must have depended on the loyalty of these men. But

[1] *Dialogus*, p. 40. [2] V. H. Galbraith, *Studies in the Public Records*, p. 48.
[3] *Feudal England*, p. 305. [4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 168, 177. [5] *Op. cit.*, p. 15.
[6] K. B. McFarlane, 'Bastard Feudalism', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, xx (1945), 162.

it is very difficult to find sufficiently strong grounds for this assumption in the accounts of the chroniclers. Nor is it easy to explain the outbreak and course of civil war in the reign of Stephen. Above all, it is peculiarly difficult to fit in what we know of financial policy and institutions under Rufus and Henry I. Perhaps the monkish writers grossly exaggerated the financial exactions of Rufus; and in any case money had to be found for granting the mortgage on Normandy and for the building of Westminster Hall. But for Henry I there is the solid and impressive evidence of the Pipe Roll of 1130.

Stubbs's calculation that the total sum accounted for in this year was £66,593, while in 1156 it was little over £22,000 and in 1189 only £48,781, cannot be taken as giving an accurate and complete account of the revenues of Henry I, Henry II and Richard I, but it at least indicates the formidable severity of Henry I's financial demands.[1] It is not easy to explain that severity on what has recently been called 'the feudal assumption that the Crown was an Anglo-Norman estate burdened with nothing but the Household expenses, the outlay of the great feasts, and an occasional foray into the Welsh border or Maine'.[2] For Henry I appears to have regulated and restricted the expenses of his household, and is even reported to have dropped the three great annual feasts held by the Conqueror and Rufus.[3] And if the troops for these occasional forays were largely provided by unpaid knight-service, only pointless avarice can have driven Henry to levy the great sums accounted for in 1130. Constitutional historians have unravelled the introduction and development of knight-service and thrown much light on the origins and structure of the Exchequer; but they have not shown how the working of these two institutions can be intelligibly related to each other in the Anglo-Norman period.

Yet to those who lived and wrote in this period these difficulties did not exist. William of Malmesbury commented on the Conqueror's avarice and added: 'But it will easily be excused, because it is impossible to rule a new kingdom without a great deal of

[1] *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi* (R. S.), ii, pp. xciv, xcix.

[2] Jolliffe, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

[3] *Gesta Regum* (R. S.), ii. 335, 483, 487. Walter Map, *De Nugis Curialium* (ed. M. R. James), p. 219, refers to Henry's written regulations, and these survive in the *Constitutio Domus Regis* of *c.* 1136 (ed. C. Johnson in *Dialogus de Scaccario*).

money.' The Conqueror, he continued, 'for fear of his enemies, cheated his territories of money in order that with it he might either delay or even repel their attacks . . . and this shameful evil still endures and daily increases, vills and churches being subjected to payments'.[1] How then did the Conqueror spend this money? Largely, it seems, on paying and rewarding his troops. It was the Conqueror's generosity which attracted so many foreign knights to the cross-Channel enterprise.[2] A little later, probably in 1067, the Conqueror rebuked William FitzOsbern for wasting treasure by excessive expenditure on knights.[3] And in 1068 he called together his mercenary knights, *solidarios milites*, paid them liberally and allowed them to return across the Channel.[4] But they were required again for the winter campaign of 1069–70. William spent Christmas at York, completed the harrying of the north in January, and then crossed the Peak country to put down the Welsh and the men of Cheshire, Staffordshire and Derbyshire. During this arduous march the troops drawn from Anjou, Brittany and Maine sought to be released; but William held his forces together, and when he reached Salisbury he was able to reward his knights liberally.[5] This was probably late in March, for William went on to spend Easter, which fell on 4 April, at Winchester.

From what source were the knights rewarded? It can hardly be a coincidence that in mid-February the Conqueror had, according to the Worcester chronicler, ordered a search of all the monasteries of England and had transferred to his own treasury the money which the wealthier Englishmen had deposited in the monasteries. Indeed, the plan had been suggested by William FitzOsbern, notoriously solicitous for the financial interests of the knights.[6] It is interesting to notice that the Easter council of 1070 which the Conqueror attended was presided over by Bishop Ermenfrid; for this same Ermenfrid held a Norman council later in the year

[1] *Gesta Regum*, ii. 335–6.
[2] William of Poitiers, *Gesta Willelmi* (ed. J. A. Giles), p. 146.
[3] William of Malmesbury, *op. cit.*, ii. 314.
[4] Ordericus Vitalis, *Historia Ecclesiastica* (ed. Le Prevost), ii. 187.
[5] *Ibid.*, ii. 196–9.
[6] Florence of Worcester (ed. Thorpe), ii. 4–5. For other evidence of the seizure of treasure in the monasteries see *Annales de Wintonia* in *Annales Monastici* (R. S.), ii. 29, and *Historia Monasterii de Abingdon* (R. S.), i. 486, 493–4.

which ordered the restitution of goods pillaged from churches. Moreover, the penitential code drawn up in this council for all ranks of the army which had achieved the conquest makes it plain that that army was not regarded as being purely feudal in composition. It distinguishes between those whom William had armed on his own orders, those armed not on his orders, those who owed him service as a matter of duty and those who fought for hire.[1]

But the Conquest was the result of an exceptional military effort, achieved, it may be thought, by forces raised and financed in exceptional ways. During the first difficult and dangerous years tenants-in-chief found it necessary to keep their knights together and to pay them; but as conditions became more settled and secure these stipendiary knights were dispersed and quartered out on lands which they held in the familiar way. We have accounts of this process at Abingdon and Ely, for example.[2] And we know from a letter of Lanfranc that Ralph Guader's followers in the rebellion of 1075 were composed partly of Bretons who held lands in England, partly of landless men who served for pay.[3] The Conqueror's own son, Robert Curthose, complained that he was being treated as just such a landless knight when he told his father: 'I do not want to be always your mercenary. Sometime I want to have something of my own, so that I may give proper pay to my followers.'[4] And when the Conqueror put down the subsequent rebellion of Robert and his followers, he confiscated their lands and, with characteristic economy, applied the rents to the pay of the mercenaries he had employed in the campaign.[5] Again it was the exceptional emergency of threatened invasion in 1085 which led William to bring over from France the mercenary force which so impressed contemporaries by its size.[6] It is also hard to deny the exceptional character of the

[1] Wilkins, *Concilia*, i. 366. Sir Frank Stenton called attention to the interest of this document in *Anglo-Saxon England*, pp. 653–4.

[2] *Historia Monasterii de Abingdon*, ii. 3; *Liber Eliensis*, ed. D. J. Stewart, p. 275.

[3] Epistola xxxv (Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, cl. 534): 'Qui vero Rodulpho traditori, et sociis suis sine terra pro solidis servierunt.'

[4] Ordericus Vitalis, ii. 378.

[5] *Ibid.*, ii. 297.

[6] Florence of Worcester, ii. 18; William of Malmesbury, *op. cit.*, ii. 320; *Historia Monasterii de Abingdon*, ii. 11. Cf. Stenton, *First Century of English Feudalism*, pp. 149–50: 'In a great emergency the knight-service due to the king from his tenants in chief was obviously unequal to the defence of the land.'

Domesday *descriptio* and the Salisbury assembly of 1086, whatever may have been the purpose of the one and the exact composition of the other.[1] During the twenty years which followed Hastings there were exceptional reasons why the Conqueror and his tenants-in-chief should employ paid knights and exceptional proceeds from loot and extortion to finance such practices. It is therefore necessary to review the evidence for the succeeding twenty years, from the making of the Domesday survey to the battle of Tinchebrai.

William of Malmesbury has a revealing account of Rufus's measures.

> At the very outset of his reign, fearing disorders, he had assembled knights, denying them nothing and promising more for the future. And so because he had energetically emptied his father's treasuries and limited revenues were left, his substance fell short; but he continued to be extravagant, for this had become second nature to him. He was a man who did not know how to beat down the price of anything or to get proper value in his dealings. Sellers sold to him at their own prices and knights fixed their own rate of pay.[2]

There was then a sellers' market for mercenaries in England. Meanwhile Duke Robert was engaged in similar negotiations to raise troops in Normandy. When his own treasures were exhausted, he raised more by selling territory to Henry.[3] The

[1] In recent discussions of the purpose of the Domesday Inquest the significance of *descriptio*, the contemporary and official term for the undertaking, has not been emphasized. In Gregory of Tours and in official documents of the Merovingian and Carolingian periods *descriptio* is used as the term for assessment and enrolment for public taxation. Cf. Gregory of Tours, *Histoira Francorum*, vi. 28: 'post congregatos de iniquis descriptionibus thesauros', echoed by Robert of Hereford at the end of his note on the Domesday *descriptio*: 'Et vexata est terra multis cladibus ex congregatione regalis pecuniae procedentibus.' For other evidence see *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, v. 665, and Dopsch, *Economic and Social Foundations of European Civilization*, pp. 292, 377. *Descriptio* was also used to refer to the collection of taxes. Cf. the charter of Adela, countess of Chartres, of 1109 cited by Ducange, *s.v.* 'descriptio': 'Descriptionem pecuniae, quae consuetudinarie tallia nominatur . . . fieri praeceperam.' Ralph of Diceto has an interesting account of the *descriptio generalis* carried out by the *regii exactores* of Louis VII of France in order to supply his army in 1173 (*Opera Historica*, R. S., i. 372).

[2] *Op. cit.*, ii. 368. [3] *Ibid.*, ii. 468; Ordericus Vitalis, iii. 266–7.

financial power to raise paid troops was not even a monopoly of princes. In the autumn of 1090 the leading citizen of Rouen, Conan, arranged to hand over the city to Rufus and, we are told by Orderic Vitalis, employed his own great wealth to raise a considerable body of troops for use against Duke Robert.[1]

But it was Rufus's war expenditure which astonished and dismayed the chroniclers. In 1094 he is described as raising mercenaries on all sides in Normandy and showering gold, silver and lands on those whom he detached from Robert.[2] In 1095 he sent his brother Henry into Normandy with ample funds; and in the campaigns of 1097 and 1098 he spent lavishly on troops drawn from France, Burgundy, Brittany and Flanders, and on subsidies to Robert of Bellême.[3] Suger, a practical statesman with his own experience of the problems and methods of war finance, described Rufus in striking terms as 'that wealthy man, a pourer out of English treasures and a wonderful merchant and paymaster of knights (*mirabilisque militum mercator et solidator*)'.[4] It is revealing that just as William of Malmesbury used the words *commercium* and *mercimonium*, so Suger applied the term *mercator* to Rufus. For war was a trade and troops, castles and allies its merchandise.

The cost of war and policy was not limited to the payment of troops. 10,000 marks had to be raised when Robert pawned Normandy in 1096. Much, too, went on the construction and repair of castles; for, as Rufus reminded Hélie de la Flèche, masons and stone-cutters were anxious for monetary gain.[5] There was, too, a lively traffic in ransoms. Orderic explains Rufus's relative lack of success in the campaigns of 1097–8 by the fact that the French were stimulated by their handsome gains from ransoms.[6] According to Suger, the balance of payments on this account was wholly in favour of the French; for Rufus's knights when captured were so anxious for their wages that they speedily ransomed themselves, while the impecunious French captives suffered long imprisonment and were released only on condition

[1] Ordericus Vitalis, iii. 352.

[2] Florence of Worcester, ii. 34.

[3] Henry of Huntingdon, *Historia Anglorum* (R. S.), p. 218; Ordericus Vitalis, iv. 40, 45.

[4] Suger, *Vie de Louis VI le Gros*, ed. H. Waquet, p. 8.

[5] Ordericus Vitalis, iv. 38.

[6] *Ibid.*, iv. 21–4: 'quorum redemptionibus opimis egentes Franci ad dimicandum animati sunt'.

of doing homage to Rufus and swearing to fight against their own kingdom and king.[1]

Rufus's only mourners may have been the troops whom he had paid so well and the loose women, uncharitably linked with the mercenaries by the chroniclers.[2] But the mercenaries were not thrown into unemployment on Rufus's death, and there are indications that they were acquiring a recognized professional pride and standing. In the rebellion of 1102, Robert of Bellême handed over the castle and town of Bridgnorth to three of his captains, placing under them 80 mercenary knights. Henry I besieged Bridgnorth, detached the rebels' Welsh allies by bribes and promises, and then threatened that unless the garrison surrendered within three days, he would hang every man whom he took. The three captains and the burgesses agreed to surrender and, when the mercenaries refused to collaborate, cooped them up in a corner of the castle and admitted the royal forces. 'Then', says Orderic,

> the king, because the mercenaries had kept faith with their prince, as was proper, decreed that they should depart freely with their arms and horses. When the mercenaries came out through the crowds of besieging forces, they publicly lamented and bewailed the fact that they had been tricked by the fraud of the burgesses and captains; and before the whole army they laid bare the trickery of their associates, lest what had happened to them should bring other mercenaries into discredit.[3]

There are other examples which suggest that at this time the mercenaries' standard of loyalty to their paymasters compared favourably with that of vassals to their lords.[4] Valuable evidence of the value attached to mercenaries and of the numbers required is afforded in the remarkable Treaty of Dover of 10 March 1103. By this treaty Count Robert of Flanders agreed to make 1,000 knights available to Henry in England against invasion or rebellion, to produce 1,000 knights in Normandy or 500 knights

[1] Suger, *op. cit.*, p. 10: 'Anglie captos ad redempcionem celerem militaris stipendii acceleravit anxietas.'

[2] Ordericus Vitalis, iv. 90. Cf. William of Malmesbury, *op. cit.*, ii. 379.

[3] Ordericus Vitalis, iv. 173–5.

[4] E.g. the conduct of the captains of the garrison at Le Mans after the death of Rufus (Ordericus Vitalis, iv. 99–102).

in Maine.[1] In return, Count Robert was to receive an annual pension of £500. It is significant that at a time when the total *servitium debitum* of England did not produce more than 5,000 knights, Henry should have been arranging for the service of 1,000 knights from one external source alone. For the value of the *servitium debitum* was reduced not merely by the practical difficulties of mobilizing it for a campaign of any duration in the field and not merely by the rebellion of individual barons. It was reduced above all by the political concern of many barons who did follow the king with the consequences to themselves of a decisive royal victory.[2]

That baronial leaders understood the ease with which cash could be converted into military power is illustrated by an incident which occurred on 2 August 1100. On that day, directly after the death of Rufus, Henry rode hard for Winchester, conveniently close, and demanded the keys of the treasury. He was there confronted by another member of the hunting party, William of Breteuil, who had spurred on his horse even faster, and who put forward the claims of Duke Robert to the succession.[3] Who was William of Breteuil? Not, as historians have sometimes supposed, the treasurer[4]: he was the son of William FitzOsbern and brother of Roger, earl of Hereford, who had rebelled in 1075. William of Breteuil had joined Robert of Bellême and Robert Mowbray in the ineffectual demonstration of Robert Curthose against the Conqueror, had fought for Duke Robert in 1088 and had ransomed himself on three occasions for a total sum of £7,000.[5]

[1] The best text of this treaty is that printed by F. Vercauteren, *Actes des comtes de Flandre, 1071–1128*, no. 30. Although this is the first such treaty of which the text survives, William of Malmesbury suggests that similar arrangements had been made by the Conqueror and renewed by Rufus. See the discussion by Bruce D. Lyon in *English Historical Review*, lxvi (1951), 178–9.

[2] For attempts of baronial followers of the king to mitigate the consequences of a royal victory, or even to prevent such a victory, see Ordericus Vitalis, iii. 274–8 (1088) and iv. 174 (1102); *Gesta Stephani* in *Chronicles of the reign of Stephen*, etc. (R. S.), iii. 27–8 (1136), 42 (1138); John of Hexham, *Historia*, in Symeon of Durham (R. S.), ii. 291 (1138); Henry of Huntingdon, *op. cit.*, p. 287 (1153).

[3] Ordericus Vitalis, iv. 87–8.

[4] H. W. C. Davis, *England under the Normans and Angevins* (10th ed.), p. 118, described William of Breteuil as the treasurer, and was followed by A. L. Poole, *From Domesday Book to Magna Carta*, p. 115.

[5] Ordericus Vitalis, ii. 380, iii. 296, 336, 348, 413.

William of Breteuil's intervention of 2 August was the act not of an official concerned for the due observance of legal formalities but of a baron who understood that the treasure at Winchester could be converted into military force for the mastery of England and the recovery of Normandy. In the battle of Tinchebrai which allowed Henry to recover control of Normandy, the role of the hired contingents from Brittany and Maine was decisive.[1]

The heavy and sustained war expenditure of these years between the Domesday survey and Tinchebrai was met in part by developments in judicial and financial organization and in part by irregular exactions which set up mounting political strains. Mr. Southern has shown that the apparently undiscriminating abuse heaped on Flambard by the chroniclers expresses not merely their resentment of the spoliation of the church but also their recognition of specific administrative developments and a general plan.[2] On one point William of Malmesbury has not received full justice. His comment on Flambard that, as translated by Stubbs, 'whenever a royal edict went forth taxing England at a certain sum, it was his custom to double it' reads like a loose generalization which cannot stand critical examination.[3] But William of Malmesbury's own language makes it probable that he was referring to the geld and not to all forms of taxation; and in 1096 the rate of geld was indeed double the normal rate. Moreover, if the knight-service of the abbey of Ely was raised from forty to eighty knights at this period there would be further ground for the charge of doubling.[4] And perhaps too much has been made of the fact that the word *scaccarium* does not appear in English records before the reign of Henry I. Rufus's writ of 1095 ordering the famous Worcester relief contains the clause *sicut per barones meos disposui*,[5] and it seems probable that this refers to the central board soon to be addressed as *barones mei de scaccario*.[6] But despite the substantial continuity of men and methods in the reigns of Rufus and Henry I, temporary concessions had to be

[1] Ordericus Vitalis, iv. 229–30; Henry of Huntingdon, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

[2] R. W. Southern, 'Ranulf Flambard and early Anglo-Norman administration', *Trans. R. Hist. S.*, 4th ser., xvi.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 97.

[4] *Liber Eliensis*, ed. D. J. Stewart, p. 276.

[5] J. H. Round, *Feudal England*, p. 309.

[6] E.g. in the writ of Henry I cited by R. L. Poole, *The Exchequer of the Twelfth Century*, p. 39, n. 4. A. L. Poole (*op. cit.*, p. 416) has called attention to an earlier mention of the barons of the exchequer in 1110.

made in 1100. Flambard went to the Tower and lucrative practices were renounced in the coronation charter. How then did Henry I finance the campaigns of the next few years? There are no records to answer this question; but it is interesting that Robert of Meulan advised Henry at this juncture to live on capital and promises, and to promise even London or York if necessary.[1] For it was after making similar concessions that Richard I lived temporarily on capital and is reported to have said that he would sell London itself if he could find a purchaser.[2]

After Tinchebrai it was both possible and expedient to reduce the scale of war expenditure. William of Malmesbury said justly of Henry that 'he preferred to fight with policy rather than with the sword: he triumphed, if he could, without spilling blood; if he could not, he spilt as little as possible'.[3] So successful was this policy that whereas Rufus was mourned by the knights to whom he had given full employment and high wages, Henry's peace was hated by the knights of England, reduced thereby to a slender diet.[4] Much of Henry's policy consisted in the skilful use of the orthodox techniques of diplomacy. In addition he employed the weapon of economic pressure. William of Malmesbury explains that Henry's relations with Murchertach, the High King of Ireland, were normally good, but that on one occasion Murchertach took an independent and insolent line. 'But soon', the historian went on, 'he was brought to reason by the embargo declared on shipping and trade. For what would Ireland be worth if goods were not shipped to it from England?'[5] Fortunately there is a scrap of record evidence to support this statement, for the Pipe Roll of 1130 shows that the burgesses of Gloucester rated Henry's influence in Ireland sufficiently highly to justify their offering him thirty marks for the recovery of money stolen from them in Ireland.[6] And when the pretender to the English throne was invested in 1127 with the county of Flanders, already importing wool from England, the embargo on trade drove the citizens of Bruges to rise against their count.[7] Another ingenious

[1] Ordericus Vitalis, iv. 112.
[2] Richard of Devizes in *Chronicles of the reign of Stephen*, etc., iii. 388.
[3] William of Malmesbury, *op. cit.*, ii. 488.
[4] *Ibid.*, ii. 540.
[5] *Ibid.*, ii. 484–5.
[6] *Pipe Roll 31 Henry I*, p. 77.
[7] Galbert of Bruges, *Histoire du meurtre de Charles le Bon*, ed. Pirenne, p. 152.

measure was the planting of a Flemish settlement in Pembrokeshire shortly after the Tinchebrai campaign, for Henry thereby freed himself of a potential source of disorder in England and provided himself with a method of restraining the Welsh less dangerous than that of a marcher lordship.[1]

By these methods defence expenditure was reduced but not abolished. The general comments of chroniclers show that, in their view, Henry continued to employ mercenary troops as a regular practice. William of Malmesbury tells us that Henry had been familiar from his youth with the readiness of the Bretons to serve for foreign pay, and that he, 'well aware of these characteristics, spent much on the Bretons whenever he needed mercenary knights, borrowing the faith of that faithless people with his coins'.[2] Robert of Torigni, a well-placed observer, emphasizes that even in the relative tranquillity of his last ten years Henry's wealth allowed him to defend his frontiers with large forces of knights whom he paid well and rewarded liberally.[3] Henry remembered these mercenaries on his deathbed, ordering Robert, earl of Gloucester, to pay them their wages and rewards from the treasury at Falaise, recently replenished from England.[4] The use of mercenaries was indeed a commonplace to the writers of this generation. Orderic Vitalis described the monks who gained promotion as abbots by currying favour with lay authorities as *stipendiarii non monachi*[5]; and Lawrence of Durham, explaining in the preface to one of his poems that the poet, like other men, required incentives, wrote of the farmer spurred on by the prospect of harvest, the pedlar by the motive of gain and the soldier by thinking of his wages.[6]

[1] William of Malmesbury, *op. cit.*, ii. 477: 'ut et regnum defaeceret, et hostium brutam temeritatem retunderet'.

[2] *Ibid.*, ii. 478.

[3] *Gesta Normannorum Ducum*, ed. J. Marx, p. 296.

[4] Ordericus Vitalis, v. 50. Robert of Torigni (*Chronicles of the reign of Stephen*, etc., iv. 129) adds the information that Earl Robert removed the bulk of this treasure, recently brought over from England.

[5] Ordericus Vitalis, ii. 225, where this phrase occurs in an elaborate comparison beginning 'Sicut Tironibus suae a principibus erogabantur stipendia militiae, sic quibusdam coronatis pro famulatu suo dabantur a laicis episcopatus et abbatiae . . .'

[6] Lawrence of Durham (Surtees Society, vol. lxx), p. 62. Cf. the provision for 'conducticii uel solidarii uero uel stipendiarii' in *Leges Henrici Primi* (Liebermann, *Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen*, i. 554).

On one of Henry's later campaigns we have information which, though fragmentary, is of particular interest when assembled. In the autumn of 1123 a powerful group of Norman barons, headed by Waleran of Meulan and Amaury de Montfort, planned rebellion in the interests of William Clito. The threat was the more formidable since it was backed by the resources of Fulk of Anjou and Louis of France. Against the rebels Henry, always nervous of treachery, employed mercenaries, drawn largely from Brittany: indeed, in this campaign he is said to have feared the treachery of his own men more than external attacks.[1] Henry's siege of Pontaudemer alone consumed six or seven weeks, though when it fell his Breton mercenaries were richly rewarded by the abundant loot.[2] On 25 March 1124 a group of the rebel leaders, including Waleran, rashly confident in themselves as the flower of the knighthood of Normandy and France, were captured by a superior force of Henry's mercenaries.[3] After this, resistance in Normandy quickly collapsed. In the summer of 1124 Henry planned a decisive stroke against Louis of France by persuading the emperor Henry V, his son-in-law and ally, to march on Rheims. Nothing more was achieved than a useful diversion of the French forces away from the Norman border, for the imperial army was too weak to risk moving beyond Metz. Henry I gave his son-in-law the characteristic advice to levy a tax.[4] He had already been applying that remedy in England. Because of the Norman rebellion heavy exactions were laid upon the people in England.[5] Two factors made these exactions the heavier to bear: a bad harvest, resulting in a famine, and a debasement of the currency which pushed prices still higher.[6] Against this background of unusual distress and heavy taxation it becomes possible to understand why the Anglo-Saxon chronicle singled out for particular mention the visitation of Ralph Bassett and his hanging of 'so many thieves as never were before' in Leicestershire in November 1124.

It also becomes possible to understand a little more clearly Henry's action in ordering the savage punishment of the English

[1] Symeon of Durham, ii. 274. [2] *Ibid.*
[3] Ordericus Vitalis, iv. 456–8.
[4] Otto of Freising, *Chronicon*, vii. 16.
[5] Symeon of Durham, ii. 274–5.
[6] *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, a. 1124; Symeon of Durham, ii. 275.

moneyers, carried out under Roger of Salisbury at Christmas 1124. The English writers describe this as simply a punishment of the moneyers who had issued coins below the proper standard of fineness.[1] But Robert of Torigni gives a more detailed account. During the Norman rebellion the English moneyers issued coins of which scarcely a third was silver, the rest being tin. When Henry's knights in Normandy received their wages in this currency and discovered that they could buy nothing with it, they complained to the king; and it was for this reason that Henry issued his savage orders to Roger of Salisbury.[2] The passage has several points of interest. It supplies further evidence that the continental campaigns were financed with English treasure; it demonstrates the pressure which the mercenaries could bring to bear on the king; and it illustrates the familiar technique of currency debasement in war finance. It is possibly significant that it was in 1108, shortly after the Tinchebrai campaign, that Henry found it necessary to take action against the clipping of the currency.[3] But a closer parallel is supplied by the substantial exports of tin to La Rochelle in 1195, for Lady Stenton has suggested that this too was used to adulterate the coinage in which Richard's troops were paid.[4] And there is the further parallel between Henry I's recoinage of 1125 and that carried out by John in 1205.[5]

But despite the temporary economic distress in England in 1123 and 1124, the English economy which supported the exactions of Henry I was neither primitive in its organization nor running at a low level of production and exchanges during the first four decades of the twelfth century. Vinogradoff's point about the connexion between the existence of 'natural economy' and a system of unpaid military service is a valid one; but no such economy existed in England at this period. Nor is it easy to find evidence for the view that conditions made it difficult for landlords to exact labour services and to move quantities of produce

[1] Symeon of Durham, ii. 281.

[2] *Gesta Normannorum Ducum*, p. 297.

[3] Florence of Worcester, ii. 57.

[4] Introduction to *Chancellor's Roll 8 Richard I* (Pipe Roll Society, N. S., vii), p. xix, where it is pointed out that some of Richard's continental pennies contained only three parts silver to nine of alloy.

[5] See summary of the evidence in introduction to *Pipe Roll 7 John* (Pipe Roll Society, N. S., vii) pp. xxvii–xxxii.

across the country. At Abingdon under Abbot Faricius, at Battle under Abbot Ralph, at Hereford under Bishop Geoffrey, at Lincoln under Robert Bloet, at Durham under Flambard and at Winchester under Henry of Blois there is evidence of enterprising management, the resumption of demesne lands, investment in improvements and a rapidly increasing revenue which supported the costs of greatly increased establishments of monks and canons, of lavish building programmes and of a higher and more civilized standard of living.[1] Nor does the evidence suggest that the long-distance transport of bulk produce by road or water was impossible or infrequent. Perhaps the references in the Anglo-Norman law-books to the special protection of roads and waterways prove little about the actual conditions.[2] It is more noteworthy that the timber for Abbot Faricius's building operations at Abingdon was brought from Wales by six wagons, each drawn by twelve oxen, the round trip taking six or seven weeks[3]; that a great bell cast in London for Durham was transported by road on a vehicle drawn by twenty-two oxen[4]; and that in 1121 Henry I cleared and deepened the Fossdyke, the canal linking Lincoln with Torksey, thus making possible the passage of shipping from the Wash to the Humber by inland waterways.[5]

There are frequent and revealing comments in William of Malmesbury's *Gesta Pontificum* on regional specialization in agriculture and on the organization and volume of trade. He describes the fertile orchards of the Vale of Gloucester and the volume of shipping handled by Bristol[6]; he stresses the predominantly pastoral economy of Cheshire and its dependence on trade with Ireland[7]; and he dwells on the importance of London as a centre of international trade and as a food market.[8] Moreover, the

[1] For Abbot Faricius, see *Historia Monasterii de Abingdon*, ii. 44–159, 286–90; for Abbot Ralph, *Chronicon Monasterii de Bello*, pp. 51–9; for Bishop Geoffrey, William of Malmesbury, *Gesta Pontificum* (R. S.), p. 304; for Robert Bloet, Henry of Huntingdon, *Epistola de Contemptu Mundi* (Appendix B to *Historia Anglorum*, R. S.), and Gerald of Wales, *Vita S. Remigii* in *Opera* (R. S.), vii. 31–2; for Flambard, Lawrence of Durham, *op. cit.*, p. 22; for Henry of Blois, Lena Voss, *Heinrich von Blois* (Historische Studien, Heft 210).

[2] See references given by F. M. Stenton, 'The Road System of Medieval England', *Economic History Review*, vii (1936).

[3] *Historia Monasterii de Abingdon*, ii. 150.

[4] Symeon of Durham, ii. 356–7.

[5] *Ibid.*, ii. 260.

[6] *Gesta Pontificum*, pp. 291–2.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 308.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 140.

nature of the economy of this period is reflected in some of Henry I's measures and decrees. If Edward I's abolition of the right of wreck is evidence that the activity of trade and commerce 'was becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile with the formal feudal structure',[1] it is relevant to remember that Henry I also issued an edict abolishing the right of wreck and giving the goods of a wrecked ship to any survivors.[2] If the Assize of Measures of 1196 is connected with the growth of English industry, and especially of the cloth industry,[3] it should be remembered that Henry I also punished the use of false measures and prescribed a standard width of cloth.[4] Just as the literary evidence shows that there was no rigid feudal tradition which made the use of paid troops unthinkable, so the evidence on economic organization and resources shows that these did not make it necessary to confine military effort within the narrow limits of the *servitium debitum* and the fyrd. The whole history of the development of Anglo-Norman administration is intelligible only in terms of the scale and the pressing needs of war finance: the expenditure on the wages of troops, the construction and repair of castles, the pensions to allies, the bribes which eased the course of campaigns and diplomacy, and the upkeep of the bureaucracy itself.

Richard FitzNeal's statement on the financial cost of war was indeed a platitude and a commonplace. But though platitudes are by definition dull and commonplaces unoriginal, it is only by recovering the commonplaces of a past age that the historian can hope to understand the working of its institutions and the subtleties of its politics. The truth and force of Richard FitzNeal's more precise statement that the wars of the Anglo-Norman period were financed from the *placita* and *conventiones* and from the urban communities is amply borne out by the entries in the Pipe Roll of 1130. For various fines and agreements the bishop of Ely was charged over £1,500; Robert fitz Walter £1,000 for an agreement with the king; Aubrey de Vere nearly £600; William de Pont de l'Arche 1,000 marks for the office and daughter of Robert Mauduit; the Jews of London were fined £2,000; and the chan-

[1] T. F. T. Plucknett, *Legislation of Edward I*, pp. 136–7.

[2] *Chronicon Monasterii de Bello*, p. 66.

[3] E. M. Carus-Wilson, 'The English Cloth Industry in the late Twelfth and early Thirteenth Centuries', *Economic History Review*, xiv (1944), 43–4.

[4] William of Malmesbury, *Gesta Regum*, ii. 487.

cellor bought his office for £3,006 13*s.* 4*d.*[1] The magnitude of these sums can be measured by the fact that a Danegeld for the whole country was producing only about £3,500. In the past sheriffs had been running up considerable arrears of debt on the farms of their counties. In 1130 a former sheriff of Wiltshire accounted for the considerable sum of £1,023 0*s.* 2*d.* under this heading.[2] But Richard Bassett and Aubrey de Vere, who held eleven counties in custody for the year 1129–30, had not only to pay their farms in full but also to pay in a surcharge of 1,000 marks on these counties, and of this sum 600 marks went straight into the Norman war-chest.[3] It is not surprising that in this same year, 1130, Henry had bad dreams on the score of his exactions, dreams vividly illustrated in drawings by John of Worcester, who took his information from Henry's personal physician.[4]

But more than bad dreams were needed to relax the weight and alter the methods of war finance: it needed, we know, the feudal reaction which followed the death of Henry, the weakness and folly of Stephen, *fere ydiota*, expressed in his reckless concessions, the disputed succession and the long civil war in which, according to Richard FitzNeal, the vital expertise of the Exchequer itself was almost entirely wiped out. Yet the acceptance of these explanations of the civil war under Stephen depends more on the frequency with which they have been repeated than on any compelling evidence to enforce them. There would have been nothing unprecedented in a disputed succession; but the disputed successions of Rufus and Henry I had not resulted in prolonged civil war. And on this occasion it would be more accurate to hold that the civil war caused the disputed succession than that the disputed succession caused the civil war. For, as Henry of Winchester pointed out in 1141, the empress had not disputed the succession effectively at the outset.[5] If Stephen made wide formal concessions in his second charter, so too had Henry I; and Stephen was careful to make the reservation *salva regia et justa dignitate mea*.[6] If we accuse Stephen of weakly basing his claim to the throne on

[1] *Pipe Roll 31 Henry I*, pp. 44, 90, 53, 37, 149, 140.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 16. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 63.
[4] *The Chronicle of John of Worcester*, ed. Weaver, pp. 32–3 and frontispiece.
[5] William of Malmesbury, *Historia Novella* (R. S.), ii. 575. Cf. *Historia Pontificalis*, ed. R. L. Poole, Appendix VI.
[6] Stubbs, *Select Charters*, 9th ed., p. 144.

election—*Dei gratia assensu cleri et populus*[1]—we must bring the same charge against Henry I, who described himself in 1100 as *nutu Dei, a clero et a populo Angliae electus*.[2] That a reaction followed the death of Henry I is certain. Even one of Henry's porters put himself at the head of a band of mercenary knights and pillaged the neighbourhood of Winchester.[3] Many of the porter's betters had more substantial grievances and greater opportunities to assert their interests. There was Richard FitzGilbert, who had been in the hands of the Jews in 1130, and who now demanded great favours from Stephen[4]; Ranulf of Chester, heavily indebted to the crown in 1130 and also in the hands of the Jews[5]; and all those anxious to recover lands from the church, castles from the crown and honours from Henry's grantees. Further, there were the claims and menaces of the Welsh, the Scots and the men of Anjou, all now enjoying exceptionally able and determined leadership.

What is not clear is that from the outset Stephen showed weakness in yielding to these demands and folly in failing to deal with these menaces. He did not strip himself of power by keeping his general promises on Danegeld, disafforestation and the freedom of ecclesiastical elections.[6] He refused the demands of Richard FitzGilbert and Baldwin de Redvers.[7] He understood the vital importance of control of the castles and compelled the surrender of those of Norwich, Bampton, Exeter, Bedford and Bamborough.[8] Nor can Stephen be fairly accused of ignoring the dangers on the borders of Scotland, Wales and Normandy. In February 1136 he led a very large army north and obtained from King David the surrender of Wark, Alnwick, Norham and Newcastle.[9] In November of that year he refused the demand of the

[1] Jolliffe, *The Constitutional History of Medieval England*, p. 203.

[2] Stubbs, *Select Charters*, p. 120.

[3] *Gesta Stephani*, p. 6.

[4] *Pipe Roll 31 Henry I*, p. 53; *Gesta Stephani*, p. 12.

[5] *Pipe Roll 31 Henry I*, pp. 110, 149.

[6] Henry of Huntingdon, *Historia Anglorum*, p. 258. Stephen's promise to abolish Danegeld is not elsewhere recorded. For Stephen's breach of his promises on the forest, see Round, *Geoffrey de Mandeville*, p. 378.

[7] *Gesta Stephani*, p. 12; Richard of Hexham, *Historia*, in *Chronicles of the reign of Stephen*, etc., iii. 146–7.

[8] Henry of Huntingdon, p. 259; *Gesta Stephani*, pp. 19–32; John of Hexham, *Historia*, in Symeon of Durham, ii. 291.

[9] Richard of Hexham, p. 146. Cf. Henry of Huntingdon, pp. 258–9.

Scots that Northumberland be granted to Henry of Scotland.[1] In February 1138 he led a counter-attack against the Scots[2]; and later in the year his despatch of a contingent of knights contributed materially to the decision of the northerners to fight the battle of the Standard.[3] Stephen's decision to leave the Welsh marches to their fate was only taken after he had seen the marcher lords frittering away the troops and money which he had sent to them in considerable quantities.[4] Moreover, in March 1137 Stephen landed in Normandy and made vigorous attempts to destroy the forces of Geoffrey of Anjou.[5] Henry of Huntingdon, no partisan of Stephen, said of the king during this stay in Normandy, that 'he completed brilliantly everything that he began'[6]; and it is necessary to set this judgement, even if too favourable, against the same writer's later and more often quoted comment that it was the king's habit to begin many things vigorously and then to pursue them slothfully.[7]

Why then was Stephen able to act so firmly during the first two years of his reign? And why did his position weaken during the following eighteen months until in June 1139 he sanctioned the arrest of Roger of Salisbury and the other members of his family? For that action meant the abandonment of the personalities, the policies and the political interests on which the strength of the monarchy had so long rested. No simple answers can be given to these questions.[8] But contemporaries noticed and emphasized one factor which does much to explain both Stephen's early firmness and later weakness: finance. When William of Malmesbury had to explain why his patron, Robert of Gloucester, did homage to Stephen in April 1136, he pointed out that Stephen had acquired the great reserve of treasure built up by Henry I and had accordingly been able to recruit a large force of mercenaries drawn largely from Flanders and Brittany.[9] Henry of

[1] Richard of Hexham, p. 151.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 155.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 161; John of Hexham, p. 292.
[4] *Gesta Stephani*, pp. 11–14.
[5] Ordericus Vitalis, v. 81–91.
[6] Henry of Huntingdon, p. 260: 'omnia quae incepit luculente perfecit'.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 283: 'mos regius erat, quod multa strenue inciperet, et segniter exsequeretur', referring to Stephen's conduct in 1151.
[8] For a recent discussion of the problem, see Isabel Megaw, 'The Ecclesiastical Policy of Stephen', *Essays in British and Irish History in honour of J. E. Todd*, ed. Cronne, Moody and Quinn.
[9] *Historia Novella*, p. 540.

Huntingdon gave precisely the same explanation for the fact that Geoffrey of Anjou concluded a truce with Stephen in 1137[1]; and from Orderic we learn that Geoffrey was then his wife's mercenary.[2] The strength of Robert and of Geoffrey was closely related to the size of Henry I's treasures in Normandy; the strength of Stephen to the much greater treasure left in England.[3] Other sources stress Stephen's military strength at this time. Richard of Hexham tells us that at the beginning of his reign Stephen 'collected very large bands of mercenary knights with which to carry out his policy in Normandy and England'.[4] The *Gesta Stephani* refers to his mobilization of a powerful force of knights who flocked to his support even before he seized the treasure at Winchester.[5] And Henry of Huntingdon described the army which Stephen led north in February 1136 as the largest within memory.[6] William of Ypres, Stephen's Flemish captain, had entered his service at least as early as 1137.[7] For the first two years of his reign Stephen was therefore able to follow the same policy as had his predecessor and to use the same instruments in politics, administration and war.

But not even Henry I's treasure, supplemented by ordinary sources of revenue and by the windfall treasure of the archbishop of Canterbury, seized on his death in 1136,[8] could long support expenditure at the rate involved by the campaigns of the first three years of Stephen's reign. According to the *Gesta Stephani*, the siege of Exeter alone cost £10,000.[9] Apart from the sums transmitted to the Welsh marches and the direct cost of the campaigns against rebels, the Scots and Geoffrey of Anjou, Stephen had other expenses. The Easter court of 1136 was notable for its splendour and extravagance.[10] In 1137 Stephen bought off the

[1] Henry of Huntingdon, p. 260.

[2] Ordericus Vitalis, v. 81–2: 'stipendiarius conjugi suae factus'.

[3] For Robert of Gloucester's share of Henry I's treasure at Falaise, see Ordericus Vitalis, v. 50, and Robert of Torigni, p. 129; for the Empress Matilda's share, see *Gesta Stephani*, p. 30.

[4] *Historia*, p. 145.

[5] *Gesta Stephani*, p. 6.

[6] *Historia Anglorum*, pp. 258–9.

[7] Ordericus Vitalis, v. 82–4; *Historia Novella*, p. 543.

[8] *Gesta Stephani*, p. 7.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 25. Cf. Henry of Huntingdon, p. 259: 'obsedit urbem Excestre . . . ibique diu morando, machinas multas construendo, multum thesauri sui absumpsit'.

[10] Henry of Huntingdon, p. 259.

claims of his brother Theobald for 2,000 marks and purchased the truce with Geoffrey of Anjou for an annual payment of 2,000 marks, the first instalment being paid at once.[1] Just as Stephen's possession of financial reserves helps to explain the nature of his actions during the first three years of his reign, so the running down and exhaustion of those reserves helps to explain both the mounting confidence of his opponents and the ability of a coalition of mercenaries and magnates to force the hand of the king in June 1139.

William of Newburgh tells us that in 1138 and 1139 the exhaustion of Henry I's treasures meant that Stephen could do less and had to act more gently, and that the evils then began.[2] Three other independent and contemporary sources emphasize Stephen's financial exhaustion and its consequences. William of Malmesbury says that in 1139 Stephen was making good his expenses by robbing others, and ascribes his attack on the church to the counsellors who persuaded the king that he need never lack money while the monasteries were full of treasure.[3] He adds that in 1140 Stephen ordered the currency to be lightened because Henry's treasure was exhausted and he could not meet the expenditure on so many knights.[4] The *Gesta Stephani* similarly attributes Stephen's attack on the church to 'evil counsellors . . . and financial necessity, which admits no law or reason'.[5] And Henry of Huntingdon connects the evils of 1140 with the fact that the great royal treasure had disappeared.[6] The statement in the *Gesta* that Stephen's action against the bishops was instigated

[1] Robert of Torigni, p. 124.

[2] *Historia Rerum Anglicarum*, in *Chronicles of the reign of Stephen*, etc., i. 33.

[3] *Historia Novella*, pp. 547, 543.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 562. This statement by a writer ordinarily careful on questions of coinage has sometimes been dismissed on the ground that it alleges debasement by Stephen, whereas the surviving coins are of a fine standard (Howlett in *Chronicles of the reign of Stephen*, etc., iii, pp. xxviii, lii; Corbett in *Cambridge Medieval History*, v. 553). But William of Malmesbury clearly refers to a reduction in the weight of the coins: 'pondus denariorum . . . alleviari'. There is, however, more evidence to support this charge against the coins issued by the Empress Matilda than against those of Stephen. See G. C. Brooke, *Catalogue of English Coins in the British Museum: The Norman Kings*, i, pp. lxxv, cxix.

[5] *Gesta Stephani*, pp. 18, 50. Cf. p. 74 for the depleted state of the treasury at Winchester after the battle of Lincoln.

[6] *Historia Anglorum*, p. 267: 'ingens thesauri copia jam deperierat'.

by evil advisers may perhaps be dismissed as the attempt of an apologist to exculpate the king. But William of Malmesbury, an Angevin partisan, also went out of his way to absolve Stephen and fix the responsibility on his advisers.[1] Contemporaries were then agreed in holding that financial need placed Stephen at the mercy of the dissident magnates and unpaid mercenary captains. What these men wanted is plain: crown lands, recognition of hereditary claims, control of castles and boroughs, freedom from the forest laws, patronage for their followers and spoliation of the church. And at the Council of Oxford in which the arrest of the bishops was ordered, a sweeping programme of despoiling the church in the interest of king and barons was formally adopted.[2]

It is impossible to explain the complicated events of these years solely in terms of finance. Nevertheless, the history of the first five years of Stephen's reign lends point to Richard FitzNeal's remark that it is the abundance or want of money which raises or depresses the power of princes.[3] That remark, like so much else in the Treasurer's preface, was a commonplace; and it is only worth while calling attention to the validity of these commonplaces on war and finance in the Anglo-Norman state because the nature of our evidence and of much of the work upon that evidence make it easy to miss their significance. The incidents of tenure by knight-service have left deep and enduring traces upon the records of English history, for those incidents were of permanent importance to the holders of land and to the crown. The shifting expedients of war finance—contracts for contingents of paid troops, pensions to allies, expenditure on fortifications and materials and manipulations of the currency—have left but few and faint traces in the records for the Anglo-Norman period, partly because they were shifting expedients and there was therefore the less need to preserve any written record of them. For that reason, the detailed history of the war finance of this period cannot be written. But it does not therefore follow that these expedients were insignificant at the time or that we must set the

[1] *Historia Novella*, p. 543.

[2] *Chronicle of John of Worcester*, p. 55: 'statutum est ut omnia per Angliam oppida, castella, munitiones quaeque in quibus secularia solent exerceri negotia, regis et baronum suorum iuri cedant'.

[3] *Dialogus de Scaccario*, p. 1.

political and social history of this period in a rigid framework of feudalism. We do not know how far those who owed knight-service performed it in person. Certainly the chroniclers and historians who are the primary sources for the political history of this period tell us of the presence of barons in sieges and campaigns; but they also tell us much about the paid service of mercenary troops, of other forms of war expenditure and of the relations between finance and policy. Moreover, they never use the term feudalism, that convenient but dangerous anachronism. 'Where would political history be', asked one great scholar, 'if it were not for the chronicles?' That was said by Tout.[1] It is difficult to argue that Orderic Vitalis and William of Malmesbury did not understand the society in which they lived; and fortunately just enough scraps of record evidence have survived to show that what they and other writers of the early twelfth century said on the general subject of war and finance deserves to be taken seriously.

[1] *Collected Papers of T. F. Tout*, iii. 18.

THE FORMATION OF THE COALITION CABINET OF 1852

By C. H. Stuart, M.A.

READ 14 MARCH 1953

'QUEL grand ministère!' wrote Princess Lieven to Lord Aberdeen on 26 December 1852. 'Mais quel curieux spectacle, vous, Lord John, Lord Palmerston! Qui est le fou qui eût osé prédire cette trinité?'

The princess's surprise at this alliance was shared by her contemporaries, among whom the old Tory Lord Londonderry could hardly contain his indignation, writing of it to Clarendon as 'this grandissima Coalition-Composition (which either seems to have dropped from the skies or been conjured in the regions below)', and adding that 'so utterly meretricious . . . and apparently indelicate and inexplicable alliance was never before contemplated, much less seen'.[1] It is true that some form of alliance had long been expected as the logical solution to the problem of weak minority government that had persisted since 1846, but it was not envisaged in the form, which it ultimately took in December 1852, of an all-embracing union of the Whigs and the former followers of Peel.[2] As late as February 1852 Gladstone had spoken of union with the Whigs as the 'least natural position' for Peel's followers, and his opinion was shared by others.[3]

[1] *The correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and Princess Lieven*, ed. E. Jones Parry, ii. 640; Herbert Maxwell, *Life and letters of the 4th Earl of Clarendon*, i. 354.

[2] The exclusion of Aberdeen or of Palmerston from such an alliance was usually assumed; see C. F. C. Greville, *A journal of the reign of Queen Victoria from 1837 to 1852* (London, 1885), iii. 176, 437–8. On one occasion the exclusion of both was mooted; see Ellice to Aberdeen, 31 December 1851, in *Selections from the correspondence of George, Earl of Aberdeen, K.G., K.T., Part III, 1850–60* (privately printed, without date), p. 210. These printed selections from Aberdeen's correspondence are available in the Manuscripts Department of the British Museum, catalogue reference, Press C. 35. d.

[3] Morley unaccountably transposed this comment of Gladstone's and applied it to the idea of 'Peelism single-handed'; see John Morley, *Life of*

In fact, between 1846 and 1852 at least four other solutions were seriously considered by active politicians as means of ending the deadlock. Conservative reunion between protectionists and Peelites was one, a protectionist alliance with Palmerston another, and with the old Whigs a third[1]; finally, there was the long nursed ambition of Peel's followers to return single-handed. Gladstone later argued that independent office was outside their limited conceptions, but this is not supported by the language of his contemporary memoranda. Certainly, after Peel was dead, the idea of an independent third-party government was widely entertained among his followers, by Gladstone himself, by Newcastle, by Argyll, and even by Aberdeen, who told Russell in the summer of 1852 that, if achieved, it would be a 'fitting termination to the contest of the last six years'.[2] Even when the coalition was being formed, Stafford Northcote submitted a memorandum to Gladstone urging an independent Peelite administration. 'I cannot help believing', he wrote, 'in an *ἀναβασις* of the 35 (i.e. Peelites) which might eclipse that of the 10,000.'[3]

My purpose in this paper is to show how this unexpected coalition came about in place of other, apparently more probable, solutions of the political problem.

In seeking to answer this question, I propose to analyse the

William Ewart Gladstone (Lloyd's popular edition, London, 1908), i. 310. In fact, Gladstone's memorandum of 25 February 1852, in Add. MS. 44778, shows that he referred to a 'junction with the liberals'.

[1] For the idea of conservative reunion see Gladstone's memoranda of December 1848 and 27 February 1850 in Add. MS. 44777; Jones Parry, *op. cit.*, ii. 384, 421; and Stanley to Aberdeen, 14 June 1851, in Add. MS. 43072, fo. 180. For the possibility of a junction between Palmerston and the protectionists see Graham to Peel, 13 November 1849, in Add. MS. 40452, and Greville, *op. cit.*, iii. 396 (where he also refers to the idea of a Whig-protectionist combination) and 448–9. For the Whigs' connexion with the protectionists see Lincoln to Peel, 18 November 1847, in Add. MS. 40481, and *The Croker Papers*, ed. Louis J. Jennings (2nd edn. London, 1885), iii. 238–9.

[2] Morley, *op. cit.*, i. 261; Gladstone's memorandum of 23 April 1851 in Add. MS. 44777; John Martineau, *Life of Henry Pelham, 5th Duke of Newcastle*, p. 112, n.; Argyll to Aberdeen, 27 February 1852, and Aberdeen to Russell, 8 August 1852, in *Aberdeen Correspondence*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 244–6, 329–30.

[3] Memorandum of December 1852 in Add. MS. 44778.

part played by the traditional forces making ministries—the court, the men of official rank or experience (that is, ministers or ministers out of office), and the House of Commons.[1]

So far as the influence of the court is concerned, printed sources are extremely reticent. Nearly all the great biographies and collections of letters of the period were published before 1914, and many of them before 1900. At that time it was reasonable and proper to omit references to the queen and her personal advisers which might have caused pain or shown lack of respect towards living people. Recently more evidence has been made available, but unfortunately this increase of information has been accompanied by excessive claims in respect of the political influence of the court.[2] It will be my aim here to state the case between ignorance and adulation.

The chief difficulty in assessing the activities of the official men consists in the exclusively biographical approach which has been applied to the problem. The story has been told many times from differing personal standpoints, but no critical version using all this material exists, except for the posthumous fragment by Halévy. Indeed, Greville's Journal is still the best account. A further difficulty arises from the faulty memories of those who took part, and from the excessive filial piety of Lord Stanmore, Aberdeen's younger son and biographer.[3] From this has arisen an interpretation of the events leading up to the coalition which makes Aberdeen the hero, Newcastle the scapegoat, and Gladstone the judicious observer waiting on events. It will be my second purpose to set this balance even, and to offer an interpretation in keeping with the evidence of the time.

[1] In using this analysis, more commonly applied to politics before the first Reform Act, I have found, as Mr. Kitson Clark has shown, 'how near to the political morals and methods of the eighteenth century was much that went on in the middle of the nineteenth.' G. S. R. Kitson Clark, 'The Electorate and the Repeal of the Corn Laws', *Trans. R. Hist. Soc.*, 5th Series, i (1951), 111.

[2] The most recent biographer of the prince consort has claimed, for example, that the coalition of 1852 was 'the creation of Prince Albert' who 'enjoyed more political power and influence than any English sovereign since King Charles II' (Roger Fulford, *The Prince Consort*, pp. 152, 117).

[3] Arthur Gordon, Lord Stanmore, *The Earl of Aberdeen*, p. 323. 'He who undertakes to write the life of a public man incurs obligations to historical truth which are paramount. . . . But the claims of filial piety are not less imperative.'

In dealing with the House of Commons there is the same difficulty of a later version being imposed on events. This is the idea of an organized Peelite party acting together in unison to hold the balance in the Commons. The danger here is of ascribing to the Peelites, other than the official men, weight as a third party which they did not have. Morley gave this point proper emphasis, but he used too readily in conjunction Gladstone's contemporary letters and later memories.[1]

If we count Peel's official staff as about a dozen, the House of Commons elected in 1847 contained roughly ninety backbenchers professing free trade principles and looking to Peel as their leader. Of these, about sixty had voted with him in June 1846. Peel refused at any time to organize them, and when Aberdeen sent him Lord Brougham's calculations of his party's strength in the new house in August 1847, he retorted that it was a calculation he had not taken the trouble to make.[2] The consequence of this attitude was that his followers began either to drift back to the protectionists or to link up with the Whig government. So, although their votes were difficult to forecast and in this way prolonged the uncertainty hanging over Russell's government, yet as Gladstone admitted in June 1849, they 'did not exercise any considerable degree of permanent influence as a body'.[3] While Peel lived, this process was gradual, but it had reached a critical stage in the last months of his life. The move towards the protectionists was demonstrated in February 1850 when, on Disraeli's motion on agricultural distress, more of Peel's followers voted with them than with Peel himself.[4] Nor could he prevent a similar leakage to the Whigs, and in the division after the Don Pacifico debate, in June 1850, twenty of his followers supported Palmerston.[5]

[1] Morley, *op. cit.*, i. 259–61. The biographers of Disraeli also pointed out the weakness of the Peelite group in the parliament of 1847–52, but they were mainly concerned to demonstrate the influence of 'Disraeli's policy' in bringing this about. See W. F. Monypenny and G. E. Buckle, *Life of Benjamin Disraeli*, iii. 379.

[2] My calculations of Peel's following are based on C. R. Dod, *Electoral Facts 1832–53* (2nd edn. London, 1853). Peel's comment to Aberdeen is in Add. MS. 43065, fos. 322–6, and Add. MS. 40455, fos. 434–7.

[3] Morley, *op. cit.*, i. 260.

[4] C. S. Parker, *Sir Robert Peel*, iii, 532–3, giving an extract from a letter in Add. MS. 40603.

[5] Morley, *op. cit.*, i. 276.

After Peel's death this separation of the Peelite leaders from their back-benchers was accelerated, particularly during 1851 over the Ecclesiastical Titles bill. In October of that year, Gladstone complained bitterly to Newcastle of their 'disorganized condition', and urged that 'we should not continue to earn Burke's description of the independent gentlemen as those on whom nobody can depend'.[1] He attempted, during the early part of 1852, to rectify this situation, and in later life he claimed that he had been so far successful as to keep Derby's ministry in office by the organized action of some forty of Peel's friends.[2] In fact, this was hardly the case. In three divisions on the Militia bill, for example, Derby would still have survived even if all the possible Peelites who supported his government had switched their votes.[3] In any event, by this stage, Gladstone was drilling converts. Several of the thirty-odd names he noted as men who 'would not join or fuse in the Liberal party', whatever the official men might do, were already merged among the Derbyites. Four of them stood as Derbyites in the general election in July and another gave up his seat in that interest. Similarly, of twenty-four names listed by Mrs. Herbert in May 1852 for a dinner-party for what she called 'the fag end of the Peel Party' six stood as supporters of Derby and two more gave up their seats to men of similar sympathies.[4]

There can be no doubt that the number of back-benchers who would continue in suspension between the two main parties was extremely small by the summer of 1852, and that their influence in divisions was less than is usually supposed. The results of the general election of 1852 further illustrate this point. It is quite wrong to think of this election as a Peelite massacre. Of the so-called Peelites seeking re-election more were successful standing as Derbyites or liberals than were defeated retaining their liberal-

[1] Gladstone to Newcastle, 22 October 1851, in Add. MS. 44262.

[2] Morley, *op. cit.*, i. 315, quoting a memorandum of 1876.

[3] The divisions of 26 April, 6 May and 7 June; in the first the government majority was 150, including 63 quondam Peelites, in the second these figures were 131 and 36, and in the third, 72 and 34. See *Hansard*, 3rd series, cxx. 1185–8; cxxi. 346–9 and cxxii, 181–2.

[4] Gladstone's memorandum of 12 March 1852 in Add. MS. 44778; and Mrs. Herbert to Gladstone, 15 May 1852, in Add. MS. 44210. For individual results in the general election of 1852 I have relied on Dod, *op. cit.*

BIBL. LONDIN UNIV

conservative label.[1] Thus the reduction in their numbers resulted not so much from defeats at the polls as from changing allegiances within the House of Commons. Even among the thirty-five who retained their Peelite identity in the new house nearly half voted with Disraeli on the budget in December.[2] Thus the view that the ministerial problem after 1846 was created by the existence of a third party holding the balance, and that it was resolved by the union of this party with the Whigs in the 1852 coalition, does not fit the facts. The Peelite party scarcely existed by the end of 1852, and Peelite votes certainly did not account for the formation of the coalition.

In dealing at length with the fortunes of the Peelites other than their leaders, it has been my purpose to show that the influence of their votes in the House of Commons was of less importance to political developments than is generally supposed. For this reason it will be wise to concentrate more intensively on the parts played by the official men and by the court.

If crown, ministers and commons, and their relationships with one another, provide the key to the politics of the years between 1846 and 1852, nevertheless, to avoid a mechanical and unreal answer, their working must be seen in the context of outside conditions. In particular, two recurrent fears were entertained by politicians, fear of France and fear of democracy. The breach with France over the Spanish marriages and, later, the rise of Louis Napoleon to absolute power made thinking men of all political colours anxious for England's defences. Russell, Graham and Aberdeen were all concerned about defence from the autumn of 1851 onwards. Six weeks before the coalition was formed Russell wrote that in view of Louis Napoleon's arrogance it was time for men of liberal principles to draw nearer together.[3] At

[1] 15 former Peelites stood successfully as Derbyites and 6 as liberals; 18 candidates were defeated standing as liberal-conservatives.

[2] *Hansard*, 3rd series, cxxiii. 1693–5. In August 1852 Russell wrote sarcastically to Aberdeen, 'I hear that Mr. S. Herbert reckons that of the 50 Peelites, 27 will vote with Ministers and 23 against. This is a somewhat odd account of an united party.' Netherby MSS. (I am greatly indebted to Sir Fergus Graham for his permission to make use of the manuscripts at Netherby.)

[3] Russell to Graham, 30 October 1852, in Netherby MSS.

the same time the growth of England's industrial population and memories of Chartist agitation made many observers nervous of social disturbances, particularly in relation to the French challenge. Hardinge put this point to Graham in October 1851:

> 'What would happen in the Potteries, Collieries and great towns,' he asked, 'when labour was suspended and some hundreds of thousands of able bodied men [were] demanding pay and food, the instant an invading force were to be telegraphed over the country?'[1]

These two fears were accompanied by a widely held suspicion of aggressive popery, based on serious thought though nourished by the innate prejudices of a long-established protestant country. As Argyll explained to Aberdeen in August 1851:

> I wish I could believe with you that 'all danger from any temporal power' on the part of the Roman Catholic priesthood is chimerical. If I did believe this, I might have seen the *Aggression* met with silent contempt without reluctance. But I really do not think we are at all entitled to be so confident on this head. There is undoubtedly an appearance at present of a coming revival of Papal principles in the minds of individual men, and, in alliance with the struggles of the temporal Governments throughout Europe.[2]

The natural starting point in considering the origins of the coalition of 1852 is the death of Peel in July 1850. In the four years after his resignation he had preserved Russell's government in office by his influence on the court, by his restraining hold on his erstwhile colleagues and by his ability always to carry some

[1] Hardinge to Graham, 6 October 1851, in Netherby MSS. Cornewall Lewis made much the same point in a letter to Graham of 20 April 1848 in Add. MS. 40452.

[2] Add. MS. 43304, fos. 48–51. Cf. Maxwell, *op. cit.*, i. 315, 330, and *Life of John, Lord Campbell*, ed. Hon. Mary Scarlett Hardcastle (London, 1881), ii. 306. Economic conditions also played an important part in influencing the decisions of politicians in these years. To some extent it was the revival of agricultural prosperity during 1851 which made political reconstruction more feasible by putting an end to protection as a practical policy. But a purely economic interpretation of political developments in 1851–2 meets the insuperable objection that, when protection was finally abandoned, Peel's staff did not rejoin their old party but merged with the liberals.

back-benchers with him on doubtful issues in the commons. But even before his death there were signs that he could not permanently maintain this situation. The queen and Prince Albert, who respected his advice, were beginning to grow restive at a situation which involved them in enduring Palmerston as foreign secretary, more particularly as their plans for transferring him within the government had made little progress. Similarly, the other Peelite leaders were tiring of what Cardwell called 'the cold baked meats of Praise and Self-approval',[1] and now hoped for a return to office. Graham, it is true, generally followed Peel's lead without making difficulties, but Newcastle, Cardwell and Gladstone, 'the impatients' as Greville called them in 1848, deeply resented what Brougham termed Peel's 'dog-in-the-manger' policy.[2] They hoped to force Peel into office, and when each successive opportunity was passed by, they relapsed into defeatist introspection. Even in the commons, as we have seen, Peel's control of votes was in decline by the end of his life.

Peel's death, therefore, merely released forces already present in the political world. At court, the emphasis moved from plans to transfer Palmerston towards larger ideas of a remodelled government which would exclude him while bringing in Peel's friends. The prince was well aware, as he told Stockmar, that Peel's followers were not prepared 'to bear with patient resignation their own permanent exclusion from office'.[3] Among the latter, Peel's death was greeted with universal sorrow, but all felt in it a political release. As Gladstone admitted many years later, 'I did not think that the death of Sir R. Peel, at the time when it occurred, was a great calamity so far as the chief question of our internal politics was concerned.'[4] Finally, in the commons, Russell was greatly weakened by the loss of his most regular supporter.

'The minute study of politics', stated the *Edinburgh Review* in

[1] Cardwell to Bonham, 23 October 1851, in Add. MS. 40617.

[2] Greville, *op. cit.*, iii. 199. Brougham to Aberdeen, August 1848, in *Aberdeen Correspondence*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 22–4.

[3] Theodore Martin, *Life of the Prince Consort*, ii. 297.

[4] Morley, *op cit.*, i. 276, quoting a memorandum of 1876. For Newcastle's view see Martineau, *op. cit.*, p. 99; and for Aberdeen's comment see Lady F. Balfour, *Life of George, 4th Earl of Aberdeen*, ii. 158.

discussing this period, 'resolves itself very much into a study of character.'[1] To understand how politicians acted we must consider what sort of men they were. Of those known for their wider careers, such as Palmerston, Gladstone and Disraeli, I need not speak; it is with the lesser characters that I am concerned, particularly Russell, Aberdeen, Graham, Herbert and Newcastle.

Russell is generally remembered for his long struggle with Palmerston and for the purity of his Whiggism, which led him in later life to lecture the queen on the principles of the Revolution of 1688. But the quality in him which I would emphasize first is his striking inability to manage people, whether in cabinet or in parliament. When he offered Clarendon the lord-lieutenancy of Ireland it was done, so the injured party observed, 'in his most cold, short, abrupt, indifferent manner—much as if he was disposing of a tide-waiter's place to an applicant'.[2] Secondly, Russell was cursed with a precipitate nature which launched him into far-reaching actions on the spur of the moment. And lastly, he was infected with a passionate love of office which made him determined to hold on when in power and to force himself forward when out of it. All this went with great courage, long political experience and a sharp, somewhat school-marmish, intelligence.

Aberdeen is commemorated for his personal qualities of 'tact, truthfulness and dignity' which Argyll later claimed to have been the foundations of the coalition. Now these qualities were certainly present in him, but they might equally well be described as weakness, naïveté and formality of manner. Certainly he made little impression on several acute observers. 'I am quite sure', Mrs. Arbuthnot noted in 1821, 'that Lord Aberdeen, with all his reputation for sense, is a pompous fool', and many years later Emily Eden wrote of him as 'a cold, yellow Scotchman turned up with black and malice'.[3] Even his friends were aware of his limitations. Gladstone observed that his unsuspecting nature made him as a child in politics; and Newcastle spoke of his 'want of manner or knowledge of how to deal with mankind' and of

[1] 'Correspondence of Earl of Aberdeen. 1850–1853', *The Edinburgh Review*, clviii (1883), 548.

[2] Maxwell, *op. cit.*, i. 276.

[3] George Douglas, 8th Duke of Argyll, *Autobiography and Memoirs*, i. 388. *The Journal of Mrs. Arbuthnot*, ed. Francis Bamford and the Duke of Wellington, i. 84, and cf. ii. 73. Maxwell, *op. cit.*, i. 352.

'his lack of courage'.[1] He was clearly indifferent to office and took little trouble to acquaint himself with the facts about persons or policies outside the world of foreign affairs.[2] He had abilities, and his part in events during 1852 was important, as we shall see, but both have been much exaggerated, and he was quite unqualified to be prime minister. 'The task is one to which I was never equal,' he wrote early in 1853. 'Nec aetas, nec mens.'[3] The impression left by his correspondence is less favourable than that alleged by his son. Often his anxiety to smooth difficulties led him to obscure issues. He excelled in the soft answer; and his letters hide the unpleasant hardness of reality in a gentle Scotch mist of truism and banality.

Where Russell was precipitate and Aberdeen politically unaware, Graham was for ever anticipating the difficulties of the future with remarkable foresight and skill. This political clairvoyance was, however, accompanied by astonishing political timidity. Aberdeen told him that he was like Gentz, who had begun all his letters to Metternich with 'Mon Prince, j'ai peur . . .'; and Londonderry observed with soldierly bluntness that he was not a man to lead a forlorn hope.[4] This combination of acuteness and caution made him the object of constant suspicion for friends and enemies, and debarred him from consideration as a leader, although he probably had no ambitions in that direction. He preferred to be the moving spirit behind events rather than to be the chief figure himself. This facet of his character explains his dependence, after Peel's death, on Aberdeen, who was far beneath him in ability and foresight.

When the Oxford examiners placed Gladstone in the first class, they relegated Herbert to the fourth. Though poor health may

[1] Morley, *op. cit.*, ii. 620; Martineau, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

[2] Six months before he became prime minister Aberdeen attended a dinner party at which he sat next to the radical M.P., Horsman. Afterwards, he wrote with surprise to his son that Horsman had 'appeared gentlemanlike and well-informed' and had even spoken with 'moderation and good sense'. 'I suppose', he concluded in explanation of this unexpected phenomenon, 'he was on his guard.' See *Aberdeen Correspondence*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 290–1.

[3] Aberdeen to Everett, 13 January 1853, in Add. MS. 43301.

[4] Aberdeen to Graham, 29 August 1847, in *Selections from the Correspondence of George, Earl of Aberdeen, K.G., K.T., 1845–8* (privately printed at Colombo, 1885). Londonderry to Aberdeen, 8 March 1851, in Add. MS. 43247, fos. 184–6. See also Greville, *op. cit.*, iii. 418.

have been the cause of this result, Herbert's intellectual qualities were, in a sense, those of that rare specimen, the genuine fourth-class man.[1] He had some intelligence and judgement but neither the vigour nor the stamina to use them. In argument, Gladstone noted, he put forward a sensible opinion but did not 'vigorously or toughly sustain it in ensuing debate'. Argyll noticed the same quality pointing to the 'attitude of the statue in which he is commemorated . . . It is an attitude that wants power and strength'.[2] Herbert's sweetness of character and great personal charm concealed this political weakness, while his genuine piety increased it. He made his political yardstick the spirit of the Gospel, and so pure a view of the world severely limited him as a politician.[3]

Finally there is Newcastle, as I will call him, though he did not succeed to that title until 1851. If Herbert was rightly placed in the fourth class, it was equally suitable that Newcastle, as the son of a nobleman, should have been granted a degree without examination. He was always conscious of his great position and of the regard due to it. It was said of him 'that he did not remember his rank unless you forgot it'.[4] But he was not a mere idle lordling. He was an able political organizer with ambitions which were in keeping with his capacities and experience. Possibly because he proved a poor administrator in the Crimean war, he has been pilloried as an ambitious and unpractical dreamer in the period leading up to the coalition. This was not, in fact, the case. His ambitions were recognized by his friends and encouraged by the court. His fault in politics lay in the bitterness of his feelings rather than in the excess of his ambitions.[5]

Of these personalities none realized the political implications

[1] Morley, *op. cit.*, i. 58; Lord Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert*, i. 14; and *University Calendar* (Oxford, 1832), p. 146.

[2] Add. MS. 44778; Argyll, *op. cit.*, i. 380–1.

[3] Stanmore, *op. cit.*, i. 82. Cf. W. S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, i. 251. 'The Sermon on the Mount is the last word in Christian ethics. Everyone respects the Quakers. Still, it is not on these terms that Ministers assume their responsibilities of guiding States.'

[4] Morley, *op. cit.*, i. 366, n. 1.

[5] Peel, recognizing this feature of Newcastle's character, once wrote of him that 'his predominant feeling is and will continue to be equal hatred of the Whigs and of the purely protectionist party'. Peel to Graham, 29 September 1848, in Netherby MSS.

of Peel's death more clearly than Russell. With a dissatisfied court—in August 1850 he admitted that he was powerless to remove Palmerston[1]—and without any reliance on Peel's followers in the commons, he was greatly in need of reinforcement if he was to retain his position, more particularly as the incapacity of his financial measures had alienated many of his radical supporters. It was this situation in the autumn of 1850 that led him to plunge into the treacherous marsh of religious politics with his letter to the bishop of Durham castigating the impertinence of the pope's claim to establish Roman Catholic dioceses with territorial titles in England. His purpose was primarily to gain the approbation of protestant England. Secondly, he hoped to weaken the Peelite leaders, several of whom were tarred with Puseyism, by forcing them into declaring in favour of the papists, thus separating them from the erastian court and from their own protestant back-benchers. In so acting he forgot the Irish.

The protestant uproar in England, which he encouraged, caused Clarendon great embarrassment in Ireland. In itself, this need not have had lasting political significance. The outcry in England was expected to blow itself out in a short time and in Ireland Clarendon's first fears proved exaggerated.[2] But Russell had committed himself so far that there was no drawing back, and he found himself forced to introduce the Ecclesiastical Titles bill into the commons in February 1851. This measure intensified and prolonged agitation in the country, while in the House of Commons it turned the Irish Roman Catholic members bitterly against the government which they had hitherto supported. Its only benefit for Russell was that, as he had hoped, it separated the Peelite back-benchers from their leaders. In this way, as Graham later observed, he tried to use the religious question as a 'solvent of the Peel party'.[3] For all the Peelite official men eventually declared against the bill.

Their motives in doing so have never been fully analysed and their biographers have been content to ascribe their action solely

[1] *The letters of Queen Victoria*, ed. A. C. Benson and Viscount Esher (London, 1908), ii. 261–4.

[2] Lewis to Graham, 27 January 1851, and Clarendon to Graham, 18 December 1850, both in Netherby MSS.

[3] Graham to Cardwell, 27 January 1852, in Netherby MSS. This letter is printed in truncated form by C. S. Parker, *Life and letters of Sir James Graham*, ii. 152.

to their concern for religious liberty. Contemporaries were more sceptical; as Disraeli told Stanley, 'the idea that the Peelites are very Catholic arises from the tone of the *Chronicle*, but that is Sidney Herbert'.[1] Herbert was innocent enough, as was Aberdeen, but both Graham and Gladstone recognized the political implications of their unpopular action. Gladstone wrote from Naples in January 1851 warning Herbert against the 'snares in the path' which Russell's letter had occasioned, and urging 'marked reserve' so that the government should be made to take full responsibility for any action it proposed. Graham had made the same point a month earlier when he argued that the decision of Stanley and the protectionists to support the anti-papal policy was 'a new ingredient in the dismemberment of parties' which 'prescribed more than usual caution' in all future conduct.[2] The political point behind this caution was simple. Once both major parties had declared against the papists, then by championing religious liberty the Peelite leaders would not only satisfy their consciences but also win the gratitude and support of the Irish members. The correctness of this analysis was soon demonstrated. Within a week of the vote on the first reading of the Ecclesiastical Titles bill, Russell was defeated on a radical proposal to extend the franchise, and thereupon resigned. Cornewall Lewis noted afterwards that 'the resignation of ministers was . . . produced by the defection of the Irish members'.[3]

Russell's resignation opened a cabinet crisis of nearly a fortnight. The court hoped to secure a Whig-Peelite government from which Palmerston would be excluded, and the prince even sketched 'for his own amusement' a rough draft allotting offices in such a coalition.[4] Russell, rather than lose office, was prepared to negotiate. Even Stanley recommended that such a plan be tried before he took on the task. Yet nothing came of the negotiations which followed. First Aberdeen and Graham, with the blessing of the court, were encouraged to agree with Russell, but rejected all compromise on the question of the Ecclesiastical Titles bill. Then Aberdeen himself was asked by the queen to form a

[1] Monypenny and Buckle, *op. cit.*, iii. 272.

[2] Stanmore, *op. cit.*, i. 136–7, 133–4.

[3] Sir George Cornewall Lewis, *Letters to various friends*, ed. Rev. Sir Gilbert Frankland Lewis (London, 1870), p. 238.

[4] *Letters of Queen Victoria*, ii. 295, and Martin, *op. cit.*, ii. 353, n. 1.

government, but again pleaded the difficulty of the religious question. Finally, when Stanley had tried and failed, Russell returned with his previous cabinet. 'For 3 weeks', Gathorne Hardy noted in his journal, 'we have been in hot water to boil a shrimp'.[1]

But there was more to all this than appeared on the surface. Graham had taken the lead in negotiations with Russell and it was never his purpose to complete a coalition. 'Sir James raised nothing but difficulties', the prince noted. For his object, as Greville astutely observed, 'was reconciliation with John Russell and the Whigs, and ultimate junction with them, after Stanley should have failed'.[2] He was greatly helped by the hostility of Newcastle and Gladstone to any idea of coalition. They hoped for a Peelite government under Aberdeen. Newcastle argued that, by holding off, 'the *summa rerum*' would be placed in Peelite hands; and Gladstone deplored Aberdeen's refusal of the queen's commission merely on the grounds of the papal aggression question, which, he considered, had been put forward by Graham only.[3] But Graham's influence prevailed and Aberdeen was converted to his way of thinking. The consequence was that Russell returned to power committed to his anti-papal bill, weakened in parliament and in the country. Prince Albert noted wisely when all was over, that 'the hatred of the Radicals, Irish and Roman Catholics seems increased against the Whigs and their attachment transferred to the Peelites'. And he added, with reference to the Ecclesiastical Titles bill: 'Lord John will have to pass some such measure, but this very measure will detach permanently from him a great portion of his ordinary supporters.'[4]

The court regarded the failure of its hopes for a coalition as inevitable 'for the present', and the Peelite leaders remained in high favour in spite of their refusal to co-operate.[5] During the

[1] *Gathorne Hardy, 1st Earl of Cranbrook*, ed. A. E. Gathorne Hardy, i. 79–80. In fact the crisis lasted from 21 February to 3 March 1851.

[2] *Letters of Queen Victoria*, ii. 296, and Greville, *op. cit.*, iii. 388. According to protectionist gossip at this time, Graham's terms were six cabinet places; see Earl of Malmesbury, *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister* (2nd edn. London, 1884) i. 277.

[3] Add. MS. 44777, fos. 322–9, and Morley, *op. cit.*, i. 301, n. 1.

[4] Martin, *op. cit.*, ii. 352.

[5] *Letters of Queen Victoria*, ii. 299. Greville, *op. cit.*, iii. 390.

early summer of 1851 Graham pursued his policy of championing the Catholics and, in consequence, of winning the support of the Irish members. So when the Ecclesiastical Titles act became law, Russell realized that he must find some means of strengthening himself against the evil consequences of its passage in the commons. Accordingly, he decided to bring forward a measure of parliamentary reform, which he hoped would appease the Radicals. This time he had forgotten the old Whigs, and once again his sudden action, designed to win support, resulted in losing it. For while his moderate supporters feared a sweeping measure, the Radicals were certainly prepared to resist anything short of it.[1] But at the moment of his weakness Russell was saved from disaster by divisions among the Peelite leaders. Characteristically, Graham had lost confidence when his policy was about to ripen. He saw that the government was weak; he was convinced that Stanley must succeed; but he was 'unwilling to take any step which might precipitate the event'. 'I shudder on the brink of the torrent', he told Aberdeen, 'and hesitate to plunge into it.'[2] He saw, as his way out, the influence of the court; the queen should refuse to sanction Russell's reform measure and Aberdeen was to stimulate her to do this. 'Balmoral', he said, 'will be the scene of real and decisive operations. . . . We must look to Aberdeenshire for our future safety.'[3]

But Aberdeen was not prepared to play this active part. He thought the queen could resist a radical measure, but he did not think she would need to do so. Russell would find some compromise and the queen would give her consent to save herself trouble. For himself, he was content to brood in his northern fastness, quoting the motto inscribed over his door, '*Procul negotiis beatus*'.[4] So unpolitical an attitude appalled the active mind of Gladstone. He had observed Graham's inconsistency and Aberdeen's weakness, and he was anxious to impose upon them his own policy of consolidating the followers of Peel into an organized independent group. At the same time he urged Newcastle to

[1] Ellice to Aberdeen, 20 October 1851, in *Aberdeen Correspondence, Part III, 1850–60*, pp. 161–2.

[2] Graham to Aberdeen, 5 May 1851, in Add. MS. 43190, fos. 205–7. Cf. Greville, *op. cit.* iii. 394, and Campbell, *op. cit.*, ii. 291.

[3] Graham to Aberdeen, 31 August 1851, in Add. MS. 43190.

[4] Aberdeen to Graham, 4 September 1851, in Netherby MSS.

accept Aberdeen as their leader, who, because of his age, 'could not very long act in that capacity' and indicated that he thought Newcastle should then succeed him.[1] These differences had their repercussions at court. The prince saw that while Graham and Aberdeen dallied, Russell might fall, and he wanted to be ready either for an independent Peelite government or for a coalition of the Peelites with Russell. Accordingly he prepared the ground for either eventuality. In June he appears to have informed Newcastle, through Stockmar, that if Russell should fall, it would be to him that the queen would turn to form an alternative administration. Then, in September, he tried to persuade Graham to accept Russell's invitation to join the cabinet.[2] Neither move came to anything. Russell did not fall: Graham would not join. Thus, by the autumn of 1851 the ministerial problem was no nearer solution.

At the end of the year Russell blundered a third time, and this proved fatal. On 17 December he dismissed Palmerston. His purpose on this occasion was to consolidate his position at court, where as a result of the inaction of Aberdeen and Graham and the rash expression of high church views by Newcastle, he was now more warmly regarded.[3] Aberdeen appears to have told the queen in the autumn that he could give her no assistance, and the court had then returned to the idea of bringing some Peelites into the government, whether Graham and Aberdeen co-operated or not.[4] Substance was given to this plan by the decision of Frederick Peel in October to join Russell. He did this with Graham's know-

[1] Morley, *op. cit.*, i. 302–3, quoting a memorandum of April 1851, and the omitted passages from this in Add. MS. 44777. Gladstone to Aberdeen, 11 October 1851, in *Aberdeen Correspondence*, *loc. cit.*, p. 158. Gladstone to Newcastle, 22 October 1851, in Add. MS. 44262.

[2] Stanmore, *op. cit.*, i. 145; Martineau, *op. cit.*, p. 106; and Newcastle to Aberdeen, 16 December 1851, Add. MS. 43197, fos. 1–2. Parker, *op. cit.*, ii. 133.

[3] Maxwell, *op. cit.*, i. 327. Graham to Aberdeen, 28 January 1852, in Add. MS. 43190. Russell's concern to placate the court was further demonstrated by his choice of Granville rather than Clarendon to succeed Palmerston; see *Letters of Queen Victoria*, ii. 345; Fulford, *op. cit.*, p. 137; and Maxwell, *op. cit.*, i. 337.

[4] Aberdeen to Graham, 12 January 1852, in *Aberdeen Correspondence*, *loc. cit.*, p. 231.

ledge, and was regarded as his 'pilot balloon'.[1] It was, therefore, reasonable to assume that even if Graham did not join, he was ready to see others do so. The dismissal of Palmerston further opened the way to possible Whig-Peelite junction. Graham recognized that a new aspect had been given to affairs by this sudden change, but considered that it was too late to patch up Russell's government. Aberdeen, on the other hand, found himself more in sympathy with Russell, now that Palmerston was gone, and urged Graham to take office if it was offered him.[2]

In this situation the court allowed Russell to bid for individual Peelites, and he made offers to Newcastle and Cardwell at the end of December, and to Graham early in January 1852.[3] But the fish would not bite. Graham doubted Russell's good faith and agreed with Newcastle that the government was on its last legs. In fact, Palmerston's dismissal robbed it of a solid core of votes, and, to this extent, Newcastle and Graham judged correctly. But their motives were quite different. Newcastle hoped still for a Peelite administration, and in the middle of January held a grand conclave at Clumber to discuss the possibility, from which Graham was pointedly excluded.[4] Graham, for his part, looked still to his plan of the previous year. Russell was to be left to fall; Derby (as Stanley had now become) and Palmerston were to be driven together and sunk in joint ruin by the free trade gun; then, and only then, was union with Russell to be attempted with Aberdeen as the negotiator. In a letter to Aberdeen of 10 January he put his case plainly:

> 'In my opinion when the crisis comes, you are the natural adviser of the Queen: and as arbiter between parties and rival claims, you, I think, must carefully preserve an impartial and neutral position... The real truth is that Lord John is unwilling

[1] Graham to Aberdeen, 21 October 1851, in Add. MS. 43190; and Oswald to Gladstone, 29 December 1851, in Add. MS. 44371.

[2] Graham to Aberdeen, 25 December 1851, in Add. MS. 43190; part of this letter is given by Parker, *op. cit.*, ii. 143. Aberdeen to Graham, 27 December 1851, in *Aberdeen Correspondence*, *loc. cit.*, p. 206.

[3] *Letters of Queen Victoria*, ii. 359–60; Martineau, *op. cit.*, pp. 108–10; Parker, *op. cit.*, ii. 150.

[4] Graham to Aberdeen, 6 January 1852, in Add. MS. 43190. Newcastle to Aberdeen, 2 January 1852, in Add. MS. 43197. Aberdeen to Graham, 16 January 1852 (written from Clumber), in Netherby MSS.

to divide his power but he will soon have to submit to the alternative of "Half a loaf or no Bread".'[1]

It was important in this plan not to break with Russell 'in an angry spirit' but to show that, though he had 'too long postponed any approach to friendly relations on fair terms', a return to them would be possible when a suitable opportunity presented itself.[2]

Graham's policy required, besides Palmerston's acquiescence in political suicide, the conversion of Aberdeen and the abandonment by the court of its pressure for Russell's immediate reinforcement. By the end of January Aberdeen had declared his readiness to conform to Graham's guidance and promptly went to Windsor to secure royal co-operation. In this he was completely successful and was able to report, 'The Queen seems to be quite reconciled to the propriety of no accession being made to the present Government from Peel's friends.'[3] There remained Palmerston, who now took affairs in his own hands and used his influence in the commons to eject Russell. On this occasion Russell's resignation was final; he did not become prime minister again for thirteen years.

When Derby took office the stage was set for the final act in the formation of the coalition of the following December. The new government's prospects were not good. The court was certainly hostile; the queen wrote of the government as temporary, and Gladstone suspected her of influencing Aberdeen in favour of future co-operation with Russell. 'It is plain', he noted, 'that the Court are . . . anxious to have a ministry in prospect as well as in *esse*.' The queen certainly spoke in this sense to the retiring Whig ministers.[4] Quite apart from the attitude of the court, Derby's

[1] Add. MS. 43190.

[2] Graham to Cardwell, 27 January 1852, in Netherby MSS. Graham to Aberdeen, 18 January 1852, in Add. MS. 43190.

[3] Aberdeen to Graham, 27 January 1852, in *Aberdeen Correspondence*, *loc. cit.*, p. 232, and again, on 29 January, in Netherby MSS. The second letter is incomplete, but internal evidence establishes that it was written from Windsor, almost certainly on 29 January.

[4] *Letters of Queen Victoria*, ii. 372, 375. Gladstone's memorandum of 25 February 1852, in Add. MS. 44778. Gladstone thought that Stockmar had been sent to influence Aberdeen; certainly these two were in touch about this time, see Add. MS. 43247, fo. 243.

cabinet lacked sufficient men of ability to govern efficiently. In this respect Palmerston's refusal to join was vital; he had been offered the Exchequer and the lead in the commons, but, though friendly, preferred to remain uncommitted.[1] Finally, Derby was weak from lack of votes in the commons, where his party remained in a minority.

Nevertheless, Derby's government survived, largely because of the suspicions and divisions among its enemies which Disraeli skilfully exploited. Uncertainty about the government's intentions over protection, and about Palmerston's future allegiance, held most of the important leaders in a state of watchful expectancy. Only Russell was incapable of sitting still. First he called a meeting of his followers, of whom about 168 assembled, and talked blithely to them of 'operating through the supplies'.[2] Then, in the middle of April, in another sudden decision, he spoke against the Militia bill, which it had recently been his purpose to pass and over which he had resigned. 'This turn', as Cardwell told Graham, was 'regarded as too sharp' by his colleagues and by the House generally.[3] In consequence, moderate opinion in the commons moved in favour of the government. Meanwhile the Peelite leaders were once more rent in division. Graham was in favour of co-operation with Russell and admitted to Gladstone that his object was 'virtual reincorporation with the Liberal party'.[4] Aberdeen, however, had relapsed again and would not follow him. With no clear idea of the future, nor much interest in it—'After all,' he confided in Princess Lieven, 'our ministerial affairs are comparatively of little consequence'[5]—he responded to the nearest pressure. This happened to come from Gladstone, since Graham was laid up with gout in Cumberland, and Gladstone wished Derby to continue in office unhindered by a united opposition. In this policy he was supported by Herbert and, together, they stood firmly against a junction with the liberals. Finally, Newcastle still clung to his idea of an independent third party, which Gladstone now opposed as impracticable, fearing, as

[1] *Letters of Queen Victoria*, ii. 369–70.

[2] *Leaves from the diary of Henry Greville*, ed. Viscountess Enfield (London, 1883), p. 418. Herbert to Graham, 11 March 1852, in Netherby MSS.

[3] Cardwell to Graham, 24 April 1852, in Netherby MSS.

[4] Gladstone's memorandum of 26 February 1852, in Add. MS. 44778.

[5] Jones Parry, *op. cit.*, ii. 625.

he noted at the time, Newcastle's 'too combative' mind and his 'too little conciliating' temper.[1]

Parliament was dissolved at the beginning of July and the general election followed. After a bitter conflict it transpired that, though strengthened, the Derbyites still had not obtained a majority.[2] Two important developments followed. First, Aberdeen abandoned his position of benevolent neutrality towards the government. Up to the last moment before the election he had remained inactive, refusing to declare against Derby in spite of some qualms about his foreign policy, and returning a non-committal answer to the puzzled Peelite landlord who wrote asking for guidance on how he should instruct his tenants to vote.[3] After the election, however, his hostility to Derby was fixed. He was influenced mainly by disgust at the electoral tactics of the Derbyites, particularly on the religious issue. 'The only test proposed at the elections', he told Newcastle at the end of July, 'involves a principle of religious bigotry . . . more objectionable to me than protection itself.'[4] Secondly, the election decided Newcastle to abandon his plans for a third party. For him it was the results of the election, and not its methods, which counted. It was now clear that there were only about thirty-five to forty potential Peelites left, and he yielded to the facts. At the beginning of August, having been in touch with the Whig whips, he wrote to Aberdeen, 'Union with Lord Derby is impossible. Isolation is pleasant but not patriotic. Co-operation with other Liberals is requisite.'[5]

[1] Gladstone's memorandum of 11 March 1852, in Add. MS. 44778. Morley, *op. cit.*, i. 311. Martineau, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

[2] Estimates of Derby's supporters after the elections varied between 300 and 320; only Disraeli pretended he had 330, cf. C. F. C. Greville, *op. cit.*, iii. 459. For the various estimates see Russell to Graham, 14 July, Graham to Russell, 17 July, and Russell to Graham, 26 July 1852, all in Netherby MSS.; Ellice to Aberdeen, 31 July 1852, in *Aberdeen Correspondence*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 307–10; and Goulburn to Aberdeen, 27 August 1852, in Add. MS. 43196.

[3] W. P. Snell to Aberdeen, 30 June, and Aberdeen's reply of 2 July 1852 are both in Add. MS 43247. In acting in this way Aberdeen was following the advice of Gladstone and Bonham; see Add. MS. 43070, fos. 254–5.

[4] *Edinburgh Review*, *loc. cit.*, p. 560.

[5] Graham to Aberdeen, 31 July 1852, in Add. MS. 43190, and Newcastle to

These two developments gave Graham the advantage. His plan for union with Russell was also helped by the latter's determination to regain office. If he could win over Gladstone and Herbert, the problem would resolve itself simply into one of agreeing the terms of union and the time for action. But Gladstone and Herbert were not to be easily won. They argued strongly against any attack on the government designed to displace it, and stated their objection to absorption in the liberal party.[1] Nevertheless, throughout July and August, Russell, Graham and Aberdeen conducted a triangular correspondence with the object of discovering common ground between them. Russell wanted energetic action as soon as parliament met; if the government were allowed one year, he argued, what was to prevent them taking 'two, three, four or five'? He wanted, also, to be prime minister and would not consider serving under anyone else.[2] Graham sought to moderate Russell's impatience and to reconcile him to a spell of opposition. 'The Grand Attack', he wrote, 'should not be hurried.'[3] Aberdeen, for his part, was coming slowly to the conclusion that he must take the lead himself. He recognized that concert with the Whigs was essential, and he knew that to be effective such concert must include Russell. But he knew also that Russell was unacceptable on all sides as prime minister. As he was the person under whom Russell might most probably be persuaded to serve, he now set about working to that end.[4] In his handling of the personalities involved over the next two months he showed great skill, smoothing Russell's pride, quietening his suspicions of Gladstone, drawing Gladstone nearer to Newcastle and moderating Newcastle's resentment against Russell. By the

Aberdeen, 2 August 1852, in Add. MS. 43197, summarized in *Edinburgh Review*, *loc. cit.*, p. 562.

[1] Gladstone to Aberdeen, 30 July and 5 August 1852, in Add. MSS. 43070 and 44088. These letters were used by Morley, *op. cit.*, i. 319, by Stanmore in his *Aberdeen*, pp. 208–9, and in his *Herbert*, i. 160. See also Herbert to Gladstone, 11 August 1852, in Add. MS. 44210.

[2] Russell to Graham, 24 July 1852, in Netherby MSS.; Russell to Aberdeen, 21 July 1852, in Spencer Walpole, *Life of Lord John Russell*, ii. 154–5. For a selection from the letters exchanged between these three at this time see *Aberdeen Correspondence*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 297–358.

[3] Graham to Russell, 26 July 1852, in Netherby MSS.

[4] *Edinburgh Review*, *loc. cit.*, p. 560; Aberdeen to Russell, 8 August 1852, in Add. MS. 43066; Aberdeen to Newcastle, 12 August 1852, in Add. MS. 43197; and Aberdeen to Graham, 15 August 1852, in Netherby MSS.

end of August he could conclude that matters were 'tolerably well placed for future concert'. None the less, by that time any further negotiation seemed to be impossible. 'We must wait for events', he told Russell, 'to decide the future.'[1]

The reason for this suspension of activity was news of Palmerston's counter-action. He was working for a Whig-Peelite junction under Lansdowne which would include, besides himself, Russell, Gladstone and Herbert, but leave out Aberdeen and Graham.[2] Graham did not take this very seriously, remarking that 'the Lansdowne tub will not hold water'.[3] But, looking forward as was his wont, he had convinced himself that Palmerston's real purpose was to unite with Derby and to take Gladstone and Herbert with him. This fear threw him into closer alliance with Russell, on whom he now urged active opposition. Aberdeen tried his best to stop this, but Graham was in one of his irrational moods of gloom and despondency.[4] The outcome was firm alliance between Russell and Graham, and another breach between Graham and Aberdeen.[5] By the beginning of October it seemed as if all the progress of the summer had been lost. Aberdeen fell back into his normal unpolitical attitude. He would preserve his 'character of spectator', he had no object of his own and would attend the opening of parliament 'not clearly knowing for what purpose'.[6] Fortunately, the situation was not as black as it appeared. Graham withdrew from complete alliance with Russell and refused to dine with Whig leaders before parliament met.[7] Gladstone and Herbert for their part admitted the impossibility of union with Derby and were prepared to let him take his chance

[1] Aberdeen to Russell, 8 and 16 August 1852, in Add. MS. 43066. Aberdeen to Newcastle, 31 August 1852, in Add. MS. 43197. Aberdeen to Graham, 31 August 1852, in Netherby MSS.

[2] Graham to Aberdeen, 5 and 6 August 1852, in Add. MS. 43190. These letters are printed with large omissions and changes of phrase in Parker, *op. cit.*, ii. 172.

[3] Graham to Aberdeen, 11 August 1852, in Add. MS. 43190.

[4] Graham to Aberdeen, 5 and 12 September 1852, in Add. MS. 43190; Aberdeen to Graham, 10 September 1852, and Graham to Russell, 21 September 1852, both in Netherby MSS.

[5] Aberdeen to Graham, 27 September 1852, in Netherby MSS. The first part of this letter is printed in Parker, *op. cit.*, ii. 179–80.

[6] Aberdeen to Graham, 7 and 12 October 1852, in Netherby MSS. The first of these letters is misdated 2 October in the copy in Add. MS. 43333.

[7] Graham to Russell, 26 October 1852, in Netherby MSS.

unaided.[1] Even Russell seemed resigned to serving in a cabinet of which he would not be head.[2] In these circumstances Aberdeen recovered his spirits. Early in November he wrote to Graham, 'I feel satisfied that with a little patience and good management, a cordial fusion will become practicable and easy.'[3]

Before the year was out Aberdeen had been proved correct. Left to their own resources, Derby and Disraeli made some last desperate moves to recruit supporters. The independent Irish party, variously estimated at between forty and fifty votes, was Disraeli's first objective. He saw that Graham's tactics in the past had captured this useful faction from Russell. He now tried to buy it over for himself, but his efforts, so he later claimed, were foiled by Derby, and when the budget was voted on, about fifty Irish members opposed the government.[4] The other potential source of support was Palmerston, but he too turned down the last-minute offers which Disraeli, handicapped by the queen's refusal to accept him as leader of the house, now offered.[5] Palmerston's decision was of crucial importance, but the *coup de grâce* was administered by Gladstone, who, in his own time for his own peculiar reasons, at last declared against the government over the budget.[6]

The court now stepped in to complete the change. After Derby had resigned, the queen decided between Aberdeen and Lansdowne in favour of the former.[7] Though she summoned both of

[1] Gladstone to Aberdeen, 27 October 1852, in Add. MS. 43070. Herbert to Aberdeen, 22 October 1852, printed in Stanmore, *Herbert*, i. 162–5.

[2] Walpole, *op. cit.*, ii. 158–9. *The Panmure Papers*, ed. Sir George Douglas and Sir George Ramsay, i. 36.

[3] Aberdeen to Graham, 8 November 1852, in *Aberdeen Correspondence*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 397–9, printed in part in *Edinburgh Review*, *loc. cit.*, p. 566.

[4] C. F. C. Greville, *A journal of the reign of Queen Victoria from 1852 to 1860* (London, 1887), i. 32–3. *Hansard*, 3rd series, cxxiii. 1693–5.

[5] Monypenny and Buckle, *op. cit.*, iii. 422–3; H. C. F. Bell, *Lord Palmerston*, ii. 70; E. Ashley, *Life and Correspondence of Viscount Palmerston* (London, 1879), ii. 255.

[6] Morley, *op. cit.*, i. 324.

[7] *Letters of Queen Victoria*, ii. 414. The influence of the court during the building of the cabinet should not be exaggerated. Thus Clarendon was chosen as Russell's successor at the Foreign Office, not Granville; St. Leonards did not remain as lord chancellor, though the queen would have

them, her purpose was to commission Aberdeen alone. In fact, Lansdowne's gout prevented him from attending the summons. The game was in Aberdeen's hands, with the full support of the court. 'For God's sake', Stockmar wrote, 'don't suffer at this moment hesitation.'[1] After some preliminary uncertainty, Russell's love of office overcame his pride, and he joined. Finally, Palmerston, bowing gracefully to the inevitable, and making as Argyll later said 'the largest sacrifice of personal feeling to public duty' of the three, accepted the Home Office[2]; Princess Lieven's trinity was formed.

The coalition government that followed survived only two years. Yet, as one of its members observed in later life, 'the amalgamation was permanent and . . . lasting'.[3] When the survivors of Peel's last cabinet joined the Whigs they laid the foundations of the later liberal party. This decision, of great importance in subsequent political development, was founded more in their personal characters and preferences than in the wishes of the court or the commons. The sympathy and support which they received from the court, individually and as a group, gave them additional strength in political manœuvre but did not govern their decisions. The queen preferred the Peelite leaders of all her possible ministers, but her part in restoring them to office, though substantial, was always secondary. In the commons, the changing allegiances of minor groups from time to time affected the relative positions of the leading politicians; thus Palmerston drew strength from radical and Graham from Irish votes. But the initiative in politics in the twilight years between the decline of royal government and the dawn of purely parliamentary rule still lay with the official men of ministerial standing or ambition.

preferred him to do so, and Graham went to the Admiralty in spite of her disapproval. Even Gladstone's appointment as chancellor of the exchequer resulted from Graham's refusal to take that position, which had first been pressed on him 'notwithstanding the royal wish' that Gladstone should have it. See *Letters of Queen Victoria*, ii. 415, 420–1,423–4; also Morley, *op. cit.*, i. 332–3.

[1] Stockmar to Aberdeen, 21 December 1852, in Add. MS. 43248.

[2] Argyll, *op. cit.*, i. 378.

[3] Argyll, *op. cit.*, i. 388.

BRISTOL—METROPOLIS OF THE WEST IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY[1]

The Alexander Prize Essay

By W. E. Minchinton, B.Sc. (Econ.)

READ 13 JUNE 1953

ALTHOUGH anticipated by earlier writers, the clearest formulation of the idea of a metropolis as the focus of economic activity is to be found in Professor N. S. B. Gras' *The Evolution of the English Corn Market*. There he writes:

> The metropolitan market may be described as a large district having one center in which is focussed a considerable trade. Trade between outlying parts of course may take place, but it is that between the metropolitan town and the rest of the area that dominates all. This is chiefly the exchange of the raw products of the country for the manufactured or imported goods of the town. The prices of all goods sent to the metropolitan center are 'made' there, or, in other words, prices diminish as the distance from the center is increased.[2]

And the idea may be extended to include a consideration of the role of the centre in investment and banking and as the hub of social and cultural activity. That is, the function of a metropolis may be considered not merely as that of market centre but as the focus for all the activities of its area.

Within Great Britain, London has the pre-eminent and obvious claim to consideration, and Mr. F. J. Fisher, in a series of articles 'of more than municipal significance', has outlined the importance of London in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as an export market, as a food market and as a centre of conspicuous consumption.[3] But, important though London has been, there are

[1] Part of the research on which this paper is based was aided by a grant from the Research Fund of the University of London.

[2] N. S. B. Gras, *The Evolution of the English Corn Market*, p. 95.

[3] 'London's export trade in the early seventeenth century' in *Econ. Hist. Rev.*, 2nd Ser., iii (1950), 151–61; 'The development of the London food

other towns in Great Britain which can claim to have exercised, to a greater or lesser extent, a quasi-metropolitan function, to have served as the focus of the economic and social life of their area. Of none is this more true than of Bristol, which has long been an important provincial centre. It is the purpose of this essay to examine the extent to which, in the eighteenth century, Bristol acted as a metropolis of the west.[1]

None will question the importance of the part played by Bristol in foreign trade in the eighteenth century. Indeed, in studies of this period concerned with Bristol, a preoccupation with overseas commerce, and in particular with the African trade, has tended to exclude consideration of all else. It was from foreign trade that Bristol derived its wealth and influence, and if to be free from the domination of any other city was a sign of metropolitan status, in the field of overseas commerce the claims of Bristol were amply substantiated. As Defoe wrote:

> The merchants of this city not only have the greatest trade, but they trade with a more entire independency upon London than any other town in Britain. An 'tis evident in this particular, (viz.) That whatsoever exportations they make to any part of the world, they are able to bring the full returns back to their own port and can dispose of it there.[2]

Further, as London grew at the expense of the outports in the sixteenth century, so Bristol engrossed some of the trade of the English Bristol Channel ports in the eighteenth century. Bideford, Barnstaple and Minehead, in particular, lost ground to Bristol and by the end of the eighteenth century drew their supplies of foreign goods coastwise from Bristol instead of direct from overseas.[3] Its commanding position in foreign trade was one source of its importance in the economy of the west.

market, 1540–1640' in *ibid.*, v (1935), 46–64; and 'The development of London as a centre of conspicuous consumption in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries' in *Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc.*, 4th Ser., xxx (1949), 37–50.

[1] For the position of Bristol in the fifteenth century see E. Carus-Wilson, 'The overseas trade of Bristol' in E. Power and M. M. Postan, *English Trade in the Fifteenth Century*, pp. 183–246.

[2] D. Defoe, *A Tour through England and Wales* (Everyman ed.), ii. 36.

[3] See port books; also F. Hancock, *Minehead* (1903), pp. 316–17; C. Vancouver, *A General View of the Agriculture of the County of Devon*, pp. 395–6; *Supplement to Collinson's History of Somerset*, pp. 112–13.

The second was its geographical position. The upper reaches of the rivers, the Avon and Frome, at whose confluence it stands, were of little consequence as arteries of communication with its hinterland, although the Avon became navigable to Bath in 1726.[1] But seaward the Avon placed Bristol at the focal point of two major systems of water communication, at the orifice of two funnels, which served through the centuries to direct the produce of the west to Bristol. The first was the Bristol Channel which linked Bristol with the ports of Somerset, Devon, Cornwall and south Wales and with more distant ports: the second was the river and canal network of the Severn and Wye, still in course of improvement, which served the marches of Wales and the west Midlands. The Severn was navigable above Shrewsbury, the Stratford Avon to within sight of Warwick, the Stour served the Staffordshire iron and coal industries and brought water communication close to Birmingham, the Salwarp served the Droitwich salt works, and the Wye was navigable to Hereford and the Lugg to Leominster.[2] The limits of Bristol's hinterland were, in great measure, defined by this system of sea and river and canal communication, most of her domestic trade being waterborne since, as Adam Smith wrote:

> By means of water carriage a more extensive market is opened to every sort of industry than what land carriage alone can afford it.[3]

Throughout the eighteenth century, the Bristol Avon was thronged with coastal craft, with market boats and with the river barges or trows. No continuous set of figures is available to indicate the volume of trade, but calculations for the random years for which port books still exist give some information about the number of coastal and river craft sailing from Bristol in the

[1] The Frome was obstructed by weirs. For the Avon see T. S. Willan, 'Bath and the navigation of the Avon', in *Proceedings* of the Bath and District Branch, Somerset Archaeol. and Nat. Hist. Soc., 1936.

[2] For details see T. S. Willan, *River Navigation in England, 1600–1750*, *English Coasting Trade, 1600–1750*, and 'The navigation and trade of the Severn valley, 1600–1750' in *Econ. Hist. Rev.* viii (1937), 68–79; G. Farr, 'Severn navigation and the trow' in *Mariner's Mirror*, xxxii (1946), 66–95; and A. S. Davies, 'The river trade of Montgomeryshire and its borders' in *Montgomeryshire Collections*, xliii (1934), 37–46.

[3] *Wealth of Nations* (Everyman ed.), i. 16.

eighteenth century. In 1698–9 449 ships left Bristol, in 1733–4 477, in 1752 453 and in 1788–9 575.[1] Figures for repeated voyages in and out of Bristol coastwise between 1752 and 1782, though fluctuating from year to year, are somewhat more than double these figures. They rose from an average of 900 per year in the 1750's to over 1,700 per year in the 1770's.[2]

Most of the coastal and river craft were owned by the outports, the master and merchant often being the same person.[3] Between 1772 and 1786, years for which details are available, never more than 35 coasting vessels were owned by Bristol citizens.[4] It is impossible to state how many vessels altogether were engaged in the trade. For the river barges, however, an estimate exists, for it was stated in 1789 that '103 trows from 50 to 130 tons carry goods upon the Severn, to and from Bristol'.[5]

Supplementing the water-borne commerce was that carried by road. Although the improvements of the eighteenth century increased the ease of road communication, there was a considerable volume of road traffic before these changes took place.[6] Bristol stood at the meeting point of five main roads. Neither the clay lands of the vale of Berkeley to the north[7] nor the flats of Somerset to the south[8] had roads which were passable in all weathers, but the three roads to the east, to Tetbury and Oxford, to Chippenham and London and to Bath and Warminster, were in better condition. By these roads Bristol merchants, Defoe reported,

[1] These figures were obtained from the port books (P.R.O., E/190). July 1698–June 1699 from 1157/1, 2: 1733–4 from 1211/2, 3: 1752 from 1217/2, 3: and 1788–9 from 1239/2, 3. No 'coastwise In' books exist for Bristol in the eighteenth century.

[2] Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 11255.

[3] For a discussion of the organization of the coastal trade, see T. S. Willan, *English Coasting Trade*, pp. 34–54.

[4] P.R.O., Customs 17/1–22.

[5] W. Barrett, *The History and Antiquities of the City of Bristol* (1789), p. 189.

[6] See J. L. Baker, 'England in the seventeenth century' in *An Historical Geography of England before 1800*, ed. H. C. Darby, p. 429.

[7] Early in the eighteenth century it was stated that wheeled vehicles could use the road only four months in the year (*Journals House of Commons*, xxi. 437–8).

[8] As the proverb had it, 'Somerset bad for the rider, good for the abider'. See also Defoe, *A Tour . . .*, i. 270.

> maintain carriers just as the London tradesmen do, to all the principal countries and towns from Southampton in the south, even to the banks of the Trent north; and tho' they have no navigable river that way, yet they drive a very great trade through all these counties.[1]

Though dearer than water transport, road carriage was both safer and more regular. By 1750 there were ninety-four carriers plying to and from the city to Leeds, Nottingham and other distant towns [2] and an even more extensive service was in existence by the end of the century.[3] Standing at the centre of this web of land and water communications, Bristol was the commercial capital of the west.[4]

First of all, Bristol was the main market for the agricultural produce of this area. Despite the growth of the London food market, this was a trade which London did not completely dominate. In his analysis of the metropolitan market in the sixteenth century, Professor Gras stated that the area around Bristol must be excluded from the metropolitan area.[5] Here prices were 'made' not by the London but by the Bristol market. And Bristol continued to exercise this metropolitan effect on prices in the eighteenth century. The single exception to Arthur Young's generalization, that as the distance from London increased so the price of agricultural produce fell, was the neighbourhood of Bristol, 'which variations', he stated, 'I attribute to the Bristol market boats constantly buying up all sorts of provisions'.[6]

Like London in the sixteenth century, Bristol's demand for agricultural produce was selective rather than indiscriminate. Each district was called on to supply those victuals which it was

[1] *Ibid.*, ii. 36.

[2] J. Latimer, *Annals of Bristol in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 288.

[3] *Matthew's New History of Bristol or Complete Guide and Bristol Directory for the Year 1793–4*, pp. 94–8.

[4] See Defoe, *A Tour . . .*, ii. 306. 'Bristol drove a great inland trade with all the western counties and thus it drew to itself the bulk of the water-borne commerce of Wales.'

[5] Gras, *English Corn Market*, p. 124.

[6] A. Young, *A Six Weeks' Tour through the Southern Counties of England and Wales* (1769), pp. 310, 316–17. But see also Gras, *op. cit.*, p. 122. Figures from Houghton's *Collections* indicate that London had cut into the Severn trade between 1691 and 1702.

best fitted to produce.[1] Of the grain crops, wheat came chiefly from the Midlands, barley from west Wales and Gloucestershire, and oats from Cardigan and Carmarthen.[2] Consignments were also from time to time brought from more distant parts, as in 1731–2 when wheat was obtained from Hull and Yarmouth [3] and in 1760 from London and some south coast ports.[4] Foreign supplies were called on, as in 1767 when grain was brought from Dantzig,[5] chiefly because of the failure of the harvest, but during the last decades of the century there were regular imports from North America.[6] Peas and beans came from Gloucestershire and from Bridgwater, for use as provender in the inns and for the sustenance of the negroes on the middle voyage,[7] while from Devonshire by sea and from Herefordshire down the Severn and Wye came cider and perry.[8]

Of the dairy products, butter was supplied by Cardigan, Pembroke and Glamorgan, 'in very great quantities, salted and barrel'd up, just as Suffolk does the city of London'.[9] The dairy farms of Somerset, Gloucestershire, and Wiltshire were the chief source of milk, eggs and poultry, while cheese came from Cheshire both coastwise by sea and down the Severn from Shrewsbury. From the environs of Bristol itself, from the vale of Evesham and from the vale of Glamorgan, especially near Llandaff, were brought regular supplies of vegetables. By the end of the eighteenth century, the stimulus of the urban demand of Bristol and Bath had led to a steady expansion of the cultivation of potatoes in south Gloucestershire.[10]

[1] F. J. Fisher, *Econ. Hist. Rev.*, v (1935), 56.

[2] Both the evidence of the port books (P.R.O., E/190) and the series of *General Views* drawn up for the Board of Agriculture from 1794 have been used for these and subsequent statements about the source of agricultural produce. W. Marshall's *Rural Economy of Gloucestershire* has also been used.

[3] Willan, *Coasting Trade*, pp. 81, 82, 148.

[4] General Committee Books, i (1757–99), City Archives, Council House, Bristol.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Bristol Presentments*, 1770–1806, Reference Library, Bristol. In 1791, for example, 10,828 bushels of wheat and 5,040 bushels of barley were imported.

[7] Marshall, *op. cit.*, i. 153.

[8] G. Turner, *General View of the Agriculture of the County of Gloucester*, p. 53.

[9] Defoe, *A Tour . . .*, ii. 55.

[10] P.R.O., HO 67/3, 11. See also W. E. Minchinton, 'Agriculture in

The main source of meat was south Wales. Cattle came on the hoof and were ferried across the Bristol Channel from Sully near Cardiff to Uphill in Somerset or across the Passage from Beachley to Aust. Warner, walking through south Wales in 1791, has recounted how his 'progress was frequently retarded by numerous droves of black cattle from Pembrokeshire and Carmarthenshire travelling towards the Passage to be transported across the Avon (*recte* Severn) and driven to the market of Bristol and the other large towns of Somerset, Gloucester and Wiltshire'.[1] To remedy the effects of the long journey, the cattle were fattened on the rich pastures of north Somerset and south Gloucestershire before they were brought to market. In Cardigan pigs were reared for the Bristol drovers and calves in both south Wales and Wiltshire were sold for veal rather than kept as stock so pressing was the demand of the Bristol market. Supplies of fish were less satisfactory and more than once in the century the common council of Bristol offered bounties to any who would supply the city with 'good fresh saleable fish'.[2]

During the eighteenth century, Bristol provided a growing market for such victuals. Already, about the beginning of the century, it had outstripped Norwich to become the second largest town in Great Britain, with a population, according to a recent estimate, of 20,000 in 1700.[3] Though it grew less rapidly than Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham, all of which were larger than Bristol in 1801, its population more than doubled in the century. According to the census, there were 41,000 inhabitants of the city and 64,000 inhabitants of the whole urban area in that year.[4] Thus, in agriculture, this growing market provided a stimulus for the adaptation of cultivation to market needs and the specialization of production upon particular commodities.

The second category of goods for which Bristol was a market was industrial raw materials. For some of them Bristol was a

Gloucestershire during the Napoleonic wars' in *Trans. Bristol and Glos. Archaeol. Soc.*, lxviii (1949), 169.

[1] R. Warner, *A Walk through Wales in 1797*, p. 31.

[2] Common Council Proceedings, January 1704 and May 1770. Council House, Bristol.

[3] D. V. Glass, 'Gregory King's estimate of the population of England and Wales, 1695', in *Population Studies*, iii (1951), 347.

[4] For comparison, the population of London in 1801 was 900,000, of Manchester-Salford 84,000, of Liverpool 78,000 and of Birmingham 74,000.

distribution point. Naval timber, imported from the Baltic or brought down the Severn from the Forest of Dean, was sent coastwise, mainly to London.[1] Teazles from Bridgwater were sent to supply the textile industries of the Cotswolds and Yorkshire.[2] Cornish tin was delivered to tinplate works, like Caerleon and Melingriffith in south Wales or Bringewood in the Midlands,[3] while diminishing amounts of lead from the Mendips were dispatched, chiefly to London.[4] Supplies of wool were brought from Milford or Cardiff and transferred to barges or trows for conveyance to Gloucester for use in the Cotswold industry,[5] and towards the end of the century these domestic supplies were supplemented by imports of Spanish wool.[6] Early in the century, as Celia Fiennes reported, coal from the mines at Kingswood Chase was sent from Bristol to Taunton,[7] but this trade came to an end before 1800 and Bristol became a coal-importing port, obtaining most of its supplies from Newport.

There were two main reasons for this entrepôt trade in raw materials. First, the vessels engaging in the Bristol Channel trade were not normally suitable for conveying cargoes up the Severn nor the barges for service in the channel, and Bristol was a convenient place for transhipment to be carried out. Second, many of the consignments were quite small, so that cargoes were completed with other goods, most of which were dispatched to Bristol. Where the trade was large enough, as was the case with the cross-channel coal trade from south Wales to north Devon and Somerset, it was carried on directly without resort to Bristol.

Other cargoes of raw materials were brought to Bristol to supply the needs of the local industries. Even at the end of the eighteenth century, Bristol was 'not more a commercial than a

[1] Port books (P.R.O., E/190).

[2] J. Billingsley, *General View of the Agriculture of the County of Somerset* (1795), p. 110.

[3] Chappell MSS., National Library of Wales: Caerleon MSS., Newport Public Library: Knight MSS., Kidderminster Public Library.

[4] See J. Gough, *Mines of Mendip*, p. 169.

[5] See port books. For Cardiff see also P.R.O., T 64/281 for the years 1739/43 and *An Account of Wool sent Coastwise from Cardiff* for the years 1763/70. Cardiff Public Library.

[6] See *Bristol Presentments*, Reference Library, Bristol.

[7] *The Journeys of Celia Fiennes*, ed. C. Morris, p. 243.

manufacturing town'.[1] Some local coal was available, water-power was obtained from the Frome, across which a considerable number of weirs had been constructed, and there was a large local market, with easy access to other markets by sea or land. From Cornwall came tin and from Anglesey copper for the local brass and copper works.[2] The local soap works obtained wood ashes and kelp from the Somerset ports, and kelp and clay from Stourbridge were used by the glass industry. This latter industry was the most important of Bristol's manufactures. Window glass and bottles were the chief products, though the reputation of the city now rests on the enamelled and coloured glassware made at this time. As a local directory noted:

> The great demand for glass bottles for the Bristol water, for the exportation of beer, cider and perry; for wine, and for the use of Town and Country keep the various bottle glasshouses here constantly at work. The call for window glass at home, at Bath and in the Towns about Bristol: in the Western Counties, Wales and from North to South wherever Bristol trade extends, and the great quantities sent to America, employ several houses for this article.[3]

Early in the century, in 1703, a Bristol glassmaker came to an agreement with a group of Stourbridge glassmakers 'which practically amounted to the cartellization of the broad (window) glass industry',[4] a short-lived attempt at monopoly, but indicative of the importance of Bristol both as a manufacturing and as a marketing centre. Sugar refining, dependent on imported raw materials, was the other major Bristol industry. By the end of the century there were twenty sugar refineries in Bristol.[5] Ancillary to these were the distilleries, while Bristol also had a number of

[1] F. M. Eden, *The State of the Poor*, ii. 183. See also *Hist. MSS. Comm., Charlemont MSS.*, p. 40: 'Bristol, a large commercial city remarkable for affording and manufacturing the best woollen nightcaps in the world.'

[2] See R. Jenkins, 'The Copper Works at Redbrook and at Bristol', *Trans. Bristol and Glos. Archaeol. Soc.*, lxiii (1942), 145–67.

[3] *Matthew's Directory*, p. 40. A writer in the *Builders' Dictionary* (1703) complained that though Bristol window glass was the best it was seldom seen in London owing to the difficulty of getting it there safely.

[4] W. H. B. Court, *The Rise of the Midland Industries, 1600–1838*, p. 124.

[5] *Matthew's Directory*, p. 40.

breweries which used grain 'the growth of the adjoining counties'.[1] Tobacco was the other industry dependent on imports. Then there was the building industry, which obtained tiles from Cornwall and freestone by barge down the Avon from Bath [2] as well as bricks, drain pipes and chimney pots from the local pottery industry. Finally, Bristol had a wide range of finishing trades, woollen, leather, lace and tinware, which had expanded at the expense of similar trades in the nearby towns. Gloucester, it was stated in 1780, 'formerly had many manufactures but Bristol hath since supplanted it: and there is nothing remaining of that kind worthy of observation'.[3] In industry, as in trade, the growth of a metropolis is often at the expense of its near neighbours.

Some of these manufactures were consumed in Bristol, some were exported, but all made their contribution to Bristol's domestic trade. The cargoes of manufactured goods sent coastwise, which alone of the consignments of domestic commerce are available for analysis, were so various as almost to defy description. Ironmongery, glass, haberdashery, mercery, apothecaries' ware, furniture and household goods and earthenware were the chief categories, but this catalogue does little to convey the immense range of articles which were sent out from Bristol. Amongst the articles sent to Barnstaple in 1810, for example, there was a malt mill, a chaffing machine and a harpsichord.[4] Not all these goods were the product of Bristol industries, for Gras' formulation of the role of a metropolis in trade as 'the exchange of the raw products of the country for the manufactured or imported products of the town' is too rigid a description of eighteenth-century commerce. Many of the manufactures were the product of Bristol's hinterland for which it acted as distribution centre. Particularly was this so for the western cloth trade, in which the influence of London was negligible.[5] Some of these manufactures were brought to Bristol for export. Guns and metal ornaments came from Birmingham, Indian textiles from London, Manchester cotton goods from Lancashire and woollen fabrics from Somerset for the Africa trade, to name but one of the branches in which Bristol engaged.

[1] Barrett, *History of Bristol*, p. 185. [2] *Matthew's Directory*, p. 33.
[3] R. J. Sulivan, *Observations made during a Tour* (*1780*), p. 118.
[4] Account book of John Milton, Quay Master at Barnstaple. County Record Office, Taunton.
[5] Willan, *Coasting Trade*, pp. 95–6.

Others were distributed by barge or coastal craft, by packhorse or wagon through Bristol's hinterland.

Among the articles in which Bristol dealt were goods imported from foreign countries and from Ireland. No cargo outwards coastwise from Bristol was complete without some of these goods: timber from the Baltic, linen from Germany, oil, fruit and wine from the Mediterranean, dyewoods, sugar, rum and cotton from the West Indies, rice and logwood from the Carolinas, tobacco from Virginia, timber and skins from New England and fish from Newfoundland. From Ireland came mainly leather, tallow, linen yarn and dairy produce. Some of these imported goods no doubt figured in the groceries which were present in so many of the cargoes from Bristol in the coastal and river trade. 'Not only all south Wales is supplied from Bristol with every article of foreign commerce', stated a contemporary, 'but likewise the cities and towns of the Severn.'[1] And one might add, the south-west of England as well. All these commodities, raw materials, agricultural produce, manufactured goods and imports contributed to Bristol's position as the chief market of the west. 'If we consider domestic Trade, or inland Navigation,' Campbell stated in 1774, 'Bristol is without rival'.[2]

The machinery of distribution differed with the product. For agricultural produce and fish, the weekly markets were the main outlet. These were held in the streets and on the quays, but so great became the congestion in the eighteenth century that a considerable building programme was embarked upon to provide the city with suitable accommodation for the sale of these goods. The sale of vegetables was removed in 1716 and that of hay in 1731 to markets on either side of the city, that in Broadmead catering for the produce of Gloucestershire and that in Temple Street for the produce of Somerset. The fish market was removed to the quay in 1717 and a new corn market was built in 1726.[3] On the Back a covered market was erected 'for the sale of poultry, fruit and other provisions from Wales'.[4] In addition to these markets, it was reported in the late eighteenth century, 'all sorts of fish,

[1] G. Walpoole, *The New British Traveller* (1784), p. 362.

[2] J. Campbell, *Political Survey of Britain* (1774), p. 147.

[3] Details about the markets from Common Council Proceedings, Council House, Bristol.

[4] *Matthew's Directory*, p. 44.

vegetables and fruit, fresh butter and numerous other articles are cryed about the streets, which are resounding from morning to night with the harsh music of those ambulatory, mercantile orators'.[1] These were supplied by the weekly market boats which came from Chepstow and Gloucester, the collecting points for the Wye and Severn valleys, and from the nearer ports of Wales.

For many manufactured goods, for cattle and grain, the Bristol fairs dominated the trading year. By the eighteenth century the eight fairs of the Middle Ages had been reduced to two, the St. Paul's or winter fair and the St. James's fair. Until 1731 the first began on 25 January and the second on 25 July, but as a result of the protests of traders the dates were changed to 1 March and 1 September. While manufactures were disposed of at each fair, the summer fair was the great cattle fair. But, as Dr. John has told us, they were more than just places of trade: for most of the people of south Wales the economic life revolved around two pivots, the local fairs and markets and the great September fair at Bristol.'[2] There they were called on to discharge their 'shop debts' not only to Bristol traders but to the itinerant salesmen as well.[3] The fair provided an opportunity for a general settlement of obligations. As Henry Escricke, a Bolton middleman, wrote in the summer of 1739: 'I hope to send you some good bills as soon as the Bristol fair is over. I am got in with 3 or 4 travellers that keeps the fair, and they pay but once in twelve months.'[4] Nor should it be forgotten that it served as a social occasion as well as a business function, the normal business of the city being 'set aside until after the fair'.

With the expansion of business and the improvement of communications, regular and organized channels of trade developed and the fairs declined. Agricultural products were purchased by Bristol dealers who went through the western counties, the Midlands and south Wales. The liquor trades led the way: corn factors bought in bulk for the Bristol brewers, and cider was purchased in large quantities by Bristol dealers who had places in

[1] *Matthew's Directory*, p. 44.
[2] A. H. John, *Industrial Development of South Wales*, p. 10.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[4] A. P. Wadsworth and J. de L. Mann, *The Cotton Trade and Industrial Lancashire, 1600–1780*, p. 269.

the country where they 'worked their liquors'. They bought by sample or sometimes without seeing the crop at all.[1] Thus the merchant secured the large supplies he required and the farmer was able to dispose of his crop in a single transaction. Some complained that the prices paid by the dealers were lower than could be obtained in Bristol, but it was pointed out that 'the dealer must take care in buying to provide for storehouse rent, porterage, freight, insurance by sea, commissions on the sales at the port he sends it to and lastly for his own trouble and capital employed'. Though there were complaints that dealers made little difference in price between a good and a bad sample, there were only a few who took their goods to the market in Bristol and an increasing number who sold direct to the factors. Butchers, too, no longer waited for the fairs or markets in Bristol but went to the local markets and carried away the carcases whole.[2]

In a similar manner the importance of the Bristol fair for woollen products declined. Bristol merchants dealt direct with the manufacturer, visited the local markets, or bought by sample. John Pinney, for example, sent his clerk to Bridgwater fair each year and purchased cloth direct from manufacturers at Kilve and Wiveliscombe.[3] Samuel Munckley, another Bristol merchant, had regular dealings with cloth manufacturers in Somerset,[4] while some makers, like Samuel Brown of Chard, brought their samples to Bristol and collected orders direct from their customers. As in agriculture, sale by sample replaced the annual visit to Bristol fair.[5]

The development of a regular system of marketing had gone farthest in the trade in iron for which Bristol was the great distributing centre. Foreign pig and bar iron, imported through Bristol [6] or brought coastwise from London, was transported to

[1] W. Marshall, *Rural Economy of Gloucestershire*, ii. 348.

[2] These statements are drawn from the various *General Views* of agriculture for counties in the Bristol hinterland. For a discussion of the general position of the middleman see R. B. Westerfield, *Middlemen in English Business*.

[3] C. M. MacInnes, in *The Trade Winds*, ed. C. N. Parkinson, p. 64.

[4] Munckley Correspondence in Ashton Court MSS., Council House, Bristol.

[5] Account Book of Samuel Brown of Chard, 1773–8, County Record Office, Taunton.

[6] See Dickinson Papers, County Record Office, Taunton.

the forges and smithies of the Black Country [1] or south Wales. Bar iron from the Midlands, Cumberland or Lancashire was sent to iron works in south Wales and Welsh iron to iron works in the Midlands.[2] The greater part of the trade was in the hands of Bristol iron merchants, of whom Nehemiah Champion [3] and Graffin Prankard [4] were probably the most important, but some establishments elsewhere like the Bringewood [5] and Caerleon Works [6] had agents in Bristol. Through the intervention of Bristol merchants, local forge masters were faced with competition from works in other parts of the country or from imported iron, and there prices were keenest.[7] The Severn was the principal highway of the iron industry [8] and while London came a good second to Bristol as a market for wire, Bristol was easily the most important centre for the trade in merchant iron.[9] In some measure, Bristol prices were accepted as the ruling prices in the iron trade. In 1780, for example, when the tinplate makers met in London to discuss prices, they drew up two lists, the Bristol list and the London list.[10] Again, when in 1748 the smaller wood-owners in the Furness area were faced with a combination of iron makers, they agreed to deliver charcoal to a new furnace at a price to be regulated under a sliding scale by the price of pig iron in the Bristol market. This agreement lasted for thirty years.[11] Thus, in the iron trade, Bristol exercised a quasi-metropolitan influence on price.

From trade it was but a short step to capital investment. The second function of Bristol in the life of its hinterland was as a

[1] The Midland trade in iron has been mapped by B. L. C. Johnson, 'The charcoal iron industry in the early eighteenth century', *Geog. Journal*, cxvii (1951), 167 ff.

[2] See A. H. John, 'Iron and coal on a Glamorgan estate, 1700–40', *Econ. Hist. Rev.*, xiii (1943), 98–9.

[3] A. Raistrick, *Quakers in Science and Industry*, p. 100.

[4] Dickinson Papers, County Record Office, Taunton.

[5] Knight MSS., Kidderminster Public Library.

[6] Caerleon MSS., Newport Public Library.

[7] A. H. John, *Econ. Hist. Rev.*, xiii (1943), 99.

[8] See T. S. Ashton, *Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution*, p. 242.

[9] B. L. C. Johnson, 'The Foley partnerships: the iron industry at the end of the charcoal era', *Econ. Hist. Rev.*, 2nd Ser., iv (1952), 333, n. 2.

[10] Reprinted in E. H. Brooke, *Appendix to Chronology of the Tinplate Works of Great Britain, 1665–1949*, pp. 234–6.

[11] Ashton, *op. cit.*, pp. 167–8.

source of capital. Although Bristol was suitably situated for the finishing trades, it was becoming in the eighteenth century a high-cost location for heavy industry, particularly in terms of labour and fuel. Thus, from the early eighteenth century, Bristol capital was invested in enterprises in its hinterland, not in the already developed, mature textile industries but in the growing mining and metal industries. It found its major outlet in south Wales. In the early years of the century the Welsh copper industry was 'almost entirely in the hands of English financiers, many of whom were Bristol merchants'.[1] The earliest was Dr. John Lane, who established the first copper works in the Swansea area in 1717.[2] The White Rock Copper Company, a partnership of Bristol merchants, was formed in 1737 to operate in Swansea, and other concerns followed as the cost advantages of that area for copper smelting became apparent. Thereafter the industry declined in Bristol, though the finishing processes continued to be carried on there. In this industry mining and merchant interests were closely allied, and this governed, as Dr. John has pointed out, the sources from which capital was obtained for its development.[3]

Coal and iron were the other industries in which Bristol capital was to be found. The expansion of the sea-coal industry in the later eighteenth century, which till then had been financed mainly by local landowners, was carried out with capital drawn from Gloucester, Birmingham and Cornwall, as well as from Bristol.[4] Already by this time Bristol interests had invested in the iron industry. There were Bristol partners in the enterprises formed in the first decade of the century to exploit the iron and coal deposits on the earl of Plymouth's land in the Dowlais area,[5] in the Myrthy Furnace (1759), where the four Bristol partners supplied half of the capital of £4,000,[6] in the Dowlais Company (1763) and in the Sirhowy iron works (1799),[7] while two new works set up at Abercarn and Cardiff were founded by Welsh

[1] A. H. John, *Econ. Hist. Rev.*, xiii (1943), 94.

[2] R. O. Roberts, 'Dr. John Lane and the foundation of the non-ferrous metal industries in the Swansea valley', *Gower*, iv (1951), 19–24.

[3] A. H. John, *Industrial Development of South Wales*, p. 28.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[5] Plymouth MSS. 755, 1404, 1426, 1435, 1437. National Library of Wales.

[6] J. Lloyd, *History of the Old South Wales Iron Works*, pp. 23–4.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

ironmasters, who were financed from Bristol.[1] But the most important single Bristol interest was that of the Harfords, who had shares in the Redbrook, Machen, Bassaleg, Lydbrook, Monmouth and New Weir forges, in Ebbw Vale, in partnership with Jeremiah Homfray, and in the Melingriffith iron and tinplate works.[2] Richard Reynolds, too, had wide connections in the iron industry in south Wales.

While copper, iron and coal were the chief ventures in which Bristol capitalists engaged in south Wales, other enterprises received their support, including the Chepstow glasshouse established in 1764,[3] the printing press operated by Samuel and Felix Farley, the Bristol master printers, at Pontypool for a brief period from 1740,[4] and lead mines in Cardiganshire.[5] The importance of this investment lay less in its volume, which was not substantial, than in its timing. It performed a 'pump-priming' function, if the term may be excused, stimulating further development by native capital. Like other merchant interests which invested in south Wales at this time, Bristol merchants were well placed to carry out such a task because of their knowledge of market conditions and their control of the machinery of distribution.

Outside south Wales, Bristol investment was slight and scattered. Dr. Lane and Thomas Coster were concerned in tin-mining in Cornwall.[6] Bristol capital was to be found in glasshouses at Nailsea and Chelwood[7] and in copper works at Warmley, Saltford and Keynsham.[8] Thomas Goldney was a partner of Abraham Darby in Bristol and later in Coalbrookdale, of which works Richard Reynolds, another Bristol Quaker, became manager.[9] There were Bristol partners in the Cilgwyn and Cefn du Slate Company in north Wales.[10] Finally, although the finance

[1] John, *Industrial Development*, pp. 8, 32.

[2] A. Raistrick, *Quakers in Science and Industry*, pp. 128, 148–9; E. L. Chappell, *Historic Melingriffith*, pp. 30–44.

[3] F. Buckley, 'The early glasshouses of Bristol', *Journal of the Society of Glass Technology*, ix (1925), 47.

[4] I. Jones, *History of Printing and Printers in Wales*, p. 38.

[5] F. Green, *Calendar of the Crosswood Deeds*, p. 143.

[6] J. Latimer, *Annals of Bristol in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 66.

[7] Buckley, *J. Soc. Glass Tech.*, ix (1925), 48.

[8] Latimer, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

[9] Raistrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 124–140; *Dynasty of Iron Founders*, pp. 47–98.

[10] A. H. Dodd, *Industrial Revolution in North Wales*, p. 311.

of canals and turnpike trusts was largely in the hands of local landowners, Bristol capital was to be found in a number of the projects carried out round Bristol. There were Bristol shareholders in the Bristol and Bath, the Stroudwater and later the Kennet and Avon Canal.[1] Caleb Dickinson, Bristol merchant and landowner, had shares in several turnpike trusts, the Toghill, the Bristol, the Somerton, and the Ilchester and Shepton Mallet.[2] Such a concentration of investment in the hinterland of Bristol was indicative of the nature of the capital market, which was still largely personal and specific. The growth of a more impersonal capital market led to a diffusion of capital amongst projects more widely scattered and the loosening of the bond forged by capital investment between Bristol and its hinterland.

As a source of short-term as well as of long-term capital, Bristol was of some importance. Goldsmiths carried on the business of banking there until 1750 when the first Bristol bank, the Bristol Old Bank, was founded. Within fifty years there were seven banks in existence in the city.[3] They discounted bills, made advances over a wide area, and from 1812 began to set up branches in the west of England and south Wales. Some of the banks set up in south Wales which had small resources had a Bristol bank as correspondent 'on which it, or its customers, could draw, and from which notes and coin could be obtained by discounting bills'.[4]

As a centre of marine and fire insurance, Bristol was second only to London, individual underwriters carrying on business as in the capital. The first provincial fire office, the Bristol Crown, was established there in 1718. By 1787 a second company, the Bristol Fire Office, founded twenty years earlier, had 'agents in all the towns of the North and West' and was underselling London offices.[5] Less information is available about ship insurance, but

[1] T. S. Willan, *River Navigation in England*, pp. 47–8; Latimer, *Bristol in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 499.

[2] Dickinson Papers, County Record Office, Taunton.

[3] C. Cave, *A History of Banking in Bristol*, pp. 9–19.

[4] T. S. Ashton, *Industrial Revolution*, p. 103. For illustrations see John, *Industrial Development*, p. 49; T. M. Hodges, 'Early Banking in Cardiff', *Econ. Hist. Rev.*, xviii (1948), 84–90; F. Green, 'Early banks in west Wales', *West Wales Historical Records*, vi (1916).

[5] H. E. Raynes, *History of British Insurance*, pp. 94, 154, 208; J. H. Clapham, *Economic History of Modern Britain*, i. 286.

both Isaac Hobhouse and Samuel Munckley, for example, acted as agents, insuring ships from other provincial ports.[1] In these various ways, Bristol acted as a financial centre of the west.

In this Bristol might be found 'all the throng and bustle of the metropolis . . . so exactly the confusion of London that it requires a very slight exertion of the fancy to imagine oneself absolutely in the Strand'.[2] But there was another Bristol which is oft-times overlooked. Those who were critical of the dirt and squalor of the city—and there were many[3]—extolled the beauty of Hotwells, the spa on the bank of the Avon at the foot of St. Vincent's Rock. 'The season for drinking is from April to September, during which time the place is greatly frequented', reported a visitor,[4] and the volumes of the Historical Manuscripts Commission provide an aristocratic commentary on this statement.[5] Hotwells flourished as a spa for the greater part of the eighteenth century, but was increasingly overshadowed by Bath, entirely consecrated to such social pleasures. The fairs and the spa made Bristol, in some slight way, a centre of conspicuous consumption.

In other ways, also, Bristol influenced the life of its hinterland. Newspapers had been established there early in the eighteenth century[6] and they circulated over a wide area.[7] Bristol was not slow to follow the new urban style of architecture for which Bath set the mode, and the Georgian terraces of Clifton, though generally less admired, do not suffer by comparison with their more publicized rival.[8] While Bath led the fashion it was Bristol which brought the new style to the attention of those engaged in

[1] Munckley Correspondence in Ashton Court MSS., Council House, Bristol, and Hobhouse Correspondence in Jefferies Collection, Reference Library, Bristol.

[2] E. D. Clarke, *A Tour through the South of England* (1791), p. 148.

[3] Among these may be noted Defoe, *A Tour*; Samuel Gade, *Journal* (MSS., University of Bristol Library); R. J. Sulivan, *Journal of a Tour* (1778?), pp. 48–9.

[4] Clarke, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

[5] See, for example, H.M.C., Bath MSS., i. 293; Charlemont MSS., p. 400; Hastings MSS., ii. 19; Somerset MSS., p. 268; Verulam MSS., p. 250. Also *Pembroke Papers, 1780–1791*, ed. Lord Herbert, p. 72; *Journeys of Celia Fiennes*, ed. C. Morris, p. 239.

[6] Latimer, *Bristol in the Eighteenth Century*, pp. 48–52.

[7] John, *Industrial Development*, p. 15.

[8] W. Ison, *The Georgian Architecture of Bristol.*

business and commerce. From Bristol the new architecture spread throughout the west of England.[1]

In many ways the life of the west was linked with Bristol. It was to Bristol that towns or interests appealed for support for the remedy of grievances, the carrying out of important projects or the finance of matters beyond local resources. To the construction of both the Flatholm and the Mumbles lighthouses, Bristol merchants made contribution. The Society of Merchant Venturers sent money to the relief of those who suffered from fires in two north Devon towns and to found libraries in the market towns of south Wales.[2] The role of metropolis was no purely economic affair.

But it would be absurd to overestimate the importance of Bristol in the life of its hinterland. There were other towns like Exeter, Hereford, Gloucester and Bath which had their smaller spheres of influence in the west. Such was the nature of Bristol's hinterland, too, that a substantial volume of commerce was carried on between ports in the Severn valley and in the Bristol Channel without the intervention of Bristol. Chiefly was this so in the coal trade from the Staffordshire coalfield and the south Wales ports. There the volume was sufficient to carry the overhead charges. In other directions, too, other parts of the hinterland made their contribution. Capital for south Wales came from Cornwall and the Midlands, as well as from Bristol. Its newspapers were challenged by the *Gloucester Journal*, which had a wide circulation, and much legal work for south Wales was done in Gloucester and Hereford.[3] And overall there was the influence of London. At many points the effect of the London market was apparent. Much smaller in size, the pull of the Bristol market cannot be compared with that of London, yet within its area, the lines of attraction towards the London markets were deflected by the rival magnetism of Bristol's demand. London, too, was important as a source of capital and as the main centre of banking

[1] See A. E. Richardson and C. L. Gill, *Regional Architecture of Bristol*, *passim*, for examples of Bristol's influence.

[2] These statements are based on documents in the records of the Society of Merchant Venturers of the City of Bristol, to whom I am indebted (and in particular to Miss G. E. Whitaker) for permission to consult the Society's records. See J. Latimer, *A History of the Society of Merchant Venturers of the City of Bristol*, p. 220.

[3] John, *Industrial Development*, p. 15.

and insurance. But all of this said in qualification does not detract from the premise of this essay, that Bristol dominated the trade of its area, that it influenced prices, that its initiative in investment and banking was of no little importance to the west and that in other directions, too, it performed metropolitan functions.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century the position of Bristol began to decline, a decline which continued into the nineteenth century. For this there were a number of reasons. First, its importance as a metropolis of the west had been founded on a network of predominantly water communications. The construction of canals in the north Midlands in the later eighteenth century shifted the outlet of trade away from Bristol, and goods which formerly came south for export now went to Liverpool. The linking of the Stroudwater and the Thames provided a canal route to London which did not pass through Bristol.[1] The improvement of the roads increased the influence of London and reduced local variations in prices. As Henry Cruger wrote as early as in October 1765:

> The conveyance of Goods from that Port to this, and from this to that, are so easy the difference of the Market seldom continues long or material, the Prices of the London market generally regulates this.[2]

Further, Bristol's importance had been founded on foreign trade, and here it lost ground. Its American trade did not recover after the revolution and in the West Indies trade it was surpassed by Liverpool, while no new staples were found to replace the old. There were delays in modernizing the harbour. Local industries, some of them dependent on foreign trade, declined, and the textile trades of Devon and the Cotswolds stagnated while the industrialization of south Wales proceeded. Bristol ceased to be an important centre for the textile trade and lost the Welsh trade to the growing ports of Cardiff, Newport and Swansea. The growing volume of trade increased the amount of direct marketing and reduced the importance of Bristol as an entrepôt.

[1] Melingriffith iron works marketed its products this way. See Melingriffith MSS. in the possession of Mr. S. Gazard, to whom I am indebted for permission to see them.

[2] *Commerce of Rhode Island*, i. 129. I owe this reference to Dr. W. Savadge.

Already by 1829, as a banker's circular commented, Bristol had ceased to be 'the metropolis of the west'; by 1850 it was no longer the 'Welsh metropolis'. In successive directions regional isolation was broken down and the coming of the railway made the influence of London all pervasive. For a period Bristol was able to exercise a quasi-metropolitan function over its hinterland in the west. But it was a transitional phase in economic development, when trade was comparatively small in volume, communications as yet imperfect, industry not fully developed and capital investment personal and specific. The improvement of communications and the growth of institutions and methods of organization appropriate to the expanding industrialism were responsible for the decline in Bristol's position. If the sixteenth century saw 'the rise of the metropolitan market' of which London was centre, then the nineteenth saw the process completed. In the new order Bristol was no longer 'the metropolis of the west'.

THE DIVISION OF THE SPOILS OF WAR IN FOURTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

By Denys Hay, M.A., F.R.Hist.S.

READ 10 OCTOBER 1953

THE desire for booty was a motive in all medieval warfare. The preoccupation of the soldier with spoils, with prisoners, horses, equipment and movable wealth in general, is, however, less evident in the surviving sources of early medieval history than in the records of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Even a cursory knowledge of the period of Anglo-French hostilities between 1337 and 1453 leaves one under no illusions as to the overriding importance to the combatants of the winnings of war. Spoils mattered equally to the rank and file soldier, to the magnate and to the crown. The depredations of the *chevauchée* in Languedoc in 1355 benefited everyone in the Black Prince's army. 'Chevaliers, escuiers, brigants, garchons' were loaded with 'leurs prisonniers et leurs richesses'.[1] Froissart makes Gloucester in 1390 object to a peace with France because of the ensuing discouragement of the 'poor knights and squires and archers of England whose comforts and station in society depend upon war'.[2] And he tells us also how the Sire d'Albret looked back over his military career and regretted the peace which alliance with France had given him. 'I'm well enough,' he told an enquirer, 'but I had more money, and so did my retinue, when I fought for the king of England.' An army on the move, he explained, often gave the chance of capturing a rich merchant; hardly a day passed without its prize; thus one could afford the 'superfluitez et jolitez. . . . Maintenant nous est mort.'[3] The

[1] Jean le Bel, *Chronique*, ed. J. Viard and E. Déprez (Société de l'histoire de France, 1904–5), ii. 222.

[2] 'Aussi s'enclinoient à la guerre povres chevalliers et escuiers et archers d'Angleterre, qui avoient aprins les oiseuses [*var.* aises] et soustenoient leur estat sur la guerre', *Œuvres*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels, 1867–79), xiv. 314.

[3] Froissart, ed. S. Luce and others (Soc. d'hist. de France, Paris, 1869 ff.), xii. 205; cf. Robert Boutruche, *La Crise d'une Société* (Paris, 1947), p. 348. Further references to Froissart are to the Paris edition unless the contrary is stated.

progress in acquisitiveness can be measured in terms of ransoms, which steadily mounted as the war with France went on. By the end of the reign of Edward III the convention that a gentleman would not unduly embarrass his captive[1] was somewhat strained: the ransom of 200,000 nobles asked of Charles of Blois thirty years before then seemed modest enough.[2] Contemporaries accepted without repugnance the most brutal consequences of this warfare for gain: the losing party could console itself on saving the wages—always in arrears—of its captured or slaughtered troops[3]; a bloody battle, it was argued, at any rate left more in the way of pickings to the survivors.[4] The slaughter was, of course, usually restricted to the common soldier. The gentlemen participating were too valuable to be killed, and in fourteenth-century campaigns in the West we normally find the destruction of considerable numbers of potential prisoners only in conditions of civil war, as in Brittany and Castile.[5] Even then one can apprehend the lively sense of wasted opportunity. When the English side at Aljubarotta (1385) had to kill their prisoners, Froissart notes not only that this was pitiful (*pitié*) but also that it was a disaster (*mesaventure*), 'because that day they killed good prisoners from whom they could have had 400,000 francs'.[6]

For no one were the profits of war more valuable than for

[1] Cf. the 'finanche raisonnable, enssi que on doit mettre ung gentil homme sans lui trop presser' (Froissart, ii. 345).

[2] 'Qui estoit moult grande a payer (mais non seroit à présent pour ung duc de Bretaigne, car les seigneurs se fourment maintenant sur autre condition et manière que ils ne faisoient pour lors, et treuvent plus tost une finance [*var.* chevance] que ne firent jamais leurs prédécesseurs ou temps passé, mais du temps passé ils ne usoient fors de leurs rentes et revenues, et à present la Duchié de Bretaigne sur ung an ou sur deux, pour aidier à leur seigneur, très bien se tailleroient à deux cens mille nobles)' (Froissart, ed. Kervyn, xii. 55). In fact, Charles of Blois did call on his subjects: S. Luce, *Bertrand du Guesclin* (Paris, 1876), p. 226; cf. Jean le Bel, ii. 243; Robert of Avesbury, *De gestis mirabilibus regis Edwardi III* (Rolls Series), pp. 418–20; Rymer, *Foedera*, iii (1). 336.

[3] Concerning French losses at Sluys: 'Li rois de France a à lor mort gaegniet deux cens mille florins. On lor devoit lors gages de quatre mois, et si en est la mer delivrée' (Froissart, ii. 226).

[4] So Cuvelier makes Bertrand du Guesclin talk of the war of Breton succession (Luce, *op. cit.*, p. 208).

[5] Cf. Luce, *op. cit.*, p. 51 (Roche-Derrein, 1347); Froissart, vi. 168 (Auvray, 1364).

[6] Froissart, xii. 162–3.

Edward III, who had the good fortune to take prisoner a king of Scotland and a king of France, besides many other magnates only slightly less illustrious and remunerative. Doubtless the sums actually paid by the Scots and the French after Neville's Cross and Poitiers were considerably smaller than the amounts agreed on in the instruments of ransom, and doubtless much of the money was already spent before it arrived.[1] Nevertheless it has been reckoned by Professor Perroy[2] that between 1360 and 1370 Edward III received the enormous sum of about £268,000 from three major ransoms. Much of royal income from war was directly or indirectly devoted to war[3]: it soon became a criticism of the crown that war did not pay for itself as it seemed that it should be easy for it to do.[4] For the crown obtained ransoms and spoils not only from princes and a couple of great battles, but from a continuous series of smaller men and on less dramatic occasions. It is the purpose of this paper to examine how, within the framework of the general desire for spoils, the profits of war were distributed between the crown and its soldiers.

Given the naked greed of many of the troops, if not of all of them, one might assume that victory in any military engagement would at once result in the victors fighting each other for the rewards of their success, unless appetite was restrained by an accepted convention. And in fact a few instances of such sordid disputes come before us. Once, we read, the commander of a French fortress surrendered to the attacking English; but the latter disputed over the ransom and murdered the enemy captain in the ensuing brawl.[5] Such cases must have occurred from time to time, but it is significant that they are not often recorded. For we must not regard as coming within this category the more frequent occasions when a prosperous or famous prisoner was claimed by rival captors. Of such cases the most celebrated is

[1] The assignments on these ransoms make it difficult to compute with certainty what was in fact paid. See D. M. Broome, 'The Ransom of John II' (*Camden Miscellany*, xiv. 1926).

[2] E. Perroy, 'L'affaire du comte de Denia', *Mélanges Halphen* (Paris, 1951), pp. 573–80.

[3] '...et envoyèrent tout leur butin et grand foison de prissoniers en Angleterre, dont grand trésor issi, dont le roy Edowart paya largement ses souldoiers', Jean le Bel, ii. 74 (1346).

[4] *Rot. Parl.*, ii. 323a, iii. 57b, 74a.

[5] Thomas Gray, *Scalacronica*, ed. H. Maxwell (Glasgow, 1907), pp. 140–1.

King John II of France, the most romantic that of John Jewel and the most interesting that of Olivier du Guesclin.[1] These are examples not of rapacity as such, but of rapacity working through well-organized legal channels, where titles to property depended on interpretation of the law of arms. Evidently the desire to take prisoners rather than fight was something of a problem for army commanders, and a proclamation was made by the Black Prince immediately prior to Poitiers that no man should linger over his prisoner on pain of forfeiting him, a rule repeated on later occasions.[2] But even legal disputes over prisoners seem to be rare enough, and on most occasions when men were made prisoners and booty was taken, we must assume that the spoils were divided fairly peaceably according to well-understood rules. What do we know of these rules?

The only statement I know of by a competent authority is by Professor A. E. Prince in his most useful survey of 'The indenture system under Edward III'.[3]

> All the 'advantages of war' were usually granted by the king to the other indenting party. To this rule there were two main exceptions, for the king reserved for himself the most important castles and lands, and, secondly, the most influential prisoners of war . . . [for whom] the king promised, however, to pay the actual captors 'a reasonable reward' . . . In subcontracts, both parties seem to have shared in the spoils of capture. Ralph Stafford and Hugh FitzSimon in 1347 agreed to divide equally the proceeds, but the more normal practice was for the superior contracting party to take a third only.[4]

Mr. Prince's remarks on the crown's right to the main enemy

[1] For the dispute about John II, see Froissart, v. 55, 57 (and ed. Kervyn, xviii. 394–6); Rymer, iii (1), 385, 467, 706; *Cal. Pat. Rolls 1358–61*, p. 320. Jewel was taken at Cocherel, 16 May 1364, wearing a helmet engraved 'Qui Jehan prendra, cent mille frans aura', and died soon after his capture, but not before there was a dispute (Froissart, vi. 129–30, 310; Luce, *Bertrand du Guesclin*, p. 445). O. du Guesclin was taken during the second half of 1378 and his ownership was disputed by Charles of Navarre and Sir John d'Arundel, while further litigation arose between Arundel's heirs and other interested parties (Froissart, ix. 98 and introd., p. lvi, n. 1; Rymer, iv. 72; *Calendar of London Plea and Mem. Rolls, 1364–81*, pp. 297–300; *1381–1412*, pp. 8–9).

[2] *Black Prince's Register*, iv. 338; below, p. 97.

[3] *Historical Essays in Honour of James Tait*, ed. J. G. Edwards and others (Manchester, 1933), pp. 283–97.

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 295.

prisoners seem to me to be completely correct and in this matter we need only enquire into the antiquity of the right, a subject I shall mention shortly. But on spoils apart from ransoms, and the ransoms of the lesser enemy captives, his observations seem to me less self-evident. His authorities for the subcontractual arrangements are a contract of 1347 in which the winnings are equally divided,[1] and an indenture of 1372, between John of Gaunt and Sir Richard Whitefield,[2] which, as we shall see in a moment,[3] is one of the first surviving instruments in which the claim to a third of the booty is specifically mentioned. Is it therefore the case that 'the superior normally took a third only' in the central period of Edward III's reign? And what of the crown's position? For in the indenture armies of Edward's foreign wars the crown was ultimately the 'superior contracting party' of practically all the soldiers under its control. Mr. Prince, we may note, makes no reference to the sharing of spoils in his later essay on the army and navy in the first decade of Edward III's reign, which perhaps indicates that he then felt less sure of the matter than in his earlier essay[4]; though prior to 1337 the indentured retinue was presumably a minor element in the English army. In view of the volume and value of the winnings of war it seems sensible to sift what evidence there is for the sharing of those 'advantages of war' which we regularly encounter in the commissions and contracts of the first half of the Hundred Years War.[5]

It will be safest to begin with a firm point, although it lies beyond Edward III's reign. In 1385 were issued the first of the general 'Ordinances of War', which regulated discipline in the royal army. Issued for the forces advancing against Scotland,

[1] G. Wrottesley, *Crécy and Calais* (1898), p. 192.

[2] *John of Gaunt's Register*, ed. S. Armitage-Smith, i (Camden Third Series, xx. 1911), 293.

[3] Below, p. 98.

[4] 'The army and navy', in J. F. Willard and W. A. Morris, *The English Government at work 1327–1336*, i (1940), 332–93.

[5] 'Qil puisse avoir toutes autres avauntages de guerre', Commission of Henry of Lancaster as Lieutenant in Gascony, 13 March 1345, Pub. Rec. Off. K.R. Mem. Roll E 159/123, m. 254. I have to thank Mr. Pierre Chaplais for drawing my attention to this. Cf. *Black Prince's Register*, iv. 143–5 (10 July 1355); 'Et avera le dit M. Henri [de Scrop] les gains de guerre... comme autres capitains ant euz, par vertue de leur commissions ou endentures, en temps passez'; John duke of Lancaster appointing a captain of the town and castle of Calais, 1369 (Rymer, iii (2). 881–2).

the 'Ordinances of Durham', as we may call them, have survived in a considerable number of manuscripts.[1] The sixteenth clause runs as follows:

> Item, qe chescun paie le tierce a son seignur ou mestre, de toute manere de gaigne darmes, et ce auxi bien ceux qe ne sont point a soulde, mes tant soulement herbergent desouz banere ou pennon daucun capitaigne.[2]

Here we have the arithmetic authoritatively set down. Each man will pay one third of his winnings of war to his lord or master. The retained soldier thus pays a third to his captain, and the captain pays a third of this, together with a third of his own winnings, to the crown. The crown is thus entitled to the 'thirds and thirds of thirds' of all the spoils of war. While we have no earlier statement of similar general bearing, there are several grounds for regarding the Durham Ordinances as a statement of existing practice rather than an innovation.

To start with, the document as a whole undoubtedly represents the military practice, in discipline and control, which was observed in the English armies of Edward III's reign. It would take too long to establish this in detail, but we may note that the arrangements laid down for taking the surrender of a defeated opponent (clause 22) have many parallels in the narratives of actual fighting half a century earlier.[3] The arrangements for pre-

[1] 'Ceux sont les estatutz, ordenances, et coustumes a tenir en lost... a Duresme, le xvij jour du Moys de Juyl, lan du regne nostre seignur le Roy Richard second noefisme', printed accurately by Travers Twist, *Black Book of the Admiralty* (Rolls Series), i. 453–8, from Brit. Mus. Cotton MS. Nero D. vi, fos. 89v–90. Other early MSS. in the British Museum are Add. 32097, fos. 42–4, Domitian A. xviii, fos. 30v–32 (dates 27 July). Another French version in Stowe 140, fos. 148–50, and English versions in Harley 369, Harley 1309, Egerton 2342, Add. 6297. There are late copies in the Bodleian, MSS. Rawlinson B. 131, B. 491, Ashmole 856, 863. There is a copy in the College of Arms (according to F. Grose, *Military Antiquities*, ii (1788), 60), and doubtless there are others. The date of 27 July looks more plausible than the generally accepted 17 July: *Cal. Pat. Rolls 1385–9*, pp. 7, 10; *Cal. Close Rolls, 1385–9*, p. 83.

[2] The thirds are also mentioned in clause 19, where penalties are laid down for not taking prisoners promptly to king, constable and marshal and for failing to guard prisoners properly. The *Black Book* makes two words of *hostyant*, in error.

[3] E.g. Froissart *passim*, and the count of Dammartin's narrative of his surrender at Poitiers in *Black Prince's Register*, iv. 339.

venting interruption of the action through anxiety to control prisoners are essentially the same as those laid down by the Black Prince in 1356.[1] Moreover, the clause itself laying down the payment of thirds is curiously matter-of-fact and seems more concerned to point out the duties of the non-retained men than those of the soldiers in the indentured retinues: all must pay thirds, it says in effect, not only the men with formal contracts. If there was doubt at all, in other words, there was doubt only about the winnings of those in the field who were not bound by the strict relationship of the indenture army. That Richard II could have invented a claim to so large a share as a third without arousing protest is on the face of it highly improbable. His magnates were to be all too anxious to find sticks to beat him with, and this seizure of a third of their profits would have been a spectacular grievance which would not have escaped both the chroniclers and the Rolls of Parliament. Nor would such an innovation have remained unmodified by the Lancastrian, Yorkist and Tudor successors of Richard, who duly repeated his claim 'that everyman pay his thirdes to his capitayne, lorde, or master, of all maner wynyng by wares',[2] and some of whom, notably Henry V, sedulously sought to collect the thirds from their troops.[3]

An even more telling argument against the sudden imposition by king and council of a division of the spoil by three in 1385 is

[1] Above, p. 94.

[2] 'Statutes and Ordenances made by . . . Henry the Fifft at . . . Maunt', Nicholas Harris Nicolas, *History of the Battle of Agincourt* (2nd ed. 1832), appendix, pp. 31–40, from a MS. in the College of Heralds; a Latin paraphrase will be found in Nicholas Upton, *De studio militari*, ed. E. Bysshe (London, 1654), pp. 133–45, and other English versions in *Black Book of the Admiralty*, i. 282–95, 459–72. In general see *Short Title Catalogue*, nos. 9332–9336; Grose, *Military Antiquities*, ii. 66–106; C. G. Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army* (Oxford, 1946), pp. 112, 149–50.

[3] Prohibition of unauthorized ransoms, 20 May 1416, *Cal. Close Rolls Henry V*, i. 355; cf. R. A. Newhall, *English Conquest of Normandy* (New Haven, 1924), pp. 285–6. For instances of the thirds and thirds of thirds being collected see Newhall, *op. cit.*, pp. 156–7, and also Pub. Rec. Office E. 101/46/4 (bond to pay a third to the crown, 3 Henry V), E. 101/48/2 (file of 47 bonds, 3 and 4 Henry V), E. 101/53/7 (receipt for 96 bonds to Henry V, 19 October 13 Henry VI); cf. *Rot. Parl.* iv. 178a, petition (1422) for a settlement between crown and the lords and captains of the late Henry V, taking account of the 'tierces et tierce de tierce de tout manere de gaignes, gaigneez par voie de guerre'.

the existence of such a fraction in documents of the preceding decade. Early indentures of retinue very seldom make mention of any proportion of spoils,[1] but I have found several which do so after 1370. Of these one is the document referred to by Mr. Prince.[2] It states that 'en droit des prisoners et autres profitz de guerre prises ou gaynez par le dit Richard [Whytefeld] ou nulle de ses gentz l'avant dit Duc [de Lancastre] avera la tierce partie'. This indenture was drawn up on 3 January 1372. Other indentures in similar terms are found in the duke's *Register* for 1374[3]; others hardly less significantly say that in respect of prisoners the duke will treat his retainer 'comme il ferra as autres de sa condicion',[4] a pretty clear indication that in the ducal household there was an accepted convention in this matter. Next we have a series of indentures between Sir Thomas Felton and a number of captains, in which Felton, acting as a royal lieutenant, reserves to the crown the thirds and thirds of thirds. These documents[5] are dated in 1381. Finally we have in April 1386 a royal indenture in which a captain is exempted from paying the magical third.[6] But this was after the Ordinance of 1385, and from then

[1] References to most printed indentures will be found in N. B. Lewis, 'The organization of indentured retinues in fourteenth-century England', *Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc.*, 4th ser., xxvii (1945); K. B. McFarlane, 'Bastard Feudalism', *Bulletin of the Inst. of Hist. Research*, xx (1943–5); and in Mr. Prince's articles quoted above, pp. 94–5. The biggest MS. collection of them is at the Public Record Office, in the Exchequer series 101/68, use of which is made below.

[2] See above, p. 95 and n. 2. For an example from 1370 see below, p. 99, n. 2.

[3] *John of Gaunt's Register*, ii. 5–6.

[4] *Ibid.*, i. 294–5, ii. 4; *John of Gaunt's Register 1379–1383*, ed. Eleanor C. Lodge and R. Somerville, i (Camden Third Series, lvi. 1937), 16–26; cf. a similar indenture between the Earl of Warwick and John Russell, 29 March 1383, Thomas Blount, *Nomo-Lexicon* (London, 1670), sig L [2v] *s.v.* 'Bouche of Court'. Much the same language ('come il ferra as autres banretz deson estat et solonc le manere de pais') is found in the enrolled copy of the contract of 1370 between Lancaster and Nevill (which Mr. H. C. Johnson kindly consulted for me) summarized in *Cal. Pat. Rolls 1370–74*, p. 46. Mr. K. B. McFarlane directed my attention to this document; I owe him further thanks for discussing with me some of the general problems examined in this paper.

[5] P.R.O., E 101/68/8–9. The phrase is 'la tierce partz de touz les prouffis gaignez par la personne du dit [captain's name] et la tierce part du tiers du prouffit de sa retenue'.

[6] P.R.O., E 101/68/10, between the king and Sir Thomas Abberbury.

onwards thirds and the thirds of thirds figure regularly in indentures.[1]

It is thus pretty clear that in the 1370's the practice in the Lancastrian household and in the royal household was the same, viz. to demand for the superior a third part of the winnings of war of soldiers serving under contract. While at an earlier date it is more than likely that the methods of dividing the spoil varied from magnate to magnate, the recruitment of the indenture army of the French wars may well have led to the widespread, if not to the exclusive, adoption of the royal third, for the indenture army meant that, through contracts and sub-contracts, a high proportion of troops were in a sense in the royal household or working to its rules and conventions. The obligation which lay on royal captains to pay a third of their winnings logically involved the crown in a claim to a third of the third[2] the captains themselves gained from their companies. The ordinance of 1385 is accordingly not an innovation when compared with actual practice towards the end of Edward III's reign. We are left none the less with the question of how the division was made during the earlier decades of Edward III's reign, and the evidence for this must now be examined.

There was, as already stated, no doubt of the crown's right to dispose of all prisoners. This was, in fact, a very ancient right,[3] but it is sufficient here to note that it was the understanding lying behind the money feofs created in the Low Countries for military purposes by Edward III in the late 1330's. From our point of view the general characteristic of many of these instruments, so feudal in language and so unfeudal in spirit, is that the king of England promises to indemnify the vassal in the event of losses and claims all the prisoners taken by him in the event of gains.[4] The most

[1] N. H. Nicolas, *Agincourt*, app., pp. 8–10; Rymer, ix. 230–2, x. 392–4; S. Lysons in *Archaeologia*, xvii (1814), 214–16; A. Abram, *Social England in the Fifteenth Century* (1909), pp. 227–8; cf. the royal pardon in John Whetamstede, *Registrum* (Rolls Series), i. 89.

[2] The first 'thirds of thirds' I have found explicitly referred to occurs in 1370; J. Bain, *Calendar of docs. relating to Scotland*, iv. 178.

[3] See the references in Alwyn Schultz, *Das höfische Leben zur Zeit der Minnisinger* (2nd ed. Leipzig, 1889), ii. 298–305; L. Gautier, *La chevallerie* (3rd ed. Paris, 1895), pp. 699–700; P. Meyer's note to *Guillaume le Maréchal* iii (Paris, 1901), 39; refs. quoted by F. M. Powicke, *Loss of Normandy*, cited below, p. 108.

[4] Rymer, ii (2). 970, 984, 992.

interesting of them relates to Henry of Flanders, count of Lodi.[1] In it Henry agrees to hand over all prisoners to the king's marshal, 'as other lords do' (*en manere que autres seignurs ferront*), that the king may have his will of them.[2] That 'other lords' were expected or required to do so may, indeed, be implicit in the omission of such stipulations in other similar contracts[3] as well as in more positive statements which show that the king or his representative had a right to prisoners.[4] It was this right which enabled the king to prohibit the release of prisoners[5]; it was this right which was frequently conveyed to royal lieutenants, usually with the reservation to the crown of prisoners of the highest rank and over a certain value, generally £500.[6] But the exercise of the royal monopoly was tempered by the distribution to the actual captor of some of his gains. The best known of such gifts were the 'rewards' for the capture of David II of Scotland and John II of France. But the practice was general and was reinforced by older traditions of largesse.[7] It was, perhaps, positively incumbent on the king. At any rate in 1340 Edward III stated that one of his commanders should be compensated for prisoners taken over by the king or released by royal order, because this was only reasonable,[8] and this notion of reasonable compensation for the prisoners

[1] Cf. *Cal. Pat. Rolls 1338–40*, p. 370; H. S. Lucas, *The Low Countries and the Hundred Years War* (Ann Arbor, 1929), p. 330.

[2] P.R.O., E 101/68/3, 26 February 1339.

[3] E.g. Guy count of Namur (1335) (Rymer, ii (2). 921).

[4] Bartholomew Burghersh to Stratford, July 1346: 'et le chambelen de Tankerville fust pris dun bacheler monseignur le prince, si qil est le prison moun seignur', Adam Murimuth, *Continuatio Chronicorum* (Rolls Series), p. 203.

[5] Murimuth, *loc. cit.*; Rymer, iii (1). 98; Henry Knighton, *Chronicon* (Rolls Series), ii. 44; *Cal. Pat. Rolls Ed. III 1348–50*, pp. 60–1, 312.

[6] P.R.O., E 101/68/4 (1355): Northampton as 'chevetein et gardein' of Brittany (cf. Rymer iii (1). 37, a similar commission of 1345). The Black Prince as lieutenant in Gascony (1355) was to have all prisoners, except the chief of the enemy (*Black Prince's Register*, iv. 143–5). Cf. A. E. Prince, 'Strength of English armies in the reign of Edward III', *Eng. Hist. Review*, xlvi (1931), 370–1.

[7] Cf. McFarlane, 'Bastard Feudalism', pp. 177–8.

[8] 'Et quia est consonum rationi quod praedicto Waltero [de Manny], ... satisfactionem competentem a nobis habeat pro prisonibus supradictis', Rymer, ii (2). 1123; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1338–40*, p. 479. Cf. Rymer, ii. 304 (*Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1313–17*, p. 602), licence to David earl of Atholl to plunder the Scots, 1316: he is to hand over any prisoners whom the king wishes to have, in return for 100 marks.

claimed by the crown is a regular feature of later commissions. The frequent exercise of this royal right to have prisoners against 'reasonable compensation' makes it hard to distinguish the king's privilege from mere participation by the crown in the well-known traffic which took place in enemy captives. If Edward III often gave 'rewards' for the 'free surrender' of prisoners taken in war, he or his clerks often refer to his purchase of prisoners, more particularly in the later part of the reign.[1]

The notion that the crown must share the profits is also clearly revealed in the practice of naval warfare at this time. The king had a right to all prisoners taken at sea if he chose to exercise it, but habitually he conceded a proportion of the spoils, usually half, to the crew of the victorious ship. When the ship was not a royal vessel the king only got a quarter, the other quarter going to the owner.[2] The admiral's share in prizes crystallized as a tenth[3] and the whole matter remained very lively for centuries to come.[4] One's impression of the proportions used in the distribution of the winnings of war at sea is that there was some slight variation, the crown occasionally being prepared to increase the proportion as an incentive, particularly to the early type of privateer; and this certainly happened later.[5]

If we may thus assume with some confidence that the crown had the right to prisoners whom it thought it desirable to take over on economic or political grounds, and the right to a definite share in booty and prisoners taken at sea, we are still left with

[1] Cf. *Cal. Pat. Rolls Ed. III, 1345–8*, pp. 225 (William Douglas), 285 (W. de Haliburton), 337, 538, 550 (count of Eu); *1358–61*, pp. 63 (royal purchase of a share in a French prisoner), 300 (purchase of Black Prince's prisoners).

[2] *Black Book of the Admiralty* (Rolls Series), i. 20–2, 30, 145–7, 223; R. G. Marsden, *Law and Custom of the Sea* (Navy Record Society), i. 1–2, 66–74, 169n. In E 101/68/7 there is a damaged indenture in which the crown reserves a quarter of spoils taken at sea, 10 April 1 Richard II; cf. Rymer, iii (2). 970, indenture of 1373 with two Genoese captains for service at sea, the crown reserving a half of the spoils.

[3] *Black Book*, i. 150, 247, 399; Marsden, 'Early prize jurisdiction', *Eng. Hist. Review*, xxiv (1909), 675–97, esp. pp. 675–6; G. Schwarzenberger, 'International law in early English practice', *Brit. Year Book of International Law*, xxv (1948), 81–2.

[4] See Richard Pares, *Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739–63* (Oxford, 1938), pp. 5–20, and the literature there quoted.

[5] Pares, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

the question of the division of the spoil, including those prisoners not taken over by the crown, prior to the period, roughly after 1370, when the third seems to have been generally accepted. We may survey the evidence chronologically.

Early indentures of retinue, as already stated, do not contain references to prisoners and spoils being shared.[1] A knowledge of the principles upon which the division was made was assumed by the contracting parties. But as the war in France gathered momentum we find the matter more or less fully dealt with in a special clause. The earliest precise information which I have come upon is the indenture, quoted by Mr. Prince, and drawn up on 16 March 1347, in which Ralph, Lord Stafford, retains Hugh Fitz Symond, reserving to himself 'la moytie des proffitz' of any ransoms of captives.[2] Next we have an indenture of 1 May 1347 recorded in the *Black Prince's Register*; in it the Prince retains Sir Thomas Furnival and ten men-at-arms. The important feature of the document is that it is laid down that if Furnival takes a prisoner, the ransom shall be halved with the prince. There is another indenture in identical terms and of the same date for Sir John Willoughby.[3] In 1348 occurs a sinister contract between Edward III and Raoul de Caours, to which Luce drew attention in his unfinished life of Bertrand du Guesclin. In this the mercenary is granted £1,000 worth of lands in Poitou to be conquered by him and all the advantages of war, Edward reserving to himself a half of ransoms and the right to determine whether or not prisoners of rank should be released.[4] On 5 March 1350 Sir Gerard de Lisle contracted to serve the earl of Arundel on the basis of an equal share in captured prisoners.[5] From these examples one might be inclined to infer that the normal procedure in the 1340's, at any rate in continental campaigns, was for the spoils to be divided by half. Such a judgment is, I suggest, premature and may well be upset as fresh evidence turns up. A more likely explanation is that we are here dealing with arrangements for sharing the profits of war which depend on a wide variety of

[1] Above, p. 98.

[2] G. Wrottesley, *Crécy and Calais* (cited above, p. 95, n. 1).

[3] *Register*, i. 128–9.

[4] 4 July 1348, Rymer, iii. 164, 168; Luce, pp. 89–90.

[5] Berkeley Castle, Select Charters. I owe this information to Dr. N. B. Lewis.

considerations: there is the possibility that on land, as later at sea, the crown and its servants needed to increase rewards in order to enlist support; there is a positive likelihood that traditions in this respect varied from the household of one magnate to another. This last point is important and can be amplified, for as we shall see, the Black Prince continued to demand a moiety when there was in other households, and notably in the royal household, a demand for a third only.

The evidence for the 1350's and 1360's is fortunately fairly plentiful. An entry in the Patent Roll for 10 December 1351 orders the arrest of John de Staunton and others, lately staying in Brittany at the king's wages, who have taken prisoners divers of the king's enemies. Walter Bentley, keeper of the land of Brittany, ought to have a part of these ransoms; but, after receiving such ransoms as well as their wages from the king, the men have left Brittany without royal permission and without satisfying Bentley of what pertains to him in respect of the prisoners.[1] By itself this tells us only that Bentley as royal captain, and possibly also the crown, had a claim to part of these ransoms. Light is, however, thrown on the matter by the survival of a series of questions put to the king and council by Bentley in the following year, together with the answers given him.[2] The English captain asked for authority to place all soldiers under royal command, 'and those who do not wish to be paid (*engagés*) should hand over the thirds of their prisoners (*les tersages des prisoniers*)'. This was approved by the crown: 'le roi voet que de ceux qui ne voillent demorer à ses gages en Bretayn, que le capitayn illoeque eit le tiersage de lour gain et de lour prisoniers'; and Edward also ruled that the captain in Brittany should be informed by all troops of the capture of any duke, count or other great lord so that if the ransom exceeded 4,000 crowns the prisoner might be handed over to the captain in Brittany for the king (*au noun du roi*) against reasonable compensation (*le roi en fera convenable grée*). Taken together the commission of 1351 and the council's rulings of 1352 leave us in no doubt that soldiers in royal employment in Brittany, those directly or indirectly

[1] *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Ed. III, 1350–54*, p. 205.

[2] Printed from Bréquigny's collections (who, so I am told by Professor Le Patourel, got it from the French Roll), by Kervyn de Lettenhove in the supplementary volume of his edition of Froissart, xviii. 339–43.

contracted to the crown, were required to hand over one third of their winnings of war. Indeed the terms of the Durham Ordinance of 1385 are practically anticipated, for as then, so thirty-odd years earlier the crown is at pains to stress that all, not only contracted soldiers, are liable to surrender a third.

At some point between 1356 and 1359 another royal officer on the continent sought advice from the government in England. This was Philip of Navarre, Edward's lieutenant in Normandy, and the royal replies to his enquiries are similar in form to those given to Bentley a little before. Edward is insistent that the forces under his lieutenant are *not* in royal control. This is a substantial point, for England and France were technically not at war and the Navarrese command was over soldiers of fortune fighting for themselves. Their actions damaged France, as Edward no doubt wished them to, but it would clearly have been highly embarrassing for him to have done anything to turn the ravaging of freebooters into an official and overt act of war. Hence to Philip of Navarre's enquiry as to whether he was to exact the third the king replied negatively:

> Item, au quart point du tierz du gaign de guerre, semble qe mons' Philippe ne poet cela demander si les gentz ne feussient a ses custages, et aussint le Roi ne le prent nulle foiz de ses [Philip's] gentz, ne aussint ne les poet il charger de le doner a nul autre contre lour gree.[1]

Here we have again proof that troops in royal pay were liable to surrender a third: the forces in Normandy are not and so do not pay it, though had the fighting been formal war doubtless the king would have demanded it as he had done in 1352.

In the 1350's we thus have the crown reserving not a half but a third of the winnings of war, and there seems no reason to suppose there is any interruption in this practice before the 1370's when, as I have tried to show, we are on firm ground.[2] Yet during the late 1350's we have conclusive proof that Edward the Black Prince was maintaining his claim to one half. In 1357 the prince ordered the arrest of two brothers who had defaulted

[1] Mr. Le Patourel kindly communicated this document (from Caligula D III) to me; he is inclined to date it 1358.

[2] Cf. above, p. 98, and below, p. 106 and n. 5.

in the payment of the duke's half in a prisoner captured at Poitiers.[1] And in 1358 the prince is found making an assignment on his moiety of the 500 marks ransom to which one of his knights, Sir Warin de Bassyngbourne, had put a prisoner, Sir John de Sentri.[2] This is Jean de Saintré, claimed by some as the prototype of the hero in the later romance by Antoine de la Sale: he was taken in 1356.[3] Yet if in one great magnate's following the half was still customary in the 1350's, there is some indication that during the 1360's the third gained ground even there. This seems to be the inference we must draw from the copy of a document, unfortunately not dated, which refers to the division of the spoil at the battle of Najera in 1367. It forms part of the *dossier* in the famous case of the count of Denia and recounts the transfer by the Black Prince to the king of his rights in the Spanish nobleman, apart from the prince's third (*sauvant et reservant a nostre dit filz son tierz*).[4] Later this third was separately conveyed to Robert Hawley.[5] The prince's third at Najera indeed throws light on more than this one battle. By the treaty drawn up the year before between him and King Peter, Prince Edward was promised that portion of ransoms 'which was customary in the French wars'.[6]

Summarizing, we may say that there is every appearance of a variety of usages prevailing in the disposal of booty and ransoms of prisoners not claimed outright by crown, superior lord or captain in the first decades of Edward III's reign. The references we find to royal practice suggest that the third was of old standing in the royal household; yet the persistence of the half in the following of a royal duke and prince precludes any certainty that in general the larger fraction was exceptional. There does, however, seem to be every likelihood that the royal system of taking only a third was gradually adopted during the period after the Peace of Brétigny, and was pretty universal by the last decade

[1] *Register*, iii. 251–2, 294–5. [2] *Ibid.*, iv. 249.

[3] Froissart, iv. 105; A. Coville, *Le Petit Jehan de Saintré: recherches complémentaires* (Paris, 1937), p. 64. Saintré had been captured before in 1351.

[4] Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 24062, f. 162. For a discussion of it see E. Perroy in *Mélanges Halphen* (cited above, p. 93, n. 2). Professor Perroy uses the old foliation (172).

[5] *Cal. Close Rolls Edward III, 1374–7*, pp. 337–8 (13 March 1375).

[6] Rymer, iii (2). 800 (Sept. 1366).

of the reign. The reason for this lies doubtless in the growth of the indentured army. 'The king's army was essentially the household in arms', to quote Professor Tout.[1] As the tradition of separate feudal contingents declined, uniformity spread in all military relationships, including the one under discussion.

It would be satisfactory if we could trace in detail the payments made, to king or captain, under the terms of the conventions which prevailed from time to time during the fourteenth century. This seems, however, unlikely to be feasible. The money paid in as the royal share of ransoms or booty went into the private treasure of the king and is lost in the recesses of the privy purse.[2] The Exchequer had no say in such adventitious and personal income. Though at a time of financial crisis ransoms which had swollen the resources of the Chamber found their way, by means of a loan, to the central financial department, this seems to have been exceptional[3]; the enquiry into the breaking of Exchequer rules in 1364 which arose over an instalment of King John of France's ransom was not an attempt by the Exchequer to secure control of the money, but to regularize its temporary custody of funds which properly belonged to the Chamber.[4] We may none the less hope for accidental record of such income, such as we have in the quittances given in 1361 to two men for thirds of ransoms pertaining to their commands in France.[5]

In the commission of 1351 quoted above, it is stated that the soldiers concerned absconded with *both* their wages *and* their ransom profits.[6] This suggests that the profits of war were deducted from wages. This procedure we know to have been applied in Henry V's campaigns in France[7] and it seems a logical extension of the sharing of spoils which we have been considering. The earliest explicit reference to such a method of accounting which I have come upon is in an indenture dated 1 March 1373 between the king and Robert, Lord Willoughby. After outlining

[1] *Chapters*, ii. 133.
[2] Cf. *ibid.*, iv. 317, n. 5.
[3] *Ibid.*, iv. 329–30.
[4] *Ibid.*, iii. 245–8.
[5] Robert de Eves and Thomas Fogg, *Cal. Pat. Rolls Ed. III, 1361–4*, pp. 122, 126; cf. the charges against Lord Latimer in 1376, *Cal. Pat. Rolls Ed. III, 1374–7*, p. 353; and the quittance to the bishop of Lincoln in 1365, Rymer, iii (2). 776.
[6] Above, p. 103.
[7] R. A. Newhall, *English Conquest of Normandy*, pp. 156–7; *Muster and Review* (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), pp. 83–4.

the terms on which Lord Willoughby will serve with 30 men-at-arms and 30 archers, the contract goes on:

> Rebatant toutes voies en descharge nostre dit seignur le Roi des ditz gages et regard du dit Robert et de sa dite retenue pour le second demy an lavauntage et profit qil et meisme sa retenue prenderont des ranceons en chivauchant et osteyant et par constreint du plat paiis parmi les chasteux et fforteressces si aucuns soient pris et tenuz par le dit Robert et sa dite retenue es parties du France durant le dit an si avant.[1]

One can hardly conceive of a scheme more likely to ensure damage to the enemy, granted the erratic and dilatory payment of wages.

No adequate survey of the division of the spoils in earlier times can be given here, but a brief glance at this topic will not be out of place. It is clear that the spoils were of immense importance in the Dark Ages, as in all 'heroic' periods of history.[2] It is also clear that from Clovis sharing the booty at Soissons, down to William the Marshal and on to the heroes of the Hundred Years War, the gambling element was closely associated with the sharing of the winnings of war.[3] Definite principles of division are also discernible, varying from area to area, from the fifth, which we find in Spain from the eleventh century to the sixteenth,[4] to the half, which was the fraction adopted in the

[1] P.R.O., E 101/68/6, with others of the same date in similar terms.

[2] A useful collection of references in Jakob Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsaltertümer*, ed. A. Heusler and R. Hübner, i (Leipzig, 1912), 343–4; cf. H. M. Chadwick, *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge, 1922), pp. 340–2.

[3] For Clovis, Gregory of Tours, *Historia Francorum*, ii. 27; *Guillaume le Maréchal*, ed. P. Meyer, lines 4177–4196, cf. 11,310: 'Li uns desuz, l'autre desoz'; Froissart, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, xii. 6: 'A ce coup serons-nous tous mors ou tous riches. Il en faut attendre l'aventure'; appendix to Murimuth (Rolls Series), p. 247, on pillaging after Crécy: 'spolia dividebant, sortem mittentes inter se quis quid tolleret.' See, too, the 'belle aventure de bons prisonniers' in Froissart, iii. 144, and cf. the 'adventuras quaerere' of official documents, N. Denholm Young, 'The tournament in the thirteenth century', in *Studies . . . presented to F. M. Powicke* (1948), pp. 252, n. 3, 267.

[4] R. Menendez Pidal, *Cantar del mio Cid*, ii (Madrid, 1911), 816–17, 887; an instance in 1520 will be found in the forthcoming *Calendar of Letters of James V of Scotland*, pp. 428–9.

crusading states and the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem.[1] Compared with our certainty in these countries we are more in the dark with regard to England and France.[2] There is, however, one country where we are well informed, namely Wales.

Here, from early times, the division of plunder was regulated by elaborate rules and the basis of the division was the third. This proportion of the winnings of war of the royal war band (*teulu*) was given to the king, as we may read in the Ancient Laws of Wales.[3] The booty was, of course, mainly in captured animals and there is every reason to suppose that Welsh princes were as rigorous in demanding their thirds of the valley sheep in the thirteenth century as they had been earlier.[4] This is not an academic point, for among the regalian rights which the English marcher lords claimed to have derived from their penetration into Wales[5] was the prerogative of the thirds of the winnings of their men in border war. This emerges during the celebrated quarrel between Gloucester and Hereford in 1290, in which Edward I intervened and details of which are to be found in the records. It was stated during these proceedings that Gloucester, whose men had invaded Hereford's lands, had been well aware of what was going on 'and that he had a third part of the goods thus taken as spoils, as was proper for the lord to have in time of war, according to the use and custom of the March' (*et quod habuit tertiam partem bonorum sic depredatorum, prout decet*

[1] P. W. Topping, *Feudal Institutions . . . In the Assizes of Romania* (Philadelphia, 1949), pp. 81–2; J. La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100–1291* (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), pp. 120, 163.

[2] F. M. Powicke, *The Loss of Normandy* (Manchester, 1913), pp. 358–63, 438, and references is the most explicit discussion. For France, see the despairing note by Professor Fawtier in F. Lot and R. Fawtier, *Le premier budget de la monarchie française: 1202–3* (Paris, 1932), p. 216.

[3] A. W. Wade Evans, *Welsh Medieval Law* (1909), pp. 154, 158, 165. This is an edition of the misnamed 'Gwentian code' of Aneurin Owen's *Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales* (Record Commission, 1841), where other references to the king's third are encountered *passim*. T. P. Ellis, *Welsh Tribal Law and Custom* (1926), i. 339, notices these without comment; cf. J. E. Lloyd, *A History of Wales* (1948), i. 317.

[4] *Mabinogion*, trans. E. Jones and G. Jones (Everyman's Library), pp. 196–7.

[5] W. Rees, *South Wales and the March 1284–1415* (Oxford, 1924), pp. 43–4; A. H. Williams, *An Introduction to the History of Wales*. ii. *The Middle Ages*, pt. i (Cardiff, 1948), pp. 167–73.

dominum tempore guerre habere, secundum usum et consuetudinem Marchie).[1] It is also known that on the Scottish side of the other border the lord was entitled to a third of the winnings of his men, but the evidence for this is derived from a later date and it would not assist the present enquiry to consider it here.[2]

It is tempting to connect the royal third of the mid-fourteenth century with the Principality of Wales, with the marcher lords and the mists of Celtic antiquity. We are told that the Spaniards got their fifth from their Moslem opponents.[3] Why should not a similar borrowing have occurred in the military contacts of England and Wales? But this is pure guesswork and results from an attempt to achieve a precision and a chain of causation which are alike beyond our grasp. Our information is largely restricted to the indenture armies of the fourteenth century. To go behind them we must enter a feudal world. When we know so little for certain of the exact obligations of knight service,[4] how may we expect to ascertain with exactitude the perquisites of that service on the field of battle?

There is one line of enquiry that would, I think, throw much light on the problem in the fourteenth century and probably on earlier centuries as well. That is an investigation of the obscure subject of the law of arms and of the neglected offices of the marshal and the constable. These two officers had certain rights to plunder which I have not discussed here, but which are strictly germane to any larger enquiry into the subject. And the law of arms, which is so inadequately treated by the works on chivalry, governed the day-to-day relationships of the soldiers whose 'abominable mélange de mercantilisme et de prouesse, de coups de lance et de coups de bourse' we have been discussing.[5] It is to be hoped that in these and other ways we may have better knowledge of that fourteenth- and fifteenth-century no-man's-land between public policy and private profit and loss.

[1] *Rot. Parl.*, i. 72a; cf. W. A. Morris, *Welsh Wars of Edward I* (1901), p. 231.

[2] Cf. R. C. Reid, 'Merkland Cross', *Transactions of the Dumfriesshire and Galloway Natural History Society*, xxi (1939), 6–16. I hope to deal with the Scottish evidence elsewhere.

[3] Menendez Pidal, *loc. cit.*

[4] F. M. Stenton, *First Century of English Feudalism* (Oxford, 1932), pp. 168–9.

[5] L. Gautier, *La chevallerie*, p. 700.

LOUIS XIV AND THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

By Professor M. A. Thomson, D.Phil., F.R.Hist.S.

READ 14 NOVEMBER 1953

ON 16 November 1700, Louis XIV publicly announced that his second grandson, Philip, duke of Anjou, was to succeed Charles II of Spain as the ruler of all the latter's dominions. On 15 May 1702, England, the Dutch republic, and the emperor all declared war on France; England and the Dutch republic then also declared war on Spain, although they had recognized Philip as king; the emperor, however, who had not done so, declared war, not on Spain, but on the duke of Anjou and his adherents.[1] If, then, Louis's action in November 1700 made war inevitable, it is curious that these declarations were so long in coming.

The prevailing opinion among English and French historians during the last century has been that the cause of the war was, not the mere accession of Philip to the throne of Spain, but Louis's actions in the intervening period. Louis, it is argued, was so infatuated with pride at the prospect of a Bourbon hegemony in Europe that he lost his head and wantonly provoked the formation of a great anti-Bourbon coalition.[2] Another view is that Louis was the innocent victim of wanton aggression, since his

[1] All dates are according to the New Style.

[2] T. B. Macaulay, *History of England* (World's Classics ed.), v. 469–74; Earl Stanhope, *History of England, 1701–1713* (1870), p. 29; R. Lodge, *History of England, 1660–1714* (1910), pp. 434–46; D. Ogg, *Europe in the Seventeenth Century* (1925), p. 267; G. M. Trevelyan, *England under Queen Anne*, i (1930), pp. 134–5; W. F. Reddaway, *History of Europe, 1610–1715* (1948), p. 396; A. de Saint-Léger and P. Sagnac, *La prépondérance française, 1661–1715* (vol. x of 'Peuples et Civilisations', Paris, 1935), p. 421, repeating the opinion already expressed by the former in *Histoire de France* (ed. E. Lavisse, viii, part ii, Paris, 1908); H. Méthivier, *Louis XIV* (Paris, 1950), p. 78. MM. E. Préclin and V. L. Tapié in *Le XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1949) are comparatively mild in their censures of Louis XIV; see pp. 355–6; E. Bourgeois in his *Manuel historique de la politique étrangère* (vol. i, 4th ed., Paris, 1906) condemns Louis; see pp. 109–12, 232 sqq.

conduct was essentially just and reasonable, though he may have made a few mistakes.[1] Neither view is free from difficulties. The former represents Louis as careless of the consequences of his acts; the latter as too stupid to realize them. Advocates of the former, indeed, can point to several episodes in Louis's earlier life that show him committing acts of aggression or provocation from motives of which pride was certainly one.[2] To discover similar instances after 1688 is much less easy. The great anti-French coalition that was brought into being by the first Grand Alliance, though it failed to reduce France to the frontiers of 1648 and 1659, had been resisted only by a prodigious effort. Even so, Louis had been ready to make considerable sacrifices in order to secure peace in 1697. There is every reason to believe that he viewed the prospect of another great war with apprehension. His professions of pacific intentions to other sovereigns cannot be taken at their face value, but his correspondence with Harcourt, his ambassador in Madrid in 1698–1700, and with Tallard, who held the London embassy during the same period, tells a tale that is all the more significant because these ambassadors were distinguished soldiers, whose opinion on the issue of a war was not to be taken lightly; both, moreover, like Louis's other trusted servants, were expected to speak their minds freely, and they and their master were well aware that the question of the Spanish Succession might lead to war.[3]

Neither Louis nor Harcourt viewed the prospect of war with enthusiasm or even expressed confidence in France's success

[1] A. Legrelle, *La diplomatie française et la Succession d'Espagne*, iv (Gand, 1892), pp. 5–173; L. André, *Louis XIV et l'Europe* (Paris, 1950), p. 304; R. Pinon, in vol. ix, *Histoire diplomatique* (Paris, 1929), of G. Hanotaux, *Histoire de la nation française*, is on the whole favourable to Louis, though he does not abstain from criticism; see pp. 264–6. Sir George Clark, *The Later Stuarts* (Oxford, 1934), argues that Louis made certain blunders, but that it was not strange that he made them; see pp. 186 sqq.

[2] M. G. Zeller makes some interesting remarks on Louis's character in 'Politique extérieure et diplomatie sous Louis XIV', *Revue d'histoire moderne*, vi (1931), 124 sqq.

[3] C. Hippeau, *Avènement des Bourbons au trône d'Espagne* (2 vols. Paris, 1875), prints the correspondence with Harcourt; that with Tallard may largely be found in Legrelle, *op. cit.*, vols. ii–iii; in H. Reynald, *Louis XIV et Guillaume III* (2 vols. Paris, 1883); and, in translation, in P. Grimblot, *Letters of William III, Louis XIV, and of their Ministers* (2 vols., 1848). Transcripts of Tallard's despatches are in P.R.O., Transcripts 3.

should war break out. Harcourt was inclined, on balance, to the view that a war in which Spain under a Bourbon king was the ally of France would be easier to fight than a war to secure the execution of a partition treaty. The only way to avert the probability of war seemed to be the complete abandonment of the Bourbon claim to any part of the Spanish inheritance, if Charles II should die without issue, and such abandonment was out of the question. And here it must be said that no estimate of Louis's policy is acceptable that does not take account of his principles as well as of his conception of his interest. Louis firmly believed in hereditary right and was convinced that the dauphin's claim to succeed the childless Charles II was valid. That claim was derived from his mother, the elder daughter of Philip IV. She had, it is true, renounced her rights to the succession before her marriage; but Louis refused to regard the renunciation as binding, not so much because it could be contended that the failure to pay his wife's dowry had voided it, as because such renunciations were in any case nullities; moreover, even if the Infanta had been competent to renounce her own rights, she had not been competent to renounce those of her issue, which depended on fundamental law. There is perhaps more to be said for Louis's view than some modern historians are ready to admit. But, however that may be, there is no doubt about Louis's convictions. None the less, after the peace of Ryswick, while still maintaining the validity of the dauphin's claim, he showed himself ready to consider one or other of two compromises.

The most experienced statesman in Europe was well aware that it was quite impossible for the same person to rule both France and Spain. That impossibility was as much political as administrative. The Spaniards made it quite plain that Charles's successor, whoever he might be, would have to reside in Spain if he was to be accepted as their ruler. To attempt to govern Spain through a viceroy would be a sure incentive to rebellion. Louis faced the obvious facts and instructed Harcourt to let it be known that there was a way out of the difficulties presented by the Bourbon claim; the dauphin had three sons and was ready to resign his right to the Spanish succession in favour of either of the two younger; the Spaniards could choose whichever of the two they preferred. This suggestion found favour with many Spanish notables, who thought its adoption would safeguard the

integrity of the Spanish empire, which Louis would be bound to defend if one of his grandsons succeeded Charles II. Harcourt was able to report that support for a French candidate was growing, but the basis of his reports was nothing more than the confidential assertions of individuals, which might not in the event prove of much significance. Charles II refused to commit himself publicly, and it was known that his sympathies were not with the Bourbons. Louis, therefore, who could not know what was going to happen in Spain, planned an alternative solution. If there was no certainty that one of his grandsons would be accepted by the Spaniards, there was a possibility that the dauphin might benefit by a partition treaty and acquire lands that would eventually be united to France. There was for a time some hope that this might be brought to pass without a war, and this consideration had weight with Louis, who wrote, in a despatch to Tallard of July 1698, that, while there was a good chance that the Spaniards would admit the Bourbon claim, the advent of a Bourbon to the throne of Spain would lead to a great war, upon which prospect Louis commented:

> Il est certain que la disposition des peuples d'Espagne, l'état de mes forces et les mesures que j'ai prises me donneraient de justes espérances d'un heureux succès de cette guerre. Mais l'on sait quand on la commence, et l'on en ignore la fin. Rien n'est plus assuré que les malheurs qu'elle entraîne avec elle et que la souffrance des peuples, et après avoir sacrifié d'aussi grands avantages pour rendre le repos à mes sujets, nul intérêt ne me paraît plus pressant que celui de leur conserver la tranquillité dont ils jouissent.[1]

This is not the language of pride or reckless ambition, but of humanity and of realistic statesmanship.

It is significant that Louis regarded the partition scheme as one to be devised by himself and William acting together. William had no claim to any part of the Spanish inheritance, but he was assumed to be in a position to commit both England and the United Provinces, and, if he were satisfied, the chances of a great war would be much diminished. William agreed to negotiate in spite of some suspicion and reluctance. The upshot of the negotiations was the Partition Treaty of 1698, which was made void

[1] Legrelle, *op. cit.*, ii. 363.

by the death of the Electoral Prince of Bavaria in February 1699. Further negotiations resulted in the treaty of 1700, which divided the Spanish empire between the dauphin and the Archduke Charles, the younger son of the other claimant, the emperor Leopold.[1] If this treaty was to be executed without a war, the consent of the emperor and the acquiescence of Spain were necessary. Neither was forthcoming. The emperor, who was as sincerely convinced of the validity of his own claim as Louis of that of the dauphin, and was also genuinely shocked that William should seek to impose a scheme of partition in concert with Louis, would not consent to a treaty that expelled the Habsburgs from Italy. He was prepared to cede his claim to the whole Spanish inheritance to the Archduke Charles; but, if Charles could not get the whole, Leopold wished to secure the union of the Spanish possessions in Italy with his own hereditary dominions, a fact of which both Louis and William were well aware. But Louis was only too glad to work for the expulsion of the Habsburgs from Italy, and William, though reluctant to see the Bourbons gain anything, thought that the terms of the treaty of 1700 were more consonant with the interests of England and the Dutch republic than any possible alternative. Once he had agreed with Louis, William genuinely tried to induce the emperor to accede to the treaty, though without avail. It was characteristic of Leopold that his obstinacy was not accompanied by activity: though his refusal to accept the treaty was senseless, unless he was prepared to fight for what he wanted, he did nothing to strengthen his forces, and for this omission his chronic irresolution was even more responsible than his chronic penury.[2] Villars, the French envoy in Vienna, an excellent soldier if an indifferent diplomat, kept Louis duly informed of Austrian weakness.

[1] For the treaties see Legrelle, *op. cit.*, vols. ii and iii; Hippeau, *op. cit.*; Reynald, *op. cit.*; O. Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart* (14 vols. Vienna, 1875–88), vols. viii and ix; A. Gaedeke, *Die Politik Oesterreichs in der Spanischen Erbfolgfrage* (2 vols. Leipzig, 1877); G. H. van Antal and I. C. H. de Pater, *Weensche Gezantschapsberichten van 1670 tot 1720* (2 vols. The Hague, 1929–34), ii. 27 sqq.; F. J. L. Krämer, *Archives de la maison d'Orange-Nassau* (3rd series. 3 vols., Leiden, 1907–9), vols. ii and iii.

[2] The documents printed by Gaedeke amply illustrate this point; see also M. Landau, *Geschichte Kaiser Karls VI als König von Spanien* (Stuttgart, 1889), pp. 58 sqq.; *Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen* (20 vols. Vienna, 1876–92), iii. 358, a pitiful revelation of incompetence.

It was in these circumstances that Louis was confronted with the need of making without much delay a momentous decision, when on the death of Charles II he was informed that the Spanish dominions had been bequeathed in their entirety to Anjou or, failing him, to his younger brother Berri, or failing Berri, to the Archduke Charles.[1] What was quite as important as the will itself was the news that the Spaniards were eager to receive Anjou as their king.[2] The will, indeed, as Louis saw things, created no right. Anjou was competent to succeed Charles only because the dauphin and the dauphin's eldest son, Burgundy, were ready to cede their rights to him.[3] Louis's view, though made public at the time, has attracted little attention from modern historians. But the point must be stressed that in Louis's eyes the Spaniards were doing their plain duty by professing their readiness to acknowledge as their king the person who in the circumstances was the rightful successor, for they had been informed that the necessary renunciations in Anjou's favour would be made. Louis realized that if he decided to stand by the treaty and reject the will he would in all probability have to fight, not merely the emperor, but also the Spaniards, and there is no reason to doubt his statement that he could not bring himself to do so.[4] There is, however, reason to believe that he did not come to his decision without hesitation. Before he had announced it, he observed to some of his courtiers that he knew that, whatever he decided, he would be severely criticized.[5] Once he had taken his decision,

[1] For the making of the will see Prince Adalbert of Bavaria, *Das Ende der Habsburger in Spanien*, ii (Munich, 1929), 198 sqq.

[2] Prince Adalbert of Bavaria and G. Maura Gamazo, 'Documentos referentes a las postrimerias de la Casa de Austria en España', *Boletin de la Real Academia de Historia*, cvi. 620–1; *Relazioni degli Stati Europei... dagli Ambasciatori Veneti nel Secolo Decimosettimo. Spagna*, ii (Venice, 1860), pp. 697–703, illustrate feeling in Madrid and confirm French reports.

[3] Legrelle, *op. cit.*, iv. 44 sqq.; G. de Lamberty, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du xviii^e siècle* (2nd ed. 14 vols. The Hague, 1724–40), i. 221 sqq.; E. Kirkpatrick de Closeburn, *Les renonciations des Bourbons et la Succession d'Espagne* (Paris, 1907), pp. 151, 168.

[4] Hippeau, *op. cit.*, ii. 299–300.

[5] Most of the evidence bearing on Louis's decision is collected in Legrelle, *op. cit.*, iv. chap. i; see also Marquis de Dangeau, *Journal* (19 vols. Paris, 1854–66), vii. 415–16; H. de Landosle, *Vauban. Lettres intimes* (Paris, 1924), pp. 49–50; and D. Peres, *A Diplomacia Portuguesa e a Successão de Espanha, 1700–1704* (Barcelos, 1931), pp. 32, 33.

he had to justify it to other countries, and did so by professing that a desire to avoid war had determined him to sacrifice his interests, which would have been better served by sticking to the treaty; as it was, the integrity of the Spanish empire would be preserved, and France would in no way be strengthened. At first a good many Englishmen and Dutchmen took the same view, which did not lack plausibility. It was in fact so plausible that some Frenchmen took it too. A few days before he heard of Charles's death, when the existence of the will was strongly suspected in France, Louis discussed the problem with Tallard, who was home on leave. Tallard, a partisan of the treaty he had helped to make, put the case against acceptance of the will with great force. To accept it would mean a long war, of which the issue would be doubtful; nor could it be assumed that a Bourbon king of Spain would always be an ally of France; French and Spanish interests were likely to conflict and the king of Spain would probably become a good Spaniard. On the other hand, the treaty gave France great and certain gains.[1]

If Louis's decision was largely determined by his principles, he was not unmindful of his interests, and his claim to have sacrificed them deserves to be treated with the contempt shown towards it by those two excellent judges, William III and his trusted friend Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of Holland.[2] Louis was not the man to risk a great war from motives of principle or family pride alone. It is possible, though unlikely, that Louis held that such a war might be avoided.[3] But he certainly did not think so for long. When English and Dutch recognition of Philip failed to come promptly, Louis began to envisage war, first as a probability, then as a certainty. Louis had both a great respect for William's abilities and an exaggerated opinion of his power, not, indeed, as king of England, but as the leader of the Dutch Republic. England, to Louis, was a factious country where almost anything might happen, but in the Republic he believed William to exercise an almost despotic power.[4] Once it had become plain

[1] Legrelle, *op. cit.*, iv. 6–8.

[2] Krämer, *op. cit.*, iii. 235, 252.

[3] Hippeau, *op. cit.*, ii. 299. Vauban at first thought the acceptance of the will would avert war; see Landosle, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

[4] Hippeau, *op. cit.*, ii. 391, 433, 448, 456; *Recueil des Instructions données aux Ambassadeurs de France. Hollande*, ii (Paris, 1923), 21, 43. Duc de la Trémoïlle, *Madame des Ursins et la Succession d'Espagne*, ii (Nantes, 1903),

that William had no mind to accept the new state of affairs, Louis began to prepare seriously for war. It so happened that some of his preparations stimulated anti-French feeling in England and the Republic. Of their effect in England he had warning from Tallard, who returned to his post soon after the acceptance of the will, but Louis disregarded the warning.[1] He may also have reckoned that quite apart from his preparations for war his policy was likely to arouse opposition. For he did not delay the revelation that he wanted France and Spain to act together in all matters. If they did so, the threat of a Bourbon domination of western and central Europe was plain.

One of the first indications of this threat was the issue of letters patent declaring that Philip retained his right to succeed to the French throne.[2] These letters have sometimes been taken to mean that Louis looked forward to the day when France and Spain would be united under the same king. The evidence, however, supports a different interpretation. It was regarded as quite possible that the French crown might devolve upon Philip in no long time. Louis was over sixty, the dauphin forty, Burgundy was not supposed to be robust and, though married, had no children.[3] Now, there was a possibility that Philip might be held to have forfeited his rights by becoming king of a foreign country, and hence a strong case for trying to avoid a disputed succession. Similar letters patent had been granted in the sixteenth century to another duke of Anjou, who had become king of Poland and who later became Henry III of France. There is, however, no reason to believe that Louis expected Philip to remain the ruler of Spain, if he became king of France. The arguments against a union of the crowns were just as strong after 1700 as before. The will of Charles II had referred to the possibility that Philip might succeed to the French throne, and had provided that, in that event, Spain was to go to Berri, or, failing him, to the Archduke Charles; nothing had been said about the possible issue of Philip

27. The same view was taken by Fénelon and Vauban. See Fénelon, *Œuvres*, xxii (Paris, 1824), 486, and Landosle, *op. cit.*, p. 108. Gualtieri, the nuncio in Paris, held it too; see Add. MSS. 20269, fos. 78v–79r.

[1] Reynald, *op. cit.*, ii. 337.

[2] Printed in Hippeau, *op. cit.*, ii. 404–7.

[3] A. Arneth, 'Hauptbericht des Grafen P. L. von Sinzendorff', *Archiv für Kunde Oesterreichischer Geschichtsquellen*, xiii. 50–1; Krämer, *op. cit.*, iii. 334.

or about another possible successor. The will, nevertheless, had declared void the renunciations, not only of Louis's wife, but also of his mother, the Infanta Anne. If the latter were a nullity, Louis himself had a claim, though one inferior to that of his issue.[1] Louis never referred to his own claim, but Monsieur, his brother, promptly protested before a notary at the passing over of his rights.[2] Monsieur died in June 1701, but his son, the future Regent Orleans, took steps to assert his rights, which, be it noted, Philip showed himself ready to support. Orleans was first gratified with the Golden Fleece, and then, after Spanish jurists had been consulted, Philip issued a declaration recognizing the rights of Orleans.[3] It seems to have been the intention of Louis and of Philip that the crowns of France and Spain should not be united, but that the Bourbon who ruled in Spain should be capable of succeeding to the throne of France. This was in conformity with sound policy. A king of Spain who at any moment might become king of France would be unlikely to be anti-French.

Efforts were likewise made to convince the Spaniards that henceforth there was to be a community of interest between France and Spain. It was decided that Grandees, when at the court of Versailles, were to enjoy the precedence of *ducs et pairs* and that *ducs et pairs* at the Spanish court were to enjoy the precedence of Grandees.[4] Joint arrangements for defence were also set in train and economic co-operation was envisaged; Louis, indeed, plainly intended that French merchants should oust the English and the Dutch from their share of the lucrative trade with the Spanish colonies. French influence at Madrid appeared to be all-powerful, and for a short time after Philip's accession was certainly popular with the Spaniards.

Thus England and the Republic had increasing cause for alarm. The Republic, moreover, was confronted with a threat of invasion early in 1701. In virtue of an arrangement with Charles II the Dutch had maintained garrisons in certain towns of the

[1] The relevant article of the will is No. 13; see Legrelle, *op. cit.*, iii. 718–19.

[2] Hippeau, *op. cit.*, ii. 322–4. Shortly afterwards the nuncio was informed of the protest; see Add. MSS. 20268, fo. 122.

[3] Duc de Saint-Simon, *Mémoires*, ed. Boislisle (41 vols. Paris, 1879–1928), ix. 33–4; A. Baudrillart, *Philippe V et la Cour de France* (5 vols. Paris, 1890–1901), i. 45, and ii. 18 sqq.

[4] M. Lafuente, *Historia general de España*, xii (Barcelona, 1922), 330; Saint-Simon, *op. cit.*, viii. 299–300; Hippeau, *op. cit.*, ii. 310.

Netherlands.[1] When they delayed to recognize Philip, Louis decided to put pressure on them and at the same time remove a potential danger to Philip. French troops poured into the Netherlands and surrounded the Dutch forces there; the Republic, in the hope of saving its troops, hurriedly recognized Philip, whereupon the garrisons were allowed to withdraw to Dutch territory.[2] Philip was quite within his rights in asking the Dutch to remove them and in inviting French forces into his lands. But the Dutch, who had been frightened into granting recognition and were still afraid of an invasion which they were ill-prepared to resist, began to rearm with vigour.[3]

There followed a period of negotiation. Louis sent one of his ablest diplomats to the Hague and initially professed readiness to allay any reasonable apprehensions the Dutch might have. When, however, it came to the point, Louis doomed the negotiation to futility by refusing to make any concession. Hence its detailed story is of no importance.[4] What are important are the reasons for Louis's conduct. It must be remembered that, so far from being averse to negotiations in general, he rather enjoyed the process of diplomatic bargaining, in which he was most skilful.[5] In 1701, however, he was asked to make concessions at the expense, not of France, but of Spain. It was assumed that Philip would do what his grandfather told him. This was true enough, but Philip could not count on the unquestioning obedience of his subjects. Louis knew well that Philip was not very firm on his throne and

[1] Legrelle, *op. cit.*, iv. 103; *Byvoegsels en aanmerkingen voor het zeventiende deel der Vaderlandsche Historie van Jan Wagenaar* (Amsterdam, 1795), 21–3; Krämer, *op. cit.*, iii. 300; S. Riezler, *Geschichte Bayerns*, vii (Gotha, 1913), 413–14; H. Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, v (Brussels, 1920), 46.

[2] F. E. de Vault and J. G. Pelet, *Mémoires militaires relatifs à la Succession d'Espagne* (11 vols. Paris, 1835–64), i. 5 sqq., 433 sqq.; Hippeau, *op. cit.*, ii. 307, 342–3, 360–1, 411–12, 469; Legrelle, *op. cit.*, iv. 100 sqq.

[3] F. J. G. Ten Raa, *Het Staatsche Leger*, vii (The Hague, 1950), 151 sqq., 208 sqq., 351 sqq.; M. J. C. de Jonge, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewesen*, iii (2nd ed. Haarlem, 1860), 560 sqq.

[4] There are accounts in Legrelle, *op. cit.*, iv. 77 sqq., and in Klopp, *op. cit.*, ix. 187 sqq.; Krämer prints the correspondence of William and Heinsius, which makes their policy plain. Lamberty, *op. cit.*, reprints some important documents.

[5] C. G. Picavet, *La Diplomatie française au temps de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1930), p. 175: 'Négocier en tout temps est pour Louis XIV un principe essentiel.'

warned him to humour his subjects and not to expect too much of them.[1] There was a danger that, if Philip showed weakness in the face of foreign pressure, the Spaniards might rebel and call in a Habsburg. The emperor had never admitted the validity of Philip's title, and was preparing for armed intervention in Italy, where he could claim to be defending the rights of the empire as well as his own. The imperial fief of Milan, he contended, had escheated on the death of Charles II.[2] Louis hoped to be able to defend Milan, and the prestige of the Bourbons in Spain would largely depend on the issue of the coming campaign. Some Spaniards, indeed, had such an opinion of French strength that they expected Louis to reconquer Portugal for Spain, and Louis had to exert a good deal of pressure to bring about the conclusion of a Hispano-Portuguese alliance, to which he attached great importance.[3]

Louis, then, had strong motives for yielding nothing; he had, however, equally strong motives for not appearing to be an aggressor. If war came, he would be hard put to it to raise money, and experience had taught him the extreme difficulty of getting the privileged classes in France to pay taxes. In 1695 he had imposed on them a new tax, the capitation, as a temporary war-time measure, and had appealed to the patriotism of the privileged. Patriotism, however, had produced only about half what had been expected.[4] Louis, true to his pledge, abolished the tax after the Peace of Ryswick. In March 1701 he imposed it again in an altered form. The preamble to the relevant edict, after setting forth Louis's desire for peace and declaring that he had accepted the will in order to avoid an unjust war, went on to say:

> Mais les mouvements et les préparatifs qui se font en Allemagne, en Angleterre, et en Hollande, ne nous laissent pas lieu de doubter que quelques princes jaloux des nouveaux avantages de la Maison de France et d'autres dans le dessein d'asujetter entièrement des peuples qu'une plus longue paix

[1] Hippeau, *op. cit.*, ii. 330 sqq.; La Trémoïlle, *op. cit.*, ii. 56–65, 79, 107.

[2] Klopp, *op. cit.*, ix. 245–6.

[3] Baudrillart, *op. cit.*, i. 70; *Mémoires du Marquis de Louville*, i (Paris, 1818), 163; G. Scelle, *La traite négrière aux Indes de Castille*, ii (Paris, 1906), 83 sqq.

[4] Saint-Simon, *op. cit.*, ii. 223, 458–68; Landosle, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

auroit pu confirmer dans le reste de la liberté dont ils jouissent, n'aient résolu de renouveller la guerre.

The last clause referred to William and reflected the belief that he loved war because it enabled him to strengthen his power in England and the Republic. The implication of the whole passage was that France must prepare to resist unprovoked aggression.[1] Shortly after the publication of this edict Louis was informed of the terms demanded by England and the Republic for a settlement.[2] These were stiff and even included a demand for compensation to the emperor. It is doubtful whether William and Heinsius, who had drawn them up, expected them to be conceded. But it is pretty certain that they regarded a settlement on these lines as highly desirable. They might, indeed, have been prepared to take less than they had asked; for Manchester, the English ambassador in Paris, dropped a hint to that effect to Torcy, the French Foreign Secretary.[3] What is beyond doubt is that William and Heinsius were determined that the emperor should be a party to any settlement. In the circumstances it was not to be expected that Louis should meet William half-way. But he not only rejected the demands, but ordered them to be printed and published —a most unusual proceeding at the time. He expected, and not without reason, that his subjects would think them outrageous and so be more ready to pay the capitation.[4] Moreover, as though to emphasize his intransigence, Louis recalled his ambassador from England. Tallard, it is true, left his secretary behind him, but the latter was without a 'character'.

When William saw that no concessions were to be expected from Louis, he was clear that the vital interests of England and the Republic could be secured only by war. But he could not declare war until he was sure of the backing of the Commons and, in any case, would not do so before he was ready. By July English

[1] Lamberty, *op. cit.*, i. 390; Saint-Simon, *op. cit.*, viii. 246–7 and 595–7; C. Cole, *Memoirs of Affairs of State* (London, 1733), pp. 279, 333–5. Cole prints the correspondence of Manchester during his embassy in Paris. See also *Correspondance des Contrôleurs Généraux avec les Intendants*, ed. A. M. de Boislisle, ii (Paris, 1883), 504–8.

[2] Lamberty, *op. cit.*, i. 403 sqq.

[3] Krämer, *op. cit.*, iii. 415 sqq.; Cole, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

[4] Marquis de Sourches, *Mémoires* (13 vols. Paris, 1882–93), vii. 39–40; Dangeau, *op. cit.*, viii. 67–8; Krämer, *op. cit.*, iii. 490.

opinion had moved far enough to give William a fairly free hand in the making of alliances. Dutch opinion had moved a good deal faster, though there was still a strong desire for peace in the Republic, if reasonable terms could be obtained. The dethroning of Philip was not, as yet, an Anglo-Dutch aim. William, indeed, had found it prudent to recognize him in April. What William wanted was to secure that the Netherlands should not become a French base, to safeguard the trade of England and the Republic with Spain and her colonies, and to get some compensation in Italy for the emperor. Meanwhile Louis stuck to his policy of neither yielding nor attacking and made what preparations he could for war. In one small matter, indeed, he showed a strange magnanimity. On the death of Charles II, two Austrian infantry regiments, lent him by the emperor, were stationed in Catalonia. These Louis allowed to leave Spain in May and to march back to Austrian territory through France.[1] This does not seem to indicate over-confidence on Louis's part, for there is no evidence that he viewed the approach of war with alacrity.

Nor, apparently, did his advisers. Chamillart, who had been finance minister since 1699 and had also taken over the War Office early in 1701, certainly did not view the future with optimism. His view was that the Bourbon kings would be lucky if they could defend Spain and the Indies.[2] In view of the state of French finances, his attitude is not strange.[3] Financial considerations may not have weighed much with Louis, who in any case had reason to think that England's war effort was just as likely to be weakened by lack of cash as was that of France.[4] But Louis is unlikely to have ignored the views of the Marquis de Chamlay, a distinguished officer, whom he had long employed, and was to continue to employ, as a kind of chief of staff.[5] Now Chamlay's memoranda reveal, if not despondency—that would be too strong

[1] *Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen*, iii. 63.

[2] Hippeau, *op. cit.*, ii. 485–6.

[3] There was a large deficit in 1699; the imminence of war and the consequent expenditure made it much larger. According to a rough calculation, expenditure on the forces rose from 55 million *livres* in 1700 to 104 million in 1701. See *Correspondance des Contrôleurs Généraux*, ii. 472–3, 579 sqq.; J. Saint-Germain, *Les financiers sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 1950), p. 58.

[4] P.R.O. Transcripts 3, 187, fo. 333v. Tallard's despatch of 3 March 1701.

[5] J. d'Auriac, 'Le Marquis de Chamlay', *Revue Historique*, lxx (1899), 301 sqq.

a term—at least grave anxiety. In the middle of 1701 Louis was told that he had not got enough troops.[1] Chamlay wrote on the assumption that France would have to fight on several fronts, not merely in Italy, where fighting had begun, and in the Netherlands, where Chamlay perhaps wanted it to begin at once, but also in Alsace. Now the defence of Alsace had been difficult in the two previous wars. What Chamlay wrote confirms what is clear from other sources, that Louis clung desperately to the hope that the empire would remain neutral. No approach was made to the emperor; William was thought to be irreconcilable, but efforts were made to persuade the princes of the empire that the empire as such had no interest in what was represented as a purely dynastic concern of the Habsburgs.[2] Such successes as Louis obtained only served to frustrate his major purpose. He got promises of alliance from the electors of Bavaria and Cologne, but, though they tried to pose as the champions of neutrality, their pro-French intentions soon became obvious, and in consequence the majority of the princes became pro-Habsburg.[3] None the less, desire not to appear an aggressor in the eyes of the Germans seems to have helped to deter Louis from starting hostilities with any potential enemy.

There was, indeed, fighting in Italy, but there the Austrians began it. Leopold did not declare war; he simply sent an army to try to occupy Milan, which, he claimed, had escheated to the empire. Louis, on his part, merely acted as the auxiliary of his grandson.[4] This Italian campaign had important results. Though Eugene, the emperor's general, won no decisive advantage, he proved more than a match for his opponents. Once Leopold had shown he could do something for himself, opinion in England and the Republic became more pro-Habsburg. On the other hand, French prestige in Spain suffered a setback, and it became even more difficult for Louis to make concessions at the very

[1] Vault and Pelet, *op. cit.*, i. 648 sqq.; G. Esnault's *Michel Chamillart* (2 vols. Paris, 1885) contains four memoranda of Chamlay dated February 1702 which embody criticisms of Louis's policy in 1701; see i. 104 sqq.

[2] B. Auerbach, *La France et le Saint Empire* (Paris, 1912), pp. 254 sqq.; Vault and Pelet, *op. cit.*, i. 119, 141, 498; La Trémoïlle, *op. cit.*, ii. 24, 25.

[3] L. Ennen, *Der spanische Erbfolgkrieg und der Churfürst Joseph Clemens von Cöln* (Jena, 1851), pp. 52 sqq.; Legrelle, *op. cit.*, iv. 216 sqq.; Riezler, *op. cit.*, vii. 467 sqq.

[4] *Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen*, iii. 131 sqq.

time when it might have appeared more expedient to make them. In fact, Louis's attitude became stiffer. The negotiations at the Hague finally broke down in July, when he refused to admit the participation of the emperor's representative. Shortly afterwards Louis recalled his ambassador from the Hague.[1] This step was followed by plans for a blow at English trade. An edict was drafted that forbade the importation into France of most English goods and imposed prohibitive duties on the remainder. This came near to being a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of Article V of the Anglo-French Treaty of Ryswick.[2] But Louis was still careful to avoid indisputable breaches of treaties; no similar prohibition was placed on the importation of Dutch goods, which was safeguarded by the Franco-Dutch commercial treaty of 1699.[3] Nor did he wish to appear unduly provocative in other ways. When Noailles, the archbishop of Paris, submitted to him the draft of a pastoral for 'vetting', the king struck out certain passages that might give England cause for complaint.[4]

Knowledge of these several decisions may help us to understand why, in the middle of September, Louis took another decision that made far more noise in the world, the decision to recognize the Old Pretender as king of England, Scotland and Ireland. Louis had long known that the death of James II would confront him with a difficult choice. Early in 1699 Tallard had pointed out that, if in that event the Old Pretender did not assume the title of king, his omission would be tantamount to the abandonment of his claims to the throne and, it might have been added, though Tallard did not do so, would cast doubt on his claim to be James II's son. If the Pretender called himself King James III, Louis would have to decide whether or no to recognize

[1] Fénelon deplored the recall of Avaux as unduly provocative; his opinion is all the more interesting because he was opposed to any cession of Spanish territory. See *Œuvres*, xxii. 471–2.

[2] Cole, *op. cit.*, 419. Manchester to Blathwayt, 16 September: 'There is now in the press an edict to prohibit all trade with England, but, that it may not look like a declaration of war, they do permit the bringing in of beer, syder, glass bottles, and wool.' The edict was published in October.

[3] Though apparently there were some restraints on Dutch trade; at least the Dutch complained of them in their declaration of war.

[4] M. Langlois, *Madame de Maintenon. Lettres*, v (Paris, 1939), 603. Maintenon to Noailles, 1 September, 1701: 'Il (*sc.* the King) a rayé ce qu'il croit qu'il vaudrait mieux oster pour ne rien exciter en Angleterre et ne leur donner aucun prétexte de se plaindre.'

him.[1] Louis, even after the Peace of Ryswick, had treated James II as a king, though he had recognized William as king of England. William did not like this, but had to stomach it, and was even prepared to admit that Louis was within his rights in so acting.[2] After all, whatever James may have been after the Revolution, before it he had indubitably been king of England; in continuing to treat him as a king, Louis was showing courtesy to an unhappy refugee. The recognition of James II's son was a very different matter, for it would imply a determination to back his claim. Louis had plenty of time to consider what he would do, for early in 1701 it became probable that James had not long to live.[3] Reports that William's health was failing were also frequent.[4] Louis cannot but have speculated about the likelihood of a second Stuart restoration after William had departed this life.

More than a generation later Saint-Simon wrote that Louis's decision was due to pressure from Madame de Maintenon, and this statement has been accepted by many historians. It is only fair to say that it can be supported by earlier and better authority.[5] There is also no doubt that Madame de Maintenon always regarded William as a wicked usurper.[6] So, for that matter, did most Frenchmen, including Louis himself, who told the nuncio that he knew full well that the recognition of the Pretender would give William a pretext to stir up English opinion against him and perhaps to declare war; but, Louis added, he had disregarded

[1] Grimblot, *op. cit.*, ii. 277 and 299.

[2] William admitted this in a circular sent to foreign courts protesting at the recognition of the Pretender. See Count G. R. de Flassan, *Histoire de la diplomatie française*, iv (Paris, 1809), 207–8.

[3] Sourches, *op. cit.*, vii. 31, 85, 113, 117n.; Dangeau, *op. cit.*, viii. 139, 145. More detailed information about James's health is to be found in Add. MSS. 20268, which contains the despatches of Gualtieri, the nuncio in Paris, to the Cardinal Secretary of State for the year 1701.

[4] Dangeau, *op. cit.*, viii. 174, 186, 222, 226, 232; Sourches, *op. cit.*, vii. 88, 110, 137–9, 148, 183, 238.

[5] Boislisle has collected much of the evidence in his edition of Saint-Simon, ix. 286–92 and 433–5; see also Cole, *op. cit.*, 415 sqq., and Gualtieri's 'Relazione della Morte del Re Brittannico' in Add. MSS. 20268, fos. 337–42. Manchester said Louis's ministers were opposed to recognition, but that the dauphin and Madame de Maintenon were for it. Gualtieri said Louis had gone against the advice of his ministers, or, at least, that of the majority, but that the princes of the blood, especially Burgundy, had been in favour of recognition; of Madame de Maintenon Gualtieri says nothing.

[6] In her letters William is always called 'le Prince d'Orange'.

his temporal interests and had been guided solely by religious motives.[1] Louis's principles were not learnt from Madame de Maintenon, nor is it easy to believe that her advocacy alone induced him to act up to them on this occasion. He had more than once sacrificed principle to expediency and it is surely probable that he thought recognition was in accordance with principle and expediency alike.

Louis certainly wanted to make interest with the pope, and in view of Clement XI's strong desire to see a Catholic once more on the throne of England, recognition was certain to commend him in Rome and might be decisive in securing for the Bourbon kings that papal support which they needed so badly and had tried so hard to get, hitherto with only imperfect success. Clement's attitude had remained cautious; to describe him as either pro-Bourbon or pro-Habsburg would be misleading. He was neither a strong nor a straightforward man, but he genuinely tried to serve what he thought were the best interests of the Church.[2] Clement deplored the prospect of a war between Catholic rulers. Could he have brought about a settlement, he would gladly have done so. The nuncio in Paris had instructions to work for peace, not, however, to press Louis to make concessions. Gualtieri was ready to act as a channel for the conveyance of any Austrian proposal and said as much to Leopold's envoy, but he was not ready to make any concrete suggestions of his own. Since Leopold was unwilling to make any direct proposals to Louis, though there is some reason to believe he hoped Louis would approach him, Gualtieri did no more than expatiate in general terms on the advantages of peace, and this achieved nothing.[3] It is significant that Gualtieri's reserve met with papal approval; what Leopold wanted was the Spanish dominions in Italy, and Clement had no desire to see them come under the direct rule of the emperor,

[1] Add. MSS. 20268, fo. 340r. In his despatch to the pope of 16 September 1701, Gualtieri again stated that Louis had been moved by religious considerations alone; see Add. MSS. 20242, fos. 13–14.

[2] Clement's policy is examined in M. Landau, *Rom, Wien, Neapel während des spanischen Erbfolgkrieges* (Leipzig, 1885), and F. Pometti, 'Studi sul Pontificato di Clemente XI', *Archivio della reale Società Romana di Storia Patria*, xxi (1898), 279 sqq.

[3] Add. MSS. 20268 contains a good deal about Gualtieri's pacific efforts; see especially fos. 101–2, 257, 405; a curious conversation with Manchester is recorded in fos. 242–3.

who was only too likely to avail himself of the vast, if debatable, claims of the empire in the interests of the house of Habsburg. A few years later the Emperor Joseph actually did so.[1] Clement had made haste to recognize Philip as king of Spain and as duke of Milan but had refused to commit himself about Naples, which was a Papal fief. He neither granted nor refused investiture, but said he would inquire into the rights of the respective claimants, and, in fact, waited to see what would happen, much to the annoyance of the Bourbon kings, who saw that the grant of investiture would make it difficult for Clement not to take sides in the coming struggle.

Nor was it only in Italy that Clement's good will, if not actual support, was of moment. He might do much to help or harm Philip in Spain itself; he might have influence on the Catholic princes in Germany. Louis had duly drawn his attention to the dangers arising to the Church from the emperor's attempt to confer a ninth electorate on the Protestant house of Hanover and from the assumption of the title of king in Prussia by the Protestant elector of Brandenburg. Louis had also urged him to set himself at the head of a league of Italian states, in order to preserve the neutrality of Italy, that is, to keep Leopold's troops out of the country.[2] Clement, however, had so far avoided becoming a catspaw of the Bourbons. The death of James gave Louis an admirable opportunity for a further attempt to associate him with their cause.

Louis's move had only a limited success. Clement, indeed, could not but commend him and did so both in a brief and in an allocution to the Sacred College, in which he stressed the point that Louis had preferred the cause of religion to his worldly interests.[3] Louis, of course, wanted more than fair words. The nuncio was informed that much could, and should, be done for the Pretender. While William lived and abstained from attacking the Bourbons, Louis would not overtly act against him, but, if William started hostilities or died, an attempt would be made to set up the Pretender in the British Isles. Meanwhile much could

[1] Landau, *op. cit.*, pp. 252 sqq.; H. Hantsch, *Reichsvizekanzler Friedrich Karl von Schönborn* (Augsburg, 1929), pp. 91–119.

[2] Add. MSS. 20268, fos. 2–4, 13 sqq., 28–32, 161, 225, 227v–230v, 239r; Legrelle, *op. cit.*, iv. 181 sqq.; Pometti, *op. cit.*

[3] Langlois, *op. cit.*, v. 618 sqq.

be done to further his interests by judicious bribery in Scotland: Louis was ready to give what he could, but his expenses were great, and a contribution from the pope would be much appreciated; naturally, strict secrecy would be maintained. Clement was so far moved by this appeal that he sent a donation, and there is reason to believe that he would have contributed a much larger sum towards the cost of a French expedition to England. Plans for this were discussed, but, as time went on, the various difficulties in the way of an invasion were pointed out by Torcy to Gualtieri, and when William died nothing was done.[1]

While these schemes were being discussed, heavy pressure was brought to bear on the pope to induce him to back the Bourbons. In October 1701, Louis told the nuncio that henceforth the interests of France and those of the Holy See were identical. A few weeks later, Torcy warned him of the dangers to the Church that were implicit in the Grand Alliance, which permitted heretics to seize Catholic lands in America and foreshadowed the domination of Italy by the emperor, who would allow English heresies to enter the Tuscan ports along with English goods. Louis reinforced this appeal by a declaration that the recognition of the Pretender had given William the chance to unite all Protestant rulers against France; Louis added pathetically that he foresaw that he was likely to pay dearly for what he had done, but that he would never regret it.[2] None the less the Holy Father's policy continued to be one of neutrality, although towards the Bourbons it was a benevolent neutrality. It was, indeed, something that he urged all Catholic rulers to follow Louis's example in recognizing the Pretender and that he exhorted the ecclesiastical princes of Germany to remain at peace; but further than that Clement would not go. Philip, in spite of his own and Louis's further pleas, was not granted the investiture of Naples.[3]

Louis's plans to help the Pretender were not made public. It was still his policy not to appear an aggressor and he instructed Torcy to draw up a note for publication, in which it was solemnly argued that William had no good reason to take exception to the

[1] The evidence is contained in the drafts of Gualtieri's despatches to the pope in Add. MSS. 20242; interesting extracts from these have been printed by F. W. Head, *The Fallen Stuarts* (Cambridge, 1901), pp. 337–43.

[2] Add. MSS. 20268, fos. 369v–370v, 418v–421r, 428r.

[3] Add. MSS. 20268, fo. 383v; 20269, fo. 55r.

recognition. Such a contention could not but appear sophistical. Granted that the recognition was not a formal breach of the Treaty of Ryswick, in the then circumstances it was plainly an act of provocation.[1] Burgundy revealed part of what was in Louis's mind when he wrote to Philip that nothing could be lost by the recognition, since William was already doing the Bourbons all the harm he could.[2] This, indeed, was true enough. Shortly before the recognition William had told an Austrian officer, sent to the Hague to concert plans with him, that he was postponing the opening of hostilities on land till his preparations were completed.[3] William, moreover, had planned an attack on the Spanish treasure fleet, which failed to take place only because the Spanish ships did not sail.[4]

If Louis wanted to provoke a declaration of war, he did not get his wish. The recognition did not materially affect William's policy. The English ambassador was promptly recalled from Paris, but the cessation of diplomatic relations did not mean immediate war. Louis, on his part, seems to have toyed for a space with the view that it might be desirable to purchase peace by concessions, especially if France could acquire part or the whole of the Low Countries when a settlement was made. Marcin, a soldier of repute, who had succeeded Harcourt as ambassador to Spain, was instructed to pave the way for Spanish concessions. He promptly replied that it would be dangerous even to mention such projects. Marcin's opinion is all the more notable because he thought the Bourbon powers were unlikely to fare well in a great war.[5] When he said the Spaniards had no mind to yield

[1] Article IV of the Anglo-French Treaty of Ryswick pledged Louis 'de ne ny troubler ny inquiéter en quelque façon que ce soit le Roy de la Grande Bretagne dans la possession de ses Royaumes'. It is to be noted that Louis never denied William the title of king of England; William was so described in Torcy's letter to Gualtieri of 27 March 1702, in which his death was announced. See Add. MSS. 20318, fo. 42. The Treaty of Ryswick had said nothing about William's successor.

[2] Louville, *op. cit.*, i. 198.

[3] Klopp, *op. cit.*, ix. 325.

[4] De Jonge, *op. cit.*, iii. 566–7; Krämer, *op. cit.*, iii. 549–55, 566–70. Bonet, the Prussian Resident in London, reported many rumours in London about the movements of the Anglo-Dutch fleets, one of which was that an attack on the Spanish fleet was designed; see Add. MSS. 30000 E., fo. 321, Bonet's despatch of 8–19 August. Louis probably heard of this rumour.

[5] Legrelle, *op. cit.*, iv. 341 sqq.; Baudrillart, *op. cit.*, i. 90.

anything, he said what he believed, not what he wanted to believe. How sensitive was Spanish opinion appeared very clearly early in 1702, when the rumour spread that Philip was thinking of abandoning Spain, because he purposed, not only to visit his Italian dominions and show himself at the front, but also to take his young queen with him. In order to reassure the Spaniards, Louis ordered Philip to leave her behind as a pledge of his intention to return.[1]

Informed French opinion does not seem to have been very cheerful in and after the autumn of 1701. Vauban said outright in a letter to a friend what many probably thought: the present gave cause for anxiety and the future might well be worse, unless God took pity on France; if only God would dispose of William, 'ce perturbateur universel du repos public de la Chrétienté, je veux dire cette âme damnée qui n'est faite que pour tourmenter les autres'; William, he added, was bent on war and once he had got it would prolong it as long as he lived, in order to establish his power in England and the Republic.[2] Before Vauban's prayer was answered, the situation was modified in a way that at once alarmed Louis's enemies and added to Louis's embarrassments. The elector of Cologne, who had become involved in a quarrel with his chapter and been threatened by some of his fellow German princes because his engagements with the Bourbon kings were suspected, thought it prudent to ask Louis to garrison some of his fortified towns. Accordingly troops were detached for that purpose from the French army in the Netherlands, but were solemnly described as 'auxiliaries of the circle of Burgundy'.[3] When the elector's envoy at the Hague sought to excuse their introduction into the electorate by using this term, the imperial envoy told him he was making himself a laughing stock.[4] The reason for using it was to give an excuse to any German prince who wanted to pretend he was deceived. What happened, however, was that the presence of French troops in the empire stimulated anti-French feeling. Louis may not have foreseen this, but he certainly foresaw that the defence of his garrisons in the

[1] La Trémoïlle, ii. 17; *Relazioni . . . Spagna*, ii. 708.

[2] Landosle, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–9.

[3] Vault and Pelet, *op. cit.*, i. 115 sqq., 648 sqq.; Lamberty, *op. cit.*, i. 665 sqq.

[4] Klopp, *op. cit.*, ix. 411.

electorate might present awkward problems. Offensive operations against either the Dutch or the empire he did not yet contemplate.[1]

By the beginning of 1702, opinion in the Republic had moved so far that Heinsius saw no reason why the Dutch should not attack when and where they found it convenient; even if they started hostilities, they would not appear to be the aggressors, for the real aggressor was Louis.[2] England, however, was not yet ready, and, before she was so, William died. Louis, when he heard the news, had the decency to forbid public rejoicing, though he also forbade William's French relatives to go into mourning.[3] There were, however, significant private comments; Torcy expressed ecstatic joy; Marshal Boufflers was sure that peace would be preserved; Philip was confident that the fleets of the maritime powers would not attack his coasts.[4] Louis himself thought he now had a chance of breaking up the anti-French coalition. Events in England he made no attempt to influence, but he tried to work upon the Dutch. When the French envoy had been recalled from the Hague, he had by Louis's order left his secretary behind him, though without a 'character'. This secretary was now accredited as resident and instructed to present a 'memorial' to the States General. No document could more clearly evince Louis's inability to understand the temper of the Dutch; for the 'memorial', while stressing Louis's desire for peace and suggesting the renewal of negotiations, stated that Louis assumed the Dutch would be ready to treat now that William's death had restored their liberty. The Dutch reply was prompt and, though couched in diplomatic language, showed how deeply they resented the insult.[5] Louis discovered that, instead of opening a door to negotiations, he had barred it and that his last hope of peace had vanished. Nor was it long before a general war began. In April the Allies began operations in western Europe by besieging Kaiserwerth.[6] A month later came their declarations of

[1] For Louis's plans see the documents printed by Vault and Pelet, vols. i and ii, and Chamlay's memoranda in Esnault, *op. cit.*, i. 104 sqq.

[2] Krämer, *op. cit.*, iii. 608–9.

[3] Dangeau, *op. cit.*, viii. 366; Sourches, *op. cit.*, vii. 238; Saint-Simon, *op. cit.*, ix. 134–6, 421, 497–8.

[4] La Trémoïlle, *op. cit.*, ii. 27, 29, 35; Louville, *op. cit.*, i. 222.

[5] Legrelle, *op. cit.*, iv. 259 sqq.; Lamberty, *op. cit.*, ii. 90 sqq.

[6] Vault and Pelet, *op. cit.*, ii. 6 sqq.

war.[1] The empire did not follow suit until September, but many princes had already joined forces with the emperor and assisted the king of the Romans to besiege and capture Landau. It remained to be seen whether the Bourbon kings were a match for this great coalition.

Neither of the two common theories mentioned at the beginning of this paper would seem to explain Louis's conduct between the death of Charles II and the outbreak of a general war in 1702, which seems to evince neither reckless arrogance nor the innocence of a political simpleton, but a curious mixture of sagacity and weakness. To blame him for accepting the will would be to blame him for sticking to his principles; to blame him for trying to secure close collaboration between France and Spain would be to blame him for pursuing what must have seemed the obvious interests of the two countries. To say that he sacrificed the interests of France to those of his family is to assume that he distinguished between them, which, granted his political beliefs, he could not do. But, if it is only fair to say this, it is equally fair to say more. When he accepted the will Louis deliberately broke a treaty that he had deliberately made. William could not be expected to forgive him, and Louis was sensible enough to see this. Indeed, once he saw that William had not been overawed, he assumed that William was determined to have war. Yet Louis allowed the English and the Dutch all the time they wanted to get ready. Though Louis had his own preparations to make, he was relatively stronger in 1701 than in 1702 and missed a good opportunity to invade the Republic. Fear of provoking the empire by appearing to be an aggressor and a desire to convince his subjects that the coming war was a war of defence certainly contributed to his passivity, but an even more important factor was probably a certain infirmity of will. However that may be, it was no proof of statesmanship to wait upon events. What happened was well within the range of probability and could have been foreseen.

In fact Louis foresaw much of it. That being so, he had nothing to gain by remaining quiescent. At the very time when he neglected an opportunity of striking a heavy blow at the Dutch, he also refused to try to obtain a settlement with the emperor. The

[1] Lamberty, *op. cit.*, ii. 107 sqq., prints the declarations of 15 May; the French declaration of war did not follow until July; *ibid.*, 200–1.

difficulty of making any concessions to Leopold was obvious, but so were the dangers of the reconstitution of the Grand Alliance. These considerations Louis should have pondered, and probably did ponder, before he accepted the will. There was also another consideration—and it would be interesting to know if it occurred to Louis. The time was to come when Louis was to seek peace, and seek it in vain, upon terms that show he had been reduced to the verge of despair. One of the causes of the intransigence of England and the Republic during the peace negotiations of 1709 and 1710 was a profound distrust of Louis's sincerity, and that distrust was largely the result of his breach of the Partition Treaty. Nothing that Louis did in 1701 was calculated to restore confidence in his good faith. For his various actions and omissions after the death of Charles II Louis had to pay a high price, but no higher than a reasonable man should have regarded as possible from the first. Granted that the will of Charles II had confronted him with a problem of appalling difficulty, the policy he had chosen to adopt combined nearly every possible disadvantage. He had made inevitable the very war he dreaded; he had allowed it to be begun in the most unfavourable circumstances; he had so blasted his reputation abroad that the making of peace was bound to be of unusual difficulty. His mistakes in this crisis, one of the greatest of his reign, sprang not so much from lack of intelligence or from pride, as from a failure of nerve.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

By Professor H. Hale Bellot, M.A., F.R.Hist.S.

READ 12 DECEMBER 1953

THOMAS JEFFERSON IN AMERICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY [1]

'THE contradictions in Jefferson's character', wrote Henry Adams, 'have always rendered it a fascinating study. Excepting his rival Alexander Hamilton, no American has been the object of estimates so widely differing and so difficult to reconcile.'[2] He was, said Adams in another passage,

> curiously vulnerable, for he seldom wrote a page without exposing himself to attack. He was superficial in his knowledge, and a martyr to the disease of omniscience. Ridicule of his opinions and of himself was an easy task, . . . for his English was often confused, his assertions inaccurate, and at times of excitement he was apt to talk with indiscretion . . .[3]

[1] For the literature relating to Jefferson, see A. Johnson, 'The history of political parties, 1789–1850', in J. Winsor (ed.), *Narrative and Critical History of America*, 8 vols. (Boston, 1884–9), vii. c. v, pp. 302–7; J. H. Larned (ed.), *The Literature of American History. A Bibliographical Guide* (Boston, 1902), nos. 1373–1382, and index *s.v.*, together with the *Supplements* for 1902, 1903, and 1904 edited by P. P. Wells (Boston, 1903, 1904, 1905); R. H. Johnston, 'A contribution to a bibliography of Thomas Jefferson . . .' in *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. A. A. Lipscomb and A. E. Bergh, 20 vols. (Washington, 1904–5), xx, thirty copies separately printed for the author as *A contribution to a bibliography of Thomas Jefferson* (Washington, 1905); E. Channing, *The Jeffersonian System, 1801–1811*, being vol. xii of *The American Nation. A History*, ed. A. B. Hart (New York, 1906), pp. 274–6; E. C. Richardson and A. E. Morse, *Writings on American History, 1902* (Princeton, 1904); A. C. McLaughlin, W. A. Slade and E. D. Lewis, *Writings on American History, 1903* (Washington, 1905); Grace G. Griffin, *Writings on American History, 1906* and subsequent years (New York, 1908–); Helen D. Bullock, 'The papers of Thomas Jefferson', *American Archivist*, iv (1941), 238–49.

[2] H. Adams, *History of the United States of America during the First Administration of Thomas Jefferson*, 2 vols. (New York, 1917), i. 277.

[3] *Ibid.*, i. 145–6.

His reputation is thus a good barometer by which to judge the state of the weather. And my subject is, not the progress of Jeffersonian studies, but the light which is thrown upon historians who have dealt with him, by their treatment of him.

The dispassionate interpretation of Jefferson can hardly be said to have begun until after the Civil War. His unorthodox religious opinions aroused great hostility towards him, and as late as 1830 his life and correspondence was refused a place in the Public Library at Philadelphia.[1] His engagement during his active political career in bitter political controversy made it in any case difficult to write about him without bias, and historical treatment of him got off to a bad start in the highly polemical chapters of John Marshall's *Life of Washington*.[2] Moreover, Jefferson was not a systematic writer. He had by the end of his life given public expression to most of his ideas.[3] But he was the author of only one book, his *Notes on Virginia*; and his public papers suffer as an index to his mind from the defect of all such documents. They cannot be accepted, without investigation, as the expression of the individual opinions of their ostensible author; and they are all embarrassed by the exigencies of the contemporary political situation. His mind and the springs of his action have therefore to be collected from his rich and voluminous private correspondence; and this only slowly became available to the public. Something was provided in George Tucker's *Life of Thomas Jefferson, Third President of the United States; with parts of his correspondence never before published, and notes of his opinions on questions of civil government, national policy, and constitutional law*, issued in two volumes in 1837.[4] But the first extensive edition of his writings did not appear until 1853–4, when a set of nine

[1] H. M. Jones, *America and French Culture, 1750–1848* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1927), p. 396, quoting Boardman, *America and the Americans* (1833).

[2] 5 vols. (Philadelphia, 1804–7).

[3] For the bibliography of the writings of Jefferson, published during his lifetime, see W. H. Peden, 'Some aspects of Jefferson bibliography', a paper read before the Bibliographical Society of America (Lexington, Va., 1941); H. B. Tomkins, *Bibliotheca Jeffersoniana. A List of Books written by or relating to Thomas Jefferson* (New York, 1887); R. H. Johnston, *op. cit.*; W. H. Wise, Jun., and J. W. Cronin, *A Bibliography of Thomas Jefferson*. Presidential Bibliographical Series, no. 3 (Washington, 1935).

[4] Philadelphia.

volumes was published by order of Congress,[1] to be supplemented in 1858 by H. S. Randall's *Life of Thomas Jefferson* in three volumes, followed by Sarah N. Randolph's *Domestic Life of Thomas Jefferson* in 1871, both drawing heavily upon the private papers.

There was on the face of it every probability that such material would reveal inconsistencies. What may be called the political correspondence was carried on over a stretch of more than sixty years. Moreover, while Jefferson was frequently apprehensive lest what he wrote privately should get into the public prints, he could never resist the satisfaction of expressing his mind; and he certainly never expected that the letters he scattered so profusely in every direction would be gathered together into serried volumes of 'collected writings'. Yet the incoherences are more profound than can be accounted for by the changes of opinion that occurred with the lapse of time or the variations in emphasis that were prompted by the differing sympathies of a variety of correspondents.

Jefferson spoke freely the accepted language of his age about natural and inalienable rights. Of these rights he thought that the most precious was the right to freedom of thought. One of his principal objections to the Constitution drafted by the Federal Convention of 1787 was the want of a bill of rights. He accounted the establishment of religious freedom in Virginia and the foundation of the university there the two principal achievements of his life. It was to be expected that, as a colonial coming to maturity as the conflict with the mother country moved to a crisis, he should have had the greatest mistrust of a strong executive. But he expressed an equal dislike of a numerous tyranny as of a single tyrant. He wished there to be a separation of powers and a constitutional instrument that should be the handiwork, not of the legislature, but of a specially chosen convention, the like of which should alone be competent to change it. He thought each department

[1] H. A. Washington (ed.), *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, being his Autobiography, Correspondence, Reports, messages, addresses and other writings, official and private, published by order of Congress, from the original manuscripts*, 9 vols. (Washington, 1853–4); succeeded by P. L. Ford (ed.), *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, 10 vols. (New York, 1892–9); A. A. Lipscomb and A. E. Bergh (eds.), *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, 20 vols. (Washington, 1904–5); J. P. Boyd (ed.), *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, i– (Princeton, 1950–), in progress.

of government should itself be the judge of its own responsibilities, though he went so far as to propose the control of the legislature by a council of revision armed with the power of veto. He believed, indeed, that the constitution of the newly independent state of Virginia, adopted in 1776, gave too much authority to the legislature. He had provided, in his own draft, for a higher degree of independence in both the executive and the judiciary; and these views were confirmed by his experience while governor of Virginia from 1779 to 1781. He 'never', writes Mr. Malone, 'approved of legislative omnipotence.'[1]

But this whig language may very easily be misunderstood. These devices, that are normally intended to secure the prevalence of the permanent reason over the occasional will, were designed by Jefferson merely to prevent the usurpation of the authority of that occasional will by one of its agents, and not in the least to frustrate it. He thought that the supremacy of the people should be unobstructed. He regarded them as the source of all powers and 'the safest depository of such as they are competent to exercise'.[2] He believed that governments should embody their will and execute it, and that the will of the majority should always prevail, though that will must be reasonable and, somewhat inconsistently, must respect the rights of minorities and had no authority to subject others to unequal rules. To these doctrines he gave a sharpness peculiar to himself by insisting further upon the autarchy of each generation, arriving, by a miscalculation, at nineteen years as the measure of a generation. It was consistent with these views that he should develop, under the pressure of political events, a great dislike and mistrust of the judiciary when, like the federal judiciary, it was beyond the reach of the people. 'In England,' he wrote in 1816,

> where judges were named and removable at the will of an hereditary executive, from which branch most misrule was feared, and has flowed, it was a great point gained, by fixing them for life, to make them independent of that executive. But in a government founded on the public will,

[1] D. Malone, *Jefferson the Virginian*, being vol. i of *Jefferson and His Time* (Boston, 1948), p. 305.

[2] N. Schachner, *Thomas Jefferson. A Biography*, 2 vols. (New York, 1951), ii. 945.

this principle operates in an opposite direction, and against that will.[1]

Though in this he was but repeating what was orthodox colonial doctrine before the Revolution, it was equally consistent that he should hold that within the state, representation being that of the whole people, the electorate should be divided into districts and not into estates, so that like numbers should carry a like influence; and that he should think that all education should properly be education for citizenship. In the university, the toleration of freedom of thought did not extend to the professor of law; no Federalism must be taught in that department, and this was to be secured by the subjection of the choice of texts to the approval of the Rector and the Board of Visitors.[2] In external relations, Jefferson was an unashamed nationalist, avowing that he had no regard for any consideration but the interests of his own 'country', whatever the unit of which he predicated that term; while within the American hemisphere, he was an ardent and uninhibited imperialist. With these views he combined an acute dislike of war, not so much because of its barbarity as because its successful prosecution was likely to demand unacceptable changes in political structure.

Thus there was ample occasion, though no excuse, for confusion. Jefferson, with characteristic subtlety, was ready to use whig arguments and have recourse to whig devices, but it is clear that what he sought was the prevalence, not of a rule of law, but of the popular will, and of the popular will in each separate situation, untrammelled by precedents and rules. But there are further complications. Every discussion of doctrines of sovereignty held in the United States must take account of the fact that sovereignty is there divided, or, if the possibility of that is denied, may be predicated either of the union or of the several states, so that what appears as liberalism in opposition to the absolutism of the one may in fact be the defence of absolutism in the other. While, to the end of his life, Jefferson when he spoke of 'my country' meant Virginia, he was nevertheless a leader in the creation of a national opposition to the mother

[1] P. L. Ford (ed.), *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, 10 vols. (New York, 1892–9), x. 38.

[2] P. A. Bruce, *History of the University of Virginia, 1819–1919*, 5 vols. (New York, 1920–22), i. 15–17, 327–9.

country, and as commissioner and minister to France from 1784 to 1789 could not escape the realization of the weakness of the several states when face to face with the European powers. Consequently he had no doubt that sovereignty must be divided between the states and the federal union; and, observes Mr. Schachner, 'he never deviated from this philosophy'.[1] Yet divided sovereignty cannot be absolute; and from that dilemma Jefferson never really escaped. Two popular wills, if they are not to stand in a relationship of mere power towards one another, must operate within a framework of rights and obligations; and that in the United States is of course what they did. But what then, it must be asked, became of the indefeasible authority of the majority when there were two of them? And what of governments embodying these popular wills and charged to execute them? In a unitary state, whether you approve of popular absolutism or not, all is plain sailing. But it is not practicable to continue indefinitely to be a nationalist in two camps. The competing claims of 'two supreme legislatures' were exactly the rock upon which the old empire had split.[2] The dilemma is, not that the federal union and the several states are, like the separate powers within the jurisdiction of each, to be themselves the judges of their own limitations, but that absolutism cannot be shared and is incompatible with any limitations at all.

To the generation that had seen the collapse of the confederacy and a triumph over the centrifugal forces that had threatened to break up the Union, Jefferson appeared as the prophet of national democracy. James Schouler, six volumes of whose *History of the United States of America under the Constitution* appeared between 1880 and 1899, to be followed by a seventh and supplementary volume in 1913, accepted the principles of parliamentary government, deferring to the 'sacred rights of the majority'[3]; asking rhetorically, with reference to Southern opposition to the tariff of 1828, 'what should be the course of a small minority, when opposed to the prevalent wishes, but to gain whatever concessions they might, submit with patience, and trust to the future'[4]; and

[1] N. Schachner, *Thomas Jefferson. A Biography*, 2 vols. (New York, 1951), i. 299.

[2] *Cf.* my *American History and American Historians* (1952), p. 46.

[3] *History of the United States of America, under the Constitution*, revd. ed., 7 vols. (New York, 1913), iii. 535.

[4] *Ibid.*, iv. 65–6.

accepting with approval the argument of Webster that 'the only sure refuge of the minority from oppression lay in obeying those forms and safeguards which the constitution clearly provided, whereby the weakest in a rightful cause might in the end prove strongest with that invincible umpire of our system, public opinion'[1]. To him the merit of Jefferson was that he believed in 'giving democracy the greatest scope possible, and trusting willingly to the experiment of recognizing public opinion and the common sense as the ultimate repository of power'[2]. He accepts, quite consistently, Jefferson's imperialism; but he also accepts, with less consistency, his equal readiness to find 'the ultimate repository of power' in the common sense of each several state. 'With the same sanguine temperament [as he regarded the example afforded by the United States to the struggling nations]', he writes, with reference to Jefferson's entry into office in 1791:

> Jefferson viewed the future opportunities of America and the ability of our American people to shape their career accordingly. While ultra Federalists in Congress spoke of the Northwest Territory as a tract which must remain a wilderness for at least a century to come, Jefferson viewed our Confederacy 'as the nest from which all America, north and south, is to be peopled'. While they talked with bated breath of erecting better safeguards against popular tumults, Jefferson asserted that 'whenever our affairs go obviously wrong, the good sense of the people will interpose and set them right'. While their distrust of the States as a perilous obstacle to Federal energy was engendering, Jefferson's eyes viewed the States as a conservative force against central despotism, and the jealousy of State governments as 'a precious reliance'.[3]

The result, in the sequel, is a difficulty in reconciling the acceptance of Jefferson's responsibility for the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 with an unwillingness to accept his responsibility for the doctrine of nullification adopted by South Carolina in 1832 and thus to turn the founder of national democracy into the father of secession.

In 1798 the legislature of the state of Kentucky, in resistance

[1] *Ibid.*, 102. [2] *Ibid.*, i. 192.
[3] *Ibid.*, i. 190.

to what its members regarded as reactionary measures adopted by Congress in a moment of panic, resolved:

> . . . that the several States composing the United States of America, are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general government; but that by compact under the style and title of a Constitution for the United States and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general government for special purposes, delegated to that government certain definite powers, reserving each State to itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self-government; and that whensoever the general government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force: that to this compact each State acceded as a State, and is an integral party, its co-States forming, as to itself, the other party: that the government created by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common Judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress . . .
>
> That this Commonwealth does therefore call on its co-States for an expression of their sentiments on the acts concerning aliens, and for the punishment of certain crimes . . . , plainly declaring whether these acts are or are not authorized by the Federal Compact. And it doubts not that . . . the co-States, recurring to their natural right in cases not made Federal, will concur in declaring these acts void and of no force, and will each unite with this Commonwealth in requesting their repeal at the next session of Congress.

The critical passages in the ordinance adopted by the convention in South Carolina in 1832 run as follows:

> Whereas the Congress of the United States, by various acts, purporting to be acts laying duties and imposts on foreign imports . . . hath exceeded its just powers under the Constitution . . . it is hereby declared and ordained, that the several acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities . . . are

unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent thereof, and are null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers or citizens . . .

And it is further ordained, that it shall not be lawful for any of the constituted authorities, whether of this State or of the United States, to enforce the payment of duties imposed by the said acts within the limits of this State; but it shall be the duty of the Legislature to adopt such measures and pass such acts as may be necessary to give full effect to this ordinance, and to prevent enforcement and arrest the operation of the said acts . . . within the limits of this State . . .

. . . . . .

And we, the people of South Carolina, to the end that it may be fully understood by the Government of the United States . . . that we are determined to maintain this, our ordinance . . . do further declare that we will not submit to the application of force, on the part of the Federal Government, to reduce this State to obedience; but that we will consider the passage, by Congress, of any act authorizing the employment of a military or naval force against the State of South Carolina . . . as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina in the Union: and that the people of this State . . . will forthwith proceed to organize a separate Government.

Of this ordinance Schouler wrote:

. . . the deep and insidious danger of South Carolina's attitude and Calhoun's was obvious; there were threatened contingencies in advance of a grievance, an indisposition to accept what the people might conscientiously declare at the polls. The same attitude was taken in 1860, and it was the attitude of aggressive rebellion.[1]

But the Jefferson of 1798 was not, in Schouler's view, to be held responsible:

. . . in his ardor when drafting these bold resolutions, he struck into a line of argument which asserted a dangerous latitude of discretion for States, or rather of State legislatures, over

[1] *History of the United States of America, under the Constitution*, revd. ed., 7 vols. (New York, 1913), iv. 42.

> Federal legislation, a latitude which neither Breckinridge nor the judicious Madison chose fully at this time to approve, nor Jefferson himself to claim again.[1]

Although we now know that in point of fact Jefferson himself would, at the time, have gone further and proclaimed the full doctrine of nullification.[2] 'Thus hastily', writes Schouler of 1832,

> was South Carolina plunged into the crisis of open and declared resistance to the laws of the Union; not as under the distorted precedent of '98, for the sake of thwarting criminal statutes which denounced death, banishment, and imprisonment, but so as to rob the general government of a revenue power rightful and indispensable to its proper maintenance.[3]

This conception of Jefferson as a prophet of national democracy, cleared of the heresy of nullification and secession, was widely accepted and struck deep roots, drawing nourishment from the political philosophy of Woodrow Wilson, though Wilson himself was not uncritical.[4] It reached its full vigour in the writings of the 1920's, and is well illustrated by the much-admired work of V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, published in three volumes in 1927.

The whole of Parrington's book is embarrassed by an unexamined confusion of individual liberty with the sovereignty of the popular will; and the failure to distinguish creates a monotonous golden haze that makes the book, as Mr. Lionel Trilling has acutely observed, '. . . rather too predictable to be continuously interesting . . .'[5] The confusion is clearly revealed in the treatment of Roger Williams.

> From the foregoing analysis of his political theory it should be clear that Roger Williams was a confirmed individualist who carried to its logical conclusion the Reformation principle of

[1] *History of the United States of America, under the Constitution*, revd. ed., 7 vols. (New York, 1913), i, 435.

[2] Adrienne Koch and H. Ammon, 'The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions; an episode in Jefferson's and Madison's defense of civil liberties', *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., v (1948), 145–76.

[3] Schouler, *op. cit.*, iv. 90.

[4] *Cf.* Woodrow Wilson, *A History of the American People*, documentary ed., 10 vols. (1918), vi. 69.

[5] L. Trilling, *The Liberal Imagination* (1951), p. 4.

> the right of private enquiry . . . That Rhode Island should not repeat the old unhappy mistake of coercive absolutism, was a matter therefore of vital concern to him. A great experiment in democracy was to be tried . . . the new commonwealth . . . was . . . established in the sovereignty of the people . . . A rigid constitution . . . Roger Williams feared as acutely as did Paine or Jefferson. To vest sovereignty in the courts through the right of review and interpretation was repugnant to his whole political theory. The fundamental law could be interpreted only by the power that created it originally, namely, the sovereign people acting in a political capacity.[1]

It is in similar terms that Jefferson is interpreted. 'Jefferson', he wrote in a later passage, 'was never greatly concerned about stable government; he was very much more concerned about responsive government—that it should faithfully serve the majority will.'[2] 'Men', in this view, he wrote, 'are more important than constitutions, and the public well-being is more sacred than statutes.'[3] 'In asserting the principle of majority will', he went on,

> Jefferson, like other democratic thinkers of the time, found himself countered by the argument of abstract justice . . . The people may legislate, but it remains to determine the validity of statutes in the light of justice; that which is unjust is *ipso facto* null and void. It was Coke's doctrine of judicial review, set up in America after its repudiation in England, and Jefferson's hostility to it was bitter . . . The Revolution had been fought in defense of rights that are broader and more human than legal principles; and to hand over those rights to be interpreted away by lawyers seemed to him moonstruck madness.[4]

In handing them over to the safe-keeping of majorities Jefferson had no such fears; and he denied that contemporary history cast any doubt upon the wisdom of such a surrender.

'His line of reasoning', writes Parrington, referring to Jefferson's opposition to Federalist policy after the establishment of the constitution,

[1] V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, 3 vols. (New York, 1927), vol. i, *The Colonial Mind, 1620–1800*, pp. 72–3.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 351. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 352. [4] *Ibid.*

> may be summarized thus: In consequence of the republican enthusiasm of the early years of the Revolution, democratic re-organization of the several state governments had been successfully achieved. Very great progress towards democracy had been made. Certain legislative acts of agrarian assemblies were now being turned against democracy, to invalidate it as a working system of government. But if agrarian majorities had used their power to enact laws beneficial to their interests, they were only applying a lesson learned from long experience with aristocratic legislatures. Such acts were no serious indictment of the democratic principle, and to make partisan use of them to justify curtailing the powers of the majority, was a betrayal of popular rights.[1]

This is the man of whom he has just said, in dealing with the Declaration of Independence, 'the words . . . were an embodiment of Jefferson's deepest convictions, and his total life thenceforward was given over to the work of providing such political machinery for America as should guarantee for all the enjoyment of their inalienable rights'.[2] Of Parrington's own opinions, which explain this incoherence, there is a glimpse in a passage relating to Samuel Adams. 'He was', he writes, 'quite untroubled by any fear of the tyranny of the mass; he was a good enough historian to know that it is always the minority and not the mass that creates tyranny.'[3]

The weakness of this interpretation of Jefferson, from Schouler to Parrington, lies in its tacit assumptions as much as in its positive statements. There is a failure to deal with the difficulties that arise from the predication of popular absolutism of two separate but overlapping jurisdictions: and there is a failure to distinguish between political ideas prompted by the desire to secure the prevalence of a rule of law and those prompted by a desire to secure the prevalence of the popular will.

Upon the first point, no such ambiguity as occurs in the work of Schouler embarrassed the rigid mind of Hermann von Holst, the four volumes of whose *Verfassung und Demokratie der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika*, becoming with volume ii

[1] V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, 3 vols. (New York, 1927), vol. i, *The Colonial Mind, 1620–1800*, p. 349.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 344. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 246.

Verfassungsgeschichte der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, appeared between 1873 and 1891.[1] To him, as a strict Austinian, drawing his ideas of course not from Austin himself but from the spring at which he also drank, it was beyond dispute that sovereignty by its very nature was insusceptible of division; and he called Bismarck himself to witness.[2] His interpretation of events was that the union had preceded the states. 'Congress had, with the consent of the people, taken the initiative in the transformation of the thirteen colonies into one soveriegn state.'[3] But there had been a failure at the time to recognize this, leading to compromises which became the source of difficulty later; and Jefferson in supporting a revived particularism threw his weight into the wrong scale. The terms of the Kentucky Resolutions could only mean that sovereignty resided in the several states and that the union was to become again the mere confederation that it had been under the Articles. Jefferson becomes thus 'not only an advocate, but the father, of the doctrine of nullification . . .'[4] and, von Holst added, 'How it can be claimed, . . . that Jefferson did not recognize secession and, as the inevitable and logical consequence thereof, a resort to the sword as a constitutional right, in the interpretation of the constitution, it is difficult to understand'.[5]

Yet the precision of von Holst is no nearer right than the ambiguity of Schouler. Both interpretations are unhistorical. The exigencies of the situations in which Jefferson from time to time found himself, and the impregnation of his mind with the political philosophy of his age, alike prevented him from ever reaching the position assumed by either of these writers. 'Jefferson's resolutions', wrote McLaughlin,

> more thoroughly present the social-compact notion than do Madison's [i.e. the Virginia Resolutions]. Suppose the Constitution is a sort of compact, analogous to the social compact, made up of parties—in this case, states—hitherto in a state of nature, and suppose that the government of the new order assumes powers not granted by the compact, or, in other words, not surrendered by the parties to the compact, what is

[1] Translated as *The Constitutional and Political History of the United States*, 8 vols. (Chicago, 1889–92).

[2] *Ibid.*, i. 16, 505; German text, i. pt. 1. 14, 436.

[3] *Ibid.*, i. 9. [4] *Ibid.*, i. 149. [5] *Ibid.*, i. 155.

to be done? In meeting this question Jefferson is evidently thinking in terms of the compact theory, and this theory must always be distinguished from that which would look upon the Constitution, or any formal organization, as if it were established by the will of a body of individuals composing one legal or moral person. 'Every state', he said, 'has a *natural right*[1] in cases not within the compact . . . to nullify . . .', etc. Those words were stricken out and do not appear in the final draft of the Kentucky Resolutions as they were passed by the legislature. Again he said: 'That the co-states recurring to their *natural rights*, in cases not made federal', etc. The whole of these Resolutions is clearly based on the theory that each state a party to the compact had the right and duty to protect its reserved rights, its natural rights, not transmitted to the government set up by the compact. This theory is entirely different from that which would look upon the states as wholly sovereign and possessed of all rights. The states had surrendered a *portion* of their rights; while each state had given up a portion, it was entitled to protect the portion not surrendered. The argument and viewpoint are the argument and viewpoint of the American Revolution, not of the South in the Civil War. The intent was to combat the theory, as the Revolutionists had done, that government was possessed of all power. The Resolutions have commonly been misread because they have been viewed from the standpoint of Calhoun's theory of law and state sovereignty, not from the standpoint of eighteenth century political-thinking.[2]

The nub of the matter indeed is that Jefferson's political philosophy was embarrassed and confused throughout his life by the division of sovereignty imposed by the circumstances of his time and place. It was clear that in America at that date neither sovereign states nor a consolidated nation were a viable proposition. There survived, therefore, in Jefferson's mind throughout a firm belief in the division of responsibilities and powers; and when he regarded the limitations upon the powers of the federal authority he continued to adhere to an orthodox doctrine of

[1] Italics, McLaughlin's.

[2] *American Hist. Rev.*, v (1900), 467–90; reprinted in A. C. McLaughlin, *The Courts, the Constitution and Parties* (Chicago, 1912), pp. 226–8.

reserved rights lying beyond the reach of the sovereign. Yet he combined with this a belief in the unlimited authority of the popular will such as could only properly be predicated of one or other of the impracticable alternatives.

If McLaughlin thus made it clear that Jefferson could not be fitted into the rigid categories of von Holst, he and his contemporaries made it equally clear that more discrimination was called for than is to be found in Schouler, Parrington and their fellows. During the last half-century much new light has been cast in particular upon two areas of Revolutionary history. The work of Becker, Beard, Andrews, and Schlesinger[1] revealed the existence of divergent class interests within the Revolutionary movement that were often associated in the several states with the rivalry between tidewater and back country. That of Beard, Farrand, Becker, R. G. Adams, McIlwain, Schuyler, and McLaughlin[2] showed that two distinguishable schools of thought contributed to the Revolutionary movement, the one opposing to parliamentary claims to omnicompetence and omnipotence the right of self-government in matters peculiarly affecting it that is inherent in each distinct estate, the division of sovereignty, and the subordination of sovereign authority in whomsoever vested to the rule of law; the other opposing popular fiat to popular fiat, parliament to parliament. Once these things are understood, the transformation of union in opposition to the claims of crown and parliament into division when it came to making constitutions at home becomes intelligible.

[1] C. L. Becker, *The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760–1776*. University of Wisconsin Bulletin, no. 286 (Madison, Wisc., 1909); C. A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (New York, 1913), and *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy* (New York, 1915); A. M. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution*. Columbia Univ. Studies, no. 182 (New York, 1918); C. M. Andrews, *The Colonial Background of the American Revolution* (New Haven, Conn., 1924).

[2] C. A. Beard, *The Supreme Court and the Constitution* (New York, 1912); M. Farrand, *The Framing of the Constitution* (New Haven, Conn., 1913); C. L. Becker, *The Declaration of Independence* (New York, 1922); R. G. Adams, *Political Ideas of the American Revolution* (Durham, N.C., 1922); C. H. McIlwain, *The American Revolution* (New York, 1923); R. L. Schuyler, *Parliament and the British Empire* (New York, 1929); A. C. McLaughlin, *The Foundations of American Constitutionalism* (New York, 1932), and *A Constitutional History of the United States* (New York, 1935).

Thus regarded, the superficiality and confusion of such interpretations as Parrington's are obvious.

'During these years', he wrote with reference to those following the conclusion of peace,

> the problem of a new fundamental law was carefully studied by the anti-agrarian leaders and solutions suggested. A remarkable change had come over their thinking. They discarded the revolutionary doctrines that had served their need in the debate with England. They were done with natural rights and romantic interpretations of politics and were turned realists. They parted company with English liberalism in its desire for a diminished state. Their economic interests were suffering from the lack of a strongly centralized government, and they were in a mood to agree with earlier realists who held that men are animals with turbulent passions, and require a government 'proper and adequate' for animals; and in view of local agrarian majorities, a proper and adequate government could not be had without a strong centralized state. The solution, they were convinced, lay in a return to some form of seventeenth-century republicanism, possibly modelled after Harrington, but with further checks upon the power of the democratic branch of the legislature and a stronger executive. Hobbes with his leviathan monarchy had gone too far, but he had, at least, understood the need of a strong state; and a strong state, subservient to their interests, the business and the landed groups were determined to set up as a barrier against a threatening agrarianism.[1]

A consistent desire to maintain a rule of law is misrepresented as an abandonment of principle under the influence of private interest, and a government, in which sovereignty is divided and subject in state and union to the control of a written constitution, made to look 'stronger' and more tyrannical than the fiats of majorities in single-chamber legislatures, to whose will executive and judiciary had been effectively rendered subordinate.

The revision of what is said about Jefferson, that a deeper understanding of the Revolution and the events that followed calls for, has likewise not been effected. Jefferson's latest biographer can still write, 'Before he arrived on the vaunted scene of Europe [in 1784] he had utterly repudiated absolutism in State

[1] Parrington, *op. cit.*, i. 278.

and Church and had accepted wholeheartedly the doctrine of the natural rights of man. Freedom was his watchword, and to him the most important of all rights—the truly inalienable ones—were the sanctity of the person and the freedom of the mind',[1] and yet see no incoherence in the fact that, 'less fearful of the illiberality and potential tyranny of popular majorities' than Madison, when presented with the draft of the new Constitution, he 'continued to believe that the most important thing was "to guard the people against the federal government, as they are already guarded against the state governments in most instances"'.[2] James Madison, in a passage in a letter to Jefferson of October 1788, quoted by Mr. Malone at this point, puts his finger on the weakness in Jefferson's argument and Mr. Malone's presentation of it.

> Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression. In our Government, the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is *chiefly* to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents. This is a truth of great importance, but not yet sufficiently attended to; and is probably more strongly impressed on my mind by facts, and reflections suggested by them, than on yours which has contemplated abuses of power issuing from a very different quarter.[3]

The point was never really taken by Jefferson. It has yet to be taken effectively by Jefferson's interpreters.

The treatment of Jefferson by Henry Adams is quite distinct from all this. Adams himself set no great store by political philosophy, and in any case the chronological limits of his *History of the United States* during the administrations of Jefferson and Madison absolved him from dealing with either the Kentucky Resolutions or the doctrine of nullification. But he never forgot the bitter months that he spent as a young man in his early

[1] D. Malone, *Jefferson and the Rights of Man*, being vol. ii of *Jefferson and His Time* (Boston, 1951), p. 153.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 176.

[3] G. Hunt (ed.), *The Writings of James Madison*, 9 vols. (New York, 1900–10), v. 272; *cf.* Malone, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

twenties at the American Legation in London during the Civil War.

> Of the year 1862 Henry Adams could never think without a shudder. The war alone did not greatly distress him; already in his short life he was used to seeing people wade in blood, and he could plainly discern in history, that man from the beginning had found his chief amusement in bloodshed; but the ferocious joy of destruction at its best requires that one should kill what one hates, and young Adams neither hated nor wanted to kill his friends the rebels, while he wanted nothing so much as to wipe England off the earth. Never could any good come from that besotted race! He was feebly trying to save his own life. Every day the British Government crowded him one step further into the grave. He could see it; the Legation knew it; no one doubted it; no one thought of questioning it. The Trent affair showed where Palmerston and Russell stood. The escape of the rebel cruisers from Liverpool was not, in a young man's eyes, the sign of hesitation, but the proof of their fixed intention to intervene. Lord Russell's replies to Mr. Adams's notes were discourteous in their indifference, and, to an irritable young private secretary of twenty-four, were insolent in their disregard of truth. Whatever forms of phrase were usual in public to modify the harshness of invective, in private no political opponent in England, and few political friends, hesitated to say brutally of Lord John Russell that he lied. This was no great reproach, for, more or less, every statesman lied, but the intensity of the private secretary's rage sprang from the belief that Russell's form of defence covered intent to kill. Not for an instant did the Legation draw a free breath. The suspense was hideous and unendurable.
>
> ... One day the private secretary smiled, when standing with the crowd in the throne-room while the endless procession made bows to the royal family, at hearing, behind his shoulder, one Cabinet Minister remark gaily to another, 'So the Federals have got another licking!' The point of the remark was its truth. Even a private secretary had learned to control his tones and guard his features and betray no joy over the 'lickings' of an enemy—in the enemy's presence.[1]

[1] *The Education of Henry Adams. An Autobiography* (Boston, 1918), pp. 128–30.

It was with a mind's-eye sharpened by such memories that Adams read the record of Jefferson's attempt to resist British encroachments upon the maritime rights of the United States by refusing to trade. Recourse to the use of the embargo was the direct and personal responsibility of Jefferson himself. It has been described by a recent authority as 'the most dramatic demonstration of Jefferson's domination'.[1] It was a failure; and Henry Adams followed the story with a sense of exasperation and wrote of it with scorn.

'So confident was Jefferson in his theory of peaceable coercion', he said, speaking of the year 1807,

> 'that he would hardly have thought his administrative career complete, had he quitted office without being allowed to prove the value of his plan. The fascination which it exercised over his mind was quite as much due to temperament as to logic; for if reason told him that Europe could be starved into concession, temperament added another motive still more alluring. If Europe persisted in her conduct America would still be safe, and all the happier for cutting off connection with countries where violence and profligacy ruled supreme. The idea of ceasing intercourse with obnoxious nations reflected his own personality in the mirror of statesmanship.[2]

'Few rulers', he went on,

> ever succeeded in running from danger with dignity. Even the absolute Emperor of Russia had not wholly preserved the respect of his subjects after the sudden somersault performed at Tilsit; and the Prince Regent of Portugal had been forced to desert his people when he banished himself to Brazil. President Jefferson had not their excuse for flight; but resistance by force was already impossible. For more than six years he had conducted government on the theory of peaceable coercion, and his own friends required that the experiment should be tried. He was more than willing, he was anxious, to gratify them; and he believed himself to have solved the difficult problem of stopping his enemy, while running away

[1] L. D. White, *The Jeffersonians. A Study in Administrative History, 1801–1829* (New York, 1951), p. 34.

[2] H. Adams, *History of the United States of America during the Second Administration of Thomas Jefferson*, 2 vols. (New York, 1909), ii. 138.

from him without loss of dignity and without the appearance of flight.[1]

The recollection of the diplomatic humiliations of those years infuriated Adams. 'Turreau [in 1806] was amused by the incongruity of inviting Napoleon Bonaparte not only to protect neutral rights, but to do so by peaceful methods, and to join with Great Britain in a Christian confederation which should have for its main object the protection of American commerce, in order to save President Jefferson the expense of protecting it himself.'[2] 'Perhaps Jefferson never knew precisely what was said of him by his Secretary of the Navy,—a passing remark by such a man as Robert Smith, repeated through such a medium as George Rose, need count for little; but the truth must be admitted that in 1808 —for the first and probably for the last time in history—a President of the United States begged for mercy from a British minister.'[3] In those passages there spoke the spirit of the ebullient nineties, irked by the memories of thirty years before. 'His [Taylor's] denunciation of war [in 1810] expressed party doctrine . . . as though the world could show either arts or liberty except such as had sprung from the cradle of war . . .'[4]

It has been possible to depict Jefferson as a nationalist and to predicate his nationalism of either state or union. Yet in either case this was to impose upon him an organic view of the state that was alien to the time in which his mind was formed and to which he never attained. It was to force him, therefore, into categories into which he does not fit, and to neglect the fact that in the America of his day escape from the division of sovereignty was impracticable. So much has been made plain by the work that has been done during the last fifty years upon the history of the Revolution and the Constitution. But something more is also called for. The more precise investigations of modern scholarship have established a distinction between those whose ideal was the maintenance of the rule of law and those whose ideal was the establishment of the rule of the people. Yet there has been no effective revision in the interpretation of the political

[1] H. Adams, *History of the United States of America during the Second Administration of Thomas Jefferson*, 2 vols. (New York, 1909), ii. 139–40.
[2] *Ibid.*, i. 204. [3] *Ibid.*, ii. 191.
[4] *History of the United States during the First Administration of James Madison*, 2 vols. (New York, 1909), i. 196.

ideas of Jefferson in the light of this distinction. To recognize that, 'while Jefferson believed in constitutional supremacy over government, he was a jealous guardian of the supremacy of the people over constitutions,'—a constitution being to him 'a means by which the people controlled their government'[1]—to recognize this and to identify it with a devotion to 'the blessings of liberty', if the 'blessings of liberty' include the protection of private rights, including freedom of thought, from invasion by acts in which government is the mere instrument of the major number of its constituents, is a confusion of thought that there is no longer any excuse for, though it may reflect indeed a widespread contemporary frame of mind.

[1] C. P. Patterson, *The Constitutional Principles of Thomas Jefferson* (Austin, Tex., 1953), p. viii.

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

REPORT OF COUNCIL. SESSION 1952–53

THE Council of the Royal Historical Society have the honour of presenting the Annual Report to the Anniversary Meeting as follows:

Her Majesty the Queen has been graciously pleased to grant her Royal Patronage to the Society.

In November 1952 the Society submitted a statement to the Committee on Ancient Probate Records upon the proposal to disperse the Probate Records at Somerset House, expressing the opinion that the dispersal of the collection on county lines would be ill-advised, and urging that the records should be kept together, those of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury in or near London, those relating to the diocese of London in some one repository in London, and the Salisbury diocesan records in London until the ecclesiastical records already at Salisbury were satisfactorily housed and freely accessible.

Professor Margaret Deanesly, K. B. McFarlane and Professor R. Pares have been nominated as the Society's representatives on the British National Committee of the International Historical Congress, Professor Deanesly taking the place of Professor R. R. Darlington. Professor J. G. Edwards has been appointed to represent the Society on the Advisory Council on the Export of Works of Art, and the Honorary Treasurer has been appointed his alternate in the event of his being unable to attend a meeting of the Council. Professor G. S. Graham represented the Society at the centenary celebrations of Laval University in September 1952.

Three volumes were issued during the session, namely, *Transactions*, *Fifth Series*, Volume 3, and *Camden Miscellany*, Volume 19, and *The Despatches of Sir Robert Sutton, Ambassador in Constantinople (1710–1714)*, edited by Professor A. N. Kurat. The former was numbered Volume LXXX in the *Camden Series*, *Third Series*, the latter Volume LXXVIII. Both were allocated to the year 1948–49. It had been hoped to issue a further *Camden Miscellany*, but this was delayed by typographical difficulties in the printing of part of its contents. The volume will be published early in the next session.

At the end of the session five volumes (excluding *Transactions*) were in the press. The Council have approved for publication *The Cartulary of St. Gregory's Priory, Canterbury*, to be edited by Mrs.

A. M. Woodcock, *The War of Saint-Sardos: Gascon correspondence and diplomatic documents (1323–25)*, to be edited by Mr. P. Chaplais, and a new edition of *The Chronicle attributed to John of Wallingford*, to be edited by Mr. R. Vaughan. The third of these will form part of a *Camden Miscellany*. The death of Sir Albert Feavearyear has involved the disappearance of his proposed *Handbook of British Currency* from the list of works accepted for publication by the Society. *Writings on British History, 1939*, was published on 23 March 1953. Work is in progress on the volumes covering the years 1940–45.

The following papers were read during the session 1952–53:

'Sherborne, Glastonbury and the expansion of Wessex.' By H. P. R. Finberg. (11 October 1952.)

'Political Nonconformity in the eighteen-thirties.' By F. R. Salter. (8 November 1952.)

'Frankish colonization: a new approach.' By Professor Charles Verlinden. (10 January 1953.)

'War and finance in the Anglo-Norman state.' By J. O. Prestwich. (14 February 1953.)

'The formation of the Coalition Cabinet of 1852.' By C. H. Stuart. (14 March 1953.)

'The *famuli*, agricultural labour in the 12th and 13th centuries.' By Professor M. M. Postan. (9 May 1953.)

Professor Postan's paper took the place of one by Professor M. J. Oakeshott, which the latter was unable to read. Professor Postan's paper will not be included in *Transactions*, but will be published elsewhere. The President, Professor T. F. T. Plucknett, delivered an address at the Anniversary Meeting on 13 December 1952 on 'Impeachment and Attainder'. The Alexander Prize was awarded to W. E. Minchinton for his essay on 'Bristol—Metropolis of the West in the eighteenth century'. The essay was read at the meeting on 13 June 1953. The annual garden party was held on 11 July 1953.

At the Anniversary Meeting on 13 December 1952 Professor H. Hale Bellot was elected President on the expiry of the term of office of Professor T. F. T. Plucknett. The Vice-Presidents retiring under By-law XVII were Professor V. H. Galbraith and Professor E. F. Jacob. Professor D. C. Douglas and Professor the Rev. M. D. Knowles were elected to fill the vacancies. The members of Council retiring under By-law XVII were Professor J. R. M. Butler, Professor Margaret Deanesly, Professor R. A. Humphreys and K. B. McFarlane. Professor G. S. Graham, H. C. Johnson, Miss K. Major and Professor G. R. Potter were elected to fill the vacancies. Messrs. C. Ryland Beeby and Co. were appointed auditors for the year 1952–53.

Council record with regret the death of 29 Fellows and 1 Associate: of an Honorary Fellow, Sir Frederic Kenyon, who was elected in 1914; and of 4 Corresponding Members, Dr. B. Croce, elected in 1951, Professor E. F. Heckscher, elected in 1951, Professor F. Lot, elected in 1935, and Professor C. Sarolea, elected in 1895. Amongst the Fellows, Council would mention specially M. S. Giuseppi, a member of Council from 1922 to 1926, Honorary Treasurer from 1931 to 1939, and Honorary Vice-President from 1943 until his death; F. A. Kirkpatrick, a member of Council from 1922 to 1925; and Professor A. Hamilton Thompson, a member of Council from 1930–1934 and from 1937 to 1941, Vice-President from 1941 to 1945, and Honorary Vice-President from 1946 until his death. 7 Fellows have resigned and 3 libraries have ceased to be Subscribing Libraries. 1 Fellow has been removed from the roll of Fellows, and 1 library from the list of Subscribing Libraries, for non-payment of their subscriptions. 15 Fellows and 11 Associates have been elected and 13 Libraries have been admitted as Subscribing Libraries. 1 Fellow has been re-elected and 1 re-instated, and 2 libraries have been re-admitted. 2 Associates have been elected to the Fellowship. The membership of the Society on 30 June 1953 was 714 Fellows, 32 Corresponding Members, and 99 Associates. Of the Fellows, 246 were life members. The Subscribing Libraries numbered 378. 24 Societies, British and foreign, exchanged their publications with those of the Royal Historical Society.

The Treasurer reports that the income of the Society for the year 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953 exceeded the expenditure chargeable against it by £141 15s. 8d. This surplus has been allocated to Publications. The sum of £1,241 15s. 8d. has thus been granted for Publications, as against £1,611 18s. 5d. in the previous year, making, with the addition of the proceeds of sales, an allocation to the Publications Fund of £1,515 6s. 11d. The moneys set aside in the Publications Reserve Fund to meet the cost of arrears of publication, being now required for that purpose, have been transferred to the Publications Account. Owing to the steadily rising cost of printing, the Council has reluctantly raised the annual subscription for Subscribing Libraries from £2 to £3.

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

I.—Income and Expenditure Account for the Year ended 30 June 1953

Dr. *Cr.*

1952	*Expenditure*	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
£			
	Establishment Expenses		
202	Rent—96, Cheyne Walk	£202 2 0	
20	Rent—Warehousing of Stock	19 10 0	
75	Rates	79 11 9	
22	Insurances, *less* Commission	21 16 0	
12	Repairs	5 15 6	
62	Wages	84 16 0	
25	Extra Service and Cleaning	33 3 5	
17	Lighting and Heating	22 5 5	
9	National Insurance	9 16 8	
13	Catering	12 3 9	
10	Sundries	2 4 9	
467			493 5 3
	Secretarial and Administrative Expenses		
500	Salary	500 0 0	
50	Superannuation	50 0 0	
176	Clerk's Salary (Part)	161 12 6	
16	National Insurance	17 4 2	
124	General Printing and Stationery (*less* Sales of Official Pamphlet, £3 7s. 6d.)	122 3 5	
34	Accountancy and Audit	38 17 0	
58	Postages	56 17 4	
13	Telephone	14 15 6	
26	Sundries	10 0 11	
997			971 10 10
	Other Charges		
14	Alexander Prize Medal	6 6 0	
1	Friends of National Libraries	1 1 0	
1	British Records Association	1 0 0	
16	British National Committee of the International Congress of Historical Sciences	15 15 0	
32			24 2 0
100	**Library**—Grant		100 0 0
100	**Contingencies Reserve Fund**—Grant		100 0 0
	Publications		
160	Director's Honorarium	160 0 0	
—	Salary of Assistant Officer	350 0 0	
59	Clerk's Salary (Part)	53 17 6	
40	Other Secretarial Expenses	40 0 0	
2	National Insurance	12 5 10	
1,200	Publications Account: Grant	1,100 0 0	
455	Proceeds from sales (*per contra*) transferred	273 11 3	
		1,373 11 3	
1,916			1,989 14 7
3,612			3,678 12 8
	Balance, being Excess of Income over Expenditure for the year transferred as a further grant for Publications		
412			141 15 8

1952	*Income*	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
£			
	Subscriptions		
	Received for 1953—		
94	Associates	£101 17 0	
682	Libraries	712 12 11	
1,412	Fellows	1,404 1 2	
2,188			2,216 11 1
187	Arrears of subscriptions received		136 13 10
197	Life Subscriptions	194 5 0	
	Less Proportion required by By-law		
122	IX to be invested	121 8 0	
75			72 17 0
	Interest and Dividends		
297	From General Investments	319 19 6	
736	From Sir George W. Prothero Bequest	746 14 8	
68	Bank Interest	32 15 4	
1,101			1,099 9 6
	Royalties		
17	From Sir George W. Prothero Bequest		21 5 8
455	**Sales of Publications**		273 11 3

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

II.—Balance Sheet 30 June 1953

1952		£ s. d.	1952		£ s. d.	£ s. d.
£	**Funds**		£	**Investments**		
	Balances at 30 June 1953 as per		9,551	General Account . .	£8,550 14 8	
31,188	Account III	30,533 18 4		(Market Value at 30 June 1953, £6,881 8s. 4d.)		
			22,378	Sir George W. Prothero Bequest . . .	22,380 7 1	
				(Market Value at 30 June 1953, £17,472 9s. 9d.)		
			31,929			30,931 1 9
68	Subscriptions received in Advance .	108 7 11		**Current Assets**		
	Investment Reserve Account			Balances at Banks:—		
2,362	As at 30th June 1952	2,362 10 0	325	Current Accounts .	383 11 8	
			7	Deposit Account .	7 3 0	
			55	Post Office Savings Bank	558 5 10	
				London Trustee Savings		
			1,300	Bank . . .	1,124 11 5	
			2	Cash in hand . .	2 7	
			1,689			2,073 14 6
				Note: The Society also owns the Library, Furniture and Office Equipment at 96, Cheyne Walk, Chelsea, and a Stock of its own publications, the cost of which has been written off to Income and Expenditure Account.		
£33,618		£33,004 16 3	£33,618			£33,004 16 3

We have examined the foregoing Income and Expenditure Account and Balance Sheet with the Books and Vouchers of the Society. We have verified the Investments appearing in the Balance Sheet. We report that the above Balance Sheet is, in our opinion, properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the affairs of the Society, according to the best of our information and explanations given to us, and as shown by the books of the Society.

C. RYLAND BEEBY & CO.,
Chartered Accountants, Auditors.

119/125, Finsbury Pavement, London, E.C.2.
24 *September*, 1953.

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

III.—Statement of Funds 30 June 1953

		Balance at the Beginning of the Year. £ s. d.		Grants and Additions during the Year. £ s. d.		Expenditure and Withdrawals during the Year. £ s. d.	Balance at the End of the Year. £ s. d.
The Sir George W. Prothero Bequest		22,405 19 6	(*a*)	6 16 5		—	22,412 15 11
Life Subscriptions Fund		2,903 0 0	(*b*)	121 8 0	(*c*)	163 0 0	2,861 8 0
Contingencies Reserve Fund (formerly Lease Renewal Fund)		512 0 4	(*d*)	100 0 0		—	612 0 4
Pension Fund		906 4 6		—	(*e*)	200 0 0	706 4 6
Library Fund		92 4 7	(*f*)	111 18 2		194 17 6	9 5 3
Publications Reserve Fund		1,239 5 0	(*g*)	1 0 0	(*h*)	1,240 5 0	—
Publications Fund (*i*)		2,077 18 11		2,755 11 11		1,948 1 2	2,885 9 8
'Writings on British History' Fund		275 0 0		—	(*k*)	177 11 3	97 8 9
General Fund		776 5 11	(*l*)	173 0 0		—	949 5 11
		£31,187 18 9		£3,269 14 6		£3,923 14 11	£30,533 18 4

REFERENCES

(*a*) Profit on conversion of Australia 3½% Stock 1950–52.
(*b*) Proportion of Life Subscriptions received in 1952–53, and required by By-Law IX to be invested.
(*c*) Proportion of Life Subscriptions transferred to General Fund in accordance with By-Law IX.
(*d*) Grant for the year.
(*e*) Payment to Miss M. B. Curran.
(*f*) £11 18s. 2d. proceeds from sales during the year, *plus* £100 Grant for the year.
(*g*) Donation.
(*h*) Amount transferred to Publications Fund.
(*i*) See Account IV.
(*k*) Half Subsidy on 'Writings 1939' £125, *plus* work on Index, Advertising, etc., £52 11s. 3d.
(*l*) Proportion of Life Subscriptions (*c*), *plus* premium on redemption of £1,000 Defence Bonds 3%, £10.

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

IV.—Publications Account for the Year ended 30 June 1953

Dr. *Cr.*

	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
To Payments made during the year:—				By Balance of Allocations at 30 June 1952, Brought Forward	2,077	18	11
Camden Third Series:—				„ Amount transferred from Publications Reserve Fund	1,240	5	0
Vol. 78	715	13	3	„ Allocation for Publications, 1952–53:—			
„ 80	651	13	8	Grants. 1,241 15 8			
„ Transactions:—				Proceeds of Sales 273 11 3			
5th Series, Vol. 3	500	3	7	(As per Income and Expenditure Acct.)			
„ Binding—Handbook of Dates	50	5	2		1,515	6	11
„ Purchase of Volumes to replace Stock	2	8	1				
„ Sundry Postages, Packing and Expenses	27	17	5				
	1,948	1	2				
„ Balance of Allocations at 30 June 1953 (required to meet cost of publications due to subscribers at date of account)	2,885	9	8				
	£4,833	10	10		£4,833	10	10

THE DAVID BERRY TRUST

Receipts and Payments Account for the Year ended 30 June 1953

Receipts				£	s.	d.
To Balance in Hand, 30 June 1952, brought forward from last Account, viz.:						
Cash at Bank: Current Account		£86	12 3			
Deposit Account		6	19 10			
Cash in hand			14 3			
£100 3% Defence Bonds (at cost)		100	0 0			
£200 2½% Defence Bonds (at cost)		200	0 0			
				394	6	4
„ Dividends on Investments per Charity Commissioners				35	14	8
„ Interest on £100 3% Defence Bonds				3	0	0
„ Interest on £200 2½% Defence Bonds				5	0	0
„ Interest on Deposit Account at Bank					2	9
				£438	3	9

Payments				£	s.	d.
By Printing and Postage				3	3	9
„ Examiners' Fees				31	10	0
„ Advertising				27	12	0
„ Balance in Hand, 30 June 1953, carried forward, viz.:						
Cash at Bank: Current Account	£68	0 0				
Deposit Account	7	2 7				
Cash in Hand		15 5				
£100 3% Defence Bonds (at cost)	100	0 0				
£200 2½% Defence Bonds (at cost)	200	0 0				
				375	18	0
				£438	3	9

We have examined the above account and find it correct.

C. RYLAND BEEBY & CO.,
Chartered Accountants, Auditors.

119/125, Finsbury Pavement, London, E.C.2.
24 *September* 1953.

The late David Berry, by his Will dated the 23rd day of April, 1926, left £1,000 to provide in every third year a gold medal and prize money for the best essay on the Earl of Bothwell, or, at the discretion of the Trustee, on Scottish History of the James Stuarts I to VI, in memory of his father, the late Rev. David Berry.

The Trust is now regulated by a Scheme sanctioned by the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice dated the 23rd day of January 1930, and made in an Action 1927.A.1233 David Anderson Berry, decd., Hunter and another *v.* Robertson and another.

This Society is now the Trustee, and the investments held on Capital Account consist of £634 17s. 2d. 3½% Conversion Stock and £540 13s. 2d. Treasury Stock 2½% 1975.

The Trustee will in every second year of the three-year period advertise in *The Times* inviting essays.

ALEXANDER PRIZE

The Alexander Prize was established in 1897 by L. C. Alexander, F.R.Hist.S. It consists of a Silver Medal awarded annually for an essay upon some historical subject. Candidates may select their own subject provided such subject has been previously submitted to and approved by the Literary Director. The essay must be a genuine work of original research, not hitherto published, and one which has not been awarded any other prize. It must not exceed 6,000 words in length and must be sent in on or before 31 January 1954. The detailed regulations should be obtained in advance from the Secretary.

LIST OF ALEXANDER PRIZE ESSAYISTS (1898–1953)[1]

1898. F. Hermia Durham ('The Relations of the Crown to Trade under James I').
1899. W. F. Lord, B.A. ('The Development of Political Parties in the reign of Queen Anne').
1901. Laura M. Roberts ('The Peace of Lunéville').
1902. V. B. Redstone ('The Social Condition of England during the Wars of the Roses').
1903. Rose Graham ('The Intellectual Influence of English Monasticism between the tenth and twelfth centuries').
1904. Enid W. G. Routh ('The Balance of Power in the Seventeenth Century').
1905. W. A. P. Mason, M.A. ('The Beginnings of the Cistercian Order').
1906. Rachel R. Reid, M.A. ('The Rebellion of the Earls, 1569').
1908. Kate Hotblack ('The Peace of Paris, 1763').
1909. Nellie Nield, M.A. ('The Social and Economic Condition of the Unfree Classes in England in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries').
1912. H. G. Richardson ('The Parish Clergy of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries').
1917. Isobel D. Thornley, B.A. ('The Treason Legislation of 1531–1534').
1918. T. F. T. Plucknett, B.A. ('The Place of the Council in the Fifteenth Century').
1919. Edna F. White, M.A. ('The Jurisdiction of the Privy Council under the Tudors').
1920. J. E. Neale, M.A. ('The Commons Journals of the Tudor Period').

[1] No award was made in 1900, 1907, 1910, 1911, 1913, 1914, 1921, 1946, 1948. The prize Essays for 1909 and 1919 were not published in the *Transactions*. No Essays were submitted in 1915, 1916 and 1943.

1922. Eveline C. Martin ('The English Establishments on the Gold Coast in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century').
1923. E. W. Hensman, M.A. ('The Civil War of 1648 in the East Midlands').
1924. Grace Stretton, B.A. ('Some Aspects of Mediæval Travel').
1925. F. A. Mace, M.A. ('Devonshire Ports in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries').
1926. Marian J. Tooley, M.A. ('The Authorship of the *Defensor Pacis*').
1927. W. A. Pantin, B.A. ('Chapters of the English Black Monks, 1215–1540').
1928. Gladys A. Thornton, B.A., Ph.D. ('A Study in the History of Clare, Suffolk, with special reference to its development as a Borough').
1929. F. S. Rodkey, A.M., Ph.D. ('Lord Palmerston's Policy for the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1839–47').
1930. A. A. Ettinger, D.Phil. ('The Proposed Anglo-Franco-American Treaty of 1852 to guarantee Cuba to Spain').
1931. Kathleen A. Walpole, M.A. ('The Humanitarian Movement of the Early Nineteenth Century to Remedy Abuses on Emigrant Vessels to America').
1932. Dorothy M. Brodie, B.A. ('Edmund Dudley, Minister of Henry VII').
1933. R. W. Southern, B.A. ('Ranulf Flambard and Early Anglo-Norman Administration').
1934. S. B. Chrimes, M.A., Ph.D. ('Sir John Fortescue and his Theory of Dominion').
1935. S. T. Bindoff, M.A. ('The Unreformed Diplomatic Service, 1812–60').
1936. Rosamond J. Mitchell, M.A., B.Litt. ('English Students at Padua, 1460–1475').
1937. C. H. Philips, B.A. ('The East India Company "Interest", and the English Government, 1783–4').
1938. H. E. I. Phillips, B.A. ('The Last Years of the Court of Star Chamber, 1630–41').
1939. Hilda P. Grieve, B.A. ('The Deprived Married Clergy in Essex, 1553–61').
1940. R. Somerville, M.A. ('The Duchy of Lancaster Council and Court of Duchy Chamber').
1941. R. A. L. Smith, M.A., Ph.D. ('The *Regimen Scaccarii* in English Monasteries').
1942. F. L. Carsten, D.Phil. ('Medieval Democracy in the Brandenburg Towns and its Defeat in the Fifteenth Century').
1944. Rev. E. W. Kemp, B.D. ('Pope Alexander III and the Canonization of Saints').
1945. Helen Suggett, B.Litt. ('The use of French in England in the later Middle Ages').
1947. June Milne, B.A. ('The Diplomacy of Dr. John Robinson at the Court of Charles XII of Sweden, 1697–1709').
1949. Ethel Drus, M.A. ('The attitude of the Colonial Office to the annexation of Fiji').
1950. Doreen J. Milne, M.A., Ph.D. ('The results of the Rye House Plot, and their influence upon the Revolution of 1688').

1951. K. G. Davies, B.A. ('The origins of the commission system in the West India Trade').
1952. G. W. S. Barrow, B.Litt. ('Scottish rulers and the religious orders, 1070–1153').
1953. W. E. Minchinton, B.Sc.(Econ.) ('Bristol—Metropolis of the West in the eighteenth century').

DAVID BERRY PRIZE

The David Berry Prize was established in 1929 by David Anderson-Berry in memory of his father, the Reverend David Berry. It consists of a Gold Medal and Money Prize awarded every three years for Scottish History. Candidates may select any subject dealing with Scottish History within the reigns of James I to James VI inclusive, provided such subject has been previously submitted to and approved by the Council of the Royal Historical Society. The Essay must be a genuine work of original research not hitherto published, and one which has not been awarded any other prize. There is no limit to the length of the Essay. It must be sent in on or before 31 October 1955.

LIST OF DAVID BERRY PRIZE ESSAYISTS (1937–1949)[1]

1937. G. Donaldson, M.A. ('The Polity of the Scottish Reformed Church *c.* 1560–1580, and the Rise of the Presbyterian Movement').
1943. Rev. Prof. A. F. Scott Pearson, D.Th., D.Litt. ('Anglo-Scottish Religious Relations, 1400–1600').
1949. T. Bedford Franklin, M.A., F.R.S.E. ('Monastic agriculture in Scotland, 1440–1600').

[1] No Essays were submitted in 1940. No award was made in 1946 and 1952.

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

(INCORPORATED BY ROYAL CHARTER)

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL—1953

Patron

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

President

PROFESSOR H. HALE BELLOT, M.A.

Honorary Vice-Presidents

PROFESSOR SIR RAYMOND BEAZLEY, J.P., D.Litt., D.Phil.
THE RIGHT HON. SIR WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, K.G., O.M., C.H., M.P., F.R.S.
SIR CYRIL FLOWER, C.B., M.A., F.B.A., F.S.A.
M. S. GIUSEPPI, I.S.O., F.S.A. (died 12 February, 1953).
G. P. GOOCH, C.H., D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A.
THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF ILCHESTER, G.B.E., D.Litt., F.S.A.
CHARLES JOHNSON, C.B.E., M.A., F.B.A., F.S.A.
PROFESSOR SIR LEWIS NAMIER, M.A., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR T. F. T. PLUCKNETT, M.A., LL.B., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR SIR MAURICE POWICKE, LL.D., Litt.D., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR SIR FRANK STENTON, M.A., LL.D., D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR R. H. TAWNEY, Litt.D., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR A. J. TOYNBEE, D.Litt., F.B.A.
G. M. TREVELYAN, O.M., C.B.E., D.C.L., LL.D., D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR SIR CHARLES WEBSTER, K.C.M.G., D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A.

Vice-Presidents

PROFESSOR C. R. CHENEY, M.A., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR W. REES, M.A., D.Sc., F.S.A.
PROFESSOR T. S. ASHTON, M.A., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR DAME LILLIAN PENSON, D.B.E., Ph.D., LL.D., D.Litt.
C. T. CLAY, C.B., Litt.D., F.B.A., F.S.A.
PROFESSOR J. G. EDWARDS, M.A., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR D. C. DOUGLAS, M.A., F.B.A.
PROFESSOR THE REV. M. D. KNOWLES, D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A., F.S.A.

Council

R. L. Atkinson, M.C., M.A., F.S.A.
Professor H. Butterfield, M.A.
Professor J. H. Le Patourel, D.Phil.
Miss C. V. Wedgwood, M.A.
Professor H. J. Habakkuk, M.A.
J. W. F. Hill, LL.M., D.Litt., F.S.A.
Miss M. McKisack, B.Litt.
Professor R. F. Treharne, Ph.D.
Professor R. R. Darlington, Ph.D.
R. B. Pugh, M.A., F.S.A.
Professor D. B. Quinn, Ph.D.
Professor M. A. Thomson, D.Phil.
Professor G. S. Graham, Ph.D.
H. C. Johnson, M.A.
Miss K. Major, B.Litt., F.S.A.
Professor G. R. Potter, Ph.D.

Honorary Secretary

———

Literary Director

P. Grierson, M.A., F.S.A.

Honorary Treasurer

T. F. Reddaway, M.A., F.S.A.

Secretary and Librarian

Miss A. M. Armstrong, B.A.

Library and Offices

96 Cheyne Walk, Chelsea, S.W.10

Bankers

Barclays Limited

STANDING COMMITTEES—1953

Finance Committee

R. L. Atkinson, M.C., M.A., F.S.A.
A. H. Cheney
Professor J. G. Edwards, M.A., F.B.A.
Professor H. J. Habakkuk, M.A.
J. W. F. Hill, LL.M., D.Litt., F.S.A.
Professor H. Hale Bellot, M.A., *President*
P. Grierson, M.A., F.S.A., *Literary Director*
T. F. Reddaway, M.A., F.S.A., *Hon. Treasurer*
——— *Hon. Secretary*

Library Committee

Professor R. R. Darlington, Ph.D.
Miss A. M. Kirkus, M.A.
Professor J. H. Le Patourel, D.Phil.
R. B. Pugh, M.A., F.S.A.
Professor H. Hale Bellot, M.A., *President*
P. Grierson, M.A., F.S.A., *Literary Director*
T. F. Reddaway, M.A., F.S.A., *Hon. Treasurer*
——— *Hon. Secretary*

Publication Committee

Professor H. Butterfield, M.A.
Professor R. R. Darlington, Ph.D.
Professor H. J. Habakkuk, M.A.
H. C. Johnson, M.A.
Professor A. V. Judges, B.A., D.Sc. (Econ.).
Miss K. Major, B.Litt., F.S.A.
Professor R. F. Treharne, Ph.D.
Miss C. V. Wedgwood, M.A.
Professor H. Hale Bellot, M.A., *President*
P. Grierson, M.A., F.S.A., *Literary Director*
T. F. Reddaway, M.A., F.S.A., *Hon. Treasurer*
——— *Hon. Secretary*

Bibliography (Annual) Committee

Professor A. Aspinall, D.Litt.
Professor the Rev. M. D. Knowles, Litt.D., F.B.A., F.S.A.
R. B. Pugh, M.A., F.S.A.
Professor W. Rees, M.A., D.Sc.
Professor H. Hale Bellot, M.A., *President*
P. Grierson, M.A., F.S.A., *Literary Director*
T. F. Reddaway, M.A., F.S.A., *Hon. Treasurer*
——— *Hon. Secretary*

LIST OF FELLOWS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

(CORRECTED TO 31 DECEMBER 1953)

Names of Officers and Members of Council are printed in SMALL CAPITALS.
*Those marked * have compounded for their Annual Subscriptions.*

*Abbott, Col. the Rev. Prebendary H. A., M.B.E., M.A., The Vicarage, Lanhydrock, Bodmin, Cornwall.
Adair, Professor E. R., M.A., McGill University, Montreal, Canada.
*Adams, A., Ph.D., 9 Ashburton Place, Boston 8, Mass., U.S.A.
*Addleshaw, Rev. Canon G. W. O., M.A., B.D., F.S.A., 10 Precentor's Court, York.
*Ady, Miss C. M., M.A., D.Litt., 40 St. Margaret's Road, Oxford.
Ainley, Rev. B. S., B.A., The Vicarage, Doveridge, Derby.
Ainsworth, J. F., M.A., Genealogical Office, The Castle, Dublin.
Albion, Rev. Gordon, D.Sc. (Louvain), Sutton Park, Guildford.
Allen, Miss H. E., A.B., A.M., Kenwood, Oneida, N.Y., U.S.A.
Allen, W. E. D., O.B.E., Whitechurch House, Cappagh, Co. Waterford, Eire.
Anderson, A. K., M.A., The Scots College, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
*Anderson, R. C., M.A., Litt.D., 32 Dartmouth Row, S.E.10.
Andrews, Rev. Canon P. J., O.B.E., D.D., Woodleigh, The Park, Cheltenham.
*Angus, W., LL.D., 69 Cluny Gardens, Edinburgh, 10.
Armstrong, Miss A. M., B.A., 7 Vale Court, Mallord Street, S.W.3.
Armstrong, C. A. J., M.A., F.S.A., Hertford College, Oxford.
Artz, Professor F. B., Ph.D., 157 Professor Street, Oberlin, Ohio, U.S.A.
ASHTON, Professor T. S., M.A., F.B.A., 7/72 Westbourne Terrace, W.2.
*Aspinall, Professor A., M.A., D.Litt., The University, Reading.
Atiya, Professor A. S., Ph.D., Litt.D., 14 Sharia Wadi el-Nil, Maadi (near Cairo), Egypt.
Atkinson, C. T., M.A., Exeter College, Oxford.
*Atkinson, R. L., M.C., M.A., F.S.A., Upper Portesbery, Camberley, Surrey.
Auchmuty, Professor J. J., M.A., Ph.D., M.R.I.A., The New South Wales University of Technology, Broadway, Sydney, N.S.W., Australia.
*Auden, Miss Henrietta M., Alderdene, Church Stretton, Salop.
Axelson, E. V., D.Litt., c/o Union War Histories, 724 Government Avenue, Pretoria, South Africa.
*Aydelotte, Professor W. O., Ph.D., State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, U.S.A.

Bagshawe, T. W., F.S.A., The Old House, Aspley Guise, Bletchley, Bucks.
Baker, Lieut.-Colonel B. G., D.S.O., J.P., F.R.G.S., St. Mary's Road, Beccles, Suffolk.
Baldwin, Professor L. D., Ph.D., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh (13), Pa., U.S.A.
*Bales, P. G., M.C., M.A., Selwyn House, Fakenham, Norfolk.

*Balfour-Melville, E. W. M., M.A., D.Litt., 2 South Learmonth Gardens, Edinburgh.
Barbour, Professor Violet, Ph.D., Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N.Y., U.S.A.
Barnes, Professor D. G., M.A., Ph.D., Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A.
*Barnes, Professor Viola F., M.A., Ph.D., Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass., U.S.A.
*Bate, G. E., The Croft, Restwell Avenue, Cranleigh, Surrey.
*Bayne-Powell, Mrs. R., The West Wing, Oxon-Hoath, Tonbridge, Kent.
*Bazeley, Miss M. L., M.A., B.D., 9 Cator Road, S.E.26.
Beardwood, Miss Alice, B.A., B.Litt., D.Phil., 415 Miller's Lane, Wynnewood, Pa., U.S.A.
Beaumont, H., M.A., Silverdale, Severn Bank, Shrewsbury.
Beazley, Professor Sir Raymond, J.P., D.Litt., D.Phil., 6 Arthur Road, Edgbaston, Birmingham.
*Beer, E. S. de, M.A., F.S.A., 11 Sussex Place, N.W.1.
*Beet, Rev. W. E., M.A., D.Litt., Charisma, Castle Road, Saltwood, Hythe.
Begley, W. W., Walcot House, 139 Kennington Road, S.E.11.
Behrens, Miss C. B. A., M.A., Bailey Hill, Denham, Bucks.
*Bell, Lieut.-Commander A. C., R.N., Wrawby Cottage, Wivenhoe, Essex.
Bell, Professor H. C. F., Ph.D., 22 Wyllys Avenue, Middletown, Conn., U.S.A.
Bell, H. E., M.A., New College, Oxford.
Beller, E. A., D.Phil., 107 Dickinson Hall, Princeton, N.J., U.S.A.
Bellot, Professor H. Hale, M.A. (*President*), Wayside, Lyndale, N.W.2.
Beloff, M., M.A., B.Litt., 379 Woodstock Road, Oxford.
*Bennett, H. S., M.A., Emmanuel College, Cambridge.
Bennett, R. F., B.A., Magdalene College, Cambridge.
Berkeley, G. F. H., J.P., B.A., Hanwell Castle, Banbury.
Betts, Professor R. R., M.A., School of Slavonic Studies, University of London, W.C.1.
Bieber, Professor R. P., Ph.D., Washington University, St. Louis 5, Mo., U.S.A.
*Bigby, Miss D. A., M.A., 28 Kensington Park Road, W.11.
Billingham, P. H., M.A., B.Litt., The Cottage, Highlands, Taunton, Som.
Bindoff, Professor S. T., M.A., 24 Alric Avenue, New Malden, Surrey.
*Bing, H. F., M.A., 57 Castle Hill, East Leake, nr. Loughborough, Leics.
Birch, F. L., C.M.G., M.A., 11 Montpelier Walk, S.W.7.
Bishop, T. A. M., B.A., 6 Chaucer Road, Cambridge.
Black, Professor J. B., M.A., The University, Aberdeen.
Blake, Professor J. W., M.A., No. 8, The College, Keele, Staffs.
*Blakey, Professor R. G., Ph.D., c/o Mr. Raymond Shove, Order Dept., Library, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 14, Minn., U.S.A.
Blomfield, Mrs. K., 57 Church Street, Isleworth, Middlesex.
*Boase, T. S. R., M.C., M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.
*Bolam, Rev. Canon C. E., c/o Mrs. Bruce Mackenzie, 25 Princes Street, Auckland, C.I., New Zealand.
*Bolsover, G. H., M.A., Ph.D., 7 Devonshire Road, Hatch End, Middlesex.
Botha, Lt.-Col. C. Graham, V.D., M.A., LL.D., Nairn, Isabel Avenue, Newlands, C.P., S. Africa.
*Boxer, Professor C. R., King's College, Strand, W.C.2.
*Brace, H. W., 136 Lea Road, Gainsborough, Lincs.
*Bracey, The Very Rev. R., Lower Newclose, Watergate Road, Newport, I.W.
*Bradbeer, H., Lynthorne, Barnfield Road, Exeter.

*Bradley, P. Brendan, M.A., D.Litt., 4 Greystone Gardens, Northwick Circle, Kenton, Middlesex.
*Brebner, Professor J. B., M.A., B.Litt., Ph.D., Columbia University, New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.
*Bridge, J. S. C., Cookley House, Henley-on-Thames.
Briers, Miss P. M., B.A., B.Litt., 201 Frobisher House, Dolphin Square, S.W.1.
Briggs, A., M.A., B.Sc.(Econ.), Worcester College, Oxford.
Brinkworth, E. R. C., B.Litt., M.A., The University, Edmund Street, Birmingham, 3.
Brinton, Professor Crane, B.A., D.Phil., 98 Widener Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, 38, Mass., U.S.A.
Brodie, Miss D. M., B.A., Ph.D., Newnham College, Cambridge.
Brogan, Professor D. W., M.A., LL.D., Peterhouse, Cambridge.
Brooks, F. W., M.A., University College, Hull.
Broome, Miss D. M., Ph.D., c/o William Deacon's Bank Ltd., 27 Great Underbank, Stockport, Cheshire.
Brown, B. Goulding, M.A., 16 Brookside, Cambridge.
Brown, Rev. C. K. F., D.Phil., Woolpit (St. Thomas's School), Ewhurst, Surrey.
*Brown, Professor Louise F., Ph.D., Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N.Y., U.S.A.
Brown, W. E., M.A., B.Sc., 53 South Park Avenue, Glasgow.
*Browning, Professor A., M.A., D.Litt., Westdel, Queen's Place, Glasgow, W.2.
Bryant, A. W. M., C.B.E., LL.D., Smedmore House, nr. Wareham, Dorset.
Buckler, Professor F. W., M.A., 6 Impington Lane, Histon, Cambs.
Bueno de Mesquita, D. M., M.A., Ph.D., Christ Church, Oxford.
Bullock, Brigadier H., C.I.E., O.B.E., 43 Dollar Street, Cirencester, Glos.
Burleigh, Professor the Rev. J. H. S., B.D., The University, Edinburgh, 10.
Burman, J., Greenfields, Hampton Lane, Solihull, Warwickshire.
Burn, Professor W. L., M.A., King's College, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.
Burne, Lt.-Col. A. H., D.S.O., 29 Sheffield Terrace, W.8.
Burne, Ven. R. V. H., M.A., 5 Abbey Street, Chester.
*Burt, Professor A. L., M.A., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 14, Minn., U.S.A.
Bury, J. P. T., M.A., Corpus Christi College, Cambridge.
*Busher, Rev. T. Story, D.D., M.A., River View, Islip, Oxford.
Butler, H. M., M.A., The Manor House, South Brent, Devon.
*Butler, Professor J. R. M., M.V.O., O.B.E., M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge.
Butler, Wilson, M.A., LL.M., Glebelands, Broughton-in-Furness.
Butterfield, Mrs., M.A., 2540 Cavendish Avenue, Victoria, B.C., Canada.
Butterfield, Professor H., M.A., Peterhouse, Cambridge.

Cabaniss, Professor J. A., Ph.D., University of Mississippi, University, Mississippi, U.S.A.
Callus, The Very Rev. D. A., O.P., S.T.M., D.Phil., Blackfriars, Oxford.
*Cam, Professor Helen M., M.A., Litt.D., F.B.A., Mochras, Grassy Lane, Sevenoaks, Kent.
*Cameron, Miss J., B.A., 902 Hood House, Dolphin Square, S.W.1.
Campbell, A., B.A., B.Litt., 11 Marston Ferry Road, Oxford.
*Campbell, Miss A. M., A.M., Ph.D., 190 George Street, Brunswick, N.J., U.S.A.
*Campbell, Professor Mildred L., Ph.D., Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N.Y., U.S.A.
Campbell, Miss Sybil, M.A., Tower Bridge Magistrate's Court, Tooley Street, S.E.1.

Carr, H. J., B.Sc. (Econ.), Ph.D., Heathermount, Harman's Water, Bracknell, Berks.
Carruthers, Mrs. James, C.H., 8 Gower Street, W.C.1.
Carter, Mrs., M.A., Wychwood, The Drove, Belmont, Surrey.
*Carter, Rev. C. S., D.D., 2 Alma Road, Bristol, 8.
Cartlidge, Rev. J. E. G., The Vicarage, Ford, Shrewsbury.
*Carus-Wilson, Miss E. M., M.A., 14 Lansdowne Road, W.11.
Chandler, G., Ph.D., 202 Pitville Avenue, Mossley Hill, Liverpool, 18.
Chaplais, P., Ph.D., 43 Nevis Road, S.W.17.
Charleston, S. J., M.A., 12 Hartington Villas, Hove, Sussex.
*Chart, D. A., I.S.O., Litt.D., 29 Cambourne Park, Upper Malone, Belfast.
Cheney, A. H., 27 Serpentine Road, Sevenoaks.
*Cheney, Professor C. R., M.A., F.B.A., 21 Rathen Road, Withington, Manchester, 20.
Chew, Miss H. M., M.A., Ph.D., Dytchleys, Coxtie Green, nr. Brentwood, Essex.
Chibnall, Mrs. A. C., M.A., D.Phil., 3 Selwyn Gardens, Cambridge.
Chrimes, S. B., M.A., Ph.D., University College, Cathay's Park, Cardiff.
*Christie, Mrs., The Pound House, Cropthorne, Pershore, Worcs.
*Church, Rev. L. F., B.A., Ph.D., Wiston, 45 Homefield Road, Worthing, Sussex.
*Churchill, Miss I. J., D.Phil., F.S.A., 9 The Drive, Tonbridge, Kent.
Churchill, The Right Hon. Sir Winston S., K.G., O.M., C.H., M.P., F.R.S., 10 Downing Street, S.W.1.
Clark, A. E., M.A., Highcroft, Birmingham Road, Walsall, Staffs.
Clark, C. Upson, Ph.D., North Hatley, Quebec, Canada.
Clark, Sir George N., LL.D., Lit.D., F.B.A., The Provost's Lodgings, Oriel College, Oxford.
Clark, G. S. R. Kitson, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge.
*Clay, C. T., C.B., M.A., Litt.D., F.B.A., F.S.A., 11 Tite Street, S.W.3.
*Clay, Miss R. M., Ilex Cottage, Shirehampton, Bristol.
Clegg, Mrs., B.A., 790 Foxhall Road, Ipswich.
Clements, E. E., M.A., 1 Catharine Place, Bath.
Coate, Miss M., M.A., F.S.A., The Haven, Paternoster Row, Ottery St. Mary, Devon.
Cobban, A. B. C., M.A., Ph.D., 11 Westbourne Park Road, W.2.
*Code, Rev. Joseph B., M.A., S.T.B., Sc.Hist.D., Manhattan College, 4513 Spuyten Duyvil Parkway, New York, 63, N.Y., U.S.A.
Colby, Professor C. W., M.A., Ph.D., 1240 Pine Avenue West, Montreal, Canada.
Cole, Lt.-Col. H. N., O.B.E., T.D., The Yaldens, Manor Road, Tongham, nr. Farnham, Surrey.
*Colgrave, B., M.A., F.S.A., 56 South Street, Durham.
Collins, Professor Ross W., M.A., B.D., Ph.D., University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.
Congreve, A. L., M.A., F.S.A., Kirmington, Cranbrook, Kent.
Corson, J. C., M.A., Ph.D., 2 Wardie Avenue, Edinburgh, 5.
Court, Professor W. H. B., M.A., A.M., The University, Edgbaston, Birmingham.
*Crawley, C. W., M.A., Trinity Hall, Cambridge.
Cronne, Professor H. A., M.A., The University, Edmund St., Birmingham, 3.
Crowe, Miss S. E., M.A., Ph.D., St. Hilda's College, Oxford.
*Cunningham, Miss A., M.A., 15 Murrayfield Gardens, Edinburgh.
*Curran, Miss M. B., M.A., 35 Buckingham Court, Kensington Park Road, W.11.

*Cuttino, G. P., D.Phil., Graduate Institute of the Liberal Arts, Emory University, Emory, Ga., U.S.A.

Dakin, D., M.A., Ph.D., 84 Madrid Road, Barnes, S.W.13.
Darlington, Professor R. R., B.A., Ph.D., Warrenhurst, Twyford, Reading.
*Darwin, F. D. S., M.A. [address unknown].
Davies, Miss A. F., M.A., 5 Belbroughton Road, Oxford.
Davies, C. C., M.A., Ph.D., 100 Divinity Road, Oxford.
*Davies, G., M.A., Huntington Library, San Marino, Cal., U.S.A.
Davies, Rev. R. T., M.A., 101 Iffley Road, Oxford.
Dawes, M. C. B., B.A., F.S.A., 16 Shakespeare Road, Worthing.
Dawson, Christopher, M.A., Hermitage, Budleigh Salterton, Devon.
*Day, P. W., M.A., 2 Rectory Terrace, Gosforth, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.
Day, W. I. Leeson, F.S.A., 2 Tresilian Gardens, Topsham, Devon.
*Deanesly, Professor Margaret, M.A., 196 Clarence Gate Gardens, N.W.1.
*Deeley, Miss A. P., M.A., Manor Farm, Merton, nr. Bicester, Oxon.
Denholm-Young, N., M.A., University College of North Wales, Bangor.
*Denny, L. R. R., M.A., 28 Hartley Avenue, Strowan, Christchurch N.W.2, New Zealand.
*Dewar, Captain Alfred C., C.B.E., R.N. (retired), B.Litt., Junior Army and Navy Club, Horseguards' Avenue, Whitehall, S.W.1.
Dickens, Professor A. G., M.A., University College, Hull.
Dickinson, Rev. J. C., M.A., F.S.A., Pembroke College, Cambridge.
Dickinson, P. G. M., The Gables, Wratting Road, Haverhill, Suffolk.
Dodd, Professor A. H., M.A., Brynhyfryd, Bangor, Caerns.
*Dodwell, Miss B., M.A., The University, Reading.
*Donaldson, G., M.A., Ph.D., 24 East Hermitage Place, Edinburgh, 6.
*Donaldson-Hudson, Miss R., B.A., Cheswardine, Market Drayton, Salop.
Dorling, Captain H. T., D.S.O., R.N. (retired), 97 Rivermead Court, Hurlingham, S.W.6.
Dormer, E. W., 29 Church Road, Earley, Reading.
Douglas, Professor D. C., M.A., F.B.A., 4 Henleaze Gardens, Bristol.
Douie, Miss D. L., B.A., Ph.D., University College, Hull.
Duncalf, Professor F. I., Ph.D., 3105 Duval Street, Austin, Texas, U.S.A.
Dunham, Professor W. H., Ph.D., Saybrook College, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., U.S.A.
Dunlop, Mrs., M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt., Dunselma, Fenwick, Ayrshire.
*Dyer, Miss F. E., 147 Jerningham Road, New Cross, S.E.14.

Eardley-Simpson, L. E., M.A., LL.B., Windley Lodge, Turnditch, nr. Derby.
Edmond, Miss D., B.Sc., 45 Hepworth Road, S.W.16.
Edwards, Professor J. G., M.A., F.B.A., Institute of Historical Research, University of London, Senate House, W.C.1.
Edwards, Miss K., M.A., Ph.D., 14 Emsworth Road, Barkingside, Ilford, Essex.
*Edwards, Rev. N., M.A., The Vicarage, Tutbury, Staffs.
Edwards, Professor R. W. D., M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt., 31 Castle Avenue, Clontarf, Dublin.
*Edwards, Major T. J., Somli, Summer Road, Thames Ditton, Surrey.
*Edwards-Rees, Miss D. M. M., M.A., 6 Hillylaid Road, Thornton-le-Fylde, nr. Blackpool.
Eeles, F. C., D.Litt., F.S.A. Scot., Earlham, Dunster, Somerset.

Elliott, C. A., M.A., The Cloisters, Eton College, Windsor.
*Elliott-Binns, Rev. Canon L. E., M.A., D.D., Freshwell House, Saffron Walden, Essex.
Ellis, C., M.A., Pen-y-Bryn, Porth-y-Felin Road, Holyhead, Anglesey.
Ellis, Miss M. F. H., c/o Old Post Office, Little Dean, Glos.
Ellis, M. H., Box 2521, G.P.O., Sydney, Australia.
Ellis, R. H., M.A., 64 Seymour Street, W.1.
*Emmison, F. G., F.S.A., Essex Record Office, County Hall, Chelmsford.
*Ensor, R. C. K., M.A., The Beacon, Sands, High Wycombe, Bucks.
d'Entrèves, Professor A. P., D.Phil., 13 Charlbury Road, Oxford.
*Erith, E. J., Southlake House, Shurlock Row, nr. Reading.
*Ettinger, A. A., M.A., D.Phil., Litt.D., 3233 Union Street, Allentown, Pa., U.S.A.
Evans, Mrs. A. K. B., Ph.D., 67 Stoneygate Road, Leicester.
Evans, D. L., B.A., B.Litt., Public Record Office, Chancery Lane, W.C.2.
Evans, Miss Joan, Litt.D., D.Lit., F.S.A., Thousand Acres, Wootton-under-Edge, Glos.
Evans, The Very Rev. S. J. A., M.A., F.S.A., The Deanery, Gloucester.
Evennett, H. O., M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge.
Eyck, E., Dr.Phil., 12 Lindfield Gardens, N.W.3.

*Farnsworth, A., LL.D., Ph.D., 37 Croham Park Avenue, South Croydon, Surrey.
Farran, Professor A. C., M.A., Kharnatak College, Dharwar, India.
*Fay, C. R., M.A., 111 Grantchester Meadows, Cambridge.
*Fay, Professor S. B., Ph.D., 194 Brattle Street, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.
Finberg, H. P. R., M.A., 34 Sheffield Terrace, W.8.
Fisher, F. J., M.A., London School of Economics, Houghton Street, W.C.2.
Fisher, Professor S. N., Ph.D., The Ohio State University, Columbus 10, Ohio, U.S.A.
*Fletcher, Rev. A. W., M.A., LL.B., F.S.A., c/o Stourton Rectory, Zeals, Wiltshire.
*Fletcher, E. G. M., B.A., LL.D., 9 Robin Grove, N.6.
Flower, Sir Cyril T., C.B., M.A., F.B.A., F.S.A., 2 Lammas Park Gardens, W.5.
Forrester, E. G., M.A., B.Litt., The Master's Lodgings, Magdalen College School, Brackley, Northants.
Fox, L., M.A., 14 Henley Street, Stratford-on-Avon.
Frampton, R., B.A., The Purlieu, West Malvern.
*Freeman, Arnold, M.A., B.Litt., Sheffield Education Settlement, Shipton Street, Sheffield.
Frend, W. H. C., M.A., D.Phil., Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge.
Fryde, E. B., D.Phil., Linden Vista, Cliff Terrace, Aberystwyth.
*Fryer, Professor C. E., M.A., Ph.D., 8452 Kirkwood Drive, Laurel Canyon, Los Angeles 46, Calif., U.S.A.
*Furber, H., M.A., Ph.D., History Department, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 4, Pa., U.S.A.
Fussell, G. E., Primrose House, Fressingfield, Diss, Norfolk.

Galbraith, Professor V. H., M.A., Litt.D., D.Lit., F.B.A., Oriel College, Oxford.
Gale, W. K. V., 63 Wolverhampton Road, Sedgley, Dudley, Worcs.
Ganshof, Professor F. L., 12 Rue Jacques Jordaens, Brussels, Belgium.
Garmonsway, G. N., M.A., 83 The Green, Ewell, Surrey
Garrett, Miss C. H., M.A. [address unknown].

*Garside, B., M.A., 74 Ormond Avenue, Hampton-on-Thames.
Gash, Professor N., M.A. B.Litt., 2 Headingley Terrace, Leeds, 6.
*George, Mrs. E., M.A., Litt.D., 51 Paulton's Square, S.W.3.
George, R. H., A.M., Ph.D., Brown University, Providence, R.I., U.S.A.
*Ghatak, Professor Jyotish Chandra, M.A., 4 Boloram Bose Ghat Road, Bhowanipur, Calcutta, India.
Gill, Professor C., M.A., Litt.D., The Crows' Nest, Storth, Milnthorpe, Westmorland.
Gipson, Professor L. H., Ph.D., Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pa., U.S.A.
*Godber, Miss A. J., M.A., F.S.A., Willington Manor, Bedford.
*Godfrey, Professor J. L., M.A., Ph.D., 500 North Street, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, U.S.A.
Goldingham, Major C. S., Manor Farm, Horsenden, Aylesbury, Bucks.
Goldthorp, L. M., M.A., Wilcroft House, Pecket Well, Hebden Bridge, Yorks.
*Gooch, G. P., C.H., M.A., Litt.D., D.Litt., F.B.A., Upway Corner, Chalfont St. Peter, Bucks.
Goodwin, Professor A., M.A., 15 Prince's Road, Heaton Moor, Stockport.
Gordon, Professor D. J., M.A., Ph.D., Wantage Hall, Reading.
Grace, W. F. F., M.A., Ph.D., Thornfield, Huyton, nr. Liverpool.
*Graham, Professor G. S., M.A. Ph.D., 49 Norland Square, W.11.
*Graham, Miss R., C.B.E., M.A., D.Litt., F.S.A., 29 Ladbroke Grove, W.11.
Greaves, R. W., M.A., D.Phil., Bedford College, Regent's Park, N.W.1.
Green, Rev. V. H. H., M.A., B.D., Lincoln College, Oxford.
*Gretton, Mrs. M. Sturge, J.P., B.Litt., 58 Banbury Road, Oxford.
Grierson, P., M.A., F.S.A. (*Literary Director*), Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge.
Griffiths, J., M.A., Springwood, Stanley Road, New Ferry, Cheshire.
*Grime, Rev. A., M.A., Ph.D., Epworth, 123 Station Road, Kearsley, Bolton, Lancs.
*Grimes, Rev. C. H. D., M.A., The Rectory, Newton Ferrers, S. Devon.
Grimm, Professor H. J., Ph.D., The Ohio State University, Columbus 10, Ohio, U.S.A.
*Griscom, Rev. Acton, M.A. [Address unknown].
Gumbley, Rev. W., O.P., Gracedieu, Boars Hill, Oxford.
Gupta, S. N. Das, M.A., Lucknow University, Lucknow, U.P., India.
*Guttridge, Professor G. H., M.A., Department of History, University of California, Berkeley, Cal., U.S.A.
Gwynn, Rev. A., M.A., B.Litt., S.J., University Hall, Dublin, Eire.
Gwynn, Professor D. R., B.A., D.Litt., 4 Lower Montenotte, Cork.

Habakkuk, Professor H. J., M.A., All Souls College, Oxford.
*Hadcock, R. N., Winchcombe Farm, Briff Lane, Bucklebury, Reading.
*Hall, C. S., M.A., Heathfield, 3 Queen's Road, Bradford, Yorks.
Hall, Professor D. G. E., M.A., D.Lit., 4 Chiltern Road, Hitchin, Herts.
Hampson, Miss E. M., M.A., Ph.D., King's College, University of Aberdeen.
Hancock, Professor Sir Keith, M.A., F.B.A., Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 25 Russell Sq., W.C.1.
Harding, W. G., F.S.A. Scot. [address unknown].
Hardwick, Mrs. R. W., Ardenlea, 6 Brooke Street, Dudley, Worcs.
*Harlow, Professor V. T., M.A., D.Litt., Fir Tree House, Old Marston, Oxford.
Harmer, Miss F. E., M.A., F.S.A., The Victoria University, Manchester, 13.
Harris, L. E., A.M.I.Mech.E., 3 Cottenham Road, Histon, Cambridge.

Hart, C. E., Woodgate, Coleford, Glos.
Hart, C. J. R., M.B., B.S., 104 Heathway, Dagenham, Essex.
Hasan, S. N., M.A., D.Phil., Aligarh University, Aligarh, U.P., India.
Haskins, Professor G. L., A.B., LL.B., 3400 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia 4, Pa., U.S.A.
*Hasluck, E. L., C.C., M.A., 90 Western Avenue, Herne Bay, Kent.
Hattersley, Professor A. F., M.A., 1 Sanders Road, Pietermaritzburg, S. Africa.
Hatton, Mrs. R. M., Ph.D., 49 Campden Street, Campden Hill, W.8.
*Havinden, Eric, M.A., 30 Park Avenue, Solihull, Warwickshire.
Hay, D., M.A., Department of History, The University, Edinburgh.
Heaton, Professor H., M.A., D.Litt., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn., U.S.A.
Hedworth-Whitty, R. G., M.A., Ph.D., Thone, Staplegrove Road, Taunton, Som.
Hemleben, S. J., M.A., D.Phil., Box 347, Southwestern Louisiana Institute, P.O., Layfayette, La., U.S.A.
Henderson, Professor G. D., D.D., D.Litt., The University, Aberdeen.
Henderson, J. M., M.A., King's College, Aberdeen.
Higby, Professor C. P., A.M., Ph.D., LL.D., Kenmore Apts, 1904 Kendall Avenue, Madison 5, Wisconsin, U.S.A.
*Higham, C. S. S., M.A., 97 Church Road, S.W.19.
Hill, J. E. C., M.A., Balliol College, Oxford.
Hill, J. W. F., M.A., LL.M., D.Litt., F.S.A., 2 Lindum Terrace, Lincoln.
*Hill, Miss M. C., M.A., County Record Office, Shirehall, Shrewsbury.
*Hill, Miss R. M. T., M.A., B.Litt., Westfield College, Hampstead, N.W.3.
Hobbs, J. L., 4 Elmfield Road, Preston Street, Shrewsbury.
Hobday, S. R., O.B.E., Canbury Oak, Battle, Sussex.
*Hodgett, G. A. J., M.A., King's College, Strand, W.C.2.
*Hogg, Brigadier O. F. G., C.B.E., F.S.A., 1 Hardy Road, Blackheath, S.E.3.
*Hoggarth, A. H. G., M.A., Elph Howe, Staveley, nr. Kendal.
*Hollingsworth, L. W., Ph.D., Shambani, Longdown Road, Lower Bourne, Farnham, Surrey.
Holt, Miss A. D., Fasga-na-Coille, Nethy Bridge, Inverness-shire.
Hood, Mrs. Ivo, Sidestrand, Cromer.
*Horn, D. B., M.A., D.Litt., Ettrick, Pentland Avenue, Colinton, Edinburgh.
Hoskins, W. G., M.Sc. (Econ.), M.A., Ph.D., Steeple Barton Vicarage, Steeple Aston, Oxford.
Houseman, J. W., M.A., Ardena, Long Lane, Harden, Bingley, Yorks.
*Howard, C. H. D., M.A., 31 Portman Square, W.1.
*Howard-Watson, Captain J. A., F.R.G.S., F.R.S.L., Bella Vista, Nicholas Road, Blundellsands, Liverpool, 23.
*Hoyland, J. S., M.A., Holland House, Woodbrooke, Selly Oak, Birmingham.
*Hoyt, Professor R. S., Ph.D., 824 East College Street, Iowa City, Iowa, U.S.A.
Hudson, G. F., M.A., All Souls College, Oxford.
Huehns, Miss G., Ph.D., 2 Westbourne Court, Westbourne Terrace, W.2.
Hughes, Professor E., M.A., The University, Durham.
Hulme, H., Ph.D., New York University, Washington Square East, New York City, U.S.A.
Humphreys, Professor R. A., O.B.E., Ph.D. (*Hon. Secretary*), 28 Drayton Gardens, S.W.10.
Hurford, G. H., 8 Feldon Street, Fulham, S.W.6.
Hurnard, Miss N. D., M.A., D.Phil., Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford.
Hurstfield, J., B.A., 7 Glenilla Road, N.W.3.

*Hussey, Professor Joan M., M.A., B.Litt., Ph.D., Royal Holloway College, Englefield Green, Surrey.
*Hyamson, A. M., O.B.E., 12A Faraday Mansions, Queen's Club Gardens, W.14.
Hyde, Professor F. E., M.A., Ph.D., Savanna, Caldy Road, West Kirby, Cheshire.
*Hyde, H. M., M.A., 32 Wilton Place, S.W.1.
*Hyde, J. H., B.A., Savoy-Plaza Hotel, Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y., U.S.A.

*Ilchester, The Right Hon. the Earl of, G.B.E., D.Litt., F.S.A., 14 Montagu Square, W.1.

Jacob, Professor E. F., M.A., D.Phil., F.B.A., F.S.A., All Souls College, Oxford.
Jaffar, Professor S. M., B.A., M.R.A.S., Central Record Office, Peshawar, Pakistan.
*Jamison, Miss E. M., M.A., F.S.A., 16A The Boltons, S.W.10.
Jarvis, R. C., F.S.A., c/o Library and Museum, King's Beam House, E.C.3.
Jenkins, Professor the Rev. Claude, D.D., F.S.A., Christ Church, Oxford.
Jenkinson, Sir Hilary, M.A., F.S.A., Arun House, Horsham, Sussex.
*Johnson, C., M.A., C.B.E., F.B.A., F.S.A., 13A Downshire Hill, N.W.3.
Johnson, H. C., M.A., Public Record Office, Chancery Lane, W.C.2.
Johnson, J. H., M.A., Whitehorns, Cedar Avenue, Chelmsford.
*Johnston, D. Hope, M.A., J.P., 1A Regent's Court, Hanover Gate, Regent's Park, N.W.1.
Johnston, Lieut.-Col. G. R., R.A., F.R.S.A., Wood Corner, Lankhills Road, Winchester.
*Johnston, Rev. J. B., M.A., B.D., 63 Cluny Gardens, Edinburgh, 10.
Johnston, S. H. F., M.A., 6 Lisburne Terrace, Aberystwyth.
*Johnstone, Professor Hilda, Litt.D., 20 St. Martin's Square, Chichester.
Jolliffe, J. E. A., M.A., Keble College, Oxford.
Jones, Arthur, M.A., 31 West Hill Avenue, Epsom, Surrey.
Jones, A. E., M.A., West View, 28 Westfield Avenue, Newby, Scarborough.
Jones, F. C., M.A., Ph.D., 28 Clarendon Road, Redland, Bristol, 6.
*Jones, Professor G. P., M.A., The University, Sheffield, 10.
Jones, Commander L. P., D.S.O., R.N. (retired), 25 Cadogan Street, S.W.3.
Jones, P. E., LL.B., 18 Wansunt Road, Bexley, Kent.
Jones, P. J., D.Phil., 16 Hilborough Crescent, S.E.12.
Jones, Capt. R. W., M.A., Affallon, Chelsea Lane, Welshpool.
Jones, Professor T. F., Ph.D., New York University, University Heights, New York City, U.S.A.
Jordan, W. M., M.A., Ph.D., 84 Reid Avenue, Port Washington, Long Island, N.Y., U.S.A.
*Judges, Professor A. V., B.A., D.Sc. (Econ.), Oliver House, 53A Strand-on-the-Green, W.4.

*Kay, H., M.A., 15 Acre House Avenue, Lindley, Huddersfield.
Kearsey, Colonel A., D.S.O., O.B.E., 5 Lexham Gardens, W.8.
Keenleyside, H. Ll., M.A., Ph.D., Department of Mines and Resources, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
*Keevil, J. J., D.S.O., M.A., M.D., F.S.A., George Hill House, Robertsbridge, Sussex.

Kelly, Rev. B. W., Corpus Christi House, 14 Trent Road, S.W.2.
Kemp, Miss B., M.A., St. Hugh's College, Oxford.
Kemp, Rev. E. W., M.A., Exeter College, Oxford.
Kemp, Lt.-Commander P. K., R.N., Malcolm's, 51 Market Hill, Maldon, Essex.
Ker, N. R., M.A., B.Litt., Stonehaven, Kirtlington, Oxon.
Ketelbey, Miss D. M., M.A., 18 Queen's Gardens, St. Andrews, Fife.
Khan, M. Siddiq, M.A., LL.B., 26 University Quarters, Nilket, P.O. Ramna, Dacca, East Pakistan.
Khanna, Kahan Chand, M.A., Ph.D., Director of Public Instruction, East Punjab, Ellerslie, Simla East, India.
*Kimball, Miss E. G., B.Litt., Ph.D., 7 Greenholm, Princeton, N.J., U.S.A.
*Kingham, W. R., M.A., Yiewsley Grange, Yiewsley, Middlesex.
Kingsford, Rev. M. R., M.A., B.Litt., S.T.M., The Rectory, Nuneham Courtenay, Oxon.
Kinloch, Rev. T. F., M.A., 26 Coalway Road, Wolverhampton.
Kirkconnell, Watson, M.A., Ph.D., LL.D., F.R.S.C., Office of the President, Acadia University, Wolfville, Nova Scotia, Canada.
*Kirkus, Miss A. M., M.A., 63 Hamilton Road, Reading.
*Kitchener, E. E., M.A., 16 Birdhurst Avenue, South Croydon, Surrey.
*Klingberg, Professor F. J., A.B., A.M., Ph.D., University of California, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, Cal., U.S.A.
Knappen, Professor M. M., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., U.S.A.
*Knight, L. Stanley, M.A., 199 Cyncoed Road, Cardiff.
*Knowles, Professor the Rev. M. D., D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A., F.S.A., Peterhouse, Cambridge.
Koeppler, H., Wilton Park, Wiston House, Steyning, Sussex.
Krishnamachari, T. M., 32 Bhagirathi Amma Street, T'Nagar, Madras, 17, India.
Krishnamurti, Raja Karyapravina N. A., Nagamalaya, Karamanai, Travancore, S. India.
Kurat, Professor A. N., D.Phil., Bahçelievler, 24 Sokak No. 15, Ankara, Turkey.

Laistner, Professor M. L. W., M.A., Litt.D., 222 Boardman Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., U.S.A.
*Langton, Rev. E., D.D., Delamere, 43 Glandon Drive, Cheadle Hulme, nr. Stockport.
Laprade, Professor W. T., Ph.D., 1108 Monmouth Avenue, Durham, N. Carolina, U.S.A.
Latham, R. C., M.A., 2 Highfield, Egham Hill, Englefield Green, Surrey.
Laws, Lt.-Col. M. E. S., O.B.E., M.C., No. 6 Flat, 129–130 Marine Parade, Brighton, Sussex.
Leconfield, The Right Hon. The Lord, B.A., 3 Wyndham House, Sloane Square, S.W.1.
Lees, R. McLachlan, M.A., Westfields, East Grinstead, Sussex.
*Legg, L. G. Wickham, M.A., The Manor House, Bodicote, Banbury, Oxon.
Legge, Miss M. D., M.A., B.Litt., 126 Woodstock Road, Oxford.
Lenanton, Lady, M.A., Bride Hall, nr. Welwyn, Herts.
*Lennard, R. V., M.A., Paine's Close, Lower Keyford, nr. Oxford.
Le Patourel, Professor J. H., M.A., D.Phil., Westcote, Hebers Ghyll Drive, Ilkley, Yorks.
Lewis, Professor B., Ph.D., 23 Northways, College Crescent, N.W.3.
Lewis, Professor M. A., C.B.E., M.A., Royal Naval College, Greenwich, S.E.10.
Lewis, N. B., M.A., Ph.D., 4 Leyfield Road, Dore, Sheffield.

Lewis, R. A., Ph.D., University College of North Wales, Bangor.
Leys, Mrs. J. A., M.A., B.Litt., Hillcrest, Ware Lane, Lyme Regis, Dorset.
Lloyd-Owen, Commander J. H., R.N., 37 Marlings Park Avenue, Chislehurst, Kent.
*Lindsay, Mrs. H., M.A., Ph.D., Girton College, Cambridge.
*Lipson, E., M.A., New College, Oxford.
Livermore, H. V., M.A., Sandycombe Lodge, Sandycombe Road, St. Margarets, Twickenham.
Lloyd, C. C., M.A., 17 Dartmouth Row, Greenwich, S.E.10.
Lloyd, H. I., O.B.E., M.A., New Court, Temple, E.C.4.
Lobel, Mrs., B.A., 16 Merton Street, Oxford.
*Lockitt, C. H., M.A., Easedown, Kingstonridge, Lewes.
Longrais, Professor F. Joüon des, D.-en-droit, L.-ès-L., 4 rue de la Terrasse, Paris XVII, France.
*Lovegrove, E. W., M.A., F.S.A., Common Hill Farm, Fownhope, Hereford.
*Lumb, Miss S. V., M.A., P.B.103c, Salisbury, S. Rhodesia.
Lunt, Professor W. E., Ph.D., Haverford College, Haverford, Pa., U.S.A.

Mabbs, A. W., 4 Westbury Court, Lordship Lane, N.22.
*Macdonald, Rev. Prebendary A. J., M.A., D.D., F.S.A., St. Dunstan's Vestry, Fleet Street, E.C.4.
Macdonald, N., A.B., A.M., Ph.D., McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.
McDowell, R. B., Ph.D., Trinity College, Dublin.
McElroy, Professor R., M.A., LL.D., Ph.D., 2123 Grove Avenue, Richmond 20, Virginia, U.S.A.
McFarlane, K. B., M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.
McIlwain, Professor C. H., LL.D., Ph.D., 17 Hancock Street, Auburndale, Mass., U.S.A.
MacInnes, Professor C. M., M.A., The University, Bristol, 8.
McKay, D. C., A.B., M.A., Ph.D., 24 Highland Street, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.
*Mackie, Professor J. D., C.B.E., M.C., M.A., F.S.A. Scot., 9 The University, Glasgow, W.2.
McKisack, Miss May, M.A., B.Litt., Somerville College, Oxford.
*McLachlan, Rev. H., M.A., D.D., Litt.D., 11 Sydenham Avenue, Liverpool, 17.
McMaster, Mrs. Ian, M.A., 21 Park Town, Oxford.
McNulty, Rev. J., B.A., St. Peter's, Woolston, Warrington, Lancs.
Mainwaring, J., M.A., D.Litt., Lingwood, St. James' Road, Dudley.
*Major, Miss K., M.A., B.Litt., F.S.A., 21 Queensway, Lincoln.
Mann, Miss J. de L., M.A., St. Hilda's College, Oxford.
Mansergh, Professor P. N. S., D.Phil., Little Paddock, Oxted, Surrey.
Marshall, Miss D., M.A., Ph.D., University College, Cathay's Park, Cardiff.
Marshall, Professor R. L., M.A., LL.D., 1 College Avenue, Magee College, Londonderry.
Martin, Miss E. C., M.A., Ph.D., Westfield College, Hampstead, N.W.3.
Martin, Professor Thomas P., A.B., A.M., Ph.D., Dunn Loring, Virginia, U.S.A.
*Mathew, The Most Rev. Archbishop D. J., M.A., Litt.D., F.S.A., Apostolic Delegation, P.O. Box 468, Mombasa, Kenya.
*Mathur, Tikait Narain, B.A., LL.B., 30/27 Chili-ent Road, Agra, U.P., India.
Medlicott, Professor W. N., D.Lit., London School of Economics, Houghton Street, W.C.2.
Meekings, C. A. F., M.A., 42 Chipstead Street, S.W.6.

*Megaro, Professor G., A.B., Ph.D., LL.B., 308 Burns Street, Forest Hills, Long Island, New York, U.S.A.
Micklewright, Rev. F. H. A., M.A., All Saints Chauntry, 27 Campden Hill Road, W.8.
Midgley, Miss L. M., M.A., County Buildings, Stafford.
Milne, A. T., M.A., 14 Allison Grove, S.E.21.
Mitchell, C., M.A., B.Litt., 6 Prince's Road, S.W.19.
*Moir, Rev. A. L., M.A., Bridstow Vicarage, Ross-on-Wye, Herefordshire.
Mollet, R., Le Coin, Bagatelle, Jersey, C.I.
Moody, Professor T. W., M.A., Ph.D., Trinity College, Dublin.
*Moorman, Mrs., B.A., The Theological College, Chichester, Sussex.
Moreton, Rev. Canon H. A. V., B.A., D. ès Lettres (Besançon), The Close, Hereford.
Morey, Rev. Dom R. Adrian, O.S.B., M.A., D.Phil., Downside Abbey, nr. Bath.
Morrah, D. M. M., M.A., 95 Bedford Court Mansions, Bedford Square, W.C.1.
*Morrell, Professor W. P., M.A., D.Phil., 16 Skibo Street, Kew, Dunedin, S.W.1, N.Z.
Morris, Ernest, F.R.G.S., The Verger's Lodge, St. Margaret's Vicarage, Leicester.
*Morris, Rev. H. C. S., M.A., Nisthouse, Dounby, Kirkwall, Orkney.
Murray, Professor J. J., Ph.D., Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, U.S.A.
Murray, Miss K. M. E., B.A., B.Litt., Upper Cranmore, Heyshott, Midhurst, Sussex.
Myers, A. R., M.A., F.S.A., 12 Park Road South, Claughton, Birkenhead, Cheshire.
Myres, J. N. L., M.A., F.S.A., Christ Church, Oxford.
*Myres, Rev. M. W., D.D., F.S.A., Frodsham Vicarage, nr. Warrington.

Namier, Professor Sir Lewis B., M.A., F.B.A., The Victoria University, Manchester, 13.
Narayan, Brij, M.A., c/o Allahabad Bank, Ltd., Delhi, India.
Nath, Dwarka, Department of Local Government, Georgetown, Demerara, British Guiana.
*Neale, Professor J. E., M.A., D.Litt., F.B.A., University College, Gower Street, W.C.1.
Nef, Professor J. U., Ph.D., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., U.S.A.
New, Professor C. W., Ph.D., McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario.
Newhall, Professor R. A., Ph.D., Williams College, Williamstown, Mass., U.S.A.
Nichols, J. F., M.C., M.A., Ph.D., F.S.A., 15 Minster Road, Godalming.
Nicholson, C. D. P., 51 Jersey Road, Hounslow, Middlesex.
*Nicholson, T. C., M.A., Strathmore, Wath-upon-Dearne, nr. Rotherham.
*Noakes, Miss J., Little Lindens, Linden Path, Leatherhead.
Nobbs, D., M.A., 51 Craiglockhart Avenue, Edinburgh, 11.
*Nunn, William, Gillgrass, Gosforth, Cumberland.

Oakeshott, W. F., M.A., The College, Winchester.
O'Brien, Most Rev. Archbishop Eris M., M.A., Ph.D., Lindsay Street, Neutral Bay, Sydney, Australia.
Offer, Rev. C. J., M.A., Ightham Rectory, Sevenoaks.
*Orr, J. E., M.A., Th.D., D.Phil., 11451 Berwick Street, Los Angeles 49, Cal., U.S.A.

O'Sullivan, Professor Mary J. Donovan, M.A., D.Litt., Lisgorm, Galway, Ireland.
Otway-Ruthven, Miss A. J., B.A., 6 Trinity College, Dublin.
Owen, C. V., Dunroy, Northlands Road, Romsey, Hants.
*Owen, Commander J. H., R.N. (retired), 41A Roland Gardens, S.W.7.
Owst, Professor G. R., Litt.D., D.Lit., Ph.D., F.S.A., Cudworth Cottage, High Street, Great Wilbraham, Cambs.

*Packard, Professor S. R., Ph.D., 45 Ward Avenue, Northampton, Mass., U.S.A.
Paik, L. G., M.A., Ph.D., Chosen Christian College, Seoul, Korea.
Pakeman, Professor S. A., M.C., M.A., c/o Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (General Council), Houses of Parliament, S.W.1.
Pantin, W. A., M.A., F.B.A., F.S.A., Oriel College, Oxford.
Pares, Professor R., C.B.E., M.A., F.B.A., 7 Carlton Terrace, Edinburgh.
*Parker, Captain H., F.R.G.S., 2 Albemarle Street, W.1.
*Parkinson, Professor C. N., M.A., Ph.D., Department of History, University of Malaya, Singapore.
Parry, E. Jones, M.A., Ph.D., 75 Cornwall Gardens, S.W.7.
Parry, Professor J. H., M.A., Ph.D., University College of the West Indies, Mona, St. Andrews, Jamaica, B.W.I.
Parsloe, C. G., B.A., 1 Leopold Avenue, S.W.19.
*Partridge, R. C. B., 43 Clapton Common, E.5.
Passant, E. J., M.A., 116 Ashley Gardens, S.W.1.
Pearce, J. P., F.R.I.B.A., Lloyds Bank Buildings, 66 Bold Street, Liverpool, 1.
Pearn, B. R., M.A., Foreign Office Research Department, Princes Street, Whitehall, S.W.1.
Peaston, Rev. A. E., M.A., B.Litt., The Manse, Dromore, Co. Down, N. Ireland.
Peel, J. K., M.A., 6 Canterbury Terrace, Leicester.
Pelham, R. A., M.A., Ph.D., South Stoneham House, Swaythling, Southampton.
Penn, C. D., M.A., 4 Grantley House, 30A Florence Road, Boscombe, Bournemouth.
Penson, Professor Dame Lillian, D.B.E., Ph.D., LL.D., D.Litt., Bedford College, Regent's Park, N.W.1.
*Percy-Smith, Lt.-Col. H. K., c/o Lloyds Bank Ltd., Pall Mall, S.W.1.
Perroy, Professor E. M. J., D-ès-L., 12 rue de l'Epée de Bois, Paris, Ve, France.
Petrie, Sir Charles, Bt., M.A., 14 Tregunter Road, The Boltons, S.W.10.
*Phelps, Rev. P. B., M.A., Swanmore, nr. Bishop's Waltham, Hants.
Philip, I. G., M.A., 28 Portland Road, Oxford.
Philips, Professor C. H., M.A., 113 Abbots Gardens, N.2.
Pickthorn, K. W. M., M.A., Litt.D., M.P., Corpus Christi College, Cambridge.
*Pieris, P. E., C.M.G., Litt.D., Nugedola, Pasyala, Ceylon.
Plucknett, Professor T. F. T., M.A., LL.B., F.B.A., 17 Crescent Road, S.W.20.
Plumb, J. H., Ph.D., Christ's College, Cambridge.
Poole, A. L., M.A., F.B.A., St. John's College, Oxford.
Postan, Professor M. M., M.A., Peterhouse, Cambridge.
*Potter, Professor G. R., M.A., Ph.D., The University, Sheffield.
Powell, Miss I. G., M.A., Royal Holloway College, Englefield Green, Surrey.
Powell, W. R., B.Litt., M.A., 173 Church Road, Harold Wood, Romford, Essex.
Powell-Price, Lt.-Col. J. C., M.A., C.I.E., E.D., 119A Ladbroke Road, W.11.
*Powicke, Professor Sir F. Maurice, M.A., LL.D., Litt.D., F.B.A., Oriel College, Oxford.
*Powley, E. B., M.A., B.Litt., The Old Rectory, Grafham, Huntingdon.

Prestwich, Mrs. M., M.A., St. Hilda's College, Oxford.
Procter, Miss Evelyn E. S., M.A., St. Hugh's College, Oxford.
*Pugh, R. B., M.A., F.S.A., 6 Lawn Road Flats, N.W.3.
Purvis, A., B.Sc., 6 Greenhalgh Walk, Hampstead Garden Suburb, N.2.
Purvis, Rev. J. S., M.A., D.D., F.S.A., 14 Chapter House Street, York.
Putnam, Professor Bertha H., Ph.D., Dickinson House, South Hadley, Mass., U.S.A.
Pybus, Miss H. J., M.A., Newnham College, Cambridge.

Quinn, Professor D. B., Ph.D., 52 Eaton Crescent, Swansea.

Radford, C. A. Ralegh, M.A., F.S.A., Culmcott, Uffculme, Devon.
Rae, D. M., M.A., Teachers' Training College, Epsom, Auckland, S.E.13, New Zealand.
Ragatz, Professor L. J., M.A., Ph.D., 5859 Olentangy Boulevard, Worthington, Ohio, U.S.A.
*Ramm, Miss A., M.A., Somerville College, Oxford.
*Ramsay, G. D., M.A., D.Phil., St. Edmund Hall, Oxford.
Ratton, M. H., 4 Walton Street, Oxford.
Read, Conyers, Ph.D., P.O. Box 593, Villa Nova, Penn., U.S.A.
*Realey, C. B., Ph.D., Department of History, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, U.S.A.
*Reaney, P. H., M.A., Litt.D., 20 Hilden Farm Estate, Hildenborough, Tonbridge, Kent.
*Reddaway, T. F., M.A., F.S.A. (*Hon. Treasurer*), Garden Hill, Totteridge Lane, N.20.
*Redford, Professor A., M.A., Ph.D., 57 Manor Drive, Manchester, 21.
*Redlich, Rev. Canon E. B., M.A., B.D., Little Bowden Rectory, Market Harborough.
Rees, Professor W., M.A., D.Sc., F.S.A., University College, Cathay's Park, Cardiff.
Reeves, Miss M. E., M.A., Ph.D., 13 Norham Gardens, Oxford.
Renier, Professor G. J., Ph.D., 7 Montpelier Row, Twickenham, Middx.
Rich, E. E., M.A., St. Catharine's College, Cambridge.
*Richards, R., M.A., F.S.A., Gawsworth Old Rectory, Gawsworth, nr. Macclesfield, Cheshire.
*Richardson, H. G., M.A., B.Sc., F.B.A., High Barn, 14 Sheridan Road, S.W.19.
Richardson, Professor W. C., M.A., Ph.D., Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, U.S.A.
Rimmer, Rev. Canon J. S., M.A., B.D., The Rectory, Ulverston, Lancs.
Roberts, Professor M., D.Phil., The Queen's University, Belfast.
Robertson, Miss A. J., M.A., Ph.D., Kinnaber, Ramsay Street, Edzell, Angus.
Robertson, L. A., M.A., B.Litt., 310 Ferry Road, Edinburgh, 5.
Robbins, Professor Caroline, Ph.D., Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Penn., U.S.A.
Robinson, Professor E. E., Ph.D., Institute of American History, Stanford University, Stanford, Cal., U.S.A.
*Robinson, Professor Howard, M.A., Ph.D., LL.D., 209 West College Street, Oberlin, Ohio, U.S.A.
*Robson, E., M.A., History Department, The University, Manchester, 13
*Rodkey, F. S., A.M., Ph.D., 325 Lincoln Hall, Urbana, Ill., U.S.A.

Roe, F. Gordon, F.S.A., 57 Peel Street, W.8.
Rogers, Rev. Patrick C. J., M.A., D.Litt., St. Mary's Training College, Trench House, Andersonstown, Belfast.
Ronan, Rev. M. V., Presbytery, Halston Street, Dublin.
Rose, Professor W. J., M.A., Ph.D., Slavic Department, The University, Vancouver, B.C., Canada.
Roskell, Professor J. S., M.A., D.Phil., 30 Hurts Croft, Chilwell, Notts.
Roth, Cecil, M.A., B.Litt., D.Phil., 31 Charlbury Road, Oxford.
Rothwell, Professor H., Ph.D., The University, Southampton.
*Routh, Miss E. M. G., Wentworth House, Richmond, Surrey.
Routledge, F. J., M.B.E., T.D., M.A., B.Litt., 10 Townfield Road, West Kirby, Cheshire.
*Rowe, Miss B. J. H., M.A., B.Litt., c/o National Provincial Bank, Ltd., The Square, Bournemouth.
Rowe, W. J., D.Phil., Yew Tree Farm, Barnston Lane, Moreton, Wirral, Cheshire.
Rowland, E. C., Launceston Grammar School, Mowbray Heights, Launceston, Tasmania.
Rowse, A. L., M.A., All Souls College, Oxford.
Rubinstein, N., Ph.D., 53 Frognal, N.W.3.
Ruddock, Miss A. A., Ph.D., Birkbeck College, Fetter Lane, E.C.2.
*Runciman, The Hon. J. C. S., M.A., 18 Elm Tree Road, St. John's Wood, N.W.8.
*Russell, Ephraim, M.A., B.Sc., 8 Talbot Road, Wembley, Middlesex.
Rutherford, Professor J., M.A., Ph.D., University College, Auckland, New Zealand.

Sadullah, M., M.A., 63 F.C. College Extension, Gulbarg Estate, Lahore, West Punjab, Pakistan.
Sage, Professor W. N., M.A., Ph.D., 4687 West 4th Avenue, Vancouver 8, B.C.
*Salter, F. R., M.A., Magdalene College, Cambridge.
Saltmarsh, J., M.A., F.S.A., King's College, Cambridge.
Salusbury, Lt.-Col. G. T., M.A., B.Litt., Institute of Army Education, Eltham Palace, Eltham, S.E.9.
*Samuel, S., LL.D., 104 Forest Hill Road, Toronto, Canada.
*Samuel, W. S., F.S.A., 46 Hanover House, N.W.8.
Saran, P., Ph.D., Department of History, University of Delhi, Delhi 8, India.
*Saunders, H. W., M.A., D.Litt., The Garden House, Shobdon, Leominster, Herefordshire.
Sayles, Professor G. O., M.A., D.Litt., University of Aberdeen, King's College, Old Aberdeen.
Schofield, B., M.A., Ph.D., British Museum, W.C.1.
*Scholes, P. A., M.A., D.Litt., D.Mus., D. ès L., F.S.A., Rutland House, 41 Davenant Road, Oxford.
Schuyler, Professor R. L., A.M., Ph.D., Columbia University, New York City, U.S.A.
*Scofield, Miss Cora L., Ph.D., The College Club, 40 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, Mass., U.S.A.
Sears, Professor L. M., Ph.D., Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, U.S.A.
*Seymour, C., LL.D., Litt.D., 223 Bradley Street, New Haven, Conn., U.S.A.
Sharma, Sri Ram, M.A., D.A.V. College, Sholapur, India.

Sharp, Mrs. M., Ph.D., 12A Royal York Crescent, Bristol, 8.
Shaw, I. P., M.A., 19B Park Hill Road, Croydon, Surrey.
*Shaw, R. C., M.Sc., F.R.C.S., Overleigh House, East Cliff, Preston, Lancs.
*Shelley, R. J. A., Denbie House, 27 Pilkington Road, Southport.
Shirley, Rev. Canon F. J., D.D., Ph.D., F.S.A., The King's School, Canterbury.
Siebert, Professor W. H., M.A., University Hall, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, U.S.A.
*Simpson, Rev. F. A., M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge.
Slosser, Professor the Rev. G. J., S.T.M., Ph.D., 203 Summit Avenue, Bellevue, Pittsburg, Pa., U.S.A.
*Smalley, Miss B., M.A., Ph.D., St. Hilda's College, Oxford.
*Smart, Lt.-Col. F. W. B., M.A., Rathmoyle, Hurtmore Road, Godalming.
Smith, S., B.A., Ph.D., Highclere, Oatlands Road, Shinfield, nr. Reading.
*Smith, W. Owston, M.A., I.E.S., 37 Chancellor House, Tunbridge Wells.
*Smyth, Rev. Canon C. H. E., M.A., 20 Dean's Yard, Westminster, S.W.1.
Soden, Rev. G. I., M.A., D.D., Barsham Rectory, Beccles, Suffolk.
Somers, Rev. H. J., J.C.B., M.A., Ph.D., St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Nova Scotia.
Somerville, R., M.A., 77 Teignmouth Road, N.W.2.
*Southam, Colonel L. A. C., D.S.O., Rodney House, Malvern Link.
Southern, R. W., M.A., Balliol College, Oxford.
Spens, H. B., B.A., 169 West George Street, Glasgow, C.2.
Stanley, Professor G. F. G., M.A., B.Litt., D.Phil., Department of History, Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.
Steed, H. Wickham, LL.D., Holly Bank, Wootton-by-Woodstock, Oxon.
Steefel, Professor L. D., M.A., Ph.D., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn., U.S.A.
Steel, A. B., M.A., University College, Cathay's Park, Cardiff.
Steer, F. W., F.S.A., 63 Orchard Street, Chichester, Sussex.
Steinberg, S. H., Ph.D., 11 Crystal Palace Park Road, S.E.26.
*Stenton, Lady, D.Litt., F.B.A., Whitley Park Farm, Reading.
*Stenton, Professor Sir Frank M., M.A., LL.D., D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A., Whitley Park Farm, Reading.
*Stones, E. L. G., Ph.D., 70 Oakfield Avenue, Glasgow, W.2.
Stretton, Miss G., M.A., 55 Holly Lodge Mansions, Highgate, N.6.
Styles, P., M.A., 15 Church Street, Warwick.
Summers, H. F., 44 King Street, Southwell, Notts.
Sutherland, Miss L. S., M.A., Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford.
Sykes, Professor the Rev. N., Phil.D., F.B.A., 2 Selwyn Gardens, Cambridge.

*Taffs, Miss W. A., M.A., Ph.D., 20 Steele's Road, N.W.3.
*Talbot, C. H., Ph.D., B.D., 132 Oakwood Court, W.14.
*Tanner, Dame Emmeline M., D.B.E., B.A., c/o E. B. Gauntlett, Esq., Little Bedwyn, Marlborough.
Tanner, L. E., M.V.O., M.A., F.S.A., 59 Warwick Square, S.W.1.
Tate, W. E., The University, Leeds.
Tawney, Professor R. H., Litt.D., F.B.A., 21A Mecklenburgh Square, W.C.1.
Taylor, A. J., M.A., F.S.A., 56 Langham Road, Teddington, Middlesex.
Taylor, Professor Eva G. R., D.Sc., Ralph's Ride, Bracknell, Berks.
Taylor, J., M.A., Bramhope Manor, Bramhope, nr. Leeds.
Taylor, Rt. Rev. Abbot F. L. A., M.C., M.A., St. Augustine's Abbey, Ramsgate.

*Teichman, Major O., D.S.O., M.B.E., M.C., M.A., Highbury, Warminster, Wilts.
*Teichman Derville, Major M., O.B.E., D.L., J.P., M.A., F.S.A., The Red House, Littlestone, New Romney, Kent.
Templeman, G., M.A., 70 Frankley Avenue, Quinton, Birmingham, 32.
Thistlethwaite, B., O.B.E., 2 Gordon Place, W.8.
*Thomas, A. H., M.A., LL.D., D.Lit., F.S.A., 2 West Park Lane, Worthing.
Thompson, Rev. J. M., M.A., F.B.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.
Thomson, Miss G. Scott., M.A., F.S.A., 4 N, Portman Mansions, Chiltern Street, Baker Street, W.1.
THOMSON, Professor M. A., D.Phil., Top Flat, Bridge House, 7 Mossley Hill Drive, Liverpool, 17.
Thomson, T. R. F., M.A., M.D., F.S.A., Cricklade, Wilts.
Thorne, Professor S. E., M.A., LL.B., Yale Law School, New Haven, Conn., U.S.A.
*Thrupp, Miss S. L., M.A., Ph.D., Faculty Exchange, University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill., U.S.A.
Tibbutt, H. G., 12 Birchdale Avenue, Kempston, Bedford.
Titterton, Commander G. A., R.N. (retd.), 17 Old Court Mansions, W.8.
Tomkeieff, Mrs. O. G., M.A., LL.B., King's College, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 2.
*Tout, Mrs. T. F., M.A., 10 North Square, N.W.11.
Toye, D. B., C.B., O.B.E., LL.D., St. Audries, Summerdown Rd., Eastbourne.
TOYNBEE, Professor A. J., D.Litt., F.B.A., Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, S.W.1.
Toynbee, Miss M. R., M.A., Ph.D., 22 Park Town, Oxford.
Toyne, S. M., M.A., Little Acres, Ware, Herts.
*TREHARNE, Professor R. F., M.A., Ph.D., Hillside, Brynymor Road, Aberystwyth.
*TREVELYAN, G. M., O.M., C.B.E., D.C.L., LL.D., D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A., 23 West Road, Cambridge.
*Trevor-Roper, H. R., M.A., Christ Church, Oxford.
Trickett, Professor the Rev. A. S., M.A., Ph.D., 328 East Republic Street, Salina, Kansas, U.S.A.
Tucker, N. R. F., Penshurst, Lansdowne Road, Colwyn Bay.
Tunstall, W. C. B., M.A., F.S.A., 34 Dartmouth Row, S.E.10.
*Tupling, G. H., M.A., B.Sc. (Econ.), Ph.D., 16 Alexandra Terrace, Haslingden, Rossendale, Lancs.
Tyler, J. E., M.A., The University, Sheffield.
Tyson, M., M.A., Ph.D., The Victoria University, Manchester, 13.

Ullmann, W., M.A., 48 Owlstone Road, Cambridge.
Underhill, C. H., 5 Fairfield Avenue, Rolleston-on-Dove, Burton-upon-Trent.
*Usher, Professor R. G., Ph.D., 5739 Cates Avenue, St. Louis 12, Mo., U.S.A.

Van Cleve, Professor T. C., M.A., Ph.D., Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine, U.S.A.
van Dijk, Rev. S. J. P., O.F.M., D.Phil., 4A South Parks Road, Oxford.
*Varley, Mrs., M.A., Lincoln Diocesan Record Office, Exchequer Gate, Lincoln.
Vaucher, Professor Paul, D. ès L., 180 Rue de Grenelle, Paris VII^{e}.
Veale, E. W. W., LL.D., F.S.A., 14 Orchard Street, Bristol.
*Vickers, K. H., M.A., Arlington, Bassett, Southampton.

Villiers, Lady de, M.A., B.Litt., 20 Walton Street, S.W.3.
Volwiler, Professor A. T., Ph.D., Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, U.S.A.

*Wagner, A. R., M.A., College of Arms, Queen Victoria Street, E.C.4.
Wainwright, F. T., Ph.D., F.S.A., University College, Dundee.
*Wake, Miss Joan, F.S.A., Northamptonshire Record Society, Lamport Hall, Northampton.
*Walker, Major G. G., D.S.O., M.C., Blanche Maison, L'Etacq, Jersey, C.I.
Walker, J., M.A., Ph.D., Ashlynne, 33 Heaton Road, Huddersfield.
Walker, J. Holland, M.B.E., F.S.A., 15 Park Valley, Nottingham.
*Walker, Miss M. I., Churchill Court, Churchill, nr. Bristol.
Wallace-Hadrill, J. M., M.A., Merton College, Oxford.
Walters, (W.) E., M.A., Malcolm House, Hillsborough Terrace, Ilfracombe, N. Devon.
*Ward, Mrs. J. G. S., Ph.D., Unsted, Hartswood Road, Brentwood, Essex.
Ward, W. R., D.Phil., 23 Sutcliffe Avenue, Longsight, Manchester, 12.
*Warmington, Professor E. H., M.A., 48 Flower Lane, N.W.7.
*Waterhouse, Professor E. K., M.A., A.M., 43 Calthorpe Road, Birmingham, 15.
*Waters, Lt.-Commander D. W., R.N., Jolyons, Bury, West Sussex.
Watkin, Rev. Dom Aelred, O.S.B., M.A., F.S.A., Downside Abbey, Stratton-on-the-Fosse, nr. Bath.
*Webster, Professor Sir Charles K., K.C.M.G., M.A., D.Litt., Litt.D., F.B.A., 4 St. John's Lodge, Harley Road, N.W.3.
Wedgwood, Miss C. V., M.A., 22 St. Ann's Terrace, St. John's Wood, N.W.8.
Weinstock, Miss M. B., M.A., The Training College, Dorchester Road, Weymouth, Dorset.
Weitzman, Miss S., M.A., Ph.D., 40 Monarch Court, Lyttelton Road, N.2.
Welbourne, E., M.A., Emmanuel College, Cambridge.
Wernham, Professor R. B., M.A., Trinity College, Oxford.
Westergaard, Professor Waldemar, Ph.D., 1000 Manning Avenue, Los Angeles, Cal., U.S.A.
Whale, Miss G. B., B.A., 29 Park Place, Cardiff.
*Whitmore, Rev. L. E., M.A., 2 Genoa Road, Anerley, S.E.20.
White, A. S., Library, War Office, Whitehall, S.W.1.
White, Miss B. M. I., M.A., D.Lit., Westfield College, Hampstead, N.W.3.
*White, G. H., F.S.A., Brooklyn, 321 Upper Richmond Road, Putney, S.W.15.
*Whitelock, Miss D., M.A., F.S.A., St. Hilda's College, Oxford.
*Whitfield, Professor A. S., B.Litt., Ph.D., Wuthering Depths, Dyffryn Ardudwy, Merioneth.
Wilkinson, Rev. J. T., M.A., B.D., 7 Demesne Road, Manchester, 16.
*Willan, T. S., M.A., D.Phil., The University, Manchester, 13.
*Williams, A. J., M.A., Church House, The Ridgeway, Mill Hill, N.W.7.
Williams, Professor C. H., M.A., 50 North Hill, N.6.
Williams, E. T., C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.A., Rhodes House, Oxford.
Williams, G., M.A., University College, Swansea.
Williams, Professor J. W., M.A., B.Litt., The Roundel, St. Andrews, Fife.
Williams, N. J., D.Phil., St. Elmo, Lower Road, Chalfont St. Peter, Gerrards Cross, Bucks.
*Williams, T. G., M.A., 63 Eardley Crescent, S.W.5.
*Williams, W. Watson, B.Sc., 4B Aughton Road, Birkdale, Southport.
Williamson, Miss D. M., M.A., 1A Sewell Road, Lincoln.
*Williamson, F., 24A Rushton Crescent, Bournemouth.

Williamson, J. A., M.A., D.Lit., 2 Laburnum Grove, Chichester.
Willson, D. H., Ph.D., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn., U.S.A.
Wilson, A. E., M.A., D.Litt., Terrington, Tivoli Crescent North, Brighton, 5.
*Wilson, Professor A. McC., M.A., Ph.D., Lyme Road, Hanover, N.H., U.S.A.
Winchester, The Right Rev. the Bishop of, M.A., D.D., Wolvesey, Winchester.
Wittke, Professor Carl, A.B., A.M., Ph.D., 2232 Harcourt Drive, Cleveland 6, Ohio, U.S.A.
Wood, A. C., M.A., B.Litt., D.Phil., 21 Elm Avenue, Beeston, Nottingham.
Wood, F. T., B.A., Ph.D., 10 Norwood Road, Sheffield, 5.
Wood, Herbert, B.A., F.S.A., c/o Lloyds Bank, Ltd., 72 Lombard Street, E.C.3.
*Woodhead, E. W., M.A., Bicknoller, Warren Lane, Aylesford, Kent.
Wood-Legh, Miss K. L., B.Litt., Ph.D., 49 Owlstone Road, Cambridge.
Woodley, E. C., M.A., Shelbourne Towers, Apt. 109, 3787 Côte des Neiges, Montreal, Canada.
Woods, E. C., Green Gables, Bowness-on-Windermere.
*Wormald, Professor F., M.A., F.B.A., F.S.A., 906 Frobisher House, Dolphin Square, S.W.1.

ASSOCIATES OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Allen, Rev. R., M.A., Ph.D., 69 Marlborough Park South, Belfast.

Bailhache, Miss S. L., B.A., 63 Hoole Road, Chester.
Barratt, Miss D. M., D.Phil., 8 Blackhall Road, Oxford.
Barrow, G. W. S., B.Litt., Flat 8, 1 Hornton Street, W.8.
Beaumont-Slegge, W., B.Sc. (Econ.), L.C.P., Education Dept., Municipal Offices, 1 Western Parade, Portsmouth.
Belton, J. J., M.Sc. (Econ.), Haroldston, Hockley Heath, Warwickshire.
Binney, J. E. D., D.Phil., 6 South Bank, Surbiton, Surrey.
Blaydon, G. R., 37 Croxton Road, Thetford, Norfolk.
Bratt, C., 66 Barn Hey Crescent, Great Meols, Hoylake.
Brock, M. G., M.A., Corpus Christi College, Oxford.
Brown, A. L., M.A., Department of Constitutional History, The University, Glasgow.
Brown, Miss L. M., M.A., 93 Church Road, Hanwell, W.7.
Brown, Miss M. M. M. Graham, M.A., 77 Cowleigh Road, Malvern, Worcs.
Busby, Lt.-Col. J. H., Flat 2, 2 Walton Street, St. Albans.

Carman, W. Y., 121 By Pass, Ewell, Surrey.
Cary, R. H., B.A., 6 Paulton's House, Paulton's Square, S.W.3.
Collar, H., The Museum, Saffron Walden, Essex.
Cook, E. T., 116 Westwood Park, S.E.23.
Corsar, K. C., Mauricewood, Milton Bridge, Midlothian.
Cowie, Rev. L. W., M.A., College of St. Mark and St. John, King's Road, S.W.10.
Cox, A. D. M., M.A., University College, Oxford.
Crompton, J., B.Litt., M.A., University College, Oxford.
Crouch, W. B., B.A., 188 Shinfield Road, Reading, Berks.

Davies, K. G., B.A., 53 Park Town, Oxford.
Dickinson, Miss J. G., M.A., 42 St. John Street, Oxford.
Driver, J. T., B.A., 152 Trafalgar Street, Ashton-under-Lyne, Lancs.
Drus, Miss E., M.A., Birkbeck College, University of London, W.C.1.
Duncan, A. A. M., M.A., The Queen's University, Belfast.

Eley, Rev. Prebendary S. A., M.A., The Vicarage, Vicarage Gate, W.8.
Ellis, W. J., Ship Hotel, Aberdaron, Pwllheli, Caernarvonshire.
Elvin, L., 10 Almond Avenue, Swanpool, Lincoln.
Emsden, Nevil, School House, Manea, March, Cambs.

Fellows, A. E., M.A., Grange Court, Chigwell, Essex.
Fisher, F. N., Netherwood, Woodlands Lane, Quarndon, Derby.
Fleming, Miss M. A., B.A., 64 Elmhurst Road, Reading.

Gifford, Miss D. H., B.A., 32 Fordwych Road, N.W.2.
Gillis, Major D. H., Ph.D., Pinevale, Antigonish, R.R. No. 5, Nova Scotia, Canada.

Girtin, T., M.A., The White Horse, Bath Road, Longford, Middlesex.
Granger, E. R., Bluefield, Blofield, Norfolk.

Halcrow, Miss E. M., B.Litt., Manor Farm, Nether Tabley, nr. Knutsford, Cheshire.
Haley, K. H. D., M.A., B.Litt., 15 Haugh Lane, Sheffield, 11.
Harding, F. A. J., B.Sc. (Econ.), 30 Clarence Road, St. Albans, Herts.
Harvey, Miss B. F., B.A., Queen Mary College, Mile End Road, E.1.
Headlam, Mrs. Cecil, Dysters Hillock, Black Lunans, By Blairgowrie, Perthshire.
Henriques, Miss U. R. Q., B.A., B.Litt., 4 Campden Hill Square, W.11.
Highfield, J. R. L., D.Phil., Merton College, Oxford.
Hope, R. B., M.A., 14 Ainsdale Drive, Sale, Cheshire.
Hopewell, S., M.A., 71 Vicarage Gardens, St. Budeaux, Plymouth.
Humphreys, Mrs. M. E., B.A., Sion Lodge, Sion Hill, Bath.
Hunt, J. W., M.A., 123 Park Road, Chiswick, W.4.

Inglis, D., M.A., The County School for Boys, Brecon, S. Wales.

Jarvis, L. D., 16 Dellside, Harefield, Middlesex.
Jones, E. W., 54 Walker Road, Blackley Estate, Manchester, 9.
Jones, J. Wilson, 33 Oak Park Road, Brettell Lane, Stourbridge, Worcs.

Kerling, Miss N. J. M., Ph.D., 26 Upper Park Road, N.W.3.

La Page, J., F.S.A., Craig Lea, 44 Bank Crest, Baildon, Yorks.
Lea, R. S., M.A., 29 Crestway, S.W.15.
Leyser, K., M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.
Lockie, D. McN., M.A., 13 Pitt Street, W.8.
Lowe, L. L. S., M.A., The Royal Commercial Travellers' Schools, Hatch End, Middlesex.

MacMahon, K. A., B.A., 31 Wellesley Avenue, Beverley High Road, Hull. Yorks.
Mathews, E. F. J., B.Sc. (Econ.), Oak Lodge, Budleigh Salterton, Devon.
Mellanby, Mrs., M.A., Abbot House, Whalley, Lancs.
Mills, H. J., M.A., B.Sc., Southern Grammar School for Boys, Albert Road, Southsea, Hants.
Milne, Miss D. J., 1 Brodie Park Avenue, Paisley, Renfrewshire.
Milne, T., Air Historical Branch, Air Ministry, 73–79 Cadogan Gardens, S.W.3

Nicholls, R. E., M.A., Ph.D., Glenholm, Hook Road, Surbiton, Surrey.

Oke, J. Fulford, Lone Oak, Holsworthy, Devon.
Oldham, C. R., M.A., Alabama, Chorleywood, Herts.

Partridge, Miss F. L., B.A., 17 Spencer Gardens, S.W.14.
Peek, Miss H. E., M.A., Drewsteignton Rectory, nr. Exeter, Devon.
Pereira, Major H. P. E., Scottish Naval and Military Museum, The Castle, Edinburgh.
Platts, W. L., F.S.A., Linden Chase House, Sevenoaks.

Radford, Miss C., Strand End, Topsham, Devon.
Ransome, Miss M. E., M.A., 144 Adelaide Road, N.W.3.
Reeve, H. F., 24 Gold Top, Newport, Mon.

Roots, I. A., M.A., University College, Cathays Park, Cardiff.
Ross, T. A., Holmwood, Tinsley Lane, nr. Three Bridges, Sussex.

Saksena, D. N., Ministry of Education, New Delhi, India.
Sanders, I. J., M.A., University College, Aberystwyth.
Sellers, J. M., M.A., 13 Alexandra Road, Pietermaritzburg, Natal, S. Africa.
Skerrett, H. A., B.A., Education Office, Springfield, Cliftonville, Northampton.
Slade, C. F., B.A., 5 Warren Road, Woodley, Reading.
Slatter, Miss M. D., M.A., 19 Clydesdale Gardens, Richmond, Surrey.
Smith, E. A., B.A., 52 Sutcliffe Avenue, Earley, Reading.
Snell, L. S., The Acland School, Fortess Road, N.W.5.
Stitt, F. B., B.Litt., Ouse Lea, Church Walk, Harrold, Beds.
Stoye, J. W., M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.

Taylor, Miss A. M., B.A., 40 Daniels Road, Little Bromwich, Birmingham, 9.
Thomas, Mrs. J. D., 42 Audley Gardens, Seven Kings, Essex.
Thompson, C. H., F.L.A., c/o Department of Agriculture, Zomba, Nyasaland, Central Africa.

Walford, A. J., M.A., Ph.D., F.L.A., 42 Carlton Avenue West, North Wembley, Middlesex.
Walker, D. G., B.A., University College, Swansea.
Walne, P., B.A., Berkshire Record Office, Shire Hall, Reading.
Warrillow, E. J. D., Hill-Cote, Lancaster Road, Newcastle, Staffs.
Waters, S. H., M.A., 5 Belmont Road, Wakefield.
Watt, D. E. R., M.A., Department of History, St. Salvator's College, St. Andrews.
White, Miss H. P., B.A., Salle Park, Reepham, Norfolk.
Whiteman, Miss E. A. O., M.A., Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford.
Wood, Mrs. S. M., M.A., B.Litt., St. Hugh's College, Oxford.
Woodcock, Mrs. A. M., M.A., B.Litt., 59 Chaveney Road, Quorn, Leicestershire.

Youings, Miss J. A., Ph.D., University College, Exeter.

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS

Birkenmajer, Professor A., Ph.D., 23 rue Nony Swiet, Warsaw, Poland.
Botha, Lt.-Col. C. Graham, M.A., LL.D., Nairn, Isabel Avenue, Newlands, C.P., South Africa.

Donoso, R., Presidente de la Sociedad Chilena de Historia y Geografía, Director del Archivo Nacional, P. Aguirre Cerda 322, Santiago, Chile.
Dopsch, Professor A., Dr.Phil., Sieveringerstrasse 44, Vienna, XIX, Austria.
Dvornik, Professor the Rev. F., D.D., D.-ès-Lettres, D.Lit., Harvard University, Dumbarton Oaks, 1703 32nd Street, Washington 7, D.C., U.S.A.

Ganshof, Professor F. L., 12 rue Jacques Jordaens, Brussels, Belgium.
Geyl, Professor P., Litt.D., Willem Barentzstraat 5, Utrecht, Holland.

Halecki, Professor O., Dr.Phil., Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, 37 East 36th Street, New York, U.S.A.
Holtzmann, Professor W., Dr.Phil., Corso Vittorio Emanuele 209, Rome, Italy.
Horváth, Professor E., Phil.D., Verpeleti ut 12.III.18, Budapest XI, Hungary.

Koht, Professor H., Dr.Phil., Litt.D., Lysaker, Norway.

Lefebvre, Professor G., 86 Boulevard Jean Jaurès, Boulogne-sur-Seine, France.
Lehmann, Professor P., Dr.Phil., Universität München Wohnung, Georgenstr. 134, München 13, Germany.
Leland, W. G., A.M., Litt.D., 1219 16th Street, N.W., Washington, 6, D.C., U.S.A.
Levene, Professor R., Presidente de la Academia Nacional de la Historia, Virrey Melo 2134, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Linvald, Professor A., Keeper of the Archives, Norgesmindevej 20, Copenhagen, Hellerup, Denmark.
Lunt, Professor W. E., Ph.D., Haverford College, Haverford, Pa., U.S.A.
Luzzatto, Professor G., S. Marco 1081, Venice, Italy.

McIlwain, Professor C. H., Ph.D., LL.D., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.
Meinecke, Professor F., Dr.Phil. et Jur., Am Hirschsprung 18, Berlin-Dahlem, Germany.
Menéndez Pidal, Professor R., Chamartín-Madrid, Spain.
Morison, Professor S. E., Ph.D., Litt.D., Harvard College Library, 417 Cambridge 38, Mass., U.S.A.

Nabholz, Professor H., Dr.Phil., D.-ès-L., The University, Zürich, Switzerland.

Perkins, Professor D., M.A., Ph.D., LL.D., University of Rochester, Rochester, 3, N.Y., U.S.A.
Perroy, Professor E. M. J., D.-ès-L., 12 rue de l'Epée de Bois, Paris V^e, France.

Ravignani, Professor E., Avda. José F. Uriburu, 1130, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Re, E., Cav. Dr., Archivio di Stato, Rome, Italy.
Read, C., Ph.D., P.O. Box 593, Villa Nova, Penn., U.S.A.
Renouvin, Professor P., Dr.-ès-L., 2 Boulevard Saint Germain, Paris, France.

Sarkar, Sir Jadunath, C.I.E., M.A., D.Litt., 255 Lake Terrace, Ras Behari Avenue, P.O., Calcutta, India.

Uriburu, Señor J. E., Basavilbaso 1254, Buenos Aires, Argentina, South America.

Van der Essen, Professor L. J., Docteur en Philosophie et Lettres, Université Catholique de Louvain, Héverlé, Louvain, Belgium.

LIST OF SUBSCRIBING LIBRARIES
1953
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Aberdeen University.
Aberystwyth, National Library of Wales.
University College of Wales.

Banbury Public Library and Museum, Marlborough Road.
Bangor, University College of North Wales.
Bath, Municipal Library.
Bedford, County Library, 56 Harpur Street.
Belfast, Central Public Library, Royal Avenue.
The Queen's University.
Birkenhead Public Library.
Birmingham, The Birmingham Library, Margaret Street.
Public Libraries (Reference Library), Ratcliffe Place.
University.
Bolton Central Reference Library, Town Hall Square.
Bradford Public Library, Darley Street.
Brighton, Public Library, Royal Pavilion.
Technical College, Richmond Terrace, Brighton, 7.
Bristol, Central Library.
University.

Cambridge, Girton College.
King's College.
Newnham College.
Pembroke College.
Peterhouse.
St. Catharine's College.
St. John's College.
The Seeley Historical Library, The Old Schools.
University Library.
Canterbury, Dean and Chapter Library.
Cardiff, National Museum of Wales.
Public Library.
University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire, Cathays Park.
Carlisle Public Library, Castle Street.
Croydon, Central Public Library, Town Hall.

Derby, County Library, S. Mary Gate.
Public Library.
Dundee, University College.
Durham University.

Edinburgh, Signet Library.
National Library of Scotland.

Edinburgh, Central Library, George IV Bridge.
University.
Englefield Green, Surrey, Royal Holloway College.
Exeter, City Library, Castle Gate.
University College.

Glasgow, Baillie's Institution, 18 Blythswood Square.
Royal Faculty of Procurators Library, 62 St. George's Place.
Mitchell Library.
University.
Gloucester Public Library, Brunswick Road.
Grimsby Public Library.

Hastings Public Museum and Art Gallery, John's Place.
Hawarden, Flint, St. Deiniol's Library.
Hertford, County Library, County Hall.
Hull, University College.

Ipswich Public Library.

Leeds, The Leeds Library, Commercial Street.
Public Library.
University.
Yorkshire Archæological Society, 10 Park Place.
Leicester Municipal Library, Wellington Street.
University College.
Lincoln, Lindsey County Library, Fairfield House, Newland.
Liverpool, Athenæum, Church Alley.
Public Library.
University.
London, The Admiralty Library, S.W.1.
The Athenæum Club, Pall Mall, S.W.1.
Bath Club, 74 St. James's Street, S.W.1.
Battersea Public Libraries, 265 Lavender Hill, S.W.11.
Bedford College for Women, Regent's Park, N.W.1.
Birkbeck College, Malet Street, W.C.1.
Brentford and Chiswick Public Library, Duke's Avenue, W.4.
British Museum, W.C.1.
Chelsea Public Library, Manresa Road, S.W.3.
Finsbury Public Library, Skinner Street, E.C.1.
Fulham Public Library, 598 Fulham Road, S.W.6.
Guildhall Library, King Street, E.C.2.
Hammersmith Central Public Library, W.6.
Hampstead Central Public Library, Finchley Road, N.W.8.
Hendon Public Library, The Burroughs, N.W.4.
House of Commons Library, Reference Division, S.W.1.
House of Lords Library, S.W.1.
Inner Temple Library, E.C.4.
Institute of Historical Research, University of London, Senate House, W.C.1.
Kensington Public Library, High Street, W.8.
King's College, Strand, W.C.2.
Law Society Library, Chancery Lane, W.C.2.

London, Leyton Public Library, High Road, E.10.
Lincoln's Inn Library, W.C.2.
London Library, St. James's Square, S.W.1.
London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, Aldwych, W.C.2.
Middle Temple Library, E.C.4.
National Portrait Gallery, W.C.2.
Oxford and Cambridge University Club, 71 Pall Mall, S.W.1.
Public Record Office, Chancery Lane, W.C.2.
Queen Mary College, Mile End Road, E.1.
Reform Club, 104 Pall Mall, S.W.1.
Royal Institution, 21 Albemarle Street, W.1.
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, W.C.1.
Sion College, Victoria Embankment, S.W.1.
Southwark Central Library, Walworth Road, S.E.17.
Stoke Newington Public Library, Church Street, N.16.
United University Club, 1 Suffolk Street, S.W.1.
University, W.C.1.
University College, Gower Street, W.C.1.
Wandsworth Public Library, West Hill, S.W.18.
Westfield College, Hampstead, N.W.3.
Westminster Public Library, St. Martin's Street, W.C.2.
Dr. Williams's Library, 14 Gordon Square, W.C.1.
Wimbledon Public Library, S.W.19.

Maidstone, Kent County Library, Springfield.
Manchester, Chetham's Library.
The John Rylands Library.
Public Libraries.
University.
Middlesbrough Public Library, Victoria Square.
Mirfield, House of the Resurrection.

Newcastle-upon-Tyne, King's College.
Literary and Philosophical Society.
Public Library.
Newport (Mon.), Public Library.
Norwich, Norfolk and Norwich Library, Guildhall Hill.
Nottingham, Public Reference Library.
University.

Oldham, Union Street Library.
Oxford, All Souls College.
Balliol College.
Bodleian Library.
Brasenose College.
Campion Hall.
Christ Church.
Corpus Christi College.
Exeter College.
Jesus College.
Keble College.

Oxford, Magdalen College.
Merton College.
New College.
Oriel College.
The Queen's College.
St. Anne's Library, 56 Woodstock Road.
St. John's College.
Union Society.

Plymouth Institution, 13 Alexandra Road, Mutley.
Preston Library (Dr. Shepherd's).

Reading, Berkshire Record Office, Shire Hall.
Public Library, Blagrave Street.

St. Andrews, University.
Sheffield, Public Library.
University.
Southampton, The University.
Stafford, William Salt Library.
Stonyhurst College, Whalley, Lancs.
Stratton-on-the-Fosse, Downside Abbey.
Swansea, University College, Singleton Park.

Wigan, Public Library.
Windsor, Royal Library, Windsor Castle.

York, Public Library.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Achimota (West Africa), University College of the Gold Coast, P.O. Box 4, Achimota.
Adelaide (South Australia), University.
Allahabad (India), University.
Auckland (New Zealand), University College.

Bombay (India), University.
Brisbane (Australia), Public Library.
University of Queensland.

Canberra, A.C.T. (Australia), Australian National University, Acton.
Commonwealth National Library.
Cape Town (South Africa), South African Library.
Christchurch (N.Z.), Canterbury University College.

Dunedin (New Zealand), Otago University, Dunedin, N.I.

Edmonton (Canada), University of Alberta.

Grahamstown (South Africa), Rhodes University College.

Hobart (Tasmania), University of Tasmania, Box 647c, G.P.O.
Hong Kong University.
Hoshiapur (India), Panjab University College.

Ibadan (Nigeria), University College.

Johannesburg (South Africa), Public Library.

Kampala (Uganda), Makerere College, P.O. Box 262.
Kingston (Ontario), Queen's University.

Lahore (Pakistan), Punjab University.
London (Canada), University of Western Ontario.
Lucknow (India), University.

Melbourne (Australia), Public Library.
University.
Montreal (Canada), Bibliothèque St. Sulpice, 1700 Rue St. Denis.
Civic Library, 1210 Sherbrooke Street E.
McGill University, Redpath Library, 3459 McTavish Street.

Nagpur (India), University of Nagpur.
New Delhi (India), Library of the National Archives of India.

Ottawa (Canada), Library of Parliament.

Peradeniya (Ceylon), University of Ceylon.
Perth (West Australia), Public Library.
Pretoria (South Africa), State Library.

Sydney (Australia), University of Sydney, Fisher Library.
Parliamentary Library of New South Wales, Parliament House, Macquarie Street.
Public Library of N.S.W., Macquarie Street.
Technical College.

Toronto (Canada), Law Society of Upper Canada, Osgoode Hall, Toronto, 1.
Legislative Library of Ontario, Parliament Buildings.
Public Library, College and St. George Street.
University.

Valletta (Malta), The Royal Malta Library.
Vancouver (British Columbia, Canada), University of British Columbia.
Victoria (British Columbia, Canada), Provincial Library.

Wellington (New Zealand), General Assembly Library.
Victoria University College.
Winnipeg (Canada), University of Manitoba.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES

AUSTRIA

Innsbruck, Historisches Seminar der Universitaet.

BELGIUM

Brussels, Bibliothèque Royale.
Université Libre, Avenue F-D. Roosevelt, 50.
Gand, Bibliothèque de l'Université, Roseraie, 9.
Liège, Bibliothèque de l'Université, Place Cockerill.
Louvain, Bibliothèque de l'Université.

CHINA

Nanking, National Central Library, P. 48 Cheng, Hsien Chieh, Nanking.
Peiping, The National Library (Periodical Division), Kunming, Yunnan.

DENMARK

Aarhus, Statsbiblioteket.
Copenhagen, Kongelige Bibliothek.

EGYPT

Cairo, University of Cairo.

FINLAND

Helsinki, University.

FRANCE

Bordeaux, Bibliothèque de l'Université, 20 Cours Pasteur.
Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale.
Institut de France, 23 Quai de Conti.
Université de Paris.
Strasbourg, Bibliothèque Nationale et Universitaire, 6 Place de la République.

GERMANY

Berlin, Allgemeine Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek.
Freie Universität, Universitäts-Bibliothek, Garystr. 45, Berlin-Dahlem.
Öffentliche Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek, Unter den Linden, 8, Berlin, N.W.7.
Bonn, Universitäts-Bibliothek, Am Hof 32–34.
Erlangen, Universitäts-Bibliothek, Universitätsstr. 1.
Freiburg i. Br., Universitäts-Bibliothek, Rempartstrasse 15.
Göttingen, Staats- und Universitäts-Bibliothek, Prinzenstrasse 1, Niedersachsische.
Greifswald, Universitäts-Bibliothek.
Halle, Universitäts-Bibliothek.
Hamburg, Staats- und Universitäts-Bibliothek, Moorweidenstrasse 40, Hamburg 13.
Heidelberg, Universitäts-Bibliothek.
Jena, Universitäts-Bibliothek.
Köln, Universitäts und Stadbibliothek, Albertus-Magnus-Platz.
Leipzig, Universitäts-Bibliothek.
Marburg, Universitäts-Bibliothek, Friedrichsplatz 15.

Marburg (Lahn), Westdeutsche Bibliothek, Universitätsstrasse 25.
München, Bayerische Staats-Bibliothek.
Münster (Westf.), Universitäts-Bibliothek, Bispinghof 24–25.
Stuttgart, Württembergesche Landesbibliothek, Urbanstrasse 19, Stuttgart-O.
Würzburg, Universitäts-Bibliothek.

HOLLAND

The Hague, Royal Library, Lange Voorhout 34.
Leiden, Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit, Rapenburg 70–74.

REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

Cork, University College.
Dublin, King's Inns Library.
National Library of Ireland, Kildare Street.
Royal Irish Academy, 19 Dawson Street.
Trinity College.

ISRAEL

Jerusalem, Jewish National and University Library, P.O. Box 503, Jerusalem, Palestine.

ITALY

Naples, Istituto Italiano di Studi Storici, Via Mariano Semmola.
Rome, Biblioteca della Camera dei Deputati, Piazza Montecitorio.
Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana.

NORWAY

Oslo, University.

POLAND

Warsaw, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

PORTUGAL

Lisbon, Biblioteca Nacional.

SWEDEN

Göteborg, Stads Bibliotek.
Lund, Universitetsbiblioteket.
Stockholm, Humanistiska Biblioteket, Stockholms Högskola, Stockholm 6.
Kungl. Bibliotek.
Uppsala, Universitetsbiblioteket.

SWITZERLAND

Basel, Universitäts-Bibliothek, Schönbeinstrasse, 20.
Zürich, Zentral Bibliothek.

UNITED STATES

Albany (N.Y.), New York State Library.
Amherst (Mass.), Amherst College.
Ann Arbor (Mich.), Michigan University.
Athens (Ga.), University of Georgia.
Auburn (Alabama), Alabama Polytechnic Institute.
Austin (Texas), Texas University.

Baltimore (Md.), Enoch Pratt Library.
Johns Hopkins University.
Peabody Institute Library.
Baton Rouge (La), Louisiana State University, University Station.
Berkeley (Calif.), University of California.
Bethlehem (Pa.), Lehigh University.
Bloomington (Ind.), Indiana University.
Boston (Mass.), Athenæum Library.
Massachusetts Historical Society, 1154 Boylston Street.
New England Historic Genealogical Society, 9 Ashburton Place.
Public Library.
Brooklyn (N.Y.), Brooklyn College, Bedford Avenue and Avenue H, Brooklyn 10.
Brunswick (Me.), Bowdoin College.
Bryn Mawr (Pa.), Bryn Mawr College.
Buffalo (N.Y.), Grosvenor Public Library.
University, Lockwood Memorial Library.

Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University.
Harvard Law School.
Canton (N.Y.), The St. Lawrence University.
Carlisle (Pa.), Dickinson College.
Chapel Hill (N.C.), University of North Carolina.
Charlottesville (Va.), University of Virginia.
Chicago (Ill.), Loyola University, E. M. Cudahy Memorial Library.
Newberry Library.
University (Order Section W. 21).
Cincinnati (Ohio), Public Library.
University.
Cleveland (Ohio), Public Library, 325 Superior Avenue, N.E.
Clinton (N.Y.), Hamilton College.
College Park (Md.), University of Maryland.
Columbia (Mo.), University of Missouri.
Columbia (S.C.), University of South Carolina, McKissick Memorial Library, Columbia, 19.
Columbus (Ohio), State University.

Dallas (Texas), Southern Methodist University, Fondren Library.
Detroit (Mich.), Public Library.
Durham (N.C.), Duke University.

East Lansing (Michigan), Michigan State College.
Emory (Ga.), University.

Eugene (Oregon), University of Oregon.
Evanston (Ill.), North Western University.

Gainesville (Fla.), University of Florida.
Gambier (Ohio), Kenyon College.

Hanover (N.H.), Dartmouth College.
Haverford (Pa.), Haverford College.
Honolulu, University of Hawaii, Honolulu 14.
Houston (Texas), Rice Institute.

Iowa, Iowa University.
Ithaca (N.Y.), Cornell University.

Jersey City (N.J.), Free Public Library, 472–486 Jersey Avenue.

Latrobe (Pa.), St. Vincent College.
Lawrence (Kans.), Kansas University.
Lexington (Kentucky), University of Kentucky, Lexington, 29.
Lincoln (Neb.), Nebraska University.
Los Angeles (Calif.), Public Library, 530 South Hope Street.
University of California, 405 Hilgard Avenue.

Madison (Wis.), University of Wisconsin.
Middletown (Conn.), Wesleyan University.
Milwaukee (Wis.), Public Library.
Minneapolis (Minn.), Athenæum.
Minnesota University.
Missoula (Montana), Montana State University.
Morgantown (W.Va.), West Virginia University.
Mundelein (Ill.), St. Mary of the Lake Seminary, Feehan Memorial Library.

Nashville (Tenn.), Joint University.
New Brunswick (N.J.), Rutgers University.
New Haven (Conn.), Yale University.
New Orleans (La.), Tulane University.
New York (N.Y.), Columbia University.
Fordham University.
General Theological Seminary, Chelsea Square.
Public Library, Fifth Avenue and 42nd Street.
University, Washington Square Library, 32 Waverley Place.
Northampton (Mass.), Smith College.
Notre Dame (Ind.), University.

Orono (Me.), University of Maine.

Philadelphia (Pa.), Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1300 Locust Street.
Pennsylvania University.
St. Clement's Library, Locust Street at Forty Second Street.
Temple University, Philadelphia, 22.
Pittsburgh (Pa.), Carnegie Library (The Periodical Room), 4400 Forbes Street.
The University, Pittsburgh, 13.
Portland (Oregon), Reed College, Portland, 2.

Poughkeepsie (N.Y.), Vassar College.
Princeton (N.J.), Institute for Advanced Study.
Princeton University.
Providence (R.I.), Brown University.
Pullman (Wash.), State College of Washington.
Purchase (N.Y.), Manhattanville College of the Sacred Heart.

Richmond (Va.), Virginia Historical Society, The Lee House, 707 East Franklin Street, Richmond, 19.
Virginia State Library.
Rochester (N.Y.), University of Rochester, The Rush Rees Library.

St. Louis (Mo.), Public Library.
University, Grand and Pine Boulevards.
Washington University.
San Francisco (Calif.), Public Library, Civic Center.
San Marino (Calif.), Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery.
Seattle (Wash.), University of Washington.
South Hadley (Mass.), Mount Holyoke College.
Stanford (Calif.), University.
State College (Pa.), Pennsylvania State College.
Storrs (Conn.), University of Connecticut, Wilbur Cross Library.
Swarthmore (Pa.), Swarthmore College.
Syracuse (N.Y.), Syracuse University.

Tallahassee (Fla.), The Florida State University.
Terre Haute (Ind.), Indiana State Normal School.

University (Alabama), University of Alabama.
Urbana (Ill.), Illinois University.

Washington (D.C.), Catholic University of America.
Folger Shakespeare Library.
Georgetown University, Washington, 7.
Wellesley (Mass.), Wellesley College.
Williamstown (Mass.), Williams College.

URUGUAY

Montevideo, Instituto de Investigaciones Historicas, Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias, Cerrito 73.

U.S.S.R.

Moscow, Library of Social Sciences of the Academy of Science of U.S.S.R.

HISTORICAL SOCIETIES IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

WHICH EXCHANGED TRANSACTIONS WITH THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 1953

Society of Antiquaries, Burlington House, London, W.1.
Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland, 63 Merrion Square, Dublin.
Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, Queen Street, Edinburgh.
The Hon. Society of Cymmrodorion, 20 Bedford Square, W.C.1.
Surrey Archæological Society, Castle Arch, Guildford.
Jewish Historical Society, Mocatta Library, University College, Gower Street, W.C.1.
Thoroton Society, Bromley House, Angel Row, Nottingham.

HISTORICAL SOCIETIES ABROAD

WHICH EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS WITH THE SOCIETY

AUSTRALIA

Royal Australian Historical Society, History House, 8 Young Street, Sydney.

BELGIUM

Académie Royale de Belgique, Commission Royale d'Histoire, Palais des Academies, rue Ducale, 1, Brussels.

BULGARIA

Académie Bulgare des Sciences, rue 7 Novembre 1, Sofia.

FRANCE

Bibliothèque de l'Université de Toulouse, 2 rue de l'Université, Toulouse, Haute-Garonne.
Société de l'École Nationale des Chartes, 19 rue de la Sorbonne, Paris.
Société de l'Histoire de France, 60 rue des Francs-Bourgeois, Paris.

GERMANY

Hansischer Geschichtsverein, Staats Archiv, Königstrasse 21, Lübeck.

HOLLAND

Bureau van de Rijks Commissie voor Vaderlandse Geschiedenis, 7 Bleyenburg, The Hague.
Historisch Genootschap, Utrecht, c/o Bibliothèque de l'Université.

PAKISTAN

Pakistan Historical Society, 2/45 Jacob Lines, Karachi.

POLAND

Société des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie, L'Université, Warsaw.

SWEDEN

Historisk Tidskrift, Storgatan 41, Stockholm.

SWITZERLAND

Allgemeine Geschichtsforschende Gesellschaft der Schweiz. Stadt Bibliothek, Berne.

UNITED STATES

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

U.S.S.R.

Moscow, State Historical Library.
State Lenin Library, Ulitza Kalinina 3.
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

The Council are not responsible for the accuracy of the foregoing list, but they request that any inaccuracy or omission may be pointed out to the Secretary, and that all changes of address may be notified to her, so that delay in forwarding communications and the publications of the Society may be avoided.

TRANSACTIONS AND PUBLICATIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

The annual publications of the Society issued to Fellows and Subscribing Libraries include the *Transactions*, supplemented since 1897 by a continuation of the publications of the Camden Society (1838–1897) as the *Camden series*, and since 1937 by a series of *Guides and handbooks*. The Society has also issued from time to time certain miscellaneous publications, has published since 1937 an annual bibliography of *Writings on British history*, and is publishing in conjunction with the American Historical Association a series of *Bibliographies of British history*. Additional copies of the *Transactions*, the *Camden series*, the *Guides and handbooks*, and the 'Miscellaneous publications' may be obtained by Fellows and Subscribing Libraries at the prices stated below. The series of annual bibliographies of *Writings on British history* and the *Bibliographies of British history* are not included among the volumes issued to subscribers, but may be obtained by them through the Society, at the special prices stated below, upon application to the Secretary, Royal Historical Society, 96 Cheyne Walk, S.W.10. Associates, while receiving only the *Transactions* in return for their subscription, are entitled to purchase at a reduction of 25 per cent one copy of other volumes issued to Fellows and Subscribing Libraries and one copy of each of the volumes of the *Writings on British history* and the *Bibliographies of British history* at the special price.

The *Transactions* and the *Camden series* are not available on sale to the public. Copies of the 'Miscellaneous publications' and of *Guides and handbooks* may be had at the stated prices on application to the Secretary, or through the booksellers. The *Writings* and the *Bibliographies of British history* may be obtained from the publishers or through the booksellers.

TRANSACTIONS*

Old series, 1872–1882. Vols. I to X.
New series, 1884–1906. Vols. I to XX.
Third series, 1907–1917. Vols. I to XI.
Fourth series, 1918–1950. Vols. I to XXXII.
Fifth series, 1951– . Vols. I–III.

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS

†Domesday commemoration. Notes on the manuscripts, etc., exhibited at the Public Record Office. 1886. 6s. 6d.

* Vols. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10 of the Old series, vols. 1, 3 and 10 of the New series and vol. 9 of the Third series are out of print. New series vols. 2 and 19 are only supplied by special leave of the Council. Others are supplied at the following rates: current number, 15s.; volumes of the Old series, 10s. each; volumes of the New and Third series, 13s. 6d. each; volumes of the Fourth and Fifth series, 10s. each. The earliest volumes of the *Transactions* were issued to Fellows in unbound parts. Any discrepancies in the lettering of bound volumes during these periods are doubtless due to this.

† Out of print.

Domesday studies. 2 vols. Edited by P. E. Dove. 1886. 32s.

†England and Napoleon in 1803: being the despatches of Lord Whitworth and others. Edited by Oscar Browning. 1887. 10s.

Walter of Henley's Husbandry, together with an anonymous Husbandry, Seneschaucie, and Robert Grosseteste's Rules. Edited by Elizabeth Lamond and the Rev. W. Cunningham. 1890. 16s.

Proceedings of the Gibbon commemoration, 1794–1894. 1895. 6s. 6d.

*The Domesday of Inclosures, 1517–18. Edited by I. S. Leadam. 2 vols. 1897. 40s.

†A bibliography of the historical works of Mandell Creighton, William Stubbs, S. R. Gardiner and John, Lord Acton. Edited by W. A. Shaw. 1903. 6s. 6d.

German opinion and German policy before the War. By G. W. Prothero. 1916. 5s. 6d.

Magna Carta commemoration essays. With preface by the Right Hon. Viscount Bryce. Edited by H. E. Malden. 1917. 33s. 6d.

*A repertory of British archives. Part I. England. Compiled by Hubert Hall. 1920. 10s. 6d.

*A list and index of the Transactions and publications of the Royal Historical Society (1869–1924) and of the publications of the Camden Society (1840–1897). Edited by Hubert Hall. 1925. 5s.

The *Domesday monachorum* of Christ Church, Canterbury. 1944. 30s.

BIBLIOGRAPHIES ISSUED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

Bibliography of British history: Tudor period, 1485–1603. Edited by Conyers Read. 1933. Oxford Univ. Press, 35s. (Special price, 24s.) (Out of print.)

Bibliography of British history: Stuart period, 1603–1714. Edited by Godfrey Davies. 1928. Oxford Univ. Press, 25s. (Special price, 19s. 6d.)

Bibliography of British history: 1714–1789. Edited by S. M. Pargellis and D. J. Medley. 1951. Oxford Univ. Press, 42s. (Special price, 32s. 6d.)

ANNUAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Writings on British history, 1934. Compiled by A. T. Milne. 1937. London, Jonathan Cape, 12s. 6d. (Special price, 10s.)

Writings on British history, 1935. Compiled by A. T. Milne. 1939. London, Jonathan Cape, 12s. 6d. (Special price, 10s.)

Writings on British history, 1936. Compiled by A. T. Milne. 1940. London, Jonathan Cape, 12s. 6d. (Special price, 10s.)

Writings on British history, 1937. Compiled by A. T. Milne. 1949. London, Jonathan Cape, 21s. (Special price, 18s.)

Writings on British history, 1938. Compiled by A. T. Milne. 1951. London, Jonathan Cape, 21s. (Special price, 18s.)

Writings on British history, 1939. Compiled by A. T. Milne. 1953. London, Jonathan Cape, 21s. (Special price, 18s.)

GUIDES AND HANDBOOKS

1. Guide to English commercial statistics, 1696–1782. By G. N. Clark, with a catalogue of materials by Barbara M. Franks. 1938. 7s. 6d.

†2. Handbook of British chronology. Edited by F. M. Powicke, with the assistance of Charles Johnson and W. J. Harte. 1939. 7s. 6d.

*Supplied only by special leave of Council. †Out of print.

†3. Medieval libraries of Great Britain, an index of surviving books. Edited by N. R. Ker. 1941. 7s. 6d.
4. Handbook of dates for students of English history. By C. R. Cheney. 1945. 6s.
5. A Guide to the National and Provincial Directories of England and Wales, excluding London, published before 1856. By Jane E. Norton. 1950. 10s. 6d.
6. Handbook of Oriental History. Edited by C. H. Philips. 1951. 12s. 6d.

Provisionally accepted for future publication:

List and index of parliamentary papers, 1700–1800. Edited by E. Wagstaff and A. T. Milne.

Bibliography of medieval cartularies. Edited by G. R. C. Davis.

Fasti ecclesiæ anglicanæ, 1066–1541. Edited by A. Hamilton Thompson.

List of calendars and general collections of texts of English History in the Library of the Royal Historical Society. Edited by E. L. C. Mullins.

†Out of print.

PUBLICATIONS OF THE LATE CAMDEN SOCIETY

CONTINUED (FROM 1897) AS THE CAMDEN SERIES OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

OLD SERIES*

*1. Historie of the arrivall of Edward IV in England and the final recoverye of his kingdomes from Henry VI (1471). Edited by J. Bruce. 1838.

*2. Kynge Johan. A play in two parts. By John Bale. Edited by J. P. Collier. 1838.

3. Alliterative poem on the deposition of Richard II; Ricardi Maydiston de Concordia inter Ric. II et civitatem London. Edited by T. Wright. 1838.

†4. Plumpton correspondence. Letters written in the reigns of Edward IV, Richard III, Henry VII, and Henry VIII. Edited by T. Stapleton. 1839.

*5. Anecdotes and traditions, illustrative of early English history and literature. Edited by W. J. Thoms. 1839.

†6. The political songs of England, from the reign of John to Edward II. Edited and translated by T. Wright. 1839.

*7. Annals of the first four years of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, by Sir J. Hayward. Edited by J. Bruce. 1840.

8. Ecclesiastical documents: 1. A brief history of the bishoprick of Somerset from its foundation to 1174. 2. Charters from the library of Dr. Cox Macro. Published by the Rev. J. Hunter. 1840.

9. Speculi Britanniæ Pars: an historical and geographical description of the county of Essex, by John Norden, 1594. Edited by Sir H. Ellis. 1840.

10. A Chronicle of the first thirteen years of the reign of Edward IV, by John Warkworth, D.D. Edited by J. O. Halliwell. 1839.

*11. Kemp's nine daies wonder: performed in a daunce from London to Norwich. Edited by Rev. A. Dyce. 1840.

*12. The Egerton papers, temp. Elizabeth and James I. Edited by J. P. Collier. 1840.

*13. Chronica Jocelini de Brakelonda, de rebus gestis Samsonis abbatis monasterii Sancti Edmundi. Edited by J. G. Rokewode. 1840.

*14. Narratives illustrative of the contests in Ireland in 1641 and 1690. Edited by T. C. Croker. 1841.

15. The chronicle of William de Rishanger, of the Barons' Wars. The miracles of Simon de Montfort. Edited by J. O. Halliwell. 1840.

*Of volumes marked with an asterisk but a few copies remain, and these are only supplied by special leave of the Council. Others may be had at the following prices: Old series, from 8s.; New series, from 10s.; Third series, from 10s. (*British diplomatic instructions*, 17s. 6d. each); current volumes, 15s. each.

†Volumes marked with a dagger are out of print.

*16. The Latin poems commonly attributed to Walter Mapes. Edited by T. Wright. 1841.

17. The second book of the travels of Nicander Nucius, of Corcyra. Edited by Rev. J. A. Cramer. 1841.

18. Three early English metrical romances. Edited by J. Robson. 1842.

*19. The private diary of Dr. John Dee, and the catalogue of his library of manuscripts. Edited by J. O. Halliwell. 1842.

*20. An apology for Lollard doctrines, attributed to Wicliffe. Edited by J. H. Todd. 1842.

21. Rutland papers. Original documents illustrative of the courts and times of Henry VII and Henry VIII. Edited by W. Jerdan. 1842.

22. The diary of Dr. Thomas Cartwright, bishop of Chester, from August 1686 to October 1687. Edited by the Rev. J. Hunter. 1843.

23. Original letters of eminent literary men of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Edited by Sir H. Ellis. 1843.

24. A contemporary narrative of the proceedings against Dame Alice Kyteler, prosecuted for sorcery in 1324, by Richard de Ledrede, bishop of Ossory. Edited by T. Wright. 1843.

25. Promptorium parvulorum sive clericorum, Lexicon anglo-latinum princeps, auctore fratre Galfrido Grammatico dicto, e Predicatoribus Lenne Episcopi, Northfolciensi, A.D. *c.* 1440. Vol. I. Edited by A. Way. 1843. (*See* nos. 54 and 89.)

*26. Three chapters of letters relating to the suppression of monasteries. Edited by T. Wright. 1843.

27. Correspondence of Robert Dudley, earl of Leycester, during his government of the Low Countries 1585 and 1586. Edited by J. Bruce. 1844.

28. Croniques de London, depuis l'an 44 Hen. III jusqu'à l'an 17 Edw. III. Edited by G. J. Aungier. 1844.

29. Three books of Polydore Vergil's English history, comprising the reigns of Henry VI, Edward IV and Richard III. Edited by Sir H. Ellis. 1844. (*See* no. 36 and Third Series, no. 74).

30. The Thornton romances. The early English metrical romances of Perceval, Isumbras, Eglamour, and Degrevant. Edited by J. O. Halliwell. 1844.

31. Verney papers. Notes of proceedings in the Long Parliament, temp. Charles I. Edited by J. Bruce. 1845.

32. The autobiography of Sir John Bramston, K.B., of Skreens, in the hundred of Chelmsford. 1845.

33. Letters from James, earl of Perth, Lord Chancellor of Scotland, etc., to his sister the countess of Erroll, and other members of his family. Edited by W. Jerdan. 1845.

34. De antiquis legibus liber. Cronica maiorum et vicecomitum Londoniarum 1178–1274. By T. Stapleton. 1846.

35. The chronicle of Calais, in the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII, to 1540. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 1846.

36. Polydore Vergil's English history, prior to the Norman Conquest. Edited by Sir H. Ellis. 1846. (*See* no. 29 and Third Series, no. 74).

37. A relation, or rather a true account, of the isle of England, about 1500. Translated from the Italian by Charlotte Augusta Sneyd. 1847.

38. Documents relative to the foundation and antiquities of the collegiate church of Middleham, co. York, and incidental notices of the castle, neighbourhood and town. Edited by Rev. W. Atthill. 1847.

39. The Camden miscellany, Vol. I: 1. Register and chronicle of the abbey of Aberconway. Edited by Sir H. Ellis. 2. Chronicle of the rebellion in Lincolnshire in 1470. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 3. Bull of Pope Innocent VIII, on the marriage of Henry VII with Elizabeth of York. Communicated by J. P. Collier. 4. Journal of the siege of Rouen in 1591. By Sir T. Coningsby. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 5. Letter from George Fleetwood to his father, giving an account of the battle of Lutzen and the death of Gustavus Adolphus. Edited by Sir P. de Malpas Grey Egerton, Bart. 6. Diary of Dr. Edward Lake, archdeacon and prebendary of Exeter, etc., in 1677 and 1678. Edited by G. P. Elliott. 1847.

40. A commentary of the services and charges of William Lord Grey of Wilton, by his son Arthur Lord Grey of Wilton. Edited by Sir P. de Malpas Grey Egerton, Bart. 1847.

41. Diary of Walter Yonge, Justice of the Peace, and M.P. for Honiton, 1604 to 1628. Edited by G. Roberts. 1848.

*42. The Diary of Henry Machyn, citizen and Merchant Taylor of London, from 1550 to 1563. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 1848.

43. The visitation of the county of Huntingdon under the authority of William Camden, Clarenceux King of Arms, by his deputy Nicholas Charles, Lancaster Herald, 1613. Edited by Sir H. Ellis. 1849.

44. The obituary of Richard Smyth, secondary of the poultry Compter. London, 1627 to 1674. Edited by Sir H. Ellis. 1849.

45. Certaine considerations upon the government of England. By Sir Roger Twysden. Edited by J. M. Kemble. 1849.

46. Letters of Queen Elizabeth and James VI of Scotland. Edited by J. Bruce. 1849.

47. Chronicon Petroburgense. Edited by T. Stapleton. 1849.

48. The chronicle of Queen Jane, and of two years of Queen Mary and especially of the rebellion of Sir Thomas Wyat. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 1850.

49. Wills and inventories, from the registers of the commissary of Bury St. Edmunds and the archdeacon of Sudbury. Edited by S. Tymms. 1850.

50. Gualteri Mapes de nugis curialium distinctiones quinque. Edited by T. Wright. 1850.

51. The Pylgrymage of Sir Richard Guylforde to the Holy Land, 1506. Edited by Sir H. Ellis. 1851.

52. Moneys received and paid for secret services of Charles II and James II, 1679 to 1688. Edited by J. Y. Akerman. 1851.

†53. Chronicle of the Grey Friars of London. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 1852.

54. Promptorium parvulorum, Vol. II. Edited by A. Way. 1853. (*See* nos. 25 and 89.)

†55. The Camden miscellany, Vol. II: 1. Account of the expenses of John of Brabant and Henry and Thomas of Lancaster, 1292–3. Edited by J. Burtt. 2. Household expenses of the Princess Elizabeth at Hatfield, 1551–2. Edited by Viscount Strangford. 3. The request and suite of a true-hearted Englishman written by William Cholmeley, Londyner, in 1553. Edited by W. J. Thoms. 4. The discovery of the Jesuits' College at

Clerkenwell in March, 1627–8, and a letter found in their house. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 5. Trelawny papers. Edited by W. D. Cooper. 6. Autobiography and anecdotes, by William Taswell. Edited by G. P. Elliott. 1853.

†56. Letters and papers of the Verney family, to the end of 1639. Edited by J. Bruce. 1853.

†57. The Ancren Riwle. A treatise on the rules and duties of monastic life. Edited by J. Morton. 1853.

58. Letters of the Lady Brilliana Harley. Edited by T. T. Lewis. 1853.

†59. A roll of the household expenses of Richard de Swinfield, bishop of Hereford, 1289–90. Vol. I. Edited by the Rev. J. Webb. 1853. (*See* no. 62.)

60. Grants, etc., from the Crown during the reign of Edward V and two speeches for opening parliament, by John Russell, bishop of Lincoln, Lord Chancellor. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 1854.

61. The Camden miscellany, Vol. III: 1. Papers relating to proceedings in co. Kent, 1642–1646. Edited by R. Almack. 2. Ancient biographical poems, on the duke of Norfolk, Viscount Hereford, the earls of Essex, and Queen Elizabeth. Edited by J. P. Collier. 3. A relation of some abuses which are committed against the Commonwealth, 1629. Edited by Sir F. Madden. 4. Inventories of the wardrobes, plate, chapel stuff, etc., of Henry FitzRoy, duke of Richmond, and of Katherine, Princess Dowager. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 1855.

62. A roll of the household expenses of Richard de Swinfield, bishop of Hereford. Vol. II. Edited by the Rev. J. Webb. 1855. (*See* no. 59.)

63. Charles I in 1646: Letters of Charles I to Queen Henrietta Maria. Edited by J. Bruce. 1856.

64. An English chronicle of the reigns of Richard II, Henry IV, Henry V and Henry VI written before 1471. Edited by the Rev. J. S. Davies. 1856.

65. The Knights Hospitallers in England, 1338. Edited by the Rev. L. B. Larking. 1857.

66. Diary of John Rous, incumbent of Santon Downham, Suffolk, from 1625 to 1642. Edited by Mary Anne E. Green. 1856.

67. Trevelyan papers prior to 1558. Part I. Edited by J. P. Collier. 1857. (*See* nos. 84 and 105.)

68. Journal of the Very Rev. Rowland Davies, dean of Ross 1688–1690. Edited by R. Caulfield. 1857.

†69. The Domesday of St. Paul's, 1222; or Registrum de visitatione maneriorum per Robertum decanum, and other original documents relating to the manors and churches belonging to the dean and chapter of St. Paul's London in the 12th and 13th centuries. Edited by W. H. Hale. 1858.

*70. Liber famelicus of James Whitelocke, a judge of the King's Bench in the reigns of James I and Charles I. Edited by J. Bruce. 1858.

†71. Savile correspondence, temp. Charles II and James II. Edited by W. D. Cooper. 1858.

72. The Romance of Blonde of Oxford and Jehan of Dammartin. By Philippe de Reimes, a trouvère of the thirteenth century. Edited by A. J. V. Le Roux de Lincy. 1858.

*73. The Camden miscellany, Vol. IV: 1. A London chronicle during the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII. Edited by C. Hopper. 2. The expenses of the Judges of Assize riding in the western and Oxford circuits, 1596–1601. Edited by W. D. Cooper. 3. The skryvener's play, the incredulity of St. Thomas. Edited by J. P. Collier. 4. The Childe of Bristowe, a poem by John Lydgate. Edited by C. Hopper. 5. Sir Edward Lake's account of his interviews with Charles I on being created a baronet. Edited by T. P. Langmead. 6. The letters of Pope to Atterbury, when in the Tower of London. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 7. Supplementary note to the Jesuits' College at Clerkenwell in March 1627–8. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 1859.

†74. Diary of the marches of the royal army during the great Civil War, kept by Richard Symonds. Edited by C. E. Long. 1859.

†75. Original papers illustrative of the life and writings of John Milton. Edited by W. D. Hamilton. 1859.

*76. Letters of George Lord Carew to Sir Thomas Roe, ambassador to the court of the Great Mogul, 1615–1617. Edited by J. Maclean. 1860.

*77. Narratives of the days of the Reformation chiefly from the MSS. of John Foxe, the martyrologist; with two contemporary biographies of Archbishop Cranmer. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 1859.

†78. Correspondence of James VI of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and others in England, temp. Elizabeth. Edited by J. Bruce. 1861.

79. Letters written by John Chamberlain during the reign of Queen Elizabeth. Edited by Sarah Williams. 1861.

80. Proceedings, principally in co. Kent, in connection with the Parliaments called in 1640. Edited by Rev. L. B. Larking. 1862.

81. Parliamentary debates in 1610. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 1862.

†82. Lists of foreign protestants, and aliens, resident in England—1618–1688. Edited by W. D. Cooper. 1862.

83. Wills from Doctors' Commons. A selection from the wills of eminent persons proved in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury. 1495–1695. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 1863.

*84. Trevelyan papers. Part II. 1446–1643. Edited by J. P. Collier. 1863. (*See* nos. 67 and 105.)

85. The life of Marmaduke Rawdon of York. Edited by R. Davies. 1863.

86. Letters of Queen Margaret of Anjou and Bishop Beckington, and others, temp. Henry V and Henry VI. Edited by C. Munro. 1863.

†87. The Camden miscellany, Vol. V: 1. Five letters of Charles II. Communicated by the marquis of Bristol. 2. Letter of the Council to Sir Thomas Lake, relating to the proceedings of Sir Edward Coke at Oatlands. 3. Documents relating to Sir Walter Raleigh's last voyage. Communicated by S. R. Gardiner. 4. A catalogue of early English miscellanies formerly in the Harleian Library. Edited by W. C. Hazlitt. 5. Letters selected from the collection of autographs in the possession of William Tite, Esq. 6. Sir Francis Drake's memorable service done against the Spaniards in 1587, written by Robert Leng, one of his co-adventurers. Edited by C. Hopper. 7. Inquiry into the genuineness of a letter dated February 3rd, 1613, signed 'Mary Magdaline Davers.' 1864.

*88. Letters from Sir Robert Cecil to Sir George Carew. Edited by J. Maclean. 1864.

†89. Promptorium parvulorum. Vol. III. Edited by A. Way. 1865. (*See* nos. 25 and 54.)

*90. Letters and other documents illustrating the relations between England and Germany at the commencement of the Thirty Years' War. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 1865. (*See* no. 98.)

*91. Registrum sive liber irrotularius et consuetudinarius prioratus Beatae Mariae Wigorniensis. Edited by W. H. Hale. 1865.

92. Pope Alexander VII and the college of Cardinals. By John Bargrave, canon of Canterbury [1662–1680] with a catalogue of Dr. Bargrave's Museum. Edited by J. C. Robertson. 1867.

†93. Accounts and papers relating to Mary, queen of Scots. Edited by A. J. Crosby and J. Bruce. 1867.

†94. History from marble. Compiled in the reign of Charles II by Thomas Dingley. Printed in photolithography by Vincent Brooks. Vol. I. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 1867. (*See* no. 97.)

*95. Manipulus vocabulorum. A dictionary of English and Latin words by Peter Levins, 1570. First printed 1570. Re-edited by H. B. Wheatley. 1867.

96. Journal of a voyage into the Mediterranean, by Sir Kenelm Digby, 1628. Edited by J. Bruce. 1868.

†97. History from marble. Vol. II. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 1868. (*See* no. 94.)

†98. Letters and other documents illustrating the relations between England and Germany at the commencement of the Thirty Years' War, from the election of the Emperor Ferdinand II to the close of the conferences of Mühlhausen. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 1868. (*See* no. 90.)

†99. Diary of John Manningham, of the Middle Temple and of Bradbourne, Kent, barrister-at-law, 1602–3. Edited by W. Tite. 1868.

†100. Notes of the treaty carried on at Ripon between Charles I and the Covenanters of Scotland, 1640, taken by Sir John Borough, Garter King of Arms. Edited by J. Bruce. 1869.

101. El hecho de los tratados del matrimonio pretendido por el Principe de Gales con la serenissima Infante de España Maria, tomado desde sus principios para major demostracion de la verdad, y ajustado con los papeles originales desde consta. Por el maestro F. Francisco de Jesus. Narrative of the Spanish marriage treaty. Edited and translated by S. R. Gardiner. 1869.

*102. Churchwardens' accounts of the town of Ludlow, in Shropshire from 1540 to the end of the reign of Queen Elizabeth. Edited by T. Wright. 1869.

†103. Notes of the debates in the House of Lords, officially taken by Henry Elsing, Clerk of the Parliaments, 1621. Edited by S. R. Gardiner.

†104. The Camden miscellany, Vol. VI: 1. Life of William Whittingham, dean of Durham, with an appendix of original documents from the Record Office. Edited by Mary Anne E. Greene. 2. The Earl of Bristol's defence of his negotiations in Spain. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. Journal of Sir Francis Walsingham, December 1570 to April 1583. Edited by C. T. Martin. 1870.

†105. Trevelyan papers. Part III, 1446–1643. Edited by Sir Walter and Sir Charles Trevelyan. 1872. (*See* nos. 67 and 84.)

NEW SERIES

Vol. 56 onwards were issued after the amalgamation of the two Societies.

1. The Fortescue papers; chiefly consisting of letters relating to state affairs, collected by John Packer, secretary to George Villiers, duke of Buckingham. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 1871.

†2. Letters and papers of John Shillingford, mayor of Exeter, 1447–50. Edited by Stuart A. Moore. 1871.

†3. The old cheque book of the Chapel Royal from 1561 to 1744. Edited by E. F. Rimbault. 1872.

*4. A true relation of the life and death of the Right Rev. William Bedell, lord bishop of Kilmore in Ireland. Edited by T. W. Jones. 1872.

†5. The maire of bristowe is kalendar, by Robert Ricart, town clerk of Bristol, 18 Edward IV. Edited by Lucy Toulmin Smith. 1872.

6. Debates in the House of Commons in 1625. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 1873.

†7. Military memoir of Colonel Birch, governor of Hereford during the Civil War; written by Roe, his secretary. Edited by the Rev. John Webb and the Rev. T. W. Webb. 1873.

8 and 9. Letters addressed from London to Sir Joseph Williamson while plenipotentiary at the congress of Cologne in the years 1673 and 1674. Edited by W. D. Christie. 1874. Two vols.

10. Account of the executors of Richard, bishop of London, 1303, and of the executors of Thomas, bishop of Exeter, 1310. Edited by the Venerable W. H. Hale, and the Rev. H. T. Ellacombe. 1874.

11. A chronicle of England during the reigns of the Tudors, from 1485 to 1559, by Charles Wriothesley, Windsor Herald. Edited by W. D. Hamilton, Vol. I. 1875. (*See* no. 20.)

12. The quarrel between the earl of Manchester and Oliver Cromwell; An episode of the English Civil War. Historical preface by J. Bruce. Annotated and completed by D. Masson. 1875.

†13. Autobiography of Anne, Lady Halket. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 1875.

†14. The Camden miscellany, Vol. VII: 1. Two sermons preached by the Boy-Bishop, one at St. Paul's, temp. Henry VIII, the other at Gloucester, temp. Mary. Edited by J. G. Nichols. 2. Speech of Sir Robert Heath, Attorney-General, in the case of Alexander Leighton in the Star Chamber, 4 June 1630. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 3. Notes of Sir G. Croke's judgment in the case of Ship Money. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 4. Letters relating to the mission of Sir Thomas Roe to Gustavus Adolphus, 1629–1630. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 5. Receipts and expenses in building Bodmin church, 1469–1472. Edited by the Rev. J. J. Wilkinson. 1875.

15. Letters of Humphrey Prideaux, dean of Norwich, to John Ellis, Under Secretary of State 1674–1722. Edited by E. Maunde Thompson. 1875.

†16. A common place book of John Milton, and a Latin essay and Latin verse. presumed to be by Milton. Edited by A. J. Horwood. 1876.

†17. Historical collections of a London citizen in the fifteenth century, containing (i) John Page's poem on the siege of Rouen, (ii) Lydgate's verses on the king of England, (iii) William Gregory's chronicle of London. Edited by James Gairdner. 1876.

18. Documents relating to the proceedings against William Prynne. Biographical preface by J. Bruce. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 1877.

19. Christ Church letters relating to the priory of Christ Church, Canterbury. Edited by J. B. Sheppard. 1877.

†20. Wriothesley's chronicle. Vol. II. Edited by W. D. Hamilton. 1878. (*See* no. 11.)

21. A treatise of the pretended divorce between Henry VIII and Catherine of Aragon, by Nicholas Harpsfield, archdeacon of Canterbury. Edited by N. Pocock. 1878.

22. Correspondence of the family of Hatton, 1601–1704. Vol. I. Edited by E. Maunde Thompson. 1878. (*See* no. 23.)

23. Correspondence of the family of Hatton, 1601–1704. Vol. II. Edited by E. Maunde Thompson. 1878. (*See* no. 22.)

24. Notes of the debates in the House of Lords officially taken by Henry Elsing, Clerk of the Parliaments, 1624 and 1626. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 1879. (*See* Third series, no. 42.)

25. The Œconomy of the Fleete: or an apologeticall answeare of Alexander Harris (late warden) unto XIX articles sett forth against him by the prisoners. Edited by the Rev. Augustus Jessopp. 1879.

26. Documents relating to St. Paul's Cathedral. Edited by the Rev. W. Sparrow Simpson. 1880.

27. The Hamilton papers; selections from original letters in the possession of the duke of Hamilton and Brandon, 1638–1648. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 1880.

†28. Three fifteenth-century chronicles, with historical memoranda and contemporary notes of occurrences by John Stowe. Edited by James Gairdner. 1880.

29. The registers of the visitors of the university of Oxford, 1647 to 1658. Edited by Montagu Burrows. 1881.

*30. Catholicon anglicum, an English-Latin wordbook, dated 1483. Edited by Sidney J. H. Herrtage. 1882.

†31. The Camden miscellany, Vol. VIII: 1. Four letters of Lord Wentworth, ear of Strafford, with a poem on his illness. Edited by S. R. Gardiner 2. Memoire by Madame de Motteville on the life of Henrietta Maria Edited by G. Hanotaux. 3. Papers relating to the delinquency of Lord Saville, 1642–1646. Edited by J. J. Cartwright. 4. A secret negotiation with Charles I, 1643–1644. Edited by Bertha M. Gardiner. 5. A letter from the earl of Manchester to the House of Lords, giving an opinion on the conduct of Oliver Cromwell. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 6. Letters addressed to the earl of Lauderdale. Edited by O. Airy. 7. Original letters of the duke of Monmouth, in the Bodleian Library. Edited by Sir George Duckett, Bart. 8. Correspondence of the family of Haddock, 1657–1719. Edited by E. Maunde Thompson. 9. Letters of Richard Thompson to Henry Thompson of Escrick, co. York. Edited by J. J. Cartwright. 1883.

32. The voyage to Cadiz in 1625, being a journal written by John Glanville, secretary to the Lord Admiral of the fleet. Edited by the Rev. A. B. Grosart. 1883.

†33. Letter book of Gabriel Harvey, 1573–1580. Edited by Edward J. L. Scott. 1884.

34. The Lauderdale papers, temp. Car. II. Vol. I. 1639–1667. Edited by O. Airy. 1884. (*See* nos. 36 and 38.)

†35. Political memoranda of Francis, fifth duke of Leeds. Edited by Oscar Browning. 1884.

36. The Lauderdale papers. Vol. II. 1667–73. Edited by O. Airy. 1885. (*See* nos. 34 and 38.)

*37. Troubles connected with the Prayer Book of 1540. Edited by N. Pocock. 1884.

*38. The Lauderdale papers. Vol. III. 1673–79. Edited by O. Airy. 1885. (*See* nos. 34 and 36.)

†39. Reports of cases in the courts of Star Chamber and High Commission. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 1886.

†40. The Nicholas papers: Correspondence of Sir Edward Nicholas, Secretary of State. Vol. I. 1641–1652. Edited by G. F. Warner, 1886. (*See* nos. 50, 57, and Third series, No. 31.)

†41. Custumals of Battle Abbey, 1283–1312. Edited by S. R. Scargill Bird. 1887.

†42. The travels through England of Dr. Richard Pococke, successively Bishop of Meath and Ossory during 1750, 1751 and later years. Edited by J. J. Cartwright. Vol. I. 1888. (*See* no. 44.)

†43. Visitations of the diocese of Norwich, 1492–1532. Edited by the Rev. Augustus Jessopp. 1888.

†44. The travels through England of Bishop Pococke. Vol. II. Edited by J. J. Cartwright. 1889. (*See* no. 42.)

†45. Documents relating to the impeachment of the duke of Buckingham in 1626. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 1889.

†46. Memoirs relating to Lord Torrington. Edited by J. K. Laughton. 1889.

†47. Essex Papers. Vol. I. Edited by O. Airy. 1890. (*See* Third series, no. 24.)

†48. Visitations and memorials of Southwell Minster. Edited by A. F. Leach. 1891.

†49. The Clarke papers. Selections from the papers of William Clarke, 1647–1660. Vol. I. Edited by C. H. Firth. 1891. (*See* nos. 54, 61 and 62.)

†50. The Nicholas papers. Vol. II. Jan. 1653–June 1655. Edited by G. F. Warner. 1892. (*See* nos. 40, 57, and Third series, no. 31.)

†51. Accounts of the obedientiars of Abingdon Abbey. Edited by R. E. G. Kirk. 1892.

†52. Expeditions to Prussia and the Holy Land made by Henry, earl of Derby (afterwards Henry IV): Accounts kept by his treasurer during the years 1390–1 and 1392–3. Edited by Lucy Toulmin Smith. 1894.

53. The Camden miscellany, Vol. IX: 1. Visitations of churches belonging to St. Paul's Cathedral,1249–1252. Edited by the Rev. W. Sparrow Simpson. 2. 'The Spousells' of the Princess Mary, daughter of Henry VII, to Charles, prince of Castile, in 1508. Edited by J. Gairdner. 3. Original letters from the bishops to the Privy Council in 1564. Edited by Mary Bateson. 4. Papers relating to Thomas Wentworth, first earl of Strafford. Edited by C. H. Firth. 5. Hamilton papers, Addenda. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 6. Memoirs of Nathaniel, Lord Crewe. Edited by the Rev. Andrew Clark. 7. The journal of Major Richard Ferrier, M.P., during a tour in France in 1687. Edited by R. F. E. and J. A. H. Ferrier. 1895.

†54. The Clarke Papers. Vol. II. Edited by C. H. Firth. 1894. (*See* nos. 49, 61 and 62.)

55. Visitations of churches belonging to St. Paul's Cathedral in 1297 and in 1485. Edited by W. Sparrow Simpson. 1895.

56. The Archpriest controversy. Documents relating to the dissensions of the Roman Catholic clergy, 1597–1602. Vol. I. Edited by T. G. Law. 1896. (*See* no. 58.)

57. The Nicholas papers. Vol. III. July 1655–Dec. 1656. Edited by G. F. Warner. 1897. (*See* nos. 40 and 50, and Third series, no. 31.)

58. The Archpriest controversy. Vol. II. Edited by T. G. Law. 1898. (*See* no. 56.)

59. A narrative of the changes in the ministry told by the duke of Newcastle in a series of letters to John White, M.P. 1765–1767. Edited by Mary Bateson. 1898.

60. The narrative of General Venables, with an appendix of papers relating to the Jamaica expedition, 1655. Edited by C. H. Firth. 1900.

61. The Clarke Papers. Vol. III. Edited by C. H. Firth. 1899. (*See* nos. 49, 54 and 62.)

62. The Clarke Papers. Vol. IV. Edited by C. H. Firth. 1901. (*See* nos. 49, 54 and 61.)

THIRD SERIES

1. The Cely papers: Correspondence and memoranda of the Cely family merchants of the Staple in London and Calais, 1477–1488. Edited by H. E. Malden. 1900.

2. The despatches and correspondence of John, earl of Buckinghamshire, Ambassador to the court of Catherine II of Russia, 1762–1765. Edited by Adelaide d'Arcy Collyer. Vol. I. 1900. (*See* no. 3.)

3. The earl of Buckinghamshire's correspondence. Vol. II. Edited by Adelaide d'Arcy Collyer. 1902. (*See* no. 2.)

4. The Camden miscellany, Vol. X: 1. The journal of Sir Roger Wilbraham, Solicitor-General in Ireland and Master of Requests, 1593–1616, together with notes in another hand, 1642–1644. Edited by H. Spencer Scott. 2. The travels and life of Sir Philip Hoby, of Bisham Abbey, written by himself, 1547–1564. Edited by Edgar Powell. 3. Prince Rupert at Lisbon. Edited by S. R. Gardiner. 1902.

5. The despatches of William Perwich, English agent in Paris, 1669–1677. Edited by M. Beryl Curran. 1903.

6. Collectanea Anglo-Premonstratensia. Vol. I. Edited by the Right Rev. F. A. Gasquet. 1904. (*See* nos. 10 and 12.)

7. Select despatches relating to the formation of the Third Coalition against France, 1804–1805. Edited by J. H. Rose. 1904.

8. The Presbyterian movement in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, as illustrated by the minute book of the Dedham classis, 1582–1589. Edited by R. G. Usher. 1905.

9. State trials of 1289–1290. Edited by T. F. Tout and Hilda Johnstone. 1906.

10. Collectanea Anglo-Premonstratensia. Vol. II. Edited by the Right Rev. F. A. Gasquet. 1906. (*See* nos. 6 and 12.)

11. The acts & ordinances of the Eastland Company preserved at York. Edited by Maud Sellers. 1906.

12. Collectanea Anglo-Premonstratensia. Vol. III. Edited by the Right Rev. F. A. Gasquet. 1906. (*See* nos. 6 and 10.)

13. The Camden miscellany, Vol. XI: 1. Some unpublished letters of Gilbert Burnet, the historian. Edited by Miss Helen C. Foxcroft. 2. Extracts from the papers of Thomas Woodcock, ob. 1695. Edited by G. C. Moore Smith. 3. The memoirs of Sir George Courthop, 1616–1685. Edited by Sophie C. Lomas. 4. The commonwealth charter of the city of Salisbury, [12] September, 1656. Edited by Hubert Hall, 1907.

14. The relation of Sydnam Poyntz, 1624–1636. Edited by the Rev. A. T. S. Goodrick. 1908.

†15. The diary of the Rev. Ralph Josselin, 1616–1683. Edited by E. Hockliffe. 1908.

16. Despatches from Paris, 1784–1789. Vol. I, 1784–1787. Edited by Oscar Browning. 1909. (*See* no. 19.)

17. The Bardon Papers: Documents relating to the imprisonment and trial of Mary, Queen of Scots. Edited by Conyers Read. 1909.

18. The Camden miscellany, Vol. XII: 1. Two London chronicles from the collection of John Stow. Edited by C. L. Kingsford. 2. Life of Sir John Digby, 1605–1645. Edited by Georges Bernard. 3. Iter bellicosum: Adam Wheeler, his account of 1685. Edited by H. E. Malden. 4. Common rights at Cottenham and Stretham in Cambridgeshire. Edited by W. Cunningham. 1910.

19. Despatches from Paris, 1784–1789. Vol. II, 1787–1789. Edited by Oscar Browning. 1910. (*See* no. 16.)

20. John of Gaunt's register, 1372–1376. Vol. I. Edited by S. Armitage-Smith. 1911. (*See* nos. 21, 56 and 57.)

21. John of Gaunt's register, 1372–1376. Vol. II. Edited by S. Armitage-Smith. 1911. (*See* nos. 20, 56 and 57.)

22. The official diary of Lieutenant-General Adam Williamson, Deputy-Lieutenant of the Tower of London, 1722–1747. Edited by J. C. Fox. 1912.

23. English merchants and the Spanish Inquisition in the Canaries. Edited by Leonora de Alberti and Annie B. Wallis Chapman. 1912.

24. The Essex papers, 1675–1677. Vol. II. Edited by the Rev. Clement E. Pike. 1913. (*See* New series, no. 47.)

25. The chronicle of Novgorod, 1016–1471. Translated and edited by R. Mitchell, N. Forbes and C. R. Beazley. 1914.

26. The official papers of Sir Nathaniel Bacon of Stiffkey, Norfolk, as Justice of the Peace, 1580–1620. Edited by W. H. Saunders. 1915. (*See* no. 52.)

27. Estate book of Henry de Bray of Harleston, Northants., *c.* 1289–1340. Edited by Dorothy Willis. 1916.

28. Autobiography of Thomas Raymond and memoirs of the family of Guise of Elmore, Glos. Edited by G. Davies. 1917.

*29. The Stonor letters and papers, 1290–1483. Vol. I. Edited by C. L. Kingsford. 1919. (*See* nos. 30 and 34.)

†30. The Stonor letters and papers, 1290–1483. Vol. II. Edited by C. L. Kingsford. 1919. (*See* nos. 29 and 34.)

31. The Nicholas papers. Vol. IV. 1657–1660. Edited by Sir G. F. Warner. 1920. (*See* New series, nos. 40, 50, 57.)
32. British diplomatic instructions, 1689–1789. Vol. I. Sweden, Part i, 1689–1727. Edited by J. F. Chance. 1922.
33. Parliamentary papers of John Robinson, 1774–1784. Edited by W. T. Laprade. 1922.
34. The Camden miscellany, Vol. XIII: 1. Gesta Dunelmensia, A.D. MºCCCº. Edited by R. K. Richardson. 2. Supplementary Stonor letters and papers, 1314–1482. Edited by C. L. Kingsford. 3. Devereux papers with Richard Broughton's memoranda (1575–1601). Edited by H. E. Malden. 4. The voyages of Captain William Jackson, 1642–1645. Edited by V. T. Harlow. 5. The English conquest of Jamaica, 1655–1656. Edited by Irene A. Wright. 1924.
35. British diplomatic instructions, 1689–1789. Vol. II. France, Part i, 1689–1721. Edited by L. G. Wickham Legg. 1925.
36. British diplomatic instructions, 1689–1789. Vol. III. Denmark. Edited by J. F. Chance. 1926.
37. The Camden miscellany, Vol. XIV: 1. Plan of St. Domingo. Spanish narrative of Santo Domingo. Translated and edited by Irene A. Wright. 2. Embajada Española; An anonymous contemporary Spanish guide to diplomatic procedure in the last quarter of the 17th c. Translated and edited by the Rev. H. J. Chaytor. 3. The will of Peter de Aqua Blanca, Bishop of Hereford, 1268. Edited by the Rev. Canon C. Eveleigh Woodruff. 4. The ransom of John II, king of France, 1360–1370. Edited by Dorothy M. Broome. 5. Historia mirabilis parliamenti, 1386. Edited by May McKisack. 1926.
38. British diplomatic instructions, 1689–1789. Vol. IV. France, Part ii, 1721–1727. Edited by L. G. Wickham Legg. 1927. (*See* nos. 35, 43 and 49.)
39. British diplomatic instructions, 1689–1789. Vol. V. Sweden, Part ii, 1727–1789. Edited by J. F. Chance. 1928. (*See* no. 32.)
40. The *Vita Wulfstani* of William of Malmesbury. Edited by R. R. Darlington. 1928.
41. The Camden miscellany, Vol. XV: 1. A transcript of 'The Red Book' of the bishopric of Hereford, *c.* 1290. Edited by the Rev. Canon A. T. Bannister. 2. Edward II, the Lords Ordainers, and Piers Gaveston's jewels and horses, 1312–1313. Edited by R. A. Roberts. 3. Table of Canterbury archbishopric charters. Edited by Irene J. Churchill. 4. An early admiralty case, A.D. 1361. Edited by Charles Johnson. 5. Select tracts and table books relating to English weights and measures, 1100–1742. Edited by Hubert Hall and Frieda J. Nicholas. 6. An English prisoner in Paris during the Terror, 1793–1794. Edited by V. T. Harlow. 1929.
42. Notes of the debates in the House of Lords, officially taken by Robert Bowyer and Henry Elsing, Clerks of the Parliaments, 1621, 1625, 1628. Edited by Frances H. Relf. 1929. (*See* New series, no. 24.)
43. British diplomatic instructions, 1689–1789. Vol. VI. France, Part iii, 1727–1744. Edited by L. G. Wickham Legg. 1930. (*See* nos. 35, 38 and 49.)
44. Private correspondence of Chesterfield and Newcastle, 1744–1746. Edited by Sir Richard Lodge. 1930.
45. Documents illustrating the activities of the general and provincial chapters of the English Black Monks, 1215–1540. Vol. I. Edited by W. A. Pantin. 1931. (*See* nos. 47 and 54.)

46. British diplomatic representatives, 1689–1789. Edited by D. B. Horn. 1932. (*See* no. 50.)
47. Documents illustrating the activities of the general and provincial chapters of the English Black Monks, 1215–1540. Vol. II. Edited by W. A. Pantin. 1933. (*See* nos. 45 and 54.)
48. Diplomatic correspondence of Richard II. Edited by Edouard Perroy. 1933.
49. British diplomatic instructions, 1689–1789. Vol. VII. France, Part iv, 1745–1789. Edited by L. G. Wickham Legg. 1934. (*See* nos. 35, 38 and 43.)
50. British diplomatic representatives, 1789–1852. Edited by S. T. Bindoff, Elizabeth F. Malcolm Smith and C. K. Webster. 1934. (*See* no. 46.)
51. Rotuli parliamentorum Anglie hactenus inediti, 1279–1373. Edited by H. G. Richardson and G. O. Sayles. 1935.
52. Camden miscellany, Vol. XVI: 1. The state of England (1600). By Sir Thomas Wilson. Edited by F. J. Fisher. 2. Discours of the Turkes. By Sir Thomas Sherley (1606–1607). Edited by Sir E. Denison Ross. 3. Relation of a short survey of the western counties of England, 1635. Edited by L. G. Wickham Legg. 4. Supplementary Stiffkey papers, 1578–1620. Edited by F. W. Brooks. 5. Probate inventory of Sir John Eliot, late prisoner in the Tower, 1633. Edited by H. Hulme. 1936. (*See* no. 26.)
53. Robert Loder's farm accounts, 1610–1620. Edited by G. E. Fussell. 1936.
54. Documents illustrating the activities of the general and provincial chapters of the English Black Monks, 1215–1540. Vol. III. Edited by W. A. Pantin. 1937. (*See* nos. 45 and 47.)
55. Memorials of the Holles family, 1493–1650. By Gervase Holles. Edited by A. C. Wood. 1937.
56. John of Gaunt's register, 1379–1383. Vol. I. Edited by Eleanor Lodge and R. Somerville. 1937. (*See* nos. 20, 21 and 57.)
57. John of Gaunt's register, 1379–1383. Vol. II. Edited by Eleanor Lodge and R. Somerville. 1937. (*See* nos. 20, 21 and 56.)
58. Early charters of the cathedral church of St. Paul, London. Edited by Marion Gibbs. 1939.
59. The formation of Canning's ministry, February to August 1827. Edited by A. Aspinall. 1938.
60. The correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and Princess Lieven, 1832–1854. Vol. I, 1832–1848. Edited by E. Jones Parry. 1938. (*See* no. 62.)
61. The letters of Arnulf of Lisieux. Edited by F. Barlow. 1939.
62. The correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and Princess Lieven, 1832–1854. Vol. II, 1848–1854. Edited by E. Jones Parry. 1939. (*See* no. 60.)
63. British Consular reports on the trade and politics of Latin America, 1824–1826. Edited by R. A. Humphreys. 1940.
64. Camden miscellany, Vol. XVII: 1. Ely chapter ordinances and visitation records, 1241–1515. Edited by Seiriol A. J. Evans. 2. Mr. Harrie Cavendish, his journey to and from Constantinople, 1589. By Fox, his servant. Edited by A. C. Wood. 3. Sir John Eliot and the vice-admiralty of Devon. Edited by Harold Hulme. 1940.
65. Correspondence of Charles Arbuthnot. Edited by A. Aspinall. 1941.
66. Ministers' accounts of the earldom of Cornwall, 1296–1297. Vol. I. Edited by L. Margaret Midgley, 1942.

67. The notebook of John Penry, 1593. Edited by Albert Peel, 1944.
68. Ministers' accounts of the earldom of Cornwall, 1296–1297. Vol. II. Edited by L. Margaret Midgley, 1945. (*See* no. 66.)
69. The letter-book of John Viscount Mordaunt, 1658–1660. Edited by Mary Coate, 1945.
70. The Gascon Calendar of 1322. Edited by G. P. Cuttino. 1949.
71. Cartulary of St. Mary Clerkenwell. Edited by W. O. Hassall. 1949.
72. Encomium Emmae Reginae. Edited by Alistair Campbell. 1949.
73. Select documents of the English lands of the abbey of Bec. Edited by Marjorie Chibnall. 1951.
74. The Anglica Historia of Polydore Vergil, A.D. 1485–1537. Edited by Denys Hay. 1950. (*See* Old Series, nos. 29 and 36).
75. The correspondence of David Scott, Director and Chairman of the East India Company, relating to Indian affairs (1787–1805). Vol. I. Edited by C. H. Philips. 1951.
76. The correspondence of David Scott, Director and Chairman of the East India Company, relating to Indian affairs (1787–1805). Vol. II. Edited by C. H. Philips. 1951.
77. The correspondence of Lord Macartney, Governor of Madras (1781–85). Edited by C. Collin Davies. 1950.
78. The despatches of Sir Robert Sutton, Ambassador in Constantinople (1710–1714). Edited by Akdes Nimet Kurat. 1953.
79. Camden miscellany, Vol. XVIII: 1. The Benares diary of Warren Hastings. Edited by C. C. Davies. 2. Some letters of the Duke of Wellington to his brother William Wellesley-Pole. Edited by Sir Charles K. Webster. 3. The Restoration visitation of the University of Oxford and its colleges. Edited by F. J. Varley. 1948.
80. Camden miscellany, Vol. XIX: 1. Some documents relating to the fulfilment and interpretation of the Treaty of Bretigny (1361–1369). Edited by P. Chaplais. 2. The Anglo-French negotiations at Bruges, 1374–1377. Edited by E. M. J. Perroy. 1952.
81. The political correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1868–1876. Vol. 1, 1868–71. Edited by Agatha Ramm. 1952.
82. The political correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1868–1876. Vol. 2, 1871–76. Edited by Agatha Ramm. 1952.
83. Camden miscellany, Vol. XX: 1. A briefe collection of the Queenes Majesties most high and most honourable Courtes of Recordes. By R. Robinson. Edited by R. L. Rickard. 2. The Hastings journal of the parliament of 1621. Edited by Lady de Villiers. 3. The minute book of James Courthope. Edited by Orlo Cyprian Williams. 1953.
84. The kalendar of Abbot Samson of Bury St. Edmunds and related documents. Edited by R. H. C. Davis. 1954.

Provisionally accepted for future publication:

British diplomatic representatives, 1509–1688. (*See* nos. 46 and 50.)

The chronicle of Walter of Hemingburgh. Edited by H. Rothwell.

Proceedings under the *Dictum de Kenilworth*. Edited by R. F. Treharne.

Historia Roffensis, 1315–1350. Edited by H. G. Richardson.

Liber Eliensis, books I, II and III. Edited by E. O. Blake.

Commercial correspondence of Lionel Cranfield. Edited by F. J. Fisher.

Correspondence of Austin Henry Layard, 1877–1878. Edited by W. N. Medlicott.

Household ordinances of the Fifteenth Century. Edited by A. R. Myers.

The political correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1877–1885. Edited by Agatha Ramm.

Canterbury professions and related documents. Edited by J. Conway Davies.

The sermons of Thomas Brinton, Bishop of Rochester 1373–89. Edited by Sister Mary Aquinas Devlin. (*In the press.*)

Journal of events during the Gladstone ministry (1868–74), by the Earl of Kimberley. Edited by Ethel Drus.

Collected correspondence of G. R. Weckherlin. Edited by Professor L. W. Forster.

The cartulary of St. Gregory's Priory, Canterbury. Edited by Audrey M. Woodcock.

The War of Saint-Sardos : Gascon correspondence and diplomatic documents (1323–25). Edited by P. Chaplais. (*In the press.*)

The Chronicle attributed to John of Wallingford. Edited by R. Vaughan.

BIBL. LONDIN UNIV.

SHL
WITHDRAWN

1976 1
1978 1